BERGS ON 


AND   THE 


DDERN    SPIRIT 


ORGE  llOWMJ)  DODSON,  PH.D, 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


CMF T  OF 

MRS.MATTIi,   H.Mi!.RRILL 


prr 


BERGSON 

AND  THE 

MODERN  SPIRIT 

AN  ESSAY 
IN  CONSTRUCTIVE  THOUGHT 


BY 


GEORGE  ROWLAND  DODSON,  Ph.D. 


BOSTON 

AMERICAN  UNITARIAN  ASSOCIATION 

1913 


CoPTRianT,  1913 
AMERICAN  UNITARIAN  ASSOCIATION 


>: 


J 


3 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

Philosophy  and  the  Average  Thoughtful  Man  .  1 
The  experiment  of  living  without  philosophy. 
The  sporting  theory  of  philosophy.  Popular  im- 
pressions of  the  history  of  thought.  The  lay- 
man's interest  in  great  questions.  Philosophy 
inevitable  when  life  reaches  the  reflective  stage 
of  development.  Looking  down  the  long  vistas 
of  evolution.  Why  religion  cannot  dispense 
with  the  service  of  the  intellect.  Great  thought 
and  noble  feeling  go  together.  Apropos  of 
Bergson.  His  reserve.  Philosophizing  in  Berg- 
sonian   fashion. 

CHAPTER  II 

Creative   Evolution   in   Real  Tibie 19 

The  nature  of  human  progress.  Its  locus  the 
spiritual  traditions  of  the  race.  How  thought 
climbs  through  the  ages.  Bergson  a  new  star  in 
the  intellectual  firmament.  The  present  thought 
situation.  Materialism  and  idealism  have  led  us 
into  an  impasse.  Our  hope  of  an  adequate  phi- 
losophy lies  in  a  thorough-going  evolutionism. 
Around  Kant  to  the  great  highway  of  human 
thought. 

CHAPTER  III 

The  Conception  of  the  Life  Force 35 

Our  inheritance  from  two  diflferent  civiliza- 
tions. Hebraic  ideas.  The  Greek  conception  of 
creation  as  the  introduction  of  order  into  chaos. 
The  Spencerian  agnosticism.  Kant's  position. 
Schopenhauer   and   the   World   Will.     Effect   of 


/^O^W  c. ' 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

his  mixed  temperament  on  his  philosophy.  He 
just  misses  the  highest  conception.  The  phi- 
losophy of  Buddhism,  of  Christianity.  Brown- 
ing's theme.  Bergson's  conception  of  the  Life 
Force. 

CHAPTER  IV 

OUTLIXE    OF    THE     BeRGSONIAX    WoRLD-ViEW        ...       50 

Why  philosophy  begins  with,  or  at  least  in- 
cludes, a  theory  of  knowledge.  Bergson's 
theory  of  the  intellect  as  an  instrument  evolved 
for  practical  but  not  for  speculative  purposes. 
It  can  know  the  very  truth  of  matter,  but  not  of 
life.  The  nature  of  conceptual  thought.  The 
thought-frames  molded  on  the  material  world 
do  not  fit  the  processes  of  life.  The  universe 
not  a  mechanism,  but  a  life  tliat  endures  through 
real  time.  In  the  beginning  was  life.  Man  the 
great  success  in  life's  adventure. 

CHAPTER  V 

Ikstinct,    Ixteli-ect    and    the    Ideally    Compixte 
Mind 64 

Instinct  and  intellect  complementary,  not  dif- 
ferent degrees  of  the  same  power.  Instinct 
may  be  developed  into  intuition.  Through  it 
alone  we  may  attain  to  insiglit  into  life.  Phi- 
losopliy  heljis  us  to  live  liy  combining  into  one 
world-view  the  scientific  knowledge  wliich  the  in- 
tellect gives  with  the  truth  concerning  life  which 
comes  through  intuition.  Bergson's  unique 
theory  of  perception.  He  is  no  relativist,  ideal- 
ist or  pragmatist.  Pragmatism  no  solution  of 
the  great  problems:  it  is  rather  the  pragnjatic 
habit   of   mind   that   has   created   them. 

CHAPTER  VI 

Beroson  and  Physical  Science 77 

Why  a  new  era  in  philosopliy  may  dale  from 
Bcrgson.  Descartes  aiul  Kant  cherish  the 
matlicinntical  ideal  of  knowledge.  Bergson  the 
first     thinker     of    his     class     to    take    into    ac- 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

count  the  data  of  biology.  Our  native  tend- 
ency to  Platonism.  Thinking  as  classifying. 
What  happens  when  we  have  an  insufficient 
number  of  classes.  Nature  of  mathematical 
knowledge.  It  is  not  knowledge  of  nature, 
but  deals  with  pure  ideals.  It  is  a  set  of  con- 
sistencies with  a  certain  applicability  in  the 
concrete  world.  Physical  science  deals  with 
artificially  isolated  systems  in  a  concrete  whole 
which  is  not  a  system,  a  mechanism,  but  a  life. 
Why  metaphysics  must  be  empirical. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The    Answer    of    the    Mechanists 89 

Sir  Ray  Lancaster  speaks  for  the  materialists 
in  science.  His  attitude  to  philosophy  and  his 
criticism  of  Bergson.  The  eye  of  the  Pecten. 
Huxley's  theory  that  we  are  conscious  auto- 
mata. The  average  man's  interest  in  the  is- 
sues involved.  Evils  of  unconscious  meta- 
physics. Logical  outcome  of  the  automaton 
theory.  The  individuality  of  life.  It  does  not 
lit  into  systems.  School  systems.  Injustice  of 
all  classifications  of  living  men.  Tolstoy's  per- 
ception of  this   fact. 

CHAPTER  VIII 
Light     From     Bergson's     Theory    of     Knowledge 

Upon   Biological   Problems 107 

The  puzzles  of  evolution.  Failure  of  attempts 
at  mechanical  explanation.  Darwin's  theory 
of  the  accumulation  of  insensible  variations. 
Insuperable  difficulties.  The  eye  of  the  Pec- 
ten. Heteroblastia.  The  mutation  theory. 
Bergson  points  the  way  to  a  solution.  Our 
baseless  assumption  that  nature  builds  organic 
structures  after  the  manner  of  a  manufac- 
turer. The  difficulty  is  due  to  the  nature  of 
our  minds,  or  rather  to  our  intellectual  bias, 
and  lies  in  our  mistaken  conception  of  what 
constitutes   an  explanation   in  the  problems   of 


CONTENTS 

FAOE 

life.  Why  the  painter  easily  accomplishes  what 
is  impossible  to  the  worker  in  mosaic.  The  life 
impulse.     This  does  not  imply  the  old  vitalism. 

CHAPTER  IX 

Some    Consequences   for   Practical   Life   axd   the 

Philosophy  of   Religiox 123 

The  great  lines  of  evolution.  The  many  inter- 
woven personalities.  Danger  of  automatism. 
T.  Davidson  on  habit.  Constant  perplexity  a 
condition  of  consciousness.  The  intellect  a 
"  trouble  man."  The  vegetative,  instinctive  and 
rational  Ufe  three  divergent  directions  of  an 
activity  that  split  up  as  it  grew.  Consequences 
for  j)edagogy,  for  practical  life,  for  religion. 
Instinct,  developed  into  intuition,  knows  life 
because  it  is  life,  because  instinctive  processes 
are  only  a  prolongation  of  organic  processes. 
This  not  mysticism.  For  Kant  all  intuition  is 
infra-intellectual.  Bergson's  contention  that 
there  is  also  a  supra-intellectual  intuition. 

CHAPTER  X 

The  Pragmatic  View  of  Sciexce  and  Common 
Sense  and  the  Synoptic  View  of  Philosophy  .  139 
The  chief  difficulty  in  understanding  "  Creative 
Evolution  "  is  that  wc  are  too  iiitellcctudl.  How 
our  fixed  hal)its  of  thought  intiTfcrc  even  with 
our  ])erceptions.  The  material  world  for  prac- 
tical purposes  is  a  collection  of  oi)jects;  really 
it  is  a  flux.  Is  matter  disintegrating?  The  phe- 
nomena of  radio-activity.  Futility  of  efforts  to 
think  the  living  in  terms  of  the  lifeless.  Zeno's 
arrow.  Achilles  aiul  the  tortoise.  Natural  in- 
ability of  the  intellect  to  comprehend  life.  This 
not  anti-intellectualism.  The  synoptic  view  of 
philosophy. 

CHAPTER  XI 

Beroson    and   Ethics 161 

]"'J('vation  and  eomjilcteness  of  Creek  ethical 
thought.     Plato's    conception    of    the    good    life. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

For  him  the  moral  problem  was  a  problem  in 
organization.  Urgent  need  to-day  of  a  revised 
conception  of  goodness.  Beauty  and  defects  of 
the  New  Testament  teaching.  The  two  great 
fundamental  ideas  of  organization  and  evolution 
round  out  ethical  philosophy.  Bergsonian  ethics. 
His  ideal  the  freedom,  alertness,  and  adaptability 
which  ever  meets  new  situations  with  appropriate 
adjustments.  Social  function  of  laughter.  No 
finalities.  Keep  life  growing.  Es  lebe  das 
Leben. 

CHAPTER  XII 

Bergsoit  and  Pragmatism 179 

Logical  and  historical  relation  of  Bergson  to 
his  predecessors,  especially  to  Schopenhauer  and 
Schelling.  Popular  interest  in  Idealism  and 
Pragmatism.  The  present  situation  according  to 
Professors  Perry  and  Pratt.  The  original  prag- 
matism of  C.  S.  Peirce  and  its  numerous  trans- 
formations. Pragmatism  as  a  method  of  de- 
termining significant  propositions,  as  a  theory 
of  truth,  a  theory  of  knowledge,  a  theory  of 
reality.  Net  outcome  of  the  controversy.  Berg- 
son no  pragmatist  in  his  theory  of  knowledge. 
For  him  the  intellect  is  an  instrument  for  prac- 
tical purposes,  yet  it  knows  the  truth  of  matter. 
In  another  way,  we  also  know  the  truth  of  life. 
In  what  sense  is  he  an  anti-intellectualist? 

CHAPTER  XIII 

The   Religious  Significance  of  Bergson's  Concep- 
tion OF  Evolution 225 

The  enduring  supremacy  of  the  moral  and 
religious  interests.  Religion  involves  a  teleo- 
logical  conception  of  the  world.  Tolstoy  on  the 
clue  to  history.  Interpreting  the  evolutionary 
process  by  its  outcome.  Bergson  rejects 
teleology,  yet  qualifies  his  view.  Finalistic  con- 
ceptions, like  the  mechanistic,  seem  to  him  too 
rigid  to  fit  the  free,  flowing,  incalculable,  adven- 
turous nature  of  life.     He  finds  a  meaning  in 


CONTENTS 

PAQE 

life.  Can  there  be  meaning  without  purpose? 
Teleology  implied  in  such  terms  as  "Creative 
Evolution,"  meaning,  progress,  eflFort. 

CHAPTER  XIV 
Behgson    and   Religion    {Coniimied) 246 

No  help  in  half-way  modes  of  thought.  Nat- 
uralism consistently  carried  out  is  transfigured 
and  becomes  a  religious  philosophy.  Man  as  the 
outcome  of  evolution.  Views  of  Professor 
Henry  Jones,  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge  and  L.  P. 
Jacks.  The  great  difficulty  in  the  way  of  this 
interpretation.  How  Bergson  meets  it.  Sense 
in  which  he  regards  "  humanity  as  the  ground  of 
evolution."  Development  along  many  lines,  yet 
man  has  kept  "  the  fundamental  direction  of 
life." 

CHAPTER  XV 
Bergson  and  Religion   {Concluded) 269 

Value  of  such  an  interpretation  of  evoluton  for 
religious  thought  and  life.  Bergson's  critics. 
The  question  of  purpose  in  human  life  and  in 
the  cosmical  ^*lan.  Bergson  offers  a  method,  and 
not  the  solution  of  all  the  great  problems.  The 
intuitive  method  in  art  and  philosophy.  Use  of 
it  by  the  great  poets.  Browning  and  Words- 
worth confirm  his  vision,  but  they  see  deeper 
and  go  further.  Poetry  and  philosophy  come 
together  on  the  heights. 


CHAPTER  I 

PHILOSOPHY  AND  THE  AVERAGE 
THOUGHTFUL  MAN 

After  a  long  period  of  neglect  and  even  dis- 
repute, philosophy  is  beginning  to  regain  the  at- 
'tention  of  the  average  man.  It  is  time.  We 
have  unduly  simplified  our  lives,  so  that  they 
tend  to  consist  almost  exclusively  of  business 
and  amusement.  Multitudes  have  been  trying 
the  experiment  of  living  without  science  and  art 
and  philosophy  and  even  religion.  The  experi- 
ment was  bound  to  fail,  for  it  meant  the  pau- 
perization of  life.  When  great  interests  that 
should  form  part  of  the  content  of  life  are  ig- 
nored, the  inevitable  result  is  a  sense  of  dissatis- 
faction, of  futility,  and  doubt  as  to  whether  it 
is  all  worth  while.  Our  greatest  need  is  a  clear 
vision  of  the  only  life  that  can  satisfy,  a  life 
that  is  informed  and  disciplined  by  science  and 
adorned  and  ennobled  by  art,  that  is  widened, 
steadied  and  strengthened  by  philosophy,  and 
that  comes  to  flower  in  the  religious  spirit  of 
faith,  hope,  gladness,  reverence  and  love.  We 
must  realize  that  art  is  not  merely  for  the  ar- 


2  BERGSON  AND  THE 

tist,  that  science  is  not  for  laboratory  investi- 
gators alone,  that  philosophy  is  not  the  exclu- 
sive business  of  professional  scholars,  and  that 
religion  is  not  solely  for  monks  and  nuns,  but 
that  all  of  these  are  for  all  the  people,  and  that 
they  are  indispensable  to  the  average  man. 

According  to  the  seer  of  Concord,  one  of  the 
offices  of  this  age  is  to  annul  the  divorce  between 
the  lovers  of  truth  and  the  lovers  of  goodness. 
Let  us  hope  that  it  will  also  succeed  in  annul- 
ling the  divorce  between  all  the  higher  interests 
of  life,  and  make  us  vividly   realize  that  they 
belong  together ;  that  they  are  at  their  best  only 
when  they  function  together;  and  that  we  can 
neither  do  without  them,  nor  with  any  one  of 
them  alone.     An  art  that  is  only  for  art's  sake 
isolates  itself,  becomes  unintelligible,  fantastic, 
irrelevant  and  repellent.      He  who  is  a  philoso- 
pher and  nothing  else  is  a  mere  technical  quib- 
bler.      The  man  of  science  cannot  afford  to  de- 
nude liimself  of  all  interests  except  those  of  his 
special  investigation,  and   religion   that  is   de- 
tached from  the  life  which  it  ought  to  sanctify 
loses  all  that  could  give  it  worth.     And  he  who 
supposes  that  none  of  these  things  concerns  him 
does  not  know  how  poor  he  is.      He  is  like  a  tree 
most  of  whose  branches  have  withered  away. 

Tlie  need  of  clear,  constructive  thinking  in 
religion,  ethics,  politics  and  social  life  is  be- 
coming urgent.     Yet  an  aversion  to  systematic 


MODERN  SPIRIT  3 

thought  lingers,  and  philosophy,  which  is  essen- 
tially a  struggle  to  rise  above  one-sided  ideas 
and  to  attain  to  juster  and  more  comprehen- 
sive views,  is  still  regarded  with  distrust.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  must  be  admitted  that  this 
situation  is  not  due  to  mere  perversity  on  the 
part  of  the  people.  There  is  some  reason  for 
their  attitude.  They  see  that  what  might  be 
called  the  sporting  theory  of  philosophy  at 
present  prevails.  Philosophy  is  a  game,  car- 
ried on  by  professionals  and  their  pupils.  One 
of  the  leading  professors  of  the  subject  recently 
remarked  that  it  is  their  business  to  teach  those 
who  are  preparing  to  teach  others,  so  that  a 
lay  philosopher  is  a  rarity.  Yet  it  is  the  1^- 
men,  the  men  and  women  who  are  meeting  life's 
problems  and  carrying  on  the  world's  work, 
who  have  most  need  of  philosophy.  They 
should  find  in  noble  views  of  reality  consola- 
tion, strength,  serenity,  and  an  elevated  joy. 
If,  however,  they  look  for  help  to  current  dis- 
cussions, they  find  the  issues  minute  and  subtle 
and  the  language  so  technical  that  they  cannot 
understand  it.  And,  when  they  do  get  some 
glimpse  of  the  nature  of  the  questions  discussed 
by  experts,  they  fail  to  see  the  relation  of  the 
discussions  to  the  great  interests  they  have  at 
heart. 

Now  it  would,  of  course,  be  a  mistake  to  de- 
preciate the  value  of  these  philosophic  subtle- 


4  BERGSON  AND  THE 

ties.  They  have  their  importance,  and  there 
is  great  joy  in  plajnng  the  game.  Moreover, 
the  players  are  for  the  most  part  earnest  and 
sincere.  Still,  the  public  has  not  unnaturally 
got  the  impression  that  the  philosophers  are  a 
set  of  critical  warriors,  who  are  constantly 
fighting  with  one  another,  who  never  construct 
or  achieve  anything,  and  whose  speculations  go 
round  and  round  without  making  any  real  prog- 
ress. The  average  man  who  for  any  reason 
takes  up  a  book  on  philosophy  finds  frequent 
reference  to  other  writers,  among  them  the  very 
greatest,  coupled  with  such  terms  of  criticism 
as  fallacy,  mistake,  confusion,  misunderstand- 
ing, logical  failure,  loose  generalization,  an- 
thropomorphism and  provincialism.  He  has 
heard,  e.  g.,  of  idealism  and,  though  he  does 
not  understand  it,  he  has  supposed  it  to  be 
something  noble  and  exalted,  and  it  is  therefore 
with  some  dismay  that  he  reads  such  a  descrip- 
tion of  it  as  that  of  I\Ir.  Hobhousc :  — "  Indeed, 
it  is  scarcely  too  nmch  to  say  that  the  effect  of 
idealism  on  the  world  has  been  mainly  to  sap  in- 
tellectual and  moral  sincerity,  to  excuse  men  in 
their  consciences  for  professing  beliefs  which  on 
the  meaning  ordinarily  attached  to  them  they 
do  not  hold,  to  soften  the  edges  of  all  hard  con- 
trasts between  riglit  and  wrong,  truth  and  fal- 
sity, to  throw  a  gloss  over  stupidity,  and  preju- 
dice,  and  caste,  and   tradition,   to  weaken   the 


\ 


MODERN  SPIRIT  5 

bases  of  reason,  and  disincline  men  to  the  search- 
ing analysis  of  their  habitual  ways  of  think- 
ing." 

The  recent  controversy  over  pragmatism,  for 
example,  is  confusing  to  the  public.  The  move- 
ment started  with  an  article  by  Mr.  C.  S.  Peirce, 
the  object  of  which  was  to  show  how  to  make 
our  ideas  clear.  The  theory  was  espoused  by 
Prof.  James,  and  by  him  and  others  has  been 
preached  as  a  sort  of  philosophic  gospel  which 
promises  deliverance  from  the  metaphysical 
troubles  which  have  long  afflicted  our  race.  The 
result  is  that  in  some  respects  the  fog  is  greater 
than  it  was  before.  The  new  method  has  not 
enabled  those  who  use  it  to  make  our  ideas  clear 
as  to  the  method  itself,  and  pragmatism  is  a 
term  of  uncertain  meaning.  It  may  signify  a 
theory  of  knowledge,  a  theory  of  truth,  an  em- 
pirical metaphysics,  a  pluralistic  view  of  reality, 
an  emphasis  on  the  biological  method  of  ap- 
proach to  philosophical  problems,  or  a  mere  in- 
surgent spirit. 

The  layman  is,  therefore,  justified  in  feeling 
that  if  the  professionals  cannot  understand  one 
another,  he  can  spend  his  leisure  hours  to  better 
advantage  than  in  seeking  enlightenment  or 
help  in  any  way  from  this  quarrelsome  crew. 
He  may  even  rejoice  in  the  thought  that  they 
escape  much  trouble  who  let  phllosoph}'  alone. 
Nevertheless,  such  a  conclusion,  natural  and  ap- 


6  BERGSON  AND  THE 

parently  justified  thougli  it  be,  is  for  the  lay- 
man himself  most  unfortunate.  For  philosophy 
is  not  a  thing  which  men  can  take  up  or  let 
alone,  as  they  please.  It  lies  along  the  path 
of  development,  and  can  be  escaped  only  by 
those  who  remain  immature.  We  live  at  first 
by  instinct,  by  habit,  by  the  tradition  which  as 
children  we  receive  on  authority.  As  we  ma- 
ture, the  period  of  reflection  inevitably  comes. 
The  faith  by  which  we  live  must  be  examined, 
criticised,  rationalized  and  purified.  We  con- 
tinue to  believe  by  instinct,  perhaps,  but  it  is 
no  less  an  instinct  or  an  imperious  desire  to  un- 
derstand what  we  believe.  "  Experience,"  saj's 
Sir  Henry  Jones,  "  is  a  process  that  changes 
and  grows,  and  at  a  certain  stage  of  the  evo- 
lution of  man's  rational  nature,  reflexion  arises 
inevitabl3\  It  becomes  the  urgent  condition  of 
furtlicr  development.  The  future  can  be  faced 
only  in  the  light  of  the  past  wliich  only  reflex- 
ion recovers ;  and  the  individual  or  a  nation  can  (^ 
achieve  a  new  triunipli  only  if  it  has  learnt  the 
lesson  of  its  own  deeds.  Reflexion  nuist  succeed 
action  and  set  free  its  moaning,  if  better  action 
is  to  follow." 

When  a  man  arrives  at  this  stage,  when  his 
experience  is  becoming  reflective  and  he  feels  the 
need  of  understanding  himself,  it  is  a  great 
misfortune  fov  hini  if  the  unfavorable  impres- 
sion  he  has    formed   of  philf)sophcrs   leads   him 


MODERN  SPIRIT  7 

to  ignore  the  leading  thinkers  and  the  great 
intellectual  constructions  of  history.  It  is  as 
if  one  should  despise  the  achievements  of  medi- 
cal science  and  in  all  emergencies  attempt  to  be 
his  own  physician.  We  do  not  think  highly  of 
the  wisdom  of  those  who  without  study  and  ex- 
perience assume  to  be  physicians,  lawyers,  engi- 
neers and  financiers.  One  of  the  hardest  and 
most  necessary  lessons  we  have  to  learn  is  that 
men  are  highly  specialized  in  their  abilities  and 
capacities,  and  that  the  greatest  of  them  are 
apt  to  be  mere  children  in  the  matters  they  have 
not  specially  studied.  Their  judgments  are  ma- 
ture and  trustworthy  in  regard  to  things  with 
which  their  experience  has  made  them  familiar ; 
but  outside  of  these  limits,  they  have  no  back- 
ground for  their  judgments  and  are  as  help- 
less as  schoolboys.  I  once  met  an  eminent  engi- 
neer, justly  esteemed  in  his  profession  and  with 
solid  achievements  to  his  credit.  By  these  he 
apparently  set  little  store.  His  interest  was  in 
telepathy  and  spiritualism,  upon  which  he 
seemed  to  feel  competent  to  have  an  opinion 
after  reading  a  few  popular  works  on  the  sub- 
ject. 

The  case  is  not  different  with  philosophy. 
The  last  twenty-five  centuries  of  thinking  on 
the  great  problems  of  life  have  not  been  with- 
out result.  And  when  even  a  first  rate  man  of 
science,  such  as  Karl  Pearson,  affects  to  despise 


8  BERGSON  AND  THE 

the  metaphysicians,  and  then  proceeds  to  con- 
struct a  psychology  and  philosophy  of  his  own, 
the  product  is  only  what  might  have  been  ex- 
pected,—  crude  and  superficial.  Haeckel,  like- 
wise, a  mighty  man  in  science,  scorning  the 
achievements  of  the  constructive  thinkers  who 
preceded  him,  succeeds  by  his  own  efforts  in 
reaching  a  philosophy  which  he  preaches  as  a 
gospel,  and  of  which  he  is  very  proud,  but 
which  the  history  of  thought  shows  to  have  been 
attained  more  than  two  thousand  years  ago. 

Assuredly,  we  must  do  our  own  thinking,  but 
not  in  isolation.  Unless  we  are  to  repeat  the 
mistakes  which  were  made  and  corrected  long 
ago,  we  must  think  in  the  light  of  other  men's 
thoughts.  For  the  history  of  philosophy  is  by 
no  means  so  profitless  as  the  average  man  may 
with  some  excuse  suppose.  It  is  the  story  of 
the  long  climb  of  human  tliought  through  the 
ages,  and  those  who  are  to  think  effectively  on 
present  day  problems  must  know  something  of 
its  course  and  the  net  result  of  it  all.  The 
great  systems  of  the  past  arc  not  obsolete. 
They  are  really  different  views  of  our  many- 
sided  world.  Prof.  Falckcnbcrg  states  tin's  truth 
as  follows :  "  The  Greek  view  of  the  world  is 
as  classic  as  the  plastic  art  of  Phidias  and  the 
epic  of  Homer;  the  Christian,  as  eternally  valid 
as  the  architecture  of  the  Middle  Ages;  the 
modern,  as  irrefutable  as  Goethe's  poetry  and 


MODERN  SPIRIT  9 

the  music  of  Beethoven.  The  views  of  the  world 
which  proceed  from  the  spirits  of  different  ages, 
as  products  of  the  general  development  of  cul- 
ture, are  not  so  much  thoughts  as  rhythms  in 
thinking,  not  theories  but  modes  of  intuition 
saturated  with  feelings  of  worth." 

That  is,  to  understand  these  great  interpreta- 
tions is  not  only  to  know  something  about  the 
universe ;  it  is  to  enter  into  the  minds  of  the 
thinkers  who  formulated  them.  It  is  to  know 
the  spirit  of  the  ages  that  produced  them,  the 
character  and  disposition  of  the  Greek,  the  Ger- 
man, the  French,  the  English,  and  other  na- 
tions and  peoples.  Such  studies  influence  for 
good  the  ignorant  and  opinionated  mind,  and 
give  it  a  largeness  and  humanity  that  is  one  of 
the  greatest  goods  of  life. 

An  increasing  number  of  men  and  women  in 
modem  society  are  reaching  this  reflective  period 
and  are  experiencing  what  might  be  called 
the  philosophic  need.  Constant  pre-occupation 
with  detail,  even  when  attended  by  material  suc- 
cess, does  not  satisfy  them ;  so  they  are  reach- 
ing out  for  they  know  not  what.  They  have  a 
vague  sense  that  as  human  beings  it  is  their 
privilege  to  live  in  the  light  of  the  whole.  They 
wish  to  rise  above  the  ordinary  provincialism 
and  to  see  life  more  in  its  tioie  proportions. 
This  they  instinctively  feel  is  necessary  to  sta- 
bility and  poise  of  mind.     To  study  philosophy 


10  BERGSON  AND  THE 

means  to  ascend  to  the  summits  of  thought ;  it 
is  to  look  down  the  long  vistas  of  evolution,  to 
see  the  tendencies  which  have  brought  us  to  the 
present  and  are  bearing  us  on  to  the  future. 
It  is  to  "  be  no  more  children,  tossed  to  and  fro, 
and  carried  about  with  every  doctrine."  It  is 
to  cease  to  be  lost  and  bewildered  in  the  detail 
of  life ;  it  is  to  get  one's  bearings  in  the  world 
and  to  see  the  present  in  its  setting  in  history. 

Those  who  are  trying  the  experiment  of  liv- 
ing without  philosophy  may  object  that  they 
feel  no  such  needs,  and  that  this  is  but  the  state- 
ment of  a  pliilosoplicr  wlio  naturally  magnifies 
the  interest  dear  to  his  heart.  But  the  fact  is 
tliat  most  civilized  men  liavc  this  need  and  sat- 
isfy it  in  one  way  or  anotlicr.  Every  great  reli- 
gion contains  witliin  it,  either  explicit  or  implicit, 
a  philosopliy,  a  cliaracteristic  world-view.  It  is 
not  expressed  in  the  language  of  the  schools. 
Indeed,  it  is  often  hidden  by  the  poetic  and  re- 
ligious emotions  associated  witli  it,  like  a  trellis 
covered  with  vines  and  flowers.  Thus  the  fa- 
iiiibar  Hebrew-Christian  scheme  began  witli  the 
creation  of  tlie  eartli  and  the  cosmos;  it  gave 
an  account  of  tlie  creation  of  plants,  animals  and 
men  ;  it  included  a  philosophy  of  history  begin- 
ning wifli  our  first  parents  and  ending  with  the 
last  judgment,  wifh  the  dissolution  of  the  old 
heavens  jind  eartli  and  the  coniiitg  of  a  new. 

In   flic  light   of  modern   science,   this   scheme 


MODERN  SPIRIT  11 

has  had  to  be  given  up.  But  we  must  not  for- 
get that  it  performed  a  real  service,  that  it 
gave  men  a  cosmic  outlook,  and  some  sense  of 
the  great  frame  in  which  human  life  is  set,  and 
most  of  all  a  profound  sense  that  in  this  vast 
scheme  our  lives  are  significant.  It  was  ca- 
pable of  dramatic  presentation  and  afforded 
scope  for  the  imagination,  for  poetry  and  re- 
ligious feeling.  As  conceived  and  presented  by 
the  noblest  minds,  it  also  profoundly  influenced 
the  moral  life.  The  outcome  of  the  whole  was 
to  be  a  society  from  which  was  to  be  excluded 
whosoever  loveth  and  maketh  a  lie,  while  even 
now  the  stars  in  their  courses  fight  for  righteous- 
ness and  those  who  stand  steadfast  in  the  truth 
feel  that  underneath  them  are  the  everlasting 
arms. 

This  religious  philosophy  was  in  part  true, 
but  it  had  its  defects,  and  as  a  cosmology  it  is 
gone  beyond  the  possibility  of  rehabilitation  ;  yet 
it  was  a  producer  of  a  consciousness  of  dignity 
and  strength,  and  it  gave  men  a  sense  of  sig- 
nificance which  many  of  their  children  with  a 
greater  knowledge  of  nature  and  history  seem 
to  have  lost,  and  which  they  are  seeking  to  re- 
gain. This  generation  is  to  be  pitied  indeed, 
if  no  noble  and  elevating  world-view  takes  the 
place  of  the  old.  It  is  vain  to  suppose  that  we 
can  live  nobly  or  happily  without  great 
thoughts.     We   may   renounce   our   intellectual 


12  BERGSON  AND  THE 

birthright  only  at  the  peril  of  call  that  we  hold 
dear.  Those  religious  leaders  who  disparage 
theology  and  assume  that  religious  feeling  is 
unaffected  by  the  intellectual  outlook,  are  mak- 
ing a  mistake  which  is  more  and  more  appar- 
ent. To  preach  a  religion  without  any  thoughisC 
in  it  is  to  promote  the  growth  of  irrational  mys- 
ticisms, such  as  have  been  productive  of  incal- 
culable injury  to  our  race. 

There  is  no  adequate  substitute  for  the  clear, 
comprehensive,  thorough-going  thinking  which 
is  philosophy,  just  as  nothing  can  take  the 
place  of  science,  or  art  or  religion.  It  is  use- 
less to  try  to  compound  for  tlie  absence  of  any 
of  tlie  great  vital  interests  by  excessive  stress 
on  one  of  the  others.  Social  service,  for  ex- 
ample, is  a  very  noble  and  useful  form  of  activ- 
ity, but  if  it  is  to  be  efficient  it  cannot  dispense 
with  social  pliilosophy.  It  demands  some 
knowledge  of  the  past  of  our  institutions,  of  ex- 
periments that  have  already  been  tried,  and  of 
the  relation  of  the  different  pliilanthropies  and 
charities  to  one  another.  It  must  be  at  once 
palliative  of  present  evils,  and  more  and  more 
preventive  of  future  evils.  Narrowness  and  con- 
traction of  view  are  fatal  to  social  effort.  Nor 
can  such  activities  be  most  fruitful  without  the 
religious  spirit.  It  is  a  real  advantage  to  be 
conscious  that  one's  beneficent  activities  are  not 
carried  on  in  opposition  to  the  great  tendencies 


MODERN  SPIRIT  13 

of  the  living  world,  but  rather  in  accord  with 
them.  For  this  means  to  realize  that  one  is 
doing  nothing  arbitrary,  but  is  an  instrument 
of  the  good  spirit  which  is  gradually  becom- 
ing dominant  in  the  hearts  of  men.  This,  I 
think,  is  what  Emerson  meant,  when  he  said 
that  our  hands  must  be  in  the  world  of  action, 
but  our  heads  above  the  storm. 

Above  all,  religion  cannot  dispense  with  the 
service  of  the  intellect.  Great  thought  and 
noble  feeling  go  together.  Although,  as  all 
philosophers  of  religion  to-day  well  understand, 
faith,  hope  and  love  well  up  spontaneously  from 
the  depths  of  life  and  are  not  created  by  argu- 
ment, it  is  nevertheless  also  true  that  religious 
emotion  is  profoundly  influenced  by  the  concep- 
tions which  the  mind  forms  of  the  world.  Ma- 
terialistic philosophies,  for  example,  seem  to 
negate  our  inspirations  and  longings,  while  an 
inspiring  world-view,  a  conception  of  the  uni- 
verse as  congenial  to  our  ideals,  one  that  can 
be  held  in  the  face  of  all  difficulties,  is  a  great 
desideratum.  Religion  might  even  be  defined 
as  the  sense  of  being  at  home  in  the  universe, 
the  conviction  that  a  life  directed  by  the  noblest 
ideals  is  precisely  what  the  situation  demands. 
Philosophy  is  therefore  not  the  enemy  of  a  pure 
and  noble  religion,  but  its  indispensable  ally  and 
friend. 

It  is  of  vital  importance  that   the  churches 


14  BERGSON  AND  THE 

shall  realize  this.  If  the}'  are  to  retain  the  in- 
telligence of  our  time,  they  must  encourage  the 
men  who  are  capable  of  constructive  thinking. 
The  temper  to  be  avoided  is  well  indicated  in 
the  following  story  told  by  Prof.  Fenn : 

A  little  girl  was  playing  about  the  room ; 
and  her  fatlicr  heard  her  say,  "  That  square  is 
blue."  Dr.  Johnson  says,  "  If  your  child  says 
he  looked  out  of  this  window  when  he  looked  out 
of  that,  flog  him."  It  did  not  seem  to  be  a  case 
requiring  such  liarsh  measures ;  and  the  father 
said,  "No,  that  is  red."  The  little  child 
thought  a  moment,  and  said,  "  That  red  square 
is  blue."  Dr.  Johnson's  dictum  seemed  to  be 
coming  dangerously  near  the  application ;  and 
the  father  said  sternly :  "  What  do  you  mean 
by  that?  A  thing  cannot  be  both  red  and 
blue."  The  child  pondered  a  moment,  and  then 
threw  herself  at  her  father,  and  said,  "  O  father, 
how  I  love  you  !  " 

That  is  a  parable  of  a  great  deal  of  our  re- 
ligious thinking.  We  say,  "  That  square  is 
red."  "  No,"  somebody  says,  "  that  square  is 
l)hie."  And  then,  forthwith,  we  "  rise  to  our 
larger  unity  "  and  our  great,  high  statements, 
and  inchide  a  self-contradiction,  and  then  say, 
"  Well,  love  is  the  greatest  thing  in  the  world." 

Whether  the  present  neglect  of  constructive 
religious  thinking  is  due  to  conscious  incapacity 
for  it  or  is  the  result  of  a  reaction  from  creeds 


MODERN  SPIRIT  15 

and  dogmas,  it  can  in  any  event  only  be  tem- 
porary. Amid  all  the  uncertainties  of  the 
groping  present  two  things  ought  to  be  self- 
evident:  the  men  of  the  future  will  continue  to 
be  religious,  and  they  will  experience  an  ever 
deeper  need  of  understanding  their  faith  and  of 
adjusting  it  to  their  conception  of  the  world 
and  of  history.  It  is  strange  that  any  intelli- 
gent man  could  suppose  that  the  religious  life  of 
men  which  has  been  growing  with  their  growth, 
which  has  been  gradually  purified  through  the 
centuries,  should  suddenly  come  to  an  end  in 
this  generation ;  and  it  is  not  less  strange  that 
any  thoughtful  person  should  on  religious 
grounds  prefer  the  world-views  of  our  remote 
ancestors  to  those  revealed  by  science  and  phi- 
losophy. I  think  it  can  be  shown,  as  I  shall 
try  to  indicate  in  this  book,  that  we  have  only  to 
take  the  truth  we  know  and  develop  its  implica- 
tions ;  that  we  have  only  to  be  courageous  and 
sequent  in  thinking  and  thorough-going  in  our 
application  of  the  theory  of  evolution,  to  find 
that  we  have  a  philosophy  adequate  for  our 
present  religious  needs. 

What  I  have  written  might  be  entitled  "  Apro- 
pos of  Bergson's  Philosophy."  I  have  not 
sought  to  give  cither  a  complete  exposition  or 
criticism  of  his  work.  To  do  that,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  employ  a  technical  apparatus  and 
mode  of  expression  that  would  defeat  my  pur- 


16  BERGSON  AND  THE 

pose.  That  is,  I  would  have  to  write  just  such  a 
book  as  Mr.  J.  ^NIcKellar  Stewart's  "  Critical  Ex- 
position of  Bergson's  Philosophy,"  or  Mr.  A.  D. 
Lindsay's  lectures  on  Bergson,  and  there  is  no 
need  to  duplicate  those  works.  I  have  rather 
sought  to  set  forth  some  of  the  larger  questions 
on  which  Bergson's  philosophy  sheds  light.  It 
is  quite  clear  that  he  can  help  us  over  some  dif- 
ficult places,  that  he  has  removed  some  stumbling 
blocks  that  have  been  in  our  way.  The  point, 
therefore,  for  all  to  whom  the  great  questions 
of  science,  philosophy  and  religion  are  in  the 
last  analysis  questions  of  life  and  living,  is  not 
where  has  Bergson  failed,  where  is  he  unintelli- 
gible or  where  does  his  logic  break  down,  but 
how  can  he  help  us,  what  suggestions  of  value 
has  he  contributed  to  the  solution  of  our  per- 
plexities. The  logician's  business  is  to  be  keen 
and  remorseless,  though  he  should  never  be  cap- 
tious or  ungenerous.  We  are  thankful  for  his 
necessary  services,  for  it  is  important  not  to 
mistake  error  for  truth.  Nevertheless,  the 
method  of  approach  here  is  different.  I  have 
studied  this  sincere  and  brilliant  thinker  in  the 
hope  of  help.  I  have  tried  to  keep  in  mind  that 
he  offers  us  not  a  system,  a  complete  philosophy, 
but  a  method  with  some  illustrations  of  the  way 
in  which  it  is  to  l)e  used.  It  is  legitimate,  there- 
fore, to  try  this  method  in  cases  which  have  re- 
sisted our  utmost  efforts  heretofore,  to  philoso- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  17 

phize  in  Bergsonian  fashion  upon  problems  of 
supreme  importance.  Philosophy  is  a  coopera- 
tive enterprise ;  it  is  the  affair  of  all  men ;  it  is, 
to  modify  the  definition  of  T.  H.  Green,  the 
progressive  effort  of  our  race  at  an  understand- 
ing of  life.  It  therefore  grows  as  does  every- 
thing that  lives.  If  the  reader  of  Bergson  finds 
that  in  some  cases  I  have  drawn  inferences 
which  seem  to  follow  from  the  philosopher's 
principles,  but  which  he  has  refrained  from 
drawing,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Bergson 
explicitly  states  that  he  offers  a  method  which 
is  to  be  used  by  others,  and  that  he  does  not 
pretend  to  set  forth  all  the  implications  of  his 
thought.  Forced  interpretations  must,  of 
course,  be  avoided.  Still,  without  falling  into 
the  company  of  the  unhappy  beings  who  wrest 
the  methods  and  conceptions  of  great  thinkers  to 
their  own  destruction,  we  may  safely  undertake 
to  point  out  certain  rather  obvious  consequences 
not  stated  by  a  philosopher  and  writer  so  re- 
served as  Bergson.  Such  reserve  is  admirable 
at  all  times,  and  in  France  especially  necessary. 
For  that  is  the  land  of  party  antagonisms  par 
excellence.  The  political  and  religious  ani- 
mosities are  there  so  intense  that  he  who  makes 
an})-  important  statement  on  living  issues  is  at 
once  claimed  as  a  partisan  friend  or  enemy. 
Synoptic  minds,  or  minds  that  appreciate  non- 
partisan views,  are  at  present  rare  among  that 


18  BERGSON 

gifted  people.  All  the  more  wonderful,  there- 
fore, is  it  that  the  greatest  living  thinker  should 
be  a  Frenchman,  that  in  a  country  torn  by  the 
strife  of  contending  parties  should  arise  one 
who  in  modern  times  has  most  nearly  realized 
Plato's  ideal  of  the  philosopher  as  "  the  specta- 
tor of  all  time  and  existence." 


CHAPTER  II 

CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  IN  REAL  TIME 

The  appearance  of  a  new  comet  in  the  sky 
or  the  flaming  up  of  a  new  star,  due  possibly 
to  a  collision  of  vast  masses  of  matter  in  the 
depths  of  space,  is  an  interesting  phenomenon, 
but  far  less  significant  for  our  race  than  the 
coming  of  a  great  poet,  prophet,  or  thinker. 
Human  existence  has,  of  course,  its  physical 
conditions ;  nevertheless  all  our  higher  values 
and  dearest  interests  are  in  the  realm  of  thought 
and  love  and  social  life.  And  because  men  and 
women  are  not  purely  physical  beings,  moved 
solely  by  physical  forces,  but  in  their  charac- 
teristically human  actions  are  influenced  chiefly 
by  ideals  which  they  admire  and  love,  it  is  lit- 
erally true,  however  paradoxical  it  may  sound, 
that  human  life  rests  on  ideal  foundations. 
Whatever  produces,  develops,  nourishes,  or  in 
any  way  changes  the  ideals  which  are  the  goals 
of  human  striving  is  of  the  first  importance  for 
our  life.  The  great  philosophers  of  Greece,  the 
prophets  of  Israel,  the  poets  and  thinkers  and 
seers   of  all  ages,   ai'e  significant  because  they 

have  produced  or  given  the  most  perfect  expres- 
19 


20  BERGSON  AND  THE 

sion  to  the  ideas  and  ideals  that  are  the  bread 
of  our  intellectual  and  spiritual  life:  they  have 
made  us  aware  of  higher  motives  and  nobler 
standards,  and  have  revealed  new  visions  of 
beauty  and  opened  up  prospects  of  grander 
possibilities  for  the  average  man. 

There  is  more  enthusiasm  over  the  fact  of 
progress  than  clear  understanding  of  its  na- 
ture. In  what,  precisely,  docs  it  consist.?  It 
is  worth  while  to  try  to  clear  away  the  popular 
confusion  on  this  subject  and  make  it  perfectly 
plain  that  the  locus  of  progress  is  the  invisible 
spiritual  tradition  of  thought  and  feeling,  of 
sentiments,  ideals,  and  accepted  standards,  that 
accumulates  and  grows  purer  from  age  to  age. 
Biologically,  in  our  structure,  there  is  little  evi- 
dence that  we  have  advanced  beyond  the  men  of 
the  Homeric  period.  But  we  are  born  into  the 
mental  and  moral  environment  of  civilization, 
we  absorb  its  traditions,  its  ideas  and  ideals, 
and  so  completely  assimilate  them  that  they  may 
be  said  to  become  our  nature,  our  very  selves. 
It  is  therefore  evident  that  the  greatest  of  all 
benefactors  are  those  who  purify  and  ennoble 
this  body  of  tradition,  this  spiritual  inheritance 
which  is  the  matrix  of  human  life.  And  they  do 
this  cl)iefly  by  making  tliouglit  more  true  and 
by  raising  moral  standards  and  developing  so- 
cial feeling.  It  is  the  function  of  the  thinker 
and   the   prophet   to  work    over   that   body   of 


MODERN  SPIRIT  21 

thought  and  sentiment  which  is  the  legacy  of 
each  generation  from  the  total  past,  to  recon- 
sider the  ideals  expressed  in  literature,  law,  and 
social  life,  to  purge  away  the  outworn,  the 
anachronisms,  the  mistakes,  and  so  transmit  to 
the  future  an  inheritance  increased  and  im- 
proved. 

A  recognition  of  this  truth  is  of  the  utmost 
social  importance.  We  must  learn  to  respect 
our  traditions  and  also  to  keep  them  plastic  and 
growing.  Without  the  inheritance  which  the 
centuries  have  bequeathed  to  us,  we  would  re- 
lapse into  the  spiritual  poverty  of  savages. 
The  higher  life  of  humanity  is  one  life,  an  age- 
long process  of  development.  It  is  therefore 
necessary  to  combat  that  most  injurious  of  the 
popular  errors  about  the  history  of  philosophy, 
the  notion  that  it  is  the  record  of  futile,  con- 
structive efforts,  and  that  each  thinker  begins  by 
destroying  the  philosophies  that  preceded  his 
own.  The  fact  is  that  this  history  is  the  story 
of  the  wonderful  ascent  of  thought  from  primi- 
tive savage  ideas  to  sublime  and  beautiful  con- 
ceptions of  life,  and  that  the  process  is  still  go- 
ing on.  Sometimes,  indeed,  we  seem  to  get  into 
a  blind  alley,  and  for  a  time  depressing  views 
prevail ;  but,  later,  the  mistake  is  perceived  and 
the  ascent  begins  again.  INIan's  conceptions  of 
the  world  and  of  his  place  therein  are  continually 
revised,  refined,  and  enlarged.     Recent  years,  in 


22  BERGSON  AND  THE 

particular,  have  witnessed  great  triumphs. 
"  Brute  matter  "  is  no  more,  for  the  atom  is 
now  conceived  as  a  structure  of  wonderful  com- 
plexity, its  constituent  electrons  being  thought 
of  in  tenns  of  electricity ;  that  is,  of  energy. 
For  those  who  understand  the  thought  situation 
the  old  materialism  is  dead.  Belated  thinkers  in 
out-of-the-way  places  may  be  some  time  in  find- 
ing this  out,  but  the  instructed  no  longer  think 
of  ultimate  reality  as  consisting  .of  inert,  dead 
particles  driven  by  physical  forces. 

The  world's  intellectual  and  moral  advances 
are  to  a  very  great  extent  made  through  gifted 
men,  whose  insight  and  power  of  constructive 
flunking  annex  whole  territories,  which  after- 
ward become  the  possession  of  the  thoughtful 
section  of  mankind.  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
Descartes,  Spinoza,  T.cibnitz,  Hume,  and  Kant 
are  among  the  greatest  lights  in  the  firmament 
of  thought,  and  the  appearance  of  a  new  star 
of  the  first  magnitude  is  an  event  of  the  first 
importance  in  the  life  of  our  race.  It  is  a 
great  thing  to  be  living  at  such  a  time,  and  I 
l)eHeve  that  we,  in  this  beginning  of  the  twen- 
tieth century,  enjoy  that  privilege.  Whether 
Prof.  Henri  Bergson  of  the  College  de  France 
will  finally  be  adjudged  worthy  of  a  place  in  the 
galaxy  named  above,  I  am  sure  that  he  is  at 
once  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  profound,  as 
well  as  one  of  the  most  original,  suggestive,  and 


MODERN  SPIRIT  23 

helpful,  of  the  thinkers  who  are  among  the 
glories  of  our  race. 

About  ten  years  ago  the  late  Prof.  William 
James  asked  me  if  I  had  read  Bergson's  writ- 
ings, and,  on  my  confession  of  ignorance  and 
request  for  information,  he  urged  me  to  read 
"Matiere  et  Memoire."  This  proved  to  be  one 
of  the  most  difficult  books  I  have  ever  studied, 
and  after  repeated  readings  there  are  parts  of 
it  that  I  do  not  understand.  And  it  was  only 
after  study  of  his  earlier  work,  "  Essai  sur  les 
donnces  immediates  de  la  conscience,"  translated 
under  the  title  of  "  Time  and  Free  Will,"  that  I 
realized  the  importance  of  the  contribution  he 
has  made  to  human  thought.^ 

The  difficulties  we  meet  in  understanding 
Bergson  are  not  due  to  any  faults  of  exposition, 
but  rather  to  the  fact  that  we  have  to  acquire 
some  new  categories,  since  he  does  not  fit  into 
any  of  the  old.  He  is  neither  an  idealist,  realist, 
pragmatist,  nor  eclectic.  No  writer  is  more 
lucid,  and  he  would  be  a  bold  man  who 
should  undertake  to  make  Bergson  clearer 
than    he    is.      Yet    so    novel    and    original    are 

1  Beginners  should  first  read  Bergson's  latest  book, 
"  Creative  Evolution,"  as  this  contains  a  summary  and 
restatement  of  his  main  positions.  The  more  technical 
and  difficult  work,  "  Time  and  Free  Will,"  should  then  be 
mastered,  not  read  in  a  merely  cursory  way.  After  a  re- 
reading of  "  Creative  Evolution,"  one  is  perhaps  pre- 
pared to  attempt  to  understand  "  Matter  and  Memory." 


24  BERGSON  AND  THE 

his  suggestions,  that  I  know  of  no  philoso- 
pher who  professes  to  understand  him  com- 
pletely. Prof.  James,  who  was  so  enthusiastic 
about  him,  said :  "  I  have  to  confess  that  Berg- 
son's  originality  is  so  profuse  that  many  of  his 
ideas  baffle  me  entirely.  I  doubt  whether  any 
one  understands  him  all  over,  so  to  speak ;  and 
I  am  sure  that  he  would  himself  be  the  first  to 
see  that  this  must  be,  and  to  confess  that  things 
which  he  himself  has  not  yet  thought  out  clearly 
Jiad  yet  to  be  mentioned  and  have  a  tentative 
place  in  his  philosophy.  ]\Iany  of  us  are  pro- 
fusely original,  in  that  no  man  can  understand 
us  —  violently  peculiar  ways  of  looking  at 
things  are  no  great  rarit3\  Tlic  rarity  is  when 
great  peculiarity  of  vision  is  allied  with  great 
lucidity  and  unusual  command  of  all  the  classic 
expository  apparatus.  Bergson's  resources  in 
the  way  of  erudition  are  remarkable  and  in  the 
way  of  expression  they  are  simply  phenomenal. 
Tliis  is  why  in  France,  wliere  Vart  de  hicn  dire 
counts  for  so  much  and  is  so  sure  of  apprecia- 
tion, he  has  immediately  taken  so  eminent  a 
place  in  public  esteem.  Old-fashioned  profes- 
sors, whom  his  ideas  quite  fail  to  satisfy,  never- 
theless speak  of  his  talents  with  bated  breath, 
wliilc  the  youngsters  flock  to  liim  as  to  a  master. 
If  anything  can  make  hard  things  easy  to  fol- 
low, it  is  a  style  like  Bergson's,  a  straight- 
forward style,  an  American  reviewer  lately  called 


MODERN  SPIRIT  25 

it,  failing  to  see  that  such  straightforwardness 
means  a  flexibility  of  verbal  resource  that  fol- 
lows the  thought  without  a  crease  or  wrinkle,  as 
elastic  silk  underclothing  follows  the  movement 
of  one's  body.  The  lucidity  of  Bergson's  way 
of  putting  things  is  what  all  readers  are  first 
struck  by.  It  seduces  you  and  bribes  you  in 
advance  to  become  his  disciple.  It  is  a  miracle, 
and  he  is  a  real  magician."  ("  A  Pluralistic 
Universe,"  p.  226.) 

I  have  spoken  of  Bergson  as  one  of  the  most 
helpful  of  thinkers,  and  to  justify  this  state- 
ment it  is  only  necessary  to  consider  the  rela- 
tion of  his  original  ideas  to  the  thought  situa- 
tion of  our  time.  Since  the  spiritual  life  is,  in 
one  of  its  aspects,  an  intellectual  life,  whatever 
clarifies  and  advances  thought  is  a  help  to  the 
spiritual  life.  Bergson's  contributions  to  phi- 
losophy are,  therefore,  by  no  means  merely  an 
intellectual  luxury.  As  he  himself  has  truly 
said,  they  help  us  to  live.  Nor  has  he  come  too 
soon.  Philosophic  and  religious  thought  seemed 
to  be  getting  into  an  impasse,  and  the  need  of 
some  guide  to  lead  men  back  to  the  great 
thoroughfare  was  urgent.  There  are  many,  of 
course,  who  do  not  realize  this,  for  the  reason 
that  they  are  able  to  hold  in  an  habitual  and 
uncritical  way  the  traditions  which  they  have 
received.  They  escape  both  the  happiness  and 
the  pain  of  thought.      But  there  are  others,  an 


£6  BERGSON  AND  THE 

increasing  number,  whose  minds  have  been 
awakened,  in  whom  has  arisen  the  deathless  de- 
sire to  know,  and  for  whom  the  joy  and  the 
difficulties  of  the  intellectual  life  have  begun. 
Realizing  that  their  mental  childhood  is  past, 
they  are  making  a  serious  effort  to  frame  some 
true  and  worthy  conception  of  the  meaning  of 
their  lives  and  of  their  place  in  the  great  whole. 

Those  who  in  recent  times  have  found  them- 
selves no  longer  satisfied  with  the  venerable  the- 
ory of  a  three-story  universe,  heaven  above,  hell 
beneath,  and  the  earth  between ;  with  the  phi- 
losophy of  history  which  started  with  the  fall  of 
man  in  Eden ;  and  with  the  somber  outlook  for 
our  race,  a  few  being  saved  and  the  rest 
going  to  perdition  Avlien  the  earth  and  its  con- 
tents perish  in  the  last  catastrophe, —  those 
who  have  outgrown  these  ideas  and  have  been 
under  the  consequent  necessity  of  trying  to 
work  out  some  theory  of  life  that  would  content 
the  mind  and  heart  have  discovered,  on  looking 
around  for  sometliing  better,  only  two  general 
world-views,  botli  of  wliic-h  are  profoundlv  un- 
satisfactory. 

On  the  one  hand,  tlicre  is  materialism,  which 
conceives  of  reality  as  consisting  of  a  vast  num- 
ber of  material  atoms,  impelled  by  j)hysical 
forces  and  moving  in  accord  witli  mechanical 
laws.  In  this  view  all  our  human  interests, 
our  higher  values,  are  mere  by-products,  epiphc- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  27 

nomcna,  with  no  more  real  significance  than  the 
iridescence  of  mother-of-pearl  or  the  colors  of 
the  rainbow.  However  satisfying  to  the  intel- 
lectual part  of  us,  this  general  view  is  pro- 
foundly depressing,  and  all  that  is  best  within 
us  revolts  against  it  and  what  it  seems  to  imply. 
It  not  only  does  not  legitimate  but  actually  ig- 
nores the  aspirations,  the  hopes,  the  faith,  and 
the  love,  which  give  conscious  life  its  value. 

The  competing  philosophy,  which  has  ap- 
peared to  be  the  only  alternative,  is  called  by 
a  noble  name,  "  idealism."  It  seems  at  first  to 
promise  much,  to  justify  faith  in  God,  freedom, 
and  immortality,  and  to  make  central  the  things 
we  care  most  for;  but  we  soon  find  that  it  has 
little  power  to  help,  partly  for  the  reason  that  it 
is  almost  unintelligible  to  all  but  trained  philoso- 
phers, and,  secondly,  because  it  starts  from  as- 
sumptions that  to  the  unsophisticated  intelli- 
gence seem  nonsense.  The  idealism  we  know 
most  of  is  called  post-Kantian ;  i.  e.,  it  is  based 
on  certain  conceptions  of  Kant.  One  of  these 
fundamental  notions  is  that  not  only  do  the 
color,  sound,  smell,  and  taste  of  objects  depend 
upon  the  peculiar  structure  of  our  sense  organs, 
but  that  time  and  space  also  are  subjective;  that 
is,  they  are  not  properties  or  relations  which 
belong  to  things  in  themselves,  but  are  modes  of 
perception,  forms  of  intuition.  This  means  that 
reality  is  not  in  time  and  space.     As  the  snow- 


28  BERGSON  AND  THE 

ball  bears  the  impress  of  the  hand  that  forms 
it,  so  things  appear  to  be  in  time  and  space, 
for  these  are  our  constitutional  modes  of  per- 
ception, the  spectacles,  as  it  were,  through 
which  we  see  reality. 

Although  our  common  sense  whispers  that 
this  is  nonsense,  it  is  possible  to  juggle  with  our 
minds  until  we  actually  think  we  comprehend 
and  accept  such  ideas.  The  motive  for  such 
self-sophistication  is  easy  to  comprehend.  We 
have  spiritual  needs  that  are  urgent,  and  this 
philosophy  is  apparently  our  only  resource. 
We  have  moved  out  of  the  structure  which  was 
the  home  of  thought  in  our  childhood,  and  it  is 
uncomfortable  being  houseless  in  the  open.  INIa- 
terialism  being  profoundly  unsatisfactory,  we 
naturally  cling  to  what  seems  to  be  the  only  al- 
ternative, especially  as  it  speaks  a  noble  lan- 
guage and  makes  fair  promises. 

Eventually,  however,  we  are  disillusioned.  It 
is  not  possible  to  rest  in  a  world  view  which 
seems  only  partially  intelligible  even  when  we 
are  reading  the  philosophic  books  in  which  it  is 
set  forth,  but  which  we  cannot  bring  into  rela- 
tion with  common  sense  and  science.  To  reach 
our  spiritual  refuge  it  ought  not  to  be  necessary 
to  be  an  intellectual  acrobat,  able  to  walk  a 
tight  rope  over  an  intellectual  abyss.  What 
we  need  above  all  things  is  an  interpretation  of 
life  that  shall  be  an  expansion,  a  development, 


MODERN  SPIRIT  29 

a  purification  and  transfiguration  of  the  views 
which,  as  men  and  women  in  a  real  world,  we 
are  compelled  to  hold  in  order  to  live  at  all. 
There  are  some  things  we  know  in  our  immedi- 
ate experience  with  a  native  certainty  beyond 
that  which  any  logical  demonstration  can  pro- 
duce. One  of  these  is  the  reality  of  our  tem- 
poral experience,  and  our  sense  that  something 
is  being  achieved,  wrought  out,  accomplished  in 
time.  We  believe  in  a  real  evolution  in  real 
time. 

But  for  the  idealism  of  which  we  speak,  evo- 
lution is  as  unreal  as  the  time  in  which  it  takes 
place.  The  Absolute  is  already  at  the  goal. 
In  fact,  it  is  timeless,  and  the  process  of  evolu- 
tion is,  therefore,  strictly  speaking,  unmeaning: 
it  is  an  illusion,  for  nothing  really  evolves.  We 
cannot  consistently  be  evolutionists  and  abso- 
lute idealists  at  the  same  time,  and  the  attempt 
to  be  both  evolutionists  in  science  and  social 
reform  and  idealists  in  philosophy  and  religion 
can  only  result  in  making  philosophy  and  re- 
ligion seem  unreal.  Now  as  to  evolution,  we 
practically  have  no  choice.  There  is  no  fruit- 
ful work  done  in  science  and  there  are  no  wise 
efforts  in  education  or  the  improvement  of  so- 
cial life  which  are  not  made  along  evolutionary 
lines.  And  no  philosophy  which,  by  making 
reality  timeless,  takes  away  all  significance  from 
our  thought,  our  aspiration,  and  our  effort,  can 


30  BERGSON  AND  THE 

ever  win  general  acceptance.  Men  must,  and 
will,  look  elsewhere  for  the  wide  views,  the  deep 
insights,  the  stability  and  serenity,  peace  and 
joy,  which  a  working  theory  of  life  ought  to 
give. 

Absolute  idealism,  then,  though  it  offers  itself 
as  a  support  for  the  higher  values,  starts  from 
assumptions  which  we  cannot  grant,  is  prac- 
ticall}^  unintelligible  to  the  unsophisticated 
mind,  and  is  inconsistent  with  the  conception  of 
real  evolution  in  real  time  which  is  absolutely 
essential  to  effective  thinkiner  and  effective  liv- 
ing.  In  this  last  respect  Kantian  idealism  is 
like  the  prevailing  mechanical  view  of  nature, 
which  is  also  incompatible  with  the  notion  of 
evolution.  For,  according  to  the  mathematical, 
mechanical  conception  of  nature,  reality  is  a 
fixed  quantity.  All  is  given.  This  all,  being 
matter  and  motion,  nothing  more  is  possible 
than  a  change  in  the  configuration  of  the  phys- 
ical system,  than  a  redistribution  of  matter  and 
motion.  Or,  if  we  prefer  to  speak  in  terms  of 
energy,  nothing  is  changed  by  the  form  of  state- 
ment. In  such  a  universe  evolution  is  impos- 
sible. Nothing  is  possible  except  ceaseless  re- 
arrangements of  the  given.  Real  creation,  the 
appearance  of  novelties,  and  human  freedom  are 
phrases  without  meaning.  And,  since  human 
beings  are  parts  of  the  given  whole,  since  what 
is  real  in  them   is  their  physical  structure,  the 


MODERN  SPIRIT  31 

system  of  atoms  composing  their  bodies,  since 
all  future  configurations  of  the  universe  of  atoms 
are  theoretically  calculable  by  mathematics,  our 
sense  that  our  life  Is  an  achievement,  that  we 
are  really  doing  something,  Is  a  delusion,  and  our 
aspirations  and  efforts  lose  their  significance. 
If  this  inconsistency  of  a  mechanical  philosophy, 
not  only  with  moral  and  social  life,  but  also  with 
the  doctrine  of  evolution.  Is  not  ordinarily  per- 
ceived, It  Is  because  the  average  man  has  small 
talent  for  ultimate  logical  consequences  and  sel- 
dom thinks  things  through. 

To  whom,  then,  shall  we  go?  It  Is  Impossible 
to  return  to  the  thoughts  of  the  world's  child- 
hood ;  the  two  views  of  life  and  the  world  which 
science  and  philosophy  have  offered  are  logic- 
ally, practically,  and  morally  Inadequate ;  and, 
finally,  some  working  theory  of  life  Is  indispen- 
sable to  the  thoughtful  section  of  mankind.  In 
this  situation  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  real 
solution  is  neither  to  go  backward  nor  to  do 
violence  to  our  logical  and  moral  sense  by  an  ar- 
bitrary acceptance  of  absolute  Idealism  or  mech- 
anism, but  to  develop  the  naturalism  of  ordinary/ 
thinking  and  make  it  thorough-going.  Since 
man  is  a  part  of  nature,  any  satisfactory  or 
logically  tenable  theory  of  that  nature  must  In- 
clude man,  with  his  science,  his  philosophy,  his 
prayers  and  aspiration,  his  indisputable  good- 
ness as  well  as  the  physical  side  of  his  life.     An 


32  BERGSON  AND  THE 

evolutionary  philosophy  which  in  its  formation 
takes  account  only  of  the  physical  aspects  of 
nature,  but  which  in  its  application  is  extended 
and  made  to  include  life  and  mind,  is  a  logical 
monstrosity.  The  only  nature  we  know  is  the 
nature  which  in  its  early  stages  and  lower  ranges 
appears  to  be  purely  physical,  but  which  indis- 
putably produces  and  sustains  civilization,  which 
blooms  into  thought  and  love,  moral  aspiration, 
purpose,  and  effort.  These  are  as  truly  parts 
of  the  great  process  as  the  more  primitive  and 
apparently  purely  physical  stages.  The  only 
rational  way  to  interpret  any  process  is  by  its 
outcome,  and,  if  the  world  process  be  interpreted 
in  this  way,  the  values  which  the  luiivcrse  evolves 
will  be  seen  to  give  to  the  preliminary  phases  all 
the  meaning  they  possess.  Human  life  will  then 
be  seen  in  true  perspective,  and  we  sliall  liave  a 
philosophy  that  will  not  ignore  or  pronounce 
unreal  the  aspects  of  life,  the  fruits  of  evolu- 
tion, which  we  care  most  for,  but  tliat  will  in- 
stead legitimate  them  and  set  them  fortli  in  their 
true  significance. 

In  a  radical,  thorough-going  evolutlonium  lies 
our  hope  of  an  adequate  philosophy,  of  a  world 
view  which  shall  satisfy  tlie  logical  sense  and 
spiritual  need  of  our  time.  Tentative  efforts  at 
such  a  construction  arc  being  made  by  the 
clearest  and  most  sequent  thinkers,  and  the 
thought   prospect    is    brighter    than    for   many 


MODERN  SPIRIT  33 

years.  This  being  the  situation,  it  is  easy  to 
see  why  Bergson  has  met  with  such  a  welcome. 
He  is  not  only  a  tremendous  reinforcement  in 
constructive  thought,  he  is  one  of  the  greatest 
of  leaders.  He  has  helped  us  past  the  funda- 
mental mistake  of  Kant,  which  has  been  so  long 
a  great  stumbling-block  in  our  intellectual  path- 
way. What  Kant  called  the  ideality,  but  in  or- 
dinary language  would  be  called  the  unreality, 
of  time,  many  of  us  have  never  accepted,  but 
to  dispute  the  authority  of  the  great  German 
philosopher  has  until  recently  been  to  lose  credit. 
It  is  therefore  not  without  lively  emotion  that 
we  read  the  masterly  essay  on  "  Time  and  Free 
Will,"  which  disposes  of  all  the  specious  argu- 
ments which  have  been  made  against  the  reality 
of  our  temporal  experience.  We  will  no  longer 
be  tempted  to  deny  what  we  are  most  certain  of, 
and  we  can  connect  philosophy  once  more  with 
our  real  life.  In  his  theory  of  knowledge,  Berg- 
son has  also  shown  that  mechanism  applies  only 
to  certain  aspects  of  reality  and  not  to  the 
whole ;  and  on  this  side,  too,  he  has  set  thought 
free.  Toi  read  the  great  pages  of  "  Creative 
Evolution  "  is  to  see  proved,  in  the  technical 
fashion  of  philosophy,  what  we  knew  in  our  heart 
of  hearts  all  the  time  ;  namely,  that  mechanism 
and  determinism  as  a  mctaphysic  could  not  be 
true,  that  the  time  process  is  real,  that  evolution 
is  more  than  a  rearrangement  of  the  given,  that 


34  BERGSON 

it  means  achievement,  and  that  life  in  its  higher 
development  is  free,  that  it  is,  in  fact,  a  great 
spiritual  adventure.  The  end  no  man  can 
know,  for  the  reason  that  our  ideals  advance  as 
we  strive  toward  them,  and  we  pursue  a  fleeing 
goal.  New  prospects  are  thus  opened  up  be- 
fore thought,  and  our  spiritual  horizon  is  in- 
definitely enlarged. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  LIFE  FORCE 

The  thoughts  of  living  men  are  but  the 
thoughts  of  their  ancestors  revised,  expanded, 
corrected.  The  conceptions  of  the  present  gen- 
eration cannot  be  understood  without  taking 
their  hneage  into  account.  The  mixed  and  in- 
consistent nature  of  some  of  our  more  important 
ideas  is  in  part  explained  by  the  fact  that  we  are 
trying  to  combine  our  intellectual  inheritance 
from  two  very  different  civilizations.  Our  an- 
swer to  the  question,  What  is  reality.''  is  influ- 
enced by  the  stream  of  Hebrew  and  Christian  tra- 
dition and  by  old  Greek  thinking.  The  Bible 
begins  with  an  account  of  the  creation  of  the 
world ;  in  fact,  with  two  accounts,  that  of  Gene- 
sis i.  being  several  centuries  later  in  date  and  in 
stage  of  development  than  that  of  Genesis  ii. 
and  iii.  The  conception  of  the  author  of  Genesis 
i.  is  that  the  materials  of  heaven  and  earth  were 
present  in  chaotic  form  and  in  darkness,  and 
that  the  Spirit  of  God  was  brooding  upon  the 
face  of  the  waters. 

Early  Greek  thought  reached  an  analogous 
35 


36  BERGSON  AND  THE 

view.     Anaxagoras    said   that   originally   there 
was  chaos,  and  then  came  mind  and  brought  or- 
der.    In  the  Timaeus  of  Plato,  creation  is  con- 
ceived of  as  the  introduction  of  order  into  the 
primitive    disorder.     Greek    speculation,    how- 
ever, soon  arrived  at  the  view  that  the  world  is 
ultimately   composed  of  atoms  which,  by  their 
mutual   attractions    and    repulsions    and   conse- 
quent   groupings,    constituted    all    things.     In 
modern  times  some  thinkers  have  become  frankly 
agnostic  on  the  subject  of  the  ultimate  nature  of 
reality.     Herbert   Spencer  says  that   the  most 
certain  of  all  things  is  that  we  are  always  in  the 
presence  of  an  infinite  and  eternal  energy  whence 
all  things  proceed,  but  he  calls  this  reality  the 
Unknowable.     It   is   true  that  he   professes   to 
know  a  good  deal  about  it;  e.  g.,  that  it  is  one, 
infinite   and   eternal;   it  is  the  All-Being;  it  is 
higher  than  personality  rather  than  lower;  and 
in  referring  to  it  we  are  nearer  the  truth  in  us- 
ing spiritualistic  terms  than  when  we  speak  the 
language   of  the  materialist.     And,   finally,  he 
says  that  we  are  compelled  to  think  of  the  uni- 
verse as  alive,  if  not  in  the  restricted  sense,  at 
least  in  the  general  sense.     The  ultimate  reality 
manifests  itself  in  matter  and  mind,  and  these 
manifestations  we  know;  but  what  it  is  in  itself 
he  thinks  we  can  never  know.      It  reveals  itself 
in  the  universe  we  call  material,  and  it  wells  up 
witliin  us  in  the  form  of  consciousness:  we  know 


MODERN  SPIRIT  37 

these  expressions  of  reality,  but  nothing  more. 

Kant,  too,  said  that  we  know  only  phenomena, 
appearances.  We  see  the  world  as  colored,  be- 
cause our  eyes  react  in  that  way  to  the  light 
stimulus.  We  hear  sounds,  because  the  air 
waves  excite  in  our  ears  movements  which  we 
feel  as  sound.  So  we  experience  reality  under 
the  forms  of  time  and  space  because  it  is  our  na- 
ture to,  and  we  think  of  the  world  in  scientific 
terms  because  we  are  made  that  way.  We  can- 
not get  behind  phenomena.  What  is  beyond,  it 
is  vain  to  seek  to  know.  All  that  we  can  know 
is  the  way  reality  affects  us.  Were  we  dif- 
ferently constituted,  all  would  appear  differ- 
ent. 

About  a  hundred  years  ago  a  young  German 
scholar  brought  forward  a  new  and  very  bril- 
liant suggestion.  He  said,  it  is  possible  to  get 
behind  the  scenes  if  we  pursue  the  right  method. 
For  I  am  not  only  a  knower:  I  am  also  of  the 
very  substance  and  stuff  of  the  world,  of  what  is 
known.  It  is  what  I  am,  and  I  am  Avhat  it  is. 
To  know  the  nature  of  reality  I  have  only  to 
look  within  myself  and  discover  what  is  funda- 
mental there.  This  observation  is  entirely  cor- 
rect, and  the  method  indicated  is  most  fruitful. 
But  Schopenhauer  failed  in  its  application.  He 
looked  within,  and  he  saw  what  many  others  had 
failed  to  sec,  but  his  vision  was  distorted  by  his 
unhappy  emotional  state.     Many  philosophers 


38  BERGSON  AND  THE 

have  considered  that  man  is  essentially  a  think- 
ing being,  and  have  concluded  that  the  funda- 
mental characteristic  of  human  nature  is 
thought.  Hegel  took  this  view,  and  Spinoza 
and  Leibnitz,  and,  though  the  statement  is  not 
absolutely  accurate,  we  may  include  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  But,  according  to  Schopenhauer's 
profounder  insight,  the  essence  of  our  nature  is 
will,  and,  since  our  nature  is  one  with  universal 
nature,  the  ultimate  reality  is  Will. 

This  was  a  great  step  forward  in  the  his- 
tory of  human  thought,  and,  if  it  had  been  made 
by  a  man  of  happy  disposition  and  sunny  na- 
ture, the  course  of  thought  in  the  last  hundred 
years  might  have  been  quite  different.  For  in 
that  case  this  world  will  would  have  been  con- 
ceived of  as  good  will,  whereas  Schopenhauer  be- 
lieved it  to  be  blind  and  wicked.  It  is  easy  to 
see  why  he  tliouglit  so,  why  his  view  was,  in  fact, 
inevitable.  The  world  was,  he  considered,  iden- 
tical in  essence  with  liis  own  nature,  and  his  own 
nature  was  discordant  and  wretched.  This  phi- 
losopher was,  indeed,  very  badly  born.  In  his 
make-up  were  two  radically  different  and  war- 
ring parts.  He  had  a  magnificent  tliinking  ap- 
paratus and  a  morbid  emotional  nature.  Paul- 
sen, following  G.  Voight,  gives  us  tlie  following 
striking  picture  of  this  original  and  unhappy 
genius :  — 

"  Schopenhauer  is  a  very  transparent  charac- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  39 

ter;  the  dualism  of  human  nature  in  which 
reason  and  desire  form  the  two  opposite  poles 
becomes  unusually,  nay,  alarmingly  discordant, 
in  him.  In  so  far  as  he  is  will,  he  lives  an  un- 
happy life.  From  his  father  he  inherited  a 
melancholy  temperament ;  he  invariably  sees 
things  in  the  wrong  light :  little  things,  too,  an- 
noy him  too  much.  He  is  full  of  violent  desires, 
impetuous,  high-tempered,  ambitious,  sensuous, 
and  withal  very  diffident.  He  is  constantly 
plagued  by  all  kinds  of  vague  fears  of  trouble, 
losses,  diseases,  which  his  sensuous  ego  might 
suffer:  he  is  extremely  suspicious  of  all  men 
without  exception, —  in  truth,  a  series  of  quali- 
ties, any  one  of  which  would  have  been  sufficient 
to  make  his  life  unhappy. 

"  That  is  one  side  of  his  life.  And  now  look 
at  the  other.  He  is  also  an  intellect,  nay,  a 
genius,  endowed  with  a  remarkable  power  of  ob- 
jective intuition.  He  has  experienced  the 
blessedness  of  the  life  of  pure  knowledge  as 
purely  and  as  deeply  as  any  thinker  before  him, 
nay,  perhaps  more  deeply  than  any  other  man, 
on  account  of  the  contrast  between  the  intellec- 
tual side  of  his  being  and  his  restless,  unhappy, 
volitional  life.  .  .  .  There  were  times  when 
Schopenhauer  enjoyed  happy  hours,  pursuing 
his  thoughts,  freed  from  all  desires  and  cares, 
without  hurry  and  worry,  without  fear  and  ha- 
tred.    But  then   came  other  times :  the  beasts 


40  BERGSON  AND  THE 

which  seemed  to  have  been  entirely  tamed  rose 
up  again,  destroyed  his  peace,  and  filled  his  life 
with  trouble  and  anxiety.  And  he  was  helpless 
against  them,  he  often  says  so  himself.  It  is  a 
curious  but  undoubted  fact  that  the  clearest 
knowledge  of  the  pcrverseness  of  the  will  can 
produce  no  change  in  it.  This  enables  us  to 
understand  his  ethical  system:  it  is  the  confes- 
sion of  his  failings  and  sins,  it  is  the  yearning 
of  his  better  self  for  deliverance  from  the  com- 
panion to  whom  it  finds  itself  yoked."  ("  Eth- 
ics," 211.      Thilly's  translation.) 

Such  was  the  man  who  made  one  of  the  most 
important  suggestions  in  the  history  of  thought, 
who  first  saw  clearly  that  tlic  deepest  in  man's 
life  is  his  will,  his  needs,  longings  and  ideal 
strivings,  and  that  the  heart  of  human  nature 
is  one  with  cosmic  nature.  There  is  truth  in  this 
philosophy,  but  it  is  colored  by  the  medium 
through  which  it  came.  Schopenhauer,  consti- 
tuted as  he  was,  could  not  but  give  a  pessimistic 
cast  to  any  world  view  he  might  hold,  and  in  his 
case  the  evil  was  exaggerated  by  the  influence 
of  Buddhism  upon  his  mind.  It  is  interesting 
to  consider  what  the  efpoct  Avould  have  been  if 
Schopenhauer  had  been  a  once-born  soul,  with 
the  elements  in  his  nature  more  nearly  in  accord 
from  the  beginning,  if  he  had  inherited  a  har- 
monious constitution  like  that  of  Edward  Ever- 
ett Hale  or  Emerson.      It  seems  certain  that  he 


MODERN  SPIRIT  41 

would  then  have  announced  an  optimistic  phi- 
losophy, one  which  would  have  amounted  to  a 
gospel.  He  would  have  said  that  the  heart  of 
the  world  is  good  will.  That  will  is  the  best 
name  for  the  reality,  he  saw  clearly.  His  ab- 
normal emotional  state  led  him  to  think  this 
world  will  blind  and  wicked.  If  it  had  not  been 
for  this  unfortunate  accident  of  heredity,  if  he 
had  been  a  happily  constituted,  wholesome  na- 
ture, he  would  have  given  the  world,  not  a  pes- 
simistic philosophy,  but  a  religion.  For  the 
message  of  religion,  purified  and  freed  from  the 
local  and  accidental,  is  that  the  heart  of  the 
universe  is  good,  that  is,  good  will.  With  every 
great  religion  goes  a  world  view,  a  philosophy 
of  some  kind.  It  matters  not  how  much  the 
feeling  element  is  emphasized  and  the  thought 
aspect  disparaged  or  ignored,  these  two  parts  of 
life  are  really  inseparable.  Religious  feeling 
and  action  will  always  be  found  to  involve  a  the- 
ory of  things.  Thus  Buddhism,  in  its  original) 
form,  started  with  the  assumption,  which  seemed  * 
to  its  followers  an  axiom,  that  life  is  suffering 
and  happiness  a  futile  and  foolish  dream,  po*^^  i 
Gautama  therefore  devised  a  way  of  escape  from  '  i/'\>'^M 
the  series  of  rebirths.  There  were  ethical  con- 
ditions to  deliverance,  and  sympathy  and  com- 
passion have  been  finiits  of  this  vicAV  of  life. 
But  it  is  a  despairing  view  nevertheless,  a  pes-  i 
simistic  philosophy.     Christianity,  on  the  other 


42  BERGSON  AND  THE 

hand,  at  least  in  its  highest  forms,  involves  an 
optimistic  view  of  reality.  We  are  not  accus- 
tomed to  think  of  it  as  a  philosophy,  because  it 
is  so  much  more.  Yet,  like  all  other  great  re- 
ligions, it  has  a  fairly  definite  outlook  upon  the 
world.  If  we  disregard  the  lower  strata  of  the 
New  Testament  and  of  the  Christian  creeds,  and 
consider  only  the  heights  reached  by  the  founder 
and  greatest  leaders  of  this  religion  in  their  su- 
preme moments  of  insight,  we  find  them  declar- 
ing in  no  uncertain  tones  that  "  God  is  love," 
that  we  are  the  children  of  the  perfect,  and  that 
evil  is  to  be  overcome,  not  by  evil,  but  by  good. 
This  view  has  been  set  forth  by  Robert  Brown- 
ing ;  it  is,  in  fact,  his  one  great  theme.  "  For 
all  the  universe  seemed  to  him  love-woven,  all  life 
is  but  the  treading  of  the  love-way,  and  no  wan- 
derer can  finally  lose  it."     He  sought 

"  To  trace  love's  faint  beginnings  in  mankind, 
To  know  even  liate  is  but  a  mask  of  love's, 
To  see  a  good  in  evil,  and  a  hope 
In  ill-success." 

We  are  so  accustomed  to  consider  Hebrew  and 
Christian  thouglit  as  apart  from  the  stream  of 
the  world's  intellectual  life  that  we  hardly 
realize  that  this  is  a  philosophy,  a  theory  of  the 
nature  of  reality,  a  magnificent  world-view,  a 
product  of  the  deepest  insight  and  greatest 
speculative  daring.      And  because  we  have  from 


MODERN  SPIRIT  43 

childhood  been  familial-  with  such  an  inspiring 
outlook  upon  life,  we  do  not  easily  or  fully  ap- 
preciate the  achievements  of  constructive  thought 
as  it  climbs  slowly  in  the  same  direction. 

The  French  thinker,  Bergson,  evidently  does 
not  come  up  to  the  world's  great  problems  by 
way  of  religion,  but  through  philosophy.  He 
is  in  the  line  of  succession  that  dates  from  Soc- 
rates and  his  great  predecessors,  and  comes  down 
through  Plato,  Aristotle,  Descartes,  Spinoza, 
Leibnitz,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume,  Kant,  Fichte, 
Hegel,  Schelling  and  Schopenhauer.  And  the 
fact  that  many  of  us  in  our  earliest  years  be- 
came familiar  with  conceptions  which  seem  to  be 
the  goal  of  the  world's  thought,  which  the  re- 
ligious insight  of  gifted  men  attained,  so  to 
speak,  at  a  bound,  but  which  could  be  construc- 
tively reached  only  by  the  intellectual  toil  of  a 
long  line  of  great  thinkers,  ought  not  to  make 
us  impatient  with  the  tentative  results  and  re- 
served statements  of  the  latest  of  these  workers 
on  the  structure  of  the  world's  thought. 

Bergson  is  not  only  a  thinker :  he  is  also  a 
seer.  Like  Schopenhauer,  he  gazes  intently  at 
reality,  but  describes  what  he  sees  in  terms  of 
life.  His  vision  is  that  of  a  great  life  flowinj; 
through  time.  This  life  current  is  the  funda- 
mental reality,  the  material  universe  being  the 
ebb  of  this  great  flow.  Matter  is  a  flux  and  not 
a   thing,   a  process   derived   from  the   spiritual 


44  BERGSON  AND  THE 

process  of  life  by  inversion.  It  is,  so  to  speak, 
life  that  has  lost,  or  is  losing,  its  vitalit}^  it  is 
existence  almost  devoid  of  duration  and  de- 
scending in  the  direction  of  space.  These  con- 
ceptions are  new  and  difficult,  but  the  important 
thing  is  that  reality  is  conceived  of  in  terms  of 
life  while  matter  is  regarded  as  a  derived  prod- 
uct. This  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  of  all 
the  attempts  to  bridge  the  chasm  between  the 
living  and  the  non-living.  Bergson  states  his 
thought  in  many  ways.  Life,  he  says,  is  tend- 
ency, a  tremendous  internal  push,  which  may  re- 
lax its  tension  and  so  descend  to  materiality. 
"  The  real  can  pass  from  tension  to  extension 
and  from  freedom  to  mechanical  necessity  by 
way  of  inversion.  Life  is  an  effort  to  remount 
the  incline  that  matter  descends."  Life  is  crea- 
tion, the  material  is  reality  unmaking  itself. 
Or,  put  in  another  wa}^  "  From  an  immense 
reservoir  of  life,  jets  must  be  gushing  out  un- 
ceasingly, of  which  each,  falling  back,  is  a 
world."  Again,  "  We  catch  a  glimpse  of  a 
simple  process,  an  action  which  is  making  itself 
across  an  action  of  the  same  kind  which  is  un- 
making itself,  like  the  fiery  path  torn  by  the 
last  rocket  of  a  fire-works  display  through  the 
black  cinders  of  the  spent  rockets  that  are  fall- 
ing dead." 
^  Any  effort  at  general  and  brief  restatement 
of    Bcrgson's    novel    views    must    be    in    some 


MODERN  SPIRIT  45 

measure  unjust.  He  must  be  read  and  re-read 
to  be  comprehended.  For  instance,  a  careless 
critic  might  infer  from  what  is  said  above  that 
the  French  philosopher  has  simply  relapsed  into 
vitalism.  But  that  is  very  far  from  the  case. 
He  considers  the  question,  and  himself  shows 
why  the  vitalistic  theories  are  untenable.  It  is 
easy  to  misunderstand  him,  for  he  cannot  state 
his  position  without  using  terms  which  others 
have  applied  in  a  different  way.  But  when  he  ^ 
speaks  of  the  life  impulse  or  force,  he  is  think- 
ing of  a  single  immense  wave  which  flows  over 
and  organizes  matter.  The  latter  being  some- 
what refractory,  the  great  movement  is  "  some- 
times turned  aside,  sometimes  divided,  always 
opposed ;  and  the  evolution  of  the  organized 
world  is  the  unrolling  of  this  conflict."  But  the 
philosopher  warns  us  not  to  attach  too  much 
importance  to  or  overwork  any  of  his  similes. 
He  speaks  of  life  as  an  impetus,  because  no 
image  borrowed  from  the  physical  can  give  a 
better  idea  of  it.  But  "  in  reality,"  he  says, 
"  life  is  of  the  psychological  order."  "  Con-  4, 
sciousness  or  supra-consciousncss  is  at  the  origin 
of  life ;  it  is  the  name  for  the  rocket  wliose  ex- 
tinguished fragments  fall  back  as  matter;  con- 
sciousness, again,  is  the  name  for  that  which 
subsists  of  the  rocket  itself  passing  through  the 
fragments  and  lighting  them  up  into  organisms. 
But  this  consciousness,  which  is  a  need  of  crea- 


46  BERGSON  AND  THE 

tion,  is  made  manifest  only  where  creation  is 
possible.  It  lies  dormant  where  life  is  con- 
demned to  automatism :  it  awakens  as  soon  as 
the  possibility  of  a  choice  is  restored." 

Such  views  are  novel  and  may  at  first  seem 
fantastic,  but  we  should  not  be  too  quick  to 
reject  them. 

It  has  been  a  long  time  since  a  constructive 
thinker  of  the  first  order  has  appeared  in  the 
world,  and  if,  as  some  believe,  we  have  now  to 
do  with  a  man  of  this  rank,  the  value  and  ex- 
tent of  his  service  to  us  will  depend  upon  our 
own  attitude.  Certainly,  a  minute,  unsympa- 
thetic, captious  criticism  that  makes  the  most 
of  minor  errors,  and  that  is  given  to  wholesale 
condemnation  of  whatever  can  be  shown  to  have 
any  defect,  is  unprofitable.  Equally  mistaken 
is  the  attitude  of  hasty  and  uncritical  accept- 
ance of  what  has  been  onl}'  superficially  exam- 
ined and  imperfectly  comprehended.  What  is 
called  for  is,  first,  an  honest,  sustained  effort 
to  understand,  to  appreciate  the  suggested 
ideas  in  the  large,  and  to  give  the  constructive 
thinker  a  generous  reception.  We  may  even 
be  able  to  help  him  detect  minor  mistakes  and 
clear  away  obscurities.  Surely,  we  ouglit  to  do 
this,  especially  when  we  consider  that  the 
larger  truth  and  nobler  conceptions  he  attains 
to  are  won  for  humanity  and  for  all  time. 
While  tJu'  fhcory  of  the  cosmical  life  must,  like 


MODERN  SPIRIT  47 

all  others,  be  subjected  to  critical  examination, 
—  our  criticism  should  be  large-minded  and 
fair. 

According  to  Bergson,  then,  evolution  is  the 
great  drama  of  the  life  force  unfolding  through 
the  ages :  it  is  the  story  of  its  adventures,  its 
vicissitudes,  its  successes  and  its  failures.  The 
failures  are  as  evident  as  the  success.  For  evo- 
lution is  not  synonymous  with  progress.  It  is 
sometimes  in  the  direction  of  our  ideals  and 
sometimes  away  from  them.  It  is  radial  rather 
than  linear.  The  molluscs,  the  fishes,  the  rep- 
tiles, are  not  on  their  way  to  become  men. 
They  diverged  from  the  trunk  of  the  tree  of 
life  ages  ago,  and  can  never  return.  What  is 
peculiar  in  the  Bergsonian  view  of  evolution  is 
the  conception  that  the  unity  of  life  is  the  unity 
of  the  original  impulse,  that  this,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  contained  within  it  many  tendencies 
which  are  differentiated  in  the  course  of  devel- 
opment. This  original  sheaf  of  tendencies  be- 
comes separated  into  its  constituent  elements. 
Thus,  in  the  line  of  growth  through  vertebrates 
up  to  man,  the  life  force  has  developed  some  of 
its  capacities,  quite  other  tendencies  being  mani- 
fested in  the  ants,  bees,  and  wasps.  In  the 
plant  world,  for  the  most  part  unconscious, 
still  other  tendencies  are  expressed.  Among 
the  two  or  three  great  lines  of  evolution  are 
many  minor  paths.     There  are  blind  alleys  into 


48  BERGSON  AND  THE 

which  life  has  run,  as  in  the  case  of  the  fungi, 
and  many  cases  of  retrogression. 

The  most  interesting  example  of  the  disso- 
ciation of  the  tendencies  in  the  original  impetus 
is  that  of  the  vegetative,  instinctive,  and  ra- 
tional life,  which  are  conceived  of,  not  as  three 
successive  degrees  or  stages  of  development  of 
one  and  the  same  tendency,  but  as  divergent 
directions  of  an  activity  that  split  up  as  it 
grew,  the  difference  being  not  one  of  intensity, 
but  of  kind.  If  Bergson  is  right  about  this,  the 
view  that  has  prevailed  since  Aristotle's  time  is 
wrong,  and  there  are  consequences  of  great  sig- 
nificance for  educational  theory,  religious  cul- 
ture, and  practical  life. 

Deferring  till  later  a  discussion  of  the  rela- 
tions of  instinct  and  reason,  it  may  be  pointed 
out  here  that  Bergson's  view  of  reality  as  a  Great 
Life  is  an  advance  upon  the  Schopenhauerian 
conception  of  the  world  will.  .  .  .  Life  is  the 
more  inclusive  term,  to  say  nothing  of  the  fact 
that  the  German  philosopher  thought  the  world 
will  blind  and  wicked  only  because  of  the  tur- 
moil, strife,  and  wretchedness  of  his  own  inner 
life.  The  French  pliilosoplier  says  that  the  life 
force  is  striving  in  the  direction  of  freedom  and 
love.  The  meaning  of  evolution  is  the  effort  of 
life  to  develop  in  matter,  which  is  determined, 
an  Instniment  of  indetennination,  of  freedom ; 
and  in  the  human  brain  success  has  been  attained. 


MODERN  SPIRIT  49 

Automatism  is  the  enemy,  and  it  is  our  peculiar 
human  privilege,  in  the  moments  when  we  are 
most  conscious,  to  have  conquered,  to  be  really 
free. 

We  cannot  properly  speak  of  a  goal,  since 
there  is  no  end  to  life's  vista.     Each  of  us  is 
rather'  a  progress  than  a  thing.     At  times  we 
have  glimpses  of  the  great  movement  of  which 
we  are  part.     "  We  have  this  sudden  illumina- 
tion before  certain  forms  of  maternal  love,  so 
striking,  and  in  most  animals  so  touching,  ob- 
servable even  in  the  solicitude  of  the  plant  for  its 
seed.     This  love,  in  which  some  have  seen  the 
great  mystery  of  life,  may  possibly  deliver  us 
life's  secret.     It  shows  us  each  generation  lean- 
ing over  the  generation  that  shall  follow.      It  1 
allows  us  a  glimpse  of  the  fact  that  the  living  \ 
being  is  above  all  a  thoroughfare,  and  that  the  I 
essence  of  life  is  in  the  movement  by  which  life  j 
is  transmitted." 


CHAPTER  IV 

THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  AND  THE 
BERGSONIAN  WORLD-VIEW. 

In  the  Preface  to  his  "  Voyages  en  Italic," 
Taine  gives  a  short  account  of  the  mental  in- 
strument which  produced  the  judgments  re- 
corded in  the  book.  He  did  this  because  he 
thought  his  readers  would  find  his  impressions 
more  interesting  and  instructive,  if  they  knew 
something  about  the  formative  influences  that 
helped  to  shape  his  mind.  So,  since  philosophy 
is  the  reaction  of  the  human  mind  to  the  world, 
to  life  and  its  environment,  it  ma\'  well  begin 
with  an  examination  of  the  mind  itself.  Every 
philosophy,  therefore,  includes  or  implies,  and, 
in  a  certain  sense,  builds  upon  a  tlieory  of 
knowledge. 

Bcrgson's  theory  of  knowledge  is  stated  with 
perfect  clearness  at  the  very  beginning  of  "  Cre- 
ative Evolution."  He  regards  the  intellect  as 
a  tool  Avhich  has  been  produced  for  practical 
I)urp(),scs.  In  this  sense,  it  is  in  the  same  cate- 
gory witli  tootli  and  claw.  The  understanding 
is  "  an  appendage  of  the  faculty  of  acting,  a 


MODERN  SPIRIT  51 

more  and  more  precise  and  more  and  more  com- 
plex and  supple  adaptation  of  the  consciousness 
of  living  beings  to  the  conditions  of  existence 
that  are  made  for  them.  Hence  should  result 
this  consequence  that  our  intellect,  in  the  narrow 
sense  of  the  word,  is  intended  to  secure  the  per- 
fect fitting  of  our  body  to  its  environment,  to 
represent  the  relations  of  external  things  among 
themselves  —  in  short,  to  think  matter.  .  .  . 
We  shall  see  that  the  human  intellect  feels  at 
home  among  inanimate  objects,  more  especially 
among  solids,  where  our  action  finds  its  fulcrum 
and  our  industry  its  tools ;  that  our  concepts 
have  been  formed  on  the  model  of  solids ;  that 
our  logic  is,  pre-eminently,  the  logic  of  solids ; 
that,  consequently,  our  intellect  triumphs  in 
geometry,  wherein  is  revealed  the  kinship  of 
logical  thought  with  unorganized  matter,  and 
where  the  intellect  has  only  to  follow  its  natural 
movement,  after  the  lightest  possible  contact 
with  experience,  in  order  to  go  from  discovery  to 
discovery,  sure  that  experience  is  following  be- 
hind it  and  will  justify  it  invariably." 

When,  therefore,  we  are  dealing  with  the 
world  which  ph3^sical  science  studies,  our  intel- 
lects are  adequate.  We  can  not  only  know  what 
to  do  in  external  situations,  but  we  may  attain 
to  some  knowledge  of  the  very  nature  of  matter. 
Bergson  is,  therefore,  no  relativist  or  pragma- 
tist.     He  says,  "  If  the  intellectual  fonn  of  the 


52  BERGSON  AND  THE 

living  being  has  been  gradually  modeled  on  the 
reciprocal  actions  and  reactions  of  certain  bodies 
and  their  material  environment,  how  should  it 
not  reveal  to  us  something  of  the  very  essence  of 
which  these  bodies  are  made?  Action  cannot 
move  in  the  unreal.  A  mind  born  to  speculation 
or  to  dream,  I  admit,  might  remain  outside  real- 
ity, might  deform  or  transform  the  real,  per- 
haps even  create  it  —  as  we  create  the  figures  of 
men  and  animals  that  our  imagination  cuts  out 
of  the  passing  cloud.  But  an  intellect  bent  upon  r^ 
the  act  to  be  performed  and  the  reaction  to  fol- 
low, feeling  the  object  so  as  to  get  its  mobile 
impression  at  every  instant,  is  an  intellect  that 
touches  something  of  the  absolute."  And 
again,  "  Intellectual  knowledge,  in  so  far  as  it 
relates  to  a  certain  aspect  of  inert  matter, 
ought  to  give  us  a  faithful  imprint  of  it,  having 
been  stereotyped  on  this  particular  object." 

That  is,  so  long  as  we  look  outward  and  are 
dealing  with  the  physical  world,  tlie  intellect 
proves  to  be  a  very  satisfactory  instrument. 
The  trouble  comes  when  we  turn  our  gaze  in- 
ward, and  seek  to  understand  our  life.  Tlic 
metaphysical  incapacity  of  our  thinking  appa- 
ratus at  once  becomes  evident.  Human  exist- 
ence in  the  past  has  depended  on  correct  tliouglits 
about  things  rather  than  on  tliouglits  al)()ut  life, 
and  it  is  therefore  entirely  natural  that  the  in- 
tellect should  be  able  to  furnish  the  former  but 


MODERN  SPIRIT  53 

not  the  latter.  If  the  desire  of  life  to  under- 
stand itself  were  due  to  mere  perversity  or  if 
it  were  of  rare  occurrence  and  could  be  sup- 
pressed, our  most  perplexing  problems  would 
not  have  arisen.  But  since  this  desire  does  ac- 
tually appear  and  become  imperious,  since  life 
in  its  progress  inevitably  reaches  a  reflective 
stage,  these  problems  must  be  bravely  met  and 
dealt  with,  and  we  must  utilize  in  their  solution 
all  the  resources  at  our  command. 

Now  it  is  a  peculiarity  of  Bergson's  view  that 
the  intellect,  because  of  its  nature  and  the  pur- 
pose for  which  it  has  been  developed,  cannot  un- 
derstand life.  In  its  efforts  to  do  so,  it  applies 
the  thought-forms  which  fit  things  but  which  do 
not  apply  to  life.  It  cannot  understand  any- 
thing which  is  not  or  cannot  be  regarded  as  a 
machine.  Lord  Kelvin  said  he  was  never  sure 
that  he  understood  anything  until  he  could  make 
a  working  model  of  it.  In  saying  this,  he  was 
the  true  spokesman  of  the  intellect.  But  it  so 
happens  that  life  is  not  a  mechanism,  even 
though  certain  of  its  products  have  mechanistic 
aspects.  What  shall  we  do,  then.''  Is  it  neces- 
sary to  give  up  the  problems  in  which  we  cannot 
help  being  interested.''  Must  we  confess  that 
our  dearest  ambitions  lie  in  one  direction  and 
our  abilities  in  another.?  If  there  were  nothing 
more  in  mind  than  in  the  powers  of  conceptual 
thought,  Bergson  sa3's  that  this  would  be  the 


64  BERGSON  AND  THE 

case.  Happily,  there  is  more  in  life  than  the 
instrumental  intellect.  The  latter,  in  its  de- 
velopment, did  not  exhaust  the  resources  of  con- 
sciousness, but  is  a  sort  of  specialization  of 
something  more  general  and  aboriginal.  Man  ^ 
as  conscious  is  not  all  intellect.  There  remain 
in  liim  traces  of  those  primitive  powers,  which, 
being  still  unspecialized,  retain  the  function  of 
knowing  life  itself.  These  powers  are  ordina- 
rily called  instinct.  So  far,  then,  as  we  are  not 
merely  practical  men  but  philosophers,  inter- 
ested in  life  and  reality,  we  must  think  with  the 
whole  man,  or,  ratlier,  we  must  not  only  think 
but  also  use  those  residual  powers,  complemen- 
tary to  thought,  which  can  know  life  because 
they  are  life,  and  which  in  their  rudimentary 
form  we  call  instinct,  but  which  may  be  developed 
and  clarified  until  they  become  intuition. 

Although  in  this  exposition  Bergson  empha- 
sizes the  difference  between  intellect  and  intui- 
tion until  the  reader  may  get  the  impression 
that  they  are  opposites  and  have  nothing  in  com- 
mon, it  is  very  necessary  to  avoid  such  a  mis- 
take. They  have  a  common  origin,  are  kindred 
in  nature  even  if  complementary  in  function, 
and  botli  are  essential  to  a  normal  and  complete 
J' /  human  life. 

<r^  This  tendency  to  exaggerate  distinctions  un- 

r    ■        til  they  appear  to  be  oppositions  is  a  practically 

inevitable  consequence  of  all  successful  attempts 


MODERN  SPIRIT  55 

at  clear  exposition.  Those  who  have  had  much 
experience  in  teaching,  or  in  the  endeavor  to 
make  things  clear  to  others,  understand  this. 
In  order  to  effectively  present  any  aspect  of 
truth,  it  is  necessary  for  the  time  to  ignore  other 
aspects, — to  be, as  it  were, unjust  to  them.  Yet, 
unless  at  another  time  they  are  recalled  and  the 
whole  embraced  in  a  synoptic  view,  the  result  is 
a  distortion  of  the  truth.  The  thinker  cannot 
drive  all  his  horses  abreast,  and  he  must  run  the 
risk  that  attends  the  exposition  of  one  truth  at  a 
time. 

Thought,  then,  is  a  process  that  makes  use 
of  concepts,  that  encloses  facts  in  certain  frames. 
In  our  converse  with  the  world,  we  find  these 
thought-forms  to  be  of  practical  value,  but  they 
are  useful  for  the  reason  that  they  were  molded 
on  the  very  objects  to  which  they  apply.  Now 
it  so  happens  that  we  are  deeply  interested  not 
only  in  these  things  and  in  the  sciences  arising 
from  their  systematic  study,  such  as  mathema- 
tics, physics,  chemistry  and  engineering,  but 
also  in  life  and  in  the  science  of  biology.  We 
want  to  understand  the  processes  of  evolution, 
to  see  how  the  present  has  grown  out  of  the  past 
and  how  life  goes  on.  And  when  we  seek  to  do 
this,  we  naturally  employ  the  same  thinking 
apparatus  that  has  proved  so  effective  in  prac- 
tical affairs  and  in  physical  and  mathematical 
science.     And  if  we  ask  what  are  the  principal 


56  BERGSON  AND  THE 

concepts,  the  most  important  thought-frames, 
with  which  the  intellect  is  provided,  and  in  which 
it  proposes  to  enclose  the  facts  of  life,  we  find 
that  they  are  two,  mechanism  and  finalism,  or, 
as  we  should  sa}^,  mechanism  and  teleology. 
Now  Bergson's  contention  is  that  neither  of  these 
fits  the  facts,  although  he  states  explicitly,  and 
it  is  important  to  remember  this,  that  while 
neither  garment  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  prop- 
erly clothe  the  reality  of  life,  yet  one  of  the  two, 
finalism,  "  might  be  recut  and  resewn,  and  in 
this  new  form  fit  less  badly  than  the  other." 
That  is  to  say,  though  neither  theory  fits  the 
facts,  yet  teleology  is  at  least  nearer  than  mech- 
anism to  the  truth. 

In  order  to  understand  the  profound  sig- 
nificance for  philosophic  and  religious  thought 
of  the  wonderful  first  chapter  of  Creative  Evo- 
lution, it  is  necessary  to  vividly  realize  and  to 
keep  in  mind  that  it  has  almost  universally 
been  considered  that  we  must  be  cither  mecha- 
nists or  telcologists  if  we  are  to  attempt  any 
comprehensive  thinking  about  life.  If  we  reject 
the  one  view,  we  must  of  necessity  hold  to  the 
other,  there  being  no  other  alternative.  Since 
Kant  and  especially  since  Darwin,  the  teleolog- 
ical  way  of  regarding  life  and  the  world  has 
been  supposed  to  be  thorouglily  discredited,  and 
the  mechanistic  way  is  said  to  be  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  field.      Men  of  science  are  content  to 


MODERN  SPIRIT  57 

let  the  poets  sing  of  their  faith  that  "  through 
the  ages  one  unceasing  purpose  runs,"  but  that, 
they  say,  is  mere  poetry.  Notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  human  life  is  essentially  purposive, 
and  that  our  life  is  a  part  of  the  world's  life, 
this  aspect  of  reality  is  generally  disregarded  in 
scientific  and  philosophic  thinking,  and  the  most 
persistent  efforts  are  made  to  explain  reality  as 
a  system,  that  is,  as  a  mechanism.  Those  who 
have  been  trying  to  fit  this  theory  to  the  facts, 
and  practically  all  who  are  deeply  interested  in 
the  larger  problems  of  life  have  made  many  such 
attempts,  have  met  with  numerous  facts  which 
seem  entirely  inconsistent  with  such  a  view;  but 
we  have  continued  for  the  reason  that  we  sup- 
posed all  finalistic  explanation  to  be  impossible, 
and  that  therefore  an  explanation  on  the  alter- 
native mechanistic  theory  must  be  possible. 

But  Bergson  has  given  an  absolutely  thor- 
ough-going and  final  refutation  of  the  mechan- 
istic view  of  life.  Whatever  defects  the  critics 
may  finally  convict  him  of,  he  has  certainly  made 
both  the  current  mechanistic  and  the  old-fash- 
ioned teleological  view  of  reality  impossible  to 
all  who  understand  his  argument.  The  thought 
situation  is,  therefore,  radically  changed.  At 
first,  the  change  may  not  seem  to  be  for  the  bet- 
ter. For,  if  we  must  think  of  reality  in  one  of 
the  two  ways,  and  neither  is  a  right  way,  are  we 
not    landed    in    agnosticism.'*     No,    replies    the 


58  BERGSON  AND  THE 

philosopher.  It  is  really  the  fact  that  we  can- 
not think,  or  intellectually  conceive,  the  reality 
of  the  life  process ;  but  we  can  live  it  and  be 
aware  of  it  as  we  live  it.  We  can  penetrate  to 
its  depths  by  insight.  In  order  to  realize  this, 
he  says,  it  is  only  necessary  to  contrast  our 
psychic  life  as  we  immediately  experience  it  with 
our  thoughts  about  it.  We  think  of  it  as  com-  * 
posed  of  a  succession  of  states,  sensations,  ideas, 
volitions,  etc.  But  it  really  is  nothing  of  the 
kind.  It  is  a  flux,  a  continuum.  Each  of  the 
so-called  states  when  examined  proves  to  be  it- 
self a  flow,  a  change.  The  "  states  "  we  think 
of  arc  purely  conceptual ;  they  are  instantaneous 
sections,  or  snapshots,  of  what  is  all  movement. 
So,  we  think  of  time  as  a  succession  of  instants, 
but  the  time  we  live  through  is  a  steady  flow,  a 
continuous  movement  whicli  swells  as  it  advances. 
In  time,  as  we  tliink  it  or  intellectuallv  conceive 
it,  the  instants  replace  one  another;  in  real  du- 
ration, the  past  lives  in  tlic  present  and  never 
really  ceases  to  be.  Life  is  like  a  snowball 
which  grows  larger  as  it  is  pushed  along.  The 
process  is  irreversible;  it  is  always  being  added 
to,  and  the  addition  y)roduccs  a  situation  which 
has  never  been  before  and  can  never  be  again. 
It  is  creative.  Novelties  actually  do  appear. 
Bergson  does  not  speak  of  it,  but  one  cannot  help 
thinking  how  true  a  description  of  evolution  this 
is.     From  the  time  when  our  planet  was  red  hot 


MODERN  SPIRIT  59 

till  the  present  when  it  is  peopled  with  millions 
of  species,  both  of  plants  and  animals,  and  when 
civilization  is  advancing  with  great  rapidity, 
the  creation  of  the  new  has  been  the  characteris- 
tic feature  of  the  whole  process. 

The  way  in  which  Bcrgson  does  connect  the 
life  process  we  know  in  ourselves  with  the  world 
process  is  most  interesting.  Having  established 
the  fact  that  our  life  does  not  consist  in  a  sue-  /3^'^u 
cession  of  instants,  but  that  we  really  endure, 
mature,  are  creating  ourselves  or  are  processes 
of  creation,  he  considers  a  simple  physical  proc- 
ess such  as  the  dissolving  of  a  lump  of  sugar  in 
a  glass  of  water.  If  I  want  to  drink  it,  I  have 
to  wait ;  and  the  external  process  for  whose  com- 
pletion I  have  to  wait  coincides  with  the  time 
I  live  through.  If,  now,  the  fact  of  this  coin- 
cidence of  the  physical  process  with  the  vital 
process,  with  the  duration  I  live  through  in 
waiting  for  its  completion  be  well  considered, 
it  will  be  found  to  mean  that  physical  processes 
are  not  merel}^  in  the  abstract  time  of  thought, 
but  that  they  endure  and  "  the  universe  of  which 
they  are  part  endures."  ^  That  is  to  say,  the 
universe  is  like  my  life  which  I  experience  and 
know  directly,  through  an  insight  which  is  life's 
awareness  of  itself,  to  be  a  creative  process  ;  and 

1  Or,  as  Mr.  J.  M.  Stewart  puts  it,  "  Spirit  is  identical 
with  duration,  and  matter  has  duration,  consequently  mat- 
ter itself  differs  from  spirit  only  in  degree." 


60  BERGSON  AND  THE 

this  means  that  the  universe  is  a  life,  an  ongoing 
process  of  creation. 

But  if  it  is  through  insight  rather  than 
through  conceptual  thought  that  we  know  the 
reality  of  life,  how,  it  will  be  asked,  can  we  ex- 
plain the  success  of  science  and  of  the  marvel- 
ous enterprises  of  this  engineering  age?  Berg- 
son's  answer  is  that  science,  like  common  sense, 
deals  with  detached  objects  and  isolated  sys- 
tems, and  it  succeeds  because  "  matter  actually 
has  a  tendency  to  create  isolable  systems  that 
can  be  treated  geometrically."  Furthermore, 
notwithstanding  his  conviction  that  reality  is  a 
creative  life  that  endures  through  time,  Bergson 
admits  that  we  are  not  without  justification  in 
regarding  matter  as  non-living.  "  Matter,"  he 
says,  "  was  life  originally.  That  is,  the  cosmical 
clan  which  is  life,  consciousness  or  supra-con- 
scious rcalit}',  is  a  current  that  ceaselessly  flows. 
When  it  turns  backward,  when  for  some  unex- 
plained reason  the  direction  of  the  flow  is  re- 
versed, the  result  is  that  flux  we  call  matter. 
Life  is  a  reality  which  is  making  itself,  matter 
is  the  same  reality  in  the  process  of  unmaking. 
Matter  is  real,  but  it  is  derivative  and  perish- 
ing. Such  a  mctap]i3'sics  might  be  called  either 
vitalism  or  monistic  spirituab'sm.  ^Matter  and 
life  or  spirit  are  one  in  origin  but  ditf'erent  in 
degree.  The  fountain  of  things,  then,  is  the 
life  impulse  which  is  essentially  a  need  of  crea- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  61 

tion  and  which  strives  in  the  direction  of  free- 
dom. It  is  "  confronted  with  matter,  that  is 
to  say,  with  the  movement  which  is  the  inverse 
of  its  own  and  which  is  necessity  itself.  But  it 
seizes  on  this  matter  and  strives  to  introduce  into 
it  the  largest  possible  amount  of  indetermina- 
tion  and  liberty."  The  result  is  the  evolution- 
ary process  and  the  organic  world. 

Some  readers  will  feel  inclined  to  stop  at  this 
point.  Such  speculations  will  seem  to  them  too 
fanciful  and  too  precarious  to  deserve  serious 
consideration.  Yet  it  will  pay  to  continue  and 
to  persist  in  the  effort  to  understand  these  new 
suggestions.  For  they  are  new,  they  are  not 
entirely  baseless,  their  author  is  a  man  of  genius, 
of  vision  and  insight,  and  there  is  a  chance  that 
we  may  really  learn  something.  Then,  too,  we 
are  tired  of  threshing  the  old  straw.  Let  us  go 
on.  The  philosopher  takes  the  utmost  pains 
to  make  his  meaning  clear.  Here  is  one  of  his 
illustrations :  "  Let  us  imagine  a  vessel  full  of 
steam  at  a  high  pressure,  and  here  and  there  in 
its  sides  a  crack  through  which  the  steam  is  es- 
caping in  a  jet.  The  steam  thrown  into  the  air 
is  nearly  all  condensed  into  little  drops  which  fall 
back,  and  this  condensation  and  this  fall  repre- 
sent simply  the  loss  of  something,  an  interrup- 
tion, a  deficit.  But  a  small  part  of  the  jet  of 
steam  subsists,  uncondcnsed,  for  some  seconds ; 
it  is  making  an  effort  to  raise  the  drops  which 


62  BERGSON  AND  THE 

are  falling;  it  succeeds  at  most  in  retarding 
their  fall.  So,  from  an  immense  reservoir  of 
life,  jets  must  be  gushing  out  unceasingly,  of 
which  each,  falling  back,  is  a  world.  The  evo- 
lution of  living  species  within  this  world  repre- 
sents what  subsists  of  the  primitive  direction  of 
the  original  jet,  and  of  an  impulsion  which  con- 
tinues itself  in  a  direction  the  inverse  of  ma- 
teriality." 

Such  illustrations  are  ingenious,  but  we  must 
be  careful  not  to  take  them  too  literally.  We 
are  so  accustomed  to  think  of  matter  as  a  collec- 
tion of  separate  objects  rather  than  the  flux, 
the  universal  interaction  which  it  really  is,  and 
to  think  of  life  as  consisting  of  numbers  of 
organic  beings,  that  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to 
keep  in  mind  that  life  is  a  current  that  flows 
through  time  and  through  all  the  beings  it  or- 
ganizes, and  that  the  physical  universe  is  a  con- 
tinuum, a  vast  complex  of  movement.  In  this 
world-view,  activity  is  the  primal  source.  In 
the  beginning  was  life.  We  are  told  that  we 
may  "  speak  of  a  center  from  which  worlds  shoot 
out  like  a  rocket  in  a  fire-works  display  —  pro- 
vided, however,  that  wc  do  not  present  this  cen- 
ter as  a  thing,  but  as  a  continuity  of  shooting 
out.  God  thus  defined,  has  nothing  of  the 
ready  made;  He  is  unceasing  life,  action,  free- 
dom."    The  Father  worketh  hitherto. 

The    great    enterprise    has    been    only    par- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  63 

tially  successful.  Life  is  essentially  freedom, 
free  creative  activity,  but  even  in  man  it  has 
found  only  incomplete  expression,  since  he  is 
ever  threatened  by  the  automatism  which  has 
overtaken  all  other  living  creatures.  Matter 
has  proved  very  refractory  to  the  age-long  ef- 
fort to  make  it  the  instrument  of  freedom. 
"  From  our  point  of  view,  life  appears  in  its  en- 
tirety as  an  immense  wave  which,  starting  from 
a  center,  spreads  outwards,  and  which  on  almost 
the  whole  of  its  circumference  is  stopped  and 
converted  into  oscillation ;  at  one  single  point 
the  obstacle  has  been  forced,  the  impulsion  has 
passed  freely.  It  is  this  freedom  that  the  hu- 
man form  registers.  Everywhere  consciousness 
has  had  to  come  to  a  stand ;  in  man  alone  it  has 
kept  on  its  way.  Man,  then,  continues  the  vital 
movement  indefinitely,  although  he  does  not  draw 
along  with  him  all  that  life  carries  in  itself." 

Man  is  the  great  success  in  life's  adventure, 
but  even  this  success  is  partial  and  incomplete. 
It  has  proved  impossible  for  all  the  tendencies 
in  the  cosmical  elan  to  find  expression  in  one 
organic  being.  Life  is  a  sheaf  of  tendencies 
which  split  and  become  separated  in  the  course 
of  evolution,  or,  as  Mr.  Balfour  says,  it  is  like 
an  army  marching  through  a  country ;  "  if  the 
cavalry  take  one  road,  the  infantry  must  take 
another." 


CHAPTER  V 

INSTINCT,  INTELLECT,  AND  THE 
IDEALLY  COMPLETE  MIND 

Man  has  a  part  of  the  ideal  mental  endow- 
ment, viz.,  the  intellect  which  creates  pure  and 
applied  science  and  thus  makes  civilization  pos- 
sible. But  ants,  bees  and  wasps  have  another 
part,  namely,  the  instinctive  powers  which  are 
so  feebly  developed  in  the  human  race.  "  It  is 
as  if  a  vague  and  formless  being,  whom  we  may 
call,  as  we  will,  man  or  superman,  had  sought 
to  realize  himself,  and  had  succeeded  only  by 
abandoning  a  part  of  himself  on  the  way.  The 
losses  are  represented  by  the  rest  of  the  animal 
world,  and  even  by  the  vegetable  world,  at  least 
in  wliat  these  have  that  is  positive  and  above  the 
accidents  of  evolution."  We  have  not  received 
all  that  life  liad  to  offer.  Tlie  inlicritance  has 
been  divided.  Tliis  has,  doubtless,  in  some  re- 
spects been  an  advantage.  The  animals  are  use- 
ful to  us  in  that  "  consciousness  has  unloaded  on 
them  whatever  encumbrances  it  was  dragging 
along,  and  so  it  has  been  enabled  to  rise,  in  man, 
to  heights  from  which  it  sees  an  unlimited  horizon 

open  again  before  it.     It  is  true  that  it  has  not 
Gi 


MODERN  SPIRIT  65 

only  abandoned  cumbersome  baggage  on  the 
way;  it  has  also  had  to  give  up  valuable  goods. 
Consciousness,  in  man,  is  pre-eminently  intellect. 
It  might  have  been,  it  ought,  so  it  seems,  to  have 
been  also  intuition.  Intuition  and  intellect  rep- 
resent two  opposite  directions  of  the  work  of 
consciousness :  intuition  goes  in  the  very  direc- 
tion of  life,  intellect  goes  in  the  inverse  direc- 
tion, and  thus  finds  itself  naturally  in  accord 
with  the  movements  of  matter.  A  complete  and 
perfect  humanity  would  be  that  in  which  these 
two  forms  of  conscious  activity  should  attain 
their  full  development." 

This  deprivation,  this  loss  of  the  instinct  or 
intuition  which  knows  the  current  of  life  as  the 
intellect  is  by  nature  adapted  to  know  the  coun- 
ter, or  material,  current,  accounts  for  the  fact 
that  biology  is  less  advanced  than  physics,  and 
for  the  confusion  into  which  we  fall  when  we  try 
to  think  life,  when  we  seek  to  apply  to  life  the 
categories  or  thought-frames  of  the  intellect 
which  were  formed  to  deal  with  a  reality  that 
flows  in  the  opposite  direction. 

Our  difficulty  in  understanding  evolution  is 
due  to  the  fact  that  we  are  one-sided,  that  we  are 
but  fractional  expressions  of  life.  [  "  In  the  hu- 
manity of  which  we  are  part,  intuition  is  almost 
completely  sacrificed  to  intellect.  It  seems  that 
to  conquer  matter  and  to  reconquer  its  own  self, 
consciousness  has  had  to  exhaust  the  best  part 


66  BERGSON  AND  THE 

of  its  power.  This  conquest,  in  the  particular 
conditions  in  which  it  has  been  accomplished,  has 
required  that  consciousness  should  adapt  itself 
to  the  habits  of  matter  and  concentrate  its  at- 
tention on  them,  in  fact  determine  itself  more 
especially  as  intellect."  The  situation,  though 
difficult,  is  not  hopeless.  The  rudiments  of  the 
powers  we  need  are  still  in  us  and  are  suscepti- 
ble of  cultivation.  According  to  Bergson,  the_ 
defect  will  be  overcome  when  the  toojmrely  inz. 
tellectuaTand  external  views  of  the  world, .fjjj- 
nished  by  conceptual  thinking,  arc  supplemented 
bj^  the  deliverances  of  our  latent  instinctive 
power,  developed  until  it  becomes  intuition,  in,- 
sight  into  life.  At  present,  intuition  is  vague 
and  discontinuous.  "  It  is  a  lamp  almost  extin- 
guished, wliich  only  glimmers  now  and  then,  for 
a  few  moments  at  most.  But  it  glimmers  wher- 
ever a  vital  interest  is  at  stake.  On  our  person- 
ality, on  our  liberty,  on  the  place  we  occupy  in 
the  whole  of  nature,  on  our  origin  and  perhaps 
also  on  our  destiny,  it  throws  a  light  feeble  and 
vacillating,  but  which  none  the  less  pierces  the 
darkness  of  the  night  in  which  the  intellect 
leaves  us." 

Whatever  we  may  think  of  the  general  world- 
view  here  set  forth,  there  is  no  doul)t  that  in  the 
last  sentences  the  French  philosopher  has  given 
expression  to  truths  of  the  utmost  importance. 
The  light  that  shines   on  life's   pathway,  that 


MODERN  SPIRIT  67 

illumines  personality,  liberty  and  our  kinship 
with  the  ideal,  is  intuition.  When  we  have  to 
deal  with  these,  the  mechanizing  intellect  is  as 
helpless  and  irrelevant  as  instinct  is  when  it  is 
a  question  of  describing  the  processes  of  the 
physical  world.  What  philosophy  aims  at  is 
completeness  of  life.  "  These  fleeting  intuitions, 
which  light  up  their  object  only  at  distant  inter- 
vals, philosophy  ought  to  seize,  first  to  sustain 
them,  then  to  expand  them  and  so  unite  them 
together.  The  more  it  advances  in  this  work, 
the  more  it  will  perceive  that  intuition  is  mind 
itself,  and,  in  a  certain  sense,  life  itself;  the  in- 
tellect has  been  cut  out  of  it  by  a  process  resem- 
bling that  which  has  generated  matter.  Thus 
is  revealed  the  unity  of  the  spiritual  life."  Im- 
mediately after,  Bcrgson  makes  the  profound 
remark,  which  experience  has  often  verified,  that 
if  we  wish  to  he  (•oni{)lete  nicii,  if  wc  wish  a 
spiritual  life  tliat  shall  be  both  intellectual  and 
i^tuitional,  we  must  first  take  the  point  of  view 
^{  intuition,  because  it  is  easy  cnougli  to  go 
from  intuition  to  intellect,  but  if  we  start  with 
the  intellect  and  try  to  think  our  way  back  to 
insj^ht  jy^to  life,  we  shalX.find,  as  men  liave  al-^ 
\^^s  found,  that  we  are  attempting  the  impossi::^ 
hle.^^  rhilosopliy  is,  therefore,  in  13ergson's 
view,  not  a  mere  idle  speculation.  It  aims  to 
round  out  human  nature,  to  recover  essential 
powers   almost  lost,  to   develop  them  to   fuller 


68  BERGSON  AND  THE 

strength,  and  to  unite  all  our  higher  activities. 
And  so  far  as  it  does  this,  we  can  all  agree  with 
him  that  "  Philosophy  introduces  us  into  the 
spiritual  life." 

Something  more  must  be  said  about  Bergson's 
theory  of  knowledge.  He  is  not  easy  to  clas- 
sify. Sometimes  he  is  called  a  pragmatist  be- 
cause he  approaches  philosophy  by  way  of 
biology  and  because  he  regards  the  intellect  as 
an  instrument  formed  for  action,  rather  than  for 
speculation.  Yet  he  is  equally  sure  that  we 
may  arrive  at  absolute  knowledge.  Science 
more  and  more  penetrates  into  the  mysteries  of 
the  nature  of  matter,  while  through  intuition 
we  know  life  from  the  inside.  Our  knowledge 
in  both  cases  is  partial,  but  is  valid  and  real  so 
far  as  it  goes.  His  view  of  perception,  as  set 
forth  in  his  "  Matter  and  Memory,"  is  not  far 
from  that  of  common  sense,  and  will  be  more 
easily  understood  by  the  average  tliouglitful 
man  than  by  those  who  have  been  sophisticated 
through  long  familiarity  with  metaphysical  dis- 
putations. The  living  body  in  general  and  the 
nervous  system  in  particular  are  only  channels 
for  the  transmission  of  movements ;  their  func- 
tion is  to  convert  stimuli  into  reactions.  The 
brain  does  not  produce  representations  of  the 
rest  of  the  universe,  for  that  would  mean  tliat  in 
some  sense  it  contains  the  material  world  of 
which  it  is  itself  but  a  part.      To  make  of  the 


i 


MODERN  SPIRIT  69 

brtain  the  condition  of  the  image  of  the  totality 
of  things  is  to  contradict  ourselves,  since  the 
brain  is  by  hypothesis  a  part  of  that  image. 
Bergson  thus  avoids  the  snare  into  which  many 
unwary  thinkers  have  fallen.  Schopenhauer, 
for  instance,  said  that  the  world  was  his  Vorstel- 
lung;  matter  was  mere  idea.  And  if  you  ask 
for  his  reason,  you  are  told  that  thought  is  a 
function  of  the  brain.  The  procedure  of  the 
author  of  the  "  Grammar  of  Science  "  is  sub- 
stantially the  same.  Thus  literary  men  and 
scientists,  who  are  strong  in  their  own  depart- 
ments but  without  discipline  in  philosophy, 
sometimes  repeat  the  mistakes  of  the  ages.  Be- 
cause of  the  brilliant  and  interesting  style  of  the 
writers  and  the  prestige  of  the  students  of  na- 
ture, both  get  a  hearing  and  tend  to  confuse  the 
situation. 

Such  assumptions  and  such  thinking  can  only 
lead  to  the  inconsistent  mixture  of  materialism 
and  idealism  which  Schopenhauer's  philosophy 
presents.  The  first  chapter  of  "  Matter  and 
Memory  "  clears  many  of  these  difficulties  away. 
Bergson  there  shows  that  if  we  begin  with  the 
assumption  that  the  ph^^sical  world  is  reality 
and  that  conscious  perception  and  thought  are 
only  epiphenomcna,  or  by-products  of  cerebral 
activity,  we  thereby  make  them  out  to  be  a  mere 
accident,  a  myster}-.  On  the  contrary,  if  we 
start  from  the  idealistic  rather  than  the  material- 


70  BERGSON  AND  THE 

istic  point  of  view,  Ave  become  unable  to  account 
for  the  order  of  nature.  We  find  it  necessary  to 
invoke  the  assistance  of  some  deus  ex  machina 
or  theory  of  prc-estabhshed  harmony  between 
matter  and  spirit.  That  is,  for  idealism  science 
is  an  accident  and  its  success  a  mystery. 

All  is  simplified  if  we  assume  that  between 
things  as  they  are  and  things  as  they  are  con- 
sciously perceived,  there  is  a  difference,  not  of 
nature  but  of  degree.  There  is  more  in  objects 
than  in  perception,  for  while  perception  does  not 
produce  representations  or  images,  it  does  select 
them ;  it  picks  out  those  aspects  of  reality  which 
interest  us  in  a  practical  way  and  with  which 
our  action  is  concerned.  We  must  never  think 
of  the  brain  as  a  camera,  for  the  picture  is  al- 
ready taken.  Pure  perception  is  something 
given,  it  is  a  part  of  things  rather  than  of  us. 
(By  pure  perception  Bcrgson  means  what  would 
be  left  of  a  perception  if  tliere  were  taken  away 
the  apperceptive  part  of  it,  the  clement  of  mem- 
ory and  recognition.)  It  knows  the  sensible 
qualities  of  matter  in  itself,  from  tlio  Inside,  that 
is,  absolutely.  The  difference  between  physical 
and  mental,  from  tliis  point  of  view,  is  a  matter 
of  degree,  the  perception  containing,  or  ratlier 
being,  a  part  of  tlie  complete  reality  of  tlie  ol)- 
ject  perceived.  In  matter  tliere  is  something 
more,  not  something  different,  from  what  is 
actually  given. 


MODERN  SPIRIT  71 

Human  action,  however,  is  not  a  simple  reflex 
response.  The  hght  of  the  past  is  brought  to 
bear  on  the  present  situation ;  memoi'y  is  an  es- 
sential element  in  every  perception;  the  part  of 
us  that  lives  or  endures  and  grows  through  time 
is  always  present,  and  this  is  the  subjective 
phase  of  the  process.  The  distinction  between 
subject  and  object,  therefore,  not  a  distinction 
between  inside  and  outside ;  it  is  not  in  any  sense 
a  matter  of  space,  but  of  time.  Bergson  sum- 
marizes his  position  thus :  "  My  knowledge  of 
matter  is,  then,  not  subjective,  as  it  is  for  Eng- 
lish idealism,  nor  relative  as  Kantian  idealism 
would  have  it.  It  is  not  subjective  because  it 
is  in  things  rather  than  in  me.  It  is  not  rela- 
tive because  the  relation  of  the  phenomenon  to 
the  thing  in  itself  is  not  that  of  the  appearance 
to  the  reality,  but  that  of  the  part  to  the  whole." 

It  has  not  been  easy  to  think  such  thoughts 
since  Descartes's  time.  Some  of  our  most  seri- 
ous metaphysical  difficulties  date  from  that  mira- 
cle of  clearness  and  consistency.  The  great 
distinction  which  he  drew,  and  from  the  lack  of 
which  previous  thought  had  been  more  or  less  of 
a  blur,  was  that  between  consciousness  and  ex- 
tension, the  one  being  the  essential  characteristic 
of  mind,  the  otlier  that  of  matter.  But  having 
made  this  distinction,  we  have  h^'postatized  it, 
and  have  exaggerated  a  difference  into  an  oppo- 
sition of  nature.     What  are  only  distinguishable 


72  BERGSON  AND  THE 

aspects  of  reality  we  have  made  into  antagonistic 
essences  or  natures.  So,  having  arbitrarily  put 
asunder  what  belongs  together,  we  have  never 
since  been  able  to  unite  the  two  phases  of  ex- 
istence in  any  satisfactory  way.  We  have  di- 
chotomized our  universe,  and  the  resulting  an- 
tinomies have  never  ceased  to  distress  our  minds. 
The  body  is  conceived  of  as  part  of  the  material 
universe,  which  is  thought  of  as  a  closed  sys- 
tem. Energy  is  ceaselessly  being  transformed, 
and  the  S3'stem  of  the  ultimate  particles  of  mat- 
ter constantly  changes  its  configuration.  But 
since  all  physical  results  must  have  physical 
causes,  our  conscious  life  seems  superfluous.  It 
is  hard  to  see  how  it  can  be  in  the  interstices  of 
the  system,  either  as  a  cause  or  an  effect  of 
physical  changes.  If  I  go  to  my  dinner,  all  the 
movements  of  my  body  are  physical  and  have 
physical  causes ;  it  is  inconceivable  that  the  con- 
scious idea  of  a  beefsteak  should  set  the  machin- 
ery'^ in  motion.  We  seem  logically  driven  to 
materialism  or  psycho-physical  parallelism,  views 
which  in  turn  quickly  prove  untenable. 

For,  after  all,  what  we  know  best  is  our  con- 
scious life,  and  it  is  a  tiling  of  purpose.  It  is 
essentially  a  striving  after  ends,  and  the  high- 
est ends  we  call  ideals.  That  is,  it  is  literally 
true  that  life  rests  on  ideal  foundations.  It  is  a 
process  of  striving  for  the  realization  of  con- 
ceived and  desired  goods.      But,  from  fliis  point 


MODERN  SPIRIT  73 

of  view,  the  disquieting  antinomy  remains. 
Having  defined  matter  and  mind,  purpose  and 
physical  process,  as  entirely  different  in  nature, 
it  has  become  impossible  to  understand  how 
either  can  influence  or  be  influenced  by  the  other. 
Hegel  said  that  we  must  remember  that  differ- 
ences are  not  absolute,  but  fall  within  a  more  in- 
clusive unity.  That  there  is  truth  in  this  view 
is  hardly  open  to  reasonable  doubt,  and  probably 
no  one  would  doubt  it  except  for  past  overstate- 
ments of  it  which  have  in  turn  led  to  caricatures, 
the  result  being  that  it  has  fallen  into  discredit. 
Bergson's  view  of  perception,  his  doctrine 
that  the  reality  perceived  is  physical  or  mental 
according  as  we  consider  the  whole  of  the  object 
or  merely  those  parts  of  it  that  are  of  practical 
concern  to  us,  has  a  technical  name,  being  known 
among  philosophers  as  the  theory  of  immanence, 
or  epistemological  monism.  It  is  held  in  a 
somewhat  different  form  by  Mach  and  Avena- 
rius,  and  seems  to  be  regarded  with  increasing 
favor  by  modern  thinkers.  Prof.  R.  B.  Perry 
makes  it  the  basis  of  a  realistic  philosophy  of 
mind  and  life.  It  seems  to  offer  a  way  of  escape 
from  the  circle  in  which  we  have  so  long  been 
going  round  and  round.  Nothing  more  can  be 
hoped  for  from  any  investigation  along  Kantian 
and  post-Kantian  lines.  It  has  long  been  evi- 
dent that  the  problem  has  been  wrongly  stated 
and  that  something  is  the  matter  with  our  as- 


74  BERGSON  AND  THE 

sumptions.  We  cannot  think  effectively  in 
terms  of  phenomenon  and  thing  in  itself,  of  a 
timeless  Absolute,  of  a  subject  whose  structural 
activity  constitutes  the  phenomenal  world  and 
gives  nature  its  laws ;  in  short,  progress  must  be 
around  Kant  rather  than  through  him.  In  this 
advance,  Bergson  is  one  of  the  leaders.  The 
reader  of  "  Matter  and  Memory  "  ought  not, 
therefore,  to  be  discouraged  by  the  novelty  of 
the  view,  for  this  is  the  direction  in  which  the 
best  thought  is  now  moving.  It  is  also  to  be  re- 
membered that  the  difficulty  in  understanding  is 
largely  due  to  fixed  habits  of  thought  on  the 
part  of  tlie  reader,  rather  than  to  any  lack  of 
expository  power  on  the  part  of  the  philosopher. 
Bergson's  ideas  cannot  be  pigeon-holed  in  the 
familiar  Kantian  categories.  What  is  neces- 
sary is  a  new  way  of  thinking,  and  those  who 
have  not  mental  vitality  and  plasticity  enough 
to  permit  of  this  should  take  to  other  pursuits ; 
philosophy  is  not  for  tliem.  INIoreover,  even 
when  we  recognize  the  defects  of  our  habitual 
thoughts  and  rise  to  a  higher  point  of  view,  we 
find  ourselves  continually  slipping  back.  The 
world-view  with  which  we  first  become  familiar 
has  an  influence  over  our  after  years  altogether 
out  of  proportion  to  its  value.  We  may  be 
forced  by  advancing  knowledge  to  give  it  up, 
but  there  is  always  danger  of  a  relapse.  Thus, 
in  my  college  days,  I  received  the  impression  that 


MODERN  SPIRIT  75 

the  bright  sunrise  of  civilization  took  place  in 
the  glorious  creative  centuries  of  classic  Greece. 
Egypt,  Assyria,  Babylon, —  I  knew  of  them,  but 
they  seemed  vague  and  shadowy.  Now  that  re- 
cent discoveries  have  immensely  widened  our 
horizon,  we  are  forced  to  think  of  Greek  culture 
itself  as  a  sort  of  renaissance.  This  is  very 
clear  when  we  are  engaged  in  archaeological 
studies,  but  I  sometimes  find  that  these  things 
have  slipped  from  my  mind  and  that  I  have 
fallen  back  into  the  view  of  history  acquired  in 
my  student  days.  In  such  a  case,  there  is  no 
help  except  in  frequent  and  long  consideration 
of  the  true  situation.  And  when  we  have  to 
deal  with  a  philosopher  who  has  a  new  vision 
and  brings  a  new  method,  there  is  no  way  of  un- 
derstanding him  except  through  long  comrade- 
ship with  his  mind.  The  casual  and  cursory 
reader  of  Bergson  will  derive  but  little  profit 
from  his  labor.  This  is  true  of  all  philosophers, 
but  it  is  particularly  true  of  him.  For  he  ac- 
knowledges frankly  that  he  himself  experiences 
difficulty  in  keeping  to  his  point  of  view.  Being 
a  philosopher  in  this  sense  goes  against  the 
grain.  It  is  easy  to  follow  the  natural  bent  of 
the  intellect  and  to  deal  with  those  aspects  of 
nature  which  arc  of  practical  concern.  But  in- 
sight is  different  from  reasoning  and  more  diffi- 
cult ;  to  attain  it,  one  must  reverse  the  current  of 
mental  life  and  assume  an  attitude  which  it  is 


76  BERGSON 

not  easy  to  maintain.  In  his  preface  to  the 
English  translation  of  "  Matter  and  Memory," 
Bergson  says  that  "  The  reader  will  find  his  way 
through  the  complexity  of  that  work  if  he  keeps 
a  fast  hold  on  the  two  principles  which  we  have 
used  as  a  clew  throughout  our  own  researches. 
The  first  is  that  in  psj^chological  analysis  we 
must  never  forget  the  utilitarian  character  of 
our  mental  functions,  which  are  essentially 
turned  toward  actions.  The  second  is  that  the 
habits  formed  in  action  find  their  way  up  to  the 
sphere  of  speculation,  where  they  create  fictitious 
problems,  and  that  metaphysics  must  begin  by 
dispersing  this  artificial  obscurity."  Which  is 
saying  with  perfect  clearness  that  whatever 
value  pragmatism  may  have  in  practical  life,  it 
incapacitates  us  for  metaphysics.  So  far  from 
being  a  method  for  the  solution  of  the  world's 
higher  problems,  it  is  really  the  pragmatic  way 
of  thinking  and  habit  of  mind  that  has  created 
them. 


CHAPTER  VI 

BERGSON'S    PHILOSOPHY    AND    PHYS- 
ICAL SCIENCE 

If  this  outline  of  Bergson's  philosophy  seems 
appreciative  rather  than  critical,  it  is  intention- 
ally so.  I  wish  his  constructions  to  have  a 
chance.  It  is  an  old  maxim  that  we  must  try 
all  things  and  hold  fast  to  that  which  is  good. 
If  we  are  not  to  accept  in  an  uncritical  way  a 
mass  of  conflicting  and  absurd  opinions,  every 
new  thought-proposal  must  be  subjected  to  thor- 
ough examination.  Still,  there  are  critics  and 
critics,  and  a  very  small-minded  logician  might 
reject,  as  inconsistent  with  his  intellectual 
scheme,  great  truths  that  life  and  reality  have 
abundant  room  for.  The  great  question  is, — 
What  light  does  Bergson's  thought  shed  on  our 
gi'eatest  problems,  what  can  he  do  for  clear, 
consistent  and  constructive  thinking  in  physical 
and  biological  science,  in  psychology,  philoso- 
phy and  religion.''  The  following  discussion  is 
by  no  means  merely  an  exposition  of  his  view  of 
the  relation  of  the  ph3'^sical  sciences  to  biology 

and  of  both  to  philosophy-,  but  is  rather  an  at- 

77 


78  BERGSON  AND  THE 

tempt  to  state  a  situation  which  he  has  helped 
to  make  clear. 

One  of  the  reasons  why  it  is  probable  that  a 
new  era  in  philosophy  will  date  from  Bergson  is 
that  he  is  the  first  thinker  of  his  class  to  take 
into  account  the  data  of  biology  and  psychology. 
It  was  the  misfortune  of  Descartes  and  Kant 
to  have   lived   before   these   sciences   had  made 
much  progress.      Science  for  them  was  mathe- 
matics and  physics,  and  it  was  natural  that  they 
should  cherish  the  mathematical  ideal  of  knowl- 
edge.     But  there  is  much  knowledge  which  is 
not  of  the  kind  these  thinkers  prized  most,  and 
one  is  hindered  in  philosophical  thinking  rather 
than  helped  by  such  an  ideal,  since  it  tends  to 
prevent    appreciation    of  the   non-mathematical 
aspects  of  reality.     The  fact  is  that  not  one  of 
the  categories  which  we  successfully  use  in  phys- 
ical and  mathematical  investigations  applies  ex- 
actly to  the  things  of  life.     As  Bergson  says : 
"  All  the  molds  crack.     They  are  too  narrow, 
above  all,  too  rigid,  for  wliat  we  try  to  put  into 
them.     Our  reasoning,  so  sure  of  itself  among 
things  inert,  feels  ill  at  ease  on  this  new  ground. 
It  would  be  difficult  to  cite  a  biological  discovery 
due  to  pure  reasoning.     And  most  often,  when 
experience   has   finally   shown   how   life   goes   to 
work  to  obtain  a  result,  wc  find  its  way  of  work- 
ing is  just  that  of  which  wo  should  never  have 
thought."     This  reminds  us  of  the  statement  of 


MODERN  SPIRIT  79 

a  great  psychologist  that  "  growth  is  essentially 
alogical." 

The  philosopher  who  comes  to  the  study  of  a 
world  which  includes  life,  and  who  tries  to  com- 
prehend it  through  concepts  derived  from  mathe- 
matics and  mechanics,  is  like  a  man  who  makes 
an  effort  to  put  a  five-fingered  hand  in  a  three- 
fingered  glove.  He  assumes  to  classify  without 
an  adequate  number  of  classes.  When  Euro- 
peans first  came  to  America,  the  natives  called 
their  sailing  vessels  birds,  their  guns  walking- 
sticks,  the  white  men  themselves  being  classified 
as  goblins  or  gods.  That  is,  the  savages  were 
like  an  office  man  without  a  sufficient  number  of 
pigeon-holes  in  his  desk.  They,  therefore,  did 
what  we  all  do :  they  sought  to  classify  the  new 
experiences  under  the  old  heads.  Such  classify- 
ing, such  subsuming,  is  what  we  ordinarily  mean 
by  knowing.  Says  Bergson :  "  Plato  was  the 
first  to  set  up  the  theory  that  to  know  the  real 
consists  in  finding  its  Idea;  that  is  to  say,  in 
forcing  it  into  a  pre-existing  frame  already  at 
our  disposal,  as  if  we  implicitly  possessed  uni- 
versal knowledge.  But  this  belief  is  natural  to 
the  human  intellect,  always  engaged  as  it  is  in 
determining  under  what  former  heading  it  shall 
catalogue  any  new  object;  and  it  may  be  said 
that,  in  a  certain  sense,  we  are  all  born  Plato- 
nists." 

We  can  easily  see  what  was  the  trouble  with 


80  BERGSON  AND  THE 

the  savages :  it  was  their  poverty  of  categories. 
But  how  is  it  that  we  make  absolute  judgments 
about  everything  without  suspecting  that  we, 
too,  need  new  concepts?  Yet  we  are  most  re- 
luctant to  acknowledge  this  defect,  even  when 
it  is  pointed  out.  "  The  idea  that  for  a  new  ob- 
ject we  might  have  to  create  a  new  concept,  per- 
haps a  new  method  of  thinking,  is  deeply  repug- 
nant to  us."  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why 
many  will  find  Bergson  difficult,  if  not  unintelli- 
gible. They  will  approach  him  with  their  little 
ready-made  sj'stem  of  thought-frames,  and,  as 
he  will  not  fit  into  them,  they  will  have  no  place 
to  put  the  truth  that  he  teaches.  Now  philoso- 
phers have  gcncrall^f  come  to  their  problems  by 
way  of  mathematics  and  physical  science,  and 
have  naturally  but  vainly  sought  to  apply  the 
categories  they  brought  with  them  to  the  proc- 
esses of  life.  This  was  perhaps  inevitable, 
since  biology  has  been  so  late  in  its  development. 
What  is  necessary  is  some  new  categories,  con- 
cepts, thought-frames,  or,  rather,  a  new  way  of 
thinking.  For  the  life  process  will  not  fit  into 
any  frame.  It  is  to  be  understood  only  by  sym- 
pathy, instinct,  intuition. 

Philosophy  must  then  abandon  the  mathemat- 
ical ideal  when  it  deals  with  the  things  of  life. 
It  must  cultivate  the  power  of  insight,  of  intui- 
tion, and  to  the  truth  concerning  life  that  comes 
through  %'ision  it  must  unite  the  truth  concern- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  81 

ing  the  material  world  derived  through  percep- 
tion and  conceptual  thought.  To  a  philosophy 
that  thus  "  takes  into  account  the  whole  of  what 
is  given,"  the  future  surely  belongs. 

As  this  matter  has  very  great  practical  as 
well  as  theoretical  importance,  I  beg  the  indul- 
gence of  the  gentle  reader  while  I  try  to  make 
clear  a  distinction  necessary  not  only  for  the 
understanding  of  Bergson,  but  also  for  effective 
thinking  on  the  greater  problems  of  life.  If 
we  mix  things  in  thinking,  we  will  mix  them  in 
action,  and  it  is  therefore  worth  while  to  make 
every  effort  to  be  clear.  Materialism  and  de- 
terminism in  philosophy  and  their  blighting  ef- 
fects on  the  higher  human  life  are  in  part  due 
to  a  confusion  of  thought  about  the  nature  of 
concepts  and  their  relation  to  the  concrete  world 
of  perceptual  experience.  For  instance,  mathe- 
matical knowledge,  which  is  ideally  exact,  is  not 
knowledge  of  nature  at  all,  and  the  knowledge 
of  nature  and  life  can  never  be  mathematically 
precise. 

It  is  easy  to  justify  this  statement.  Take, 
e.  g.,  geometry,  which  deals  with  points,  lines, 
surfaces,  angles,  etc.  Every  real  triangle  — 
that  is,  every  triangle  that  we  can  feel  or  see  — 
is  only  an  approximation  to  a  perfect  figure. 
The  lines  constituting  its  sides  are  not  perfectly 
straight,  and  they  have  a  certain  breadth, 
whether  we  draw  them  on  paper,  the  blackboard. 


82  BERGSON  AND  THE 

in  the  sand  or  make  them  of  wood  or  metal. 
With  this  concrete  triangle  of  our  perceptual 
experience  geometry  has  nothing  to  do.  It 
deals  with  an  ideal  figure,  formed  in  the  mind, 
or  by  the  mind,  through  our  power  of  carrying 
to  a  limit  in  the  imagination  qualities  which  we 
have  perceived.  We  perceive  imperfect,  con- 
crete, geometrical  figures,  but  we  can  conceive 
of  perfect  ones.  Now  these  perfect  triangles, 
circles,  etc.,  are  ideals,  abstractions,  concepts, 
and  geometry  deals  exclusively  with  these. 
Mathematics  is,  then,  not  a  knowledge  of  nature 
at  all.  It  moves  wholly  in  the  region  of  con- 
cepts, abstractions.  And  the  same  is  true  of 
physics  and  mechanics,  so  far  as  these  sciences 
are  mathematical.  In  the  problem  of  the  lever, 
for  instance,  in  our  calculations  we  substitute 
for  all  real  levers,  such  as  crow-bars  and  hoe- 
handles,  a  rigid  straight  line:  tlie  fulcrum  is 
conceived  of  as  a  point,  and  the  weight  to  be 
lifted  as  an  abstract  mass.  How  can  any  one 
fail  to  see  that  in  all  such  cases  the  calculator 
is  dealing  i0ith  pure  ideals,  just  as  truly  as  if  he 
were  a  poet?  In  the  concrete  world  those  con- 
cepts are  useful  so  far  as  they  are  applicable. 
To  the  extent  that  a  crow-bar  is  like  a  rigid 
straight  line,  what  is  true  of  the  line  will  prove 
true  of  the  crow-bar.  So  far  as  the  concrete 
conditions  are  identical  with  the  ideal,  abstract, 
or  conceptual  conditions,  that  far  will  the  cal- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  83 

culations  work.  And  they  do  work  sufficiently 
well  to  be  useful,  but  all  the  exactness  is  in  the 
realm  of  concepts. 

It  is  the  same  with  necessity.  There  is  no 
necessity  except  in  the  realm  of  concepts.  Given 
this,  then  something  else  logically  follows.  If 
life  were  no  more  than  an  interplay  of  concepts, 
the  determinist  might  make  out  his  case.  But 
there  is  vastly  more  in  anything  than  in  our 
concept  of  that  thing,  there  is  more  in  life  than 
in  any  man's  thought  of  life.  The  bankruptcy 
of  thought  is  always  due  to  failure  to  remember 
this  fact.  The  concepts  we  form  are  frames  for 
enclosing  fact,  and,  however  useful  they  may  be 
in  enabling  us  to  order  our  experience,  they  are 
only  frames,  while  experience  is  infinitely  rich. 

Mathematics,  then,  and  the  physical  sciences 
so  far  as  they  are  mathematical,  are  clearly  seen 
to  be  a  set  of  consistencies.  Knowledge  of  na- 
ture is  knowledge  of  the  extent  to  which  they 
apply.  There  are  aspects  of  the  world  process 
which  our  formulae  approximately  describe. 
But  these  formulae  in  themselves  make  no  state- 
ments as  to  external  or  objective  existence.  The 
extent  to  which  the  concepts  of  physical  science 
apply  is  in  every  case  to  be  determined  empiric- 
ally. Now  science  is  successful  because  its  way 
of  conceiving  physical  processes  enables  us  in 
some  measure  to  control  them.  From  our  ex- 
perience with  the  physical  world  we  arrive  at 


84  BERGSON  AND  THE 

certain  ideas  or  concepts  which  we  proceed  to  de- 
fine, to  make  precise.  We  then  study  the  logical 
relations  of  these  ideas,  and  having  reached  cer- 
tain conclusions  we  take  them  back  into  the 
region  of  experience  which  first  suggested  them, 
and  it  is  sometimes  our  good  fortune  to  find  that 
nature  justifies  our  expectations. 

In  the  enthusiasm  of  our  success,  however,  it 
is  easy  to  forget,  and  we  often  do  forget,  that 
these  principles  are  of  limited  application. 
They  describe  certain  aspects  of  reality  only. 
They  apply  to  artificial  systems  which  our 
thought  isolates  in  the  concrete  whole.  The 
real  whole  may  well  be  a  life,  as  Bergson  con- 
tends, and  as  Fcchner  divined  long  ago.  If 
there  is  a  soul  of  goodness  in  things  evil,  there 
is  often  a  soul  of  truth  in  writings  so  imaginary 
and  even  fantastic  as  Fechner's  "  Zend-Avesta." 
Because  we  succeed  when  we  conceive  of  inor- 
ganic nature  as  composed  of  atoms  or  electrons 
moving  in  accord  with  laws  capable  of  mathe- 
matical statement,  it  does  not  follow  that  there 
is  nothing  in  organic  beings  or  in  the  universe 
as  a  whole  that  is  not  theoretically  capable  of 
statement  in  similar  terms.  Bergson  puts  it 
thus :  "  The  question  is  whether  the  natural 
systems  which  we  call  living  beings  must  be  as- 
similated to  the  artificial  systems  tliat  science 
cuts  out  within  inert  matter,  or  wliother  they 
must  not  rather  be  compared  to  that  natural  sys- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  85 

tern  which  is  the  whole  of  the  universe.  That 
Hfe  is  a  kind  of  mechanism  I  cordially  agree. 
But  is  it  the  mechanism  of  parts  artificially  iso- 
lated within  the  whole  of  the  universe,  or  is  it 
the  mechanism  of  the  real  whole?  The  real 
whole  might  well  be,  we  conceive,  an  indivisible 
continuity.  The  systems  we  cut  out  within  it 
would,  properly  speaking,  not  then  be  parts  at 
all ;  they  would  be  partial  views  of  the  whole. 
And,  with  these  partial  views  put  end  to  end, 
you  will  not  make  even  a  beginning  of  the  re- 
construction of  the  whole,  any  more  than,  by 
multiplying  photographs  of  an  object  in  a  thou- 
sand different  aspects,  you  will  reproduce  the 
object  itself.  So  of  life  and  of  the  physico- 
chemical  phenomena  to  which  you  endeavor  to 
reduce  it.  Analysis  will  undoubtedly  resolve 
the  process  of  organic  creation  into  an  ever 
growing  number  of  physico-chemical  phenomena, 
and  chemists  and  physicists  will  have  to  do,  of 
course,  with  nothing  but  these.  But  it  does  not 
follow  that  physics  and  chemistry  will  ever  give 
us  the  key  to  life." 

It  is  important  here  to  guard  against  misun- 
derstanding. Bergson  is  not  warning  the  phys- 
icists and  chemists  away  from  the  realm  of  life, 
or  seeking  to  limit  the  scope  of  their  researches 
in  any  way.  It  is  in  fact  their  duty  to  proceed 
as  they  are  doing'  and  to  explain  on  their  prin- 
ciples all  that  is  so  explicable.     How  far  they 


86  BERGSON  AND  THE 

can  go  can  not  be  settled  a  priori,  but  must  be 
detei-mined  empirically.  But  the  extension  of 
their  methods  as  far  as  they  prove  to  be  of  use 
is  one  thing;  to  assert  that  there  is  nothing  in 
life  not  describable  in  physical  and  chemical 
terms  is  something  entirely  different.  The  for- 
mer is  the  procedure  of  the  man  of  science,  the 
latter  that  of  the  a  priori  philosopher.  When 
the  same  man  essays  to  act  in  both  roles,  we  may 
accept  him  in  the  one  and  reject  him  in  the 
other. 

It  is  a  curious  fact  that  men  of  science  who 
make  excursions  into  philosophy  often  do  not 
realize  how  a  priori  they  are.  They  would  not 
think  of  making  assertions  about  any  other  sub- 
ject which  they  liave  not  studied,  but  they  occa- 
sionally act  as  if  training  in  psychology  and  phi- 
losophy were  wholly  unnecessary.  It  is  not  likely 
tliat  such  mistakes  will  long  continue  to  be  made, 
since  investigators  are  more  and  more  interested 
in  examining  the  foundations  and  presupposi- 
tions of  their  respective  sciences.  But  many 
readers  of  popular  science  have  very  confused 
notions  about  the  relations  of  concepts  to  things. 
It  is,  therefore,  of  the  liighest  importance  to 
bring  about  a  general  understanding  of  the  fact 
that  while  the  data  of  matliematics  are  drawn 
from  experience,  they  are  only  suggestions  of 
the  abstractions,  the  ideals,  the  perfect  figures, 
with  which  mathematics  deals.     After  the  start 


MODERN  SPIRIT  87 

has  been  made,  the  physical  world  could  cease 
to  exist  without  detriment  to  mathematics, 
which  is  henceforth  a  logical  procedure.  Phys- 
ical science,  also,  ignores  all  but  the  physical  as- 
pects of  reality.  It  does  this  necessarily.  It 
cannot  do  its  work  unless  it  restricts  itself  to 
the  field  it  has  chosen,  and  for  the  time  ignores 
metaphysics  and  poetry.  This  is  entirely  right. 
Evil  results  ensue  only  when  physical  science  is 
made  into  metaphysics,  and  it  is  assumed  that 
the  aspects  of  reality  which  it  studies  are  funda- 
mental, and  that,  consequently,  life  and  con- 
sciousness and  purpose  are  incidental,  or  epi- 
phenomenal.  In  such  a  metaphysics,  freedom 
and  purpose  are  excluded  by  definition.  Berg- 
son  claims  that  w^e  should  not  make  the  assump- 
tion that  the  most  abstract  concepts  are  funda- 
mental and  the  chief  characteristic  of  reality, 
but  that  we  should  build  on  the  idea  of  life, 
which  is  the  richest  and  most  inclusive  of  ideas. 
If  we  do  this,  there  will  be  room  in  our  philoso- 
phy for  all  the  manifold  peculiarities  of  life,  for 
consciousness,  purpose  and  freedom,  and  there 
will  also  be  a  place  for  physics  and  mathematics, 
since  life  has  the  aspects  with  which  these  sci- 
ences deal.  We  can  always  go  from  more  to  the 
less,  from  the  concrete  to  the  abstract,  but  we 
cannot  construct  an  adequate  theory  of  life  out 
of  concepts  derived  solely  from  a  consideration 
of  its  physical  aspects.     If  we  wish  to  know  life, 


88  BERGSON 

we  must  recognize  its  non-mathematical  quali- 
ties. In  short,  our  metaphysics  must  be  em- 
pirical. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  ANSWER  OF  THE  MECHANISTS 

The  reverence  for  science  is  at  present  so 
great  that  when  a  new  idea  or  theory  is  an- 
nounced, many  reserve  their  decision  until  they 
learn  what  men  of  science  think  about  the  sub- 
ject, and  with  the  pronouncement  of  this  author- 
ity they  do  not  presume  to  differ.  They  accept 
the  principle, —  scientia  locuta  est,  causa  finita 
est.  When  a  philosopher  appears  whose  con- 
struction involves  a  very  definite  interpretation 
of  science,  the  public  naturally  awaits  with  some 
interest  the  response  of  the  investigators ;  it 
wishes  to  know  how  the  new  theory  is  regarded 
by  the  mathematicians,  physicists,  chemists,  and 
biologists.  In  the  case  of  Prof.  Bergson,  we 
have  not  had  long  to  wait.  There  has  just  ap- 
peared a  book,  entitled  "  Modern  Science  and 
the  Illusions  of  Prof.  Bergson,"  by  Hugh  S.  R. 
Elliot,  which  assumes  to  speak  in  the  name  of 
science,  and  by  its  authority  to  condemn  as 
puerile  illusions  the  ideas  of  the  French  philoso- 
pher. The  work  is  introduced  by  Sir  Ray  Lan- 
caster, K.C.B.,  F.R.S.  In  spite  of  this  com- 
mendatory introduction,  this  production  cannot 
89 


90  BERGSON  AND  THE 

be  accepted  as  "  The  Answer  of  Science."  For, 
as  Prof.  G.  Dawes  Hicks  justly  remarks,  the 
author  "  has  no  acute  criticism  to  offer,  and  the 
volume  is  saturated  with  a  kind  of  dogmatism 
which  happily  has  now  become  well-nigh  obso- 
lete among  genuine  thinkers,"  and  "  one  can 
only  express  regret  that  a  distinguished  man  of 
science  should  give  his  sanction  to  anything  so 
futile  and  irrelevant  as  this  volume,  for  the  most 
part,  contains."  The  point  of  view  of  the  critic 
and  his  sponsor  is  clearly  stated.  They  agree 
in  believing  that  science  implies  a  materialistic 
conception  of  nature,  and  they  condemn  in  a 
wholesale  way  as  pernicious  metaphysics  all  non- 
materialistic  views.  In  his  preface.  Sir  R.  Lan- 
caster says :  "  To  me  the  conclusion  has  for 
many  years  commended  itself  —  that  the  ma- 
terialist and  mechanical  scheme  of  nature  (in- 
cluding man's  nature)  elaborated  by  physical 
science,  is  true  and  trustworthy,  whatever  there 
may  be  outside  and  beyond  the  possibilities  of 
human  knowledge."  His  opinion  of  the  value 
of  philosophy  is  curtl}'  stated  thus:  "  Our  uni- 
versity' professors  of  philosophy  arc  maintained, 
it  would  appear,  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  a 
record  of  the  very  various  and  contradictory 
hypotheses  of  this  motley  crowd  of  assailants 
of  a  dead  wall,"  and  he  quotes  with  approval 
the  famous  definition  of  the  metaphysician  as  "  a 
blind  man  in  a  dark  room  hiiniiim  for  a  black 


MODERN  SPIRIT  91 

cat  —  which  is  not  there."  With  such  con- 
tempt for  all  the  great  constructive  efforts  of 
the  human  mind,  i.  e.,  for  all  of  them  which  do 
not  arrive  at  a  materialistic  conception  of  na- 
ture and  history,  it  is  not  strange  that  he  should 
condemn  the  books  of  Bergson  as  "  worthless 
and  unprofitable  matter,  causing  waste  of  time 
and  confusion  of  thought  to  many  of  those  who 
read  them." 

On  turnino;  to  the  book  which  the  distin- 
guishcd  biologist  says  "  effects  the  exposure  "  of 
the  "  illusions  and  perversions  "  of  Bergson  "  in 
a  masterly  way,"  one  finds  the  same  estimate  of 
metaphysics  as  "  a  maze  of  sesquipedalian 
verbiage,"  and  the  frank  avowal  that  "  the  at- 
titude of  this  book  is  purely  mechanistic."  One 
does  not  find,  or  even  expect,  a  lucid  account  of 
the  views  criticised  after  reading  the  author's 
admission  that  he  does  not  understand  them :  — 
"  Holding,  as  I  do,  that  Bergson's  metaphysics 
are  a  cloud  of  words,  carrying  with  them  no 
real  meaning,  it  will  be  necessary  that  an  im- 
partial exposition  should  likewise  be  verbose  and 
cloudy."  This  exposition  may  be  passed  over 
with  the  remark  that  it  bears  but  slight  resem- 
blance to  anything  Bergson  has  ever  said,  and 
that  nothing  helpful  is  to  be  expected  of  an  au- 
tlior  who  can  write  such  a  sentence  as  this : 
"  The  habit  of  using  words  without  any  sig- 
nificance is  almost  a  disease  with  Bergson ;  as 


92  BERGSON  AND  THE 

soon  as  a  phrase  comes  into  his  mind,  which 
sounds  well,  it  all  goes  down  into  his  philosophy 
with  its  meaning  never  once  considered." 

There  is  only  one  objection  urged  by  this 
writer  that  deserves  to  be  considered,  and  this 
for  the  reason  that  he  is  perhaps  speaking  for 
Sir  Ray  Lancaster  on  a  question  of  biological 
fact.  He  attempts  to  make  a  point  against  the 
conclusions  which  Bergson  draws  from  the  simi- 
larity between  the  structure  of  the  eye  in  the 
mollusc  Pecten  and  man.  A  mechanical  biology 
might  conceive  of  such  an  eye  as  built  up  by 
the  accumulation  of  innumerable  minute  varia- 
tions or  a  vast  number  of  happily  and  almost 
miraculously  co-ordinated  variations.  But 
when  it  is  demanded  that  we  conceive  of  two 
such  scries  of  happy  accidents  infinitely  long 
and  yet  parallel,  in  conditions  so  different  as 
those  of  mollusc  and  man,  it  is  clear  that  the 
limits  of  credibility  have  been  passed,  and  that 
the  mechanical  conception  which  requires  such 
impossibilities  of  us  is  in  extremis.  The  the- 
ory of  probabilities  demands  that  we  seek  in 
some  other  direction  for  an  explanation.  Now 
Mr.  Elliot  does  not  lessen  the  force  of  Berg- 
son's  argument  by  showing  that  tlic  Pearly 
Nautilus  has  an  entirely  different  eye,  one  con- 
structed on  the  pin-hole  camera  plan.  The  dif- 
ficulties for  a  purely  mechanical  biology  in  those 
two  scries  of  alterations,  wliich  arc  parallel  in 


MODERN  SPIRIT  93 

every  particular  through  long  ages,  remain. 
The  Pearly  Nautilus  offers  no  special  difficulty 
on  Bergson's  theory  of  adaptation,  not  as  pas- 
sive, but  as  active,  as  of  the  nature  of  the  so- 
lution of  a  problem.  Life,  which  has  developed 
the  two  ways  of  knowing  in  man,  and  which  in 
providing  its  creatures  with  so  many  varied 
means  of  defense,  of  securing  food,  of  cross-fer- 
tilization, etc.,  might  equally  well  under  certain 
conditions  employ  the  pin-hole  camera  device, 
instead  of  a  lens,  for  focusing  light  and  pro- 
ducing vision. 

What  gives  this  book  its  real  value  and  makes 
it  worthy  of  discussion  is  not  its  attempt  to  re- 
fute Bergson,  but  its  contention  that  science 
rests  upon  and  carries  with  it  a  materialistic 
philosophy,  not  only  of  the  physical  universe, 
but  of  life,  not  excepting  that  of  man.  It  con- 
trasts with  Plato,  "  as  the  type  of  all  that  is 
bad  in  metaphysics,"  and  with  German  idealism, 
"  the  thorough  materialism  which  underlies 
modern  science  —  a  materialism  which  may  be 
repudiated  by  men  of  science  themselves,  but 
which  nevertheless  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  their 
efforts."  Speaking  of  Descartes,  the  author 
says  that  "  it  is  not  in  the  denial  of  conscious- 
ness to  animals  that  Descartes  demands  our  ad- 
miration:  it  is  in  the  conception  of  them  as 
highly  complex  machines  or  automata  —  a  con- 
ception  which   in   all   probability   is   absolutely 


94  BERGSON  AND  THE 

correct ;  though,  far  from  being  limited  to  the 
lower  animals,  it  must  be  extended  to  include 
also  the  human  species."  The  following  sen- 
tence deserves  to  be  placed  in  italics :  "  Science 
is  completely,  and  without  exception,  material- 
istic. The  progress  of  science  therefore  neces- 
sarily means  the  progress  of  materialism" 
This  statement  is  more  important  than  it  seems 
to  be,  issuing  as  it  does  from  a  man  whose 
philosophic  heroes  are  Epicurus,  Lucretius,  De 
Lamettrie,  D'Holbach,  Huxley  and  Du  Bois- 
Reymond,  and  who,  on  coming  to  Spinoza  in  his 
survey  of  the  progress  of  philosophy,  remarks, 
"  there  is  nothing  particular  to  say  about  him, 
save  that  he  evolved  his  system  from  the  depths 
of  his  own  mind,  explaining  the  Universe  as  mani- 
festations of  an  infinite  impersonal  substance." 
What  makes  it  significant  is  that  it  expresses 
both  the  conviction  of  some  scientific  men,  such 
as  Sir  Ray  Lancaster,  and  the  popular  impres- 
sion as  to  the  metaphysical  import  of  science. 

Time,  it  is  seldom  put  as  bluntly  as  this. 
According  to  this  writer,  "  the  whole  of  science 
is  built  upon  materialism,  as  tlie  whole  of  chem- 
istry is  built  upon  the  atomic  theory,  and  the 
foundation  is  secure,"  and  "  the  history  of  sci- 
entific discoveries  is  a  history  of  materialistic 
successes,  for  no  scientific  discovery  has  ever  been 
made  that  is  not  based  upon  materialism  and 
mechanism."     IMcn  of  science  are  usually  more 


MODERN  SPIRIT  95 

reserved.  Many  profess  not  to  be  interested  in 
metaphysics  at  all,  and  refuse  to  discuss  the  pre- 
suppositions of  their  investigations.  This  is 
doubtless  due  to  a  feeling  that  it  is  more  profit- 
able to  pursue  their  special  researches  than  to 
inquire  into  their  philosophic  implications ;  and, 
in  the  case  of  teachers,  there  is  the  knowledge 
that  an  avowal  of  a  materialistic  philosophy  may 
arouse  hostility,  since  religiously  trained  stud- 
ents feel  at  once  that  it  threatens  interests  which 
they  have  at  heart.  Still,  Mr.  Elliot  is  possibly 
right  when,  speaking  of  the  theory  that  men  are 
only  conscious  automata,  he  says  that  physiolo- 
gists have  very  generally  adopted  it. 

If  this  be  so,  if  science  necessarily  involves 
and  brings  with  it  a  materialistic  philosophy,  it 
is  important  that  this  fact  be  demonstrated  and 
made  perfectly  clear.  But  if  it  is  true  that  an 
acceptance  of  the  results  of  science  does  not  im- 
ply, or  logically  demand,  the  acceptance  of  such 
a  philosophy,  that  fact  also  ought  to  be  brought 
out  into  the  light.  There  is  a  special  reason 
for  a  clarifying  discussion  in  the  latter  case. 
These  matters  have  more  to  do  with  the  real 
welfare  of  the  average  man  than  we  might  at 
first  suspect.  Many  people  are  hard,  narrow, 
and  unhappy,  and  are  living  without  the  faith, 
hope,  and  peace  which  should  be  every  man's 
possession,  because  their  minds  are  imprisoned 
in    a    little    rigid,    mechanical   philosophy    into 


96  BERGSON  AND  THE 

which  they  are  vainly  trying  to  compress  life. 
Often  they  have  gotten  into  this  sad  state  un- 
awares. Many  of  our  young  men  who  pursue 
scientific  studies  do  not  realize  that  there  is  an 
unconscious  metaphysics  underlying  physical 
science.  As  Bergson  points  out,  the  men  of 
science  often  declare  that  they  have  nothing  to 
do  with  philosophy,  yet,  mixed  up  in  their  de- 
scriptions and  analyses,  there  are  often  meta- 
ph3sical  assumptions  which  the  student  is  led  to 
accept  unsuspectingly,  and  so  he  occasionally 
becomes  a  materialist  without  knowing  it,  and 
even  while  supposing  that  he  has  never  philoso- 
phized. It  is  unrecognized  metaphysics  that  is 
the  greatest  danger. 

Bergson's  critic  will,  therefore,  perform  a 
real  service  if  he  incites  a  discussion  of  these 
fundamental  questions.  In  one  of  tlie  finer 
paragraphs  of  his  book,  he  says  that  "  Between 
the  advocates  and  opponents  of  a  doctrine,  only 
tliat  side  has  anything  to  fear  from  discussion 
which  is  likely  to  be  refuted.  Impartial  discus- 
sion always  makes  for  truth,  and  those  who 
drag  in  emotion,  only  obscure  the  issue  and  pre- 
vent the  elucidation  of  the  Truth.  It  is  in  their 
interest  to  do  this,  only  when  their  faith  is  weak. 
The  stronger  tlieir  conviction,  the  more  will  they 
welcome  an  opportunity  to  defend  it  by  sound 
arguments,  the  greater  will  be  their  resentment 
against  those  who  knowingly  falsify  the  discus- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  97 

sion  bj  emotional  heat.     Magna  est  Veritas,  et 
pravalehit  will  be  their  motto." 

If  we  are  to  accept  the  theory  that  mechanism 
is  universal  not  only  in  the  inorganic  world,  but 
also  in  the  organic,  we  ought  to  do  so  con- 
sciously, and  with  a  full  realization  of  all  that 
necessarily  follows.  Such  a  metaphysics  ought 
not  to  be  adopted  unawares,  merely  as  a  result 
of  a  constant  pre-occupation  with  physical  proc- 
esses which  may  gradually  produce  an  impres- 
sion that  the  deepest  reality  of  the  world  is  a 
vast  number  of  atoms  moving  in  accord  with 
mechanical  laws.  The  materialism  of  most 
young  students  of  science  is  no  more  than  just 
such  an  impression.  The  general  views  of 
reality  in  question  may  be  outlined  as  follows : 
It  is  assumed  that  in  the  universe  there  is  a 
fixed  quantity  of  matter  and  also  a  fixed  quan- 
tity of  energy.  Both  matter  and  energy  un- 
dergo ceaseless  changes  of  form,  but  the  total 
amount  remains  forever  the  same.  What  we 
call  events  are  redistributions  of  matter  and  mo^ 
tion.  A  "  machine  is  an  instrument  for  secur- 
ing that  a  transformation  of  energy  from  one 
specific  form  to  another  specific  form  shall  take 
place  with  regularity."  Nature  makes  machines 
and  man  imitates  her.  On  this  theory,  "  Man 
may  be  defined  as  a  machine  for  converting 
chemical  energy  into  motion."  "  He  is  like  a 
toy  or  puppet,   in   which   the   arms,  legs,   and 


98  BERGSON  AND  THE 

movable  parts,  are  drawn  upwards  and  down- 
wards by  wires.  Only  it  is  a  mechanical  toy,  in 
which  the  wires  work  of  their  own  accord  for  a 
short  time  after  they  have  been  wound  up,  or 
heated,  or  supplied  with  chemical  energy,  such 
as  food." 

This  is  called  the  automaton  theory,  which 
was  espoused  by  Huxley,  and  which  he  named 
epiphenomenalism.  The  essence  of  it  "  is  that 
all  the  actions  of  men  are  explicable  as  purely 
material  and  mechanical  sequences  without  invok- 
ing the  assistance  of  mind  or  consciousness,  or 
anything  but  matter  and  energy  working  un- 
der their  ordinary  laws.  Consciousness  appears 
only  as  an  inert  accompaniment  of  material 
cerebral  changes."  Few,  I  suppose,  of  those 
who  entertain  this  view  realize  all  that  it  im- 
plies. Yet  its  practical  outcome  is  perfectly 
obvious.  There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  con- 
sequences to  which  it  leads  and  which  cannot  be 
escaped  unless  we  renounce  logic,  or,  either  from 
fear  or  from  lack  of  mental  vigor,  arrest  our 
thought  in  its  course.  In  order  that  we  may 
avoid  all  suspicion  of  deliberate  caricature  or  of 
distorting  tlic  theory  by  overstatement  or  in 
any  other  way,  it  will  be  well  to  accept  tlie  for- 
mulation of  Mr.  Elliot,  who  is  spokesman  for 
Sir  Ray  Lancaster,  Prof.  Huxley,  and  the 
mechanists  in  general.  Consciousness,  it  is  de- 
clared, is  "  an  inert  accompanimtnt  of  material 


MODERN  SPIRIT  99 

cerebral  changes."  It  is  not  a  cause  of  bodily 
action,  for  "  Cause  applies  only  to  matter  and 
motion:  it  cannot  be  alleged  in  stating  the  con- 
nection between  mind  and  body."  Thus,  if  I 
desire  to  raise  my  ami  and  in  fact  do  so,  the 
conscious   desire    is   not  the   cause   of   the   act. 

"  The  precedent  to  the  motion  of  the  arm  is 
not  the  mental  desire,  but  the  cerebral  substra- 
tum underlying  the  state  of  consciousness  called 
desire."  "  When  we  examined  this  new  factor 
of  consciousness,  we  found  it  to  be  possessed  of 
no  significance  whatever,  in  accounting  -for  the 
changes  and  events  which  occur  in  our  visible 
and  tangible  world." 

This  is  certainly  explicit  and  clear.  Observe 
the  consequences.  If  consciousness  is  inert,  it 
has  no  more  to  do  with  producing  bodily  action 
than  have  our  shadows ;  if  it  is  without  any  sig- 
nificance in  producing  physical  changes,  then  all 
these  changes  would  go  on  just  as  they  do  if  it 
were  nonexistent.  If  it  does  nothing,  is  per- 
fectly inert,  it  might  cease  to  be,  and  to  a  spec- 
tator of  our  human  affairs  nothing  would  ap- 
pear to  be  changed.  INIcn  and  women  would  act 
as  if  they  suffered  and  enjoyed,  but  no  feeling 
would  accompany  their  gestures  or  cries.  The 
physical  object  we  call  the  hand  of  Shakespeare 
would  hold  a  pen  and  make  the  characters  we 
call  letters,  in  this  way  producing  the  manu- 
script    of    Hamlet.     Actors     would    represent 


100  BERGSON  AND  THE 

Othello,  Desdemona,  Cordelia  and  Lear,  just  as 
they  do  now,  before  masses  of  albuminous  mat- 
ter we  call  men.  For,  according  to  this  con- 
scious automaton  theory,  it  is  a  mistake  to  think 
we  go  to  theaters  and  symphonies  for  the  enjoy- 
ment we  find  there.  What  sets  our  bodies  in 
motion  is  not  the  desire  for  the  pleasant  excite- 
ment, but  the  nervous  accompaniment  of  that  de- 
sire, and  the  nervous  system,  being  part  of  the 
physical  mechanism  of  the  world,  is  entirely  un- 
affected by  consciousness. 

This  theory  asserts  that  what  is  physical  has 
ph3^sical  causes  only,  and  since  the  action  of 
Socrates  in  going  calmly  to  his  death  for  his 
ideals  and  principles  was  a  physical  action,  a 
redistribution  of  matter  and  motion,  his  out- 
ward conduct  would  not  have  been  changed  if 
he  had  been  an  unconscious  instead  of  a  con- 
scious automaton.  Jesus,  with  his  passionate 
sympathy  and  desire  to  save ;  Damiens,  going 
to  live  with  and  die  for  the  lepers  ;  the  mother, 
bending  over  her  beloved  cliild ;  the  scholar,  in 
his  ardent  and  life-long  search  for  truth ;  all 
men,  in  fact,  who  think  tliey  are  really  moved 
by  ideals  and  conscious  purposes,  are  under  the 
same  illusion.  We  are  combustion  engines,  all 
our  actions  are  physically  explicable,  and  no 
motion  that  we  make  is  swen-ed  in  the  least  by 
consciousness,  the  complex  systems  of  materials 
constituting  our  bodies  having  at  each  moment 


MODERN  SPIRIT  101 

a  certain  configuration  which  was  theoretically 
determinable  thousands  of  years  ago.  To  be 
sure,  we  are  conscious,  but  the  consciousness  is 
only  an  epiphcnomenon,  an  inert  accompaniment. 
Like  our  shadows,  it  makes  no  difference  in  any- 
thing we  do.  Without  it,  no  cause  of  physical 
movement  in  the  world  would  be  lost,  the  con- 
stant redistribution  of  matter  and  motion  would 
proceed  in  the  same  way  and  by  the  same  laws. 
We  would  be  born,  seem  to  fall  in  love,  marry 
and  rear  children;  civilizations  would  rise  and 
fall ;  there  would  be  the  outward  form  of  courts 
of  justice  and  of  churches  filled  with  unconscious 
automata  going  through  the  motions  of  singing 
hymns  and  expressing  aspirations  for  a  better 
life.  All  our  human  activities  would  by  the 
hypothesis  go  just  as  well  without  conscious- 
ness as  with  it. 

This  is  not  an  unsympathetic  caricature,  but 
simply  a  statement  of  what  the  theory  of 
epiphenomenalism  comes  to  when  it  is  held  in  a 
thorough-going  and  not  half-hearted  wsiy.  If 
we  arc  only  conscious  automata,  if  consciousness 
accompanies  physical  processes  but  cannot  in- 
fluence them,  we  are  ultimately  driven  to  this. 
Well  may  the  advocate  of  this  view  say  that  he 
who  agrees  with  him  in  regarding  it  as  true  will 
"  not  brood  over  a  false  step  once  taken :  for  he 
knows  that  the  necessity  for  it  was  implicit  in 
the  nebula  of  our  solar  system  myriads  of  ages 


102  BERGSON  AND  THE 

ago,  and  that  the  consequences  of  it  are  simi- 
larly determined."  A  man  of  sense,  when  he  ar- 
rives at  such  a  conclusion,  will  suspect  that 
something  is  wrong  with  the  assumptions  with 
which  he  started.  He  is  much  more  sure  that 
human  life  is  an  affair  of  purpose  than  he  is  of 
the  truth  of  an  abstract  doctrine,  according  to 
which  our  life  is  nothing  more  than  a  puppet 
show.  If  he  is  not  a  philosopher,  he  may  not 
be  able  to  discover  the  source  of  the  difficulty ; 
but  if  he  has  the  good  fortune  to  read  Berg- 
son  he  will  find  the  explanation  of  the  whole 
matter.  Whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  some  of 
his  suggestions,  Bergson  can  hardly  be  wrong 
in  his  conception  of  the  nature  and  function  of 
the  intellect.  Spencer's  definition  of  life,  as  the 
adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  external  re- 
lations, was  valuable  in  that  it  called  attention 
to  the  necessity  of  constant  adjustment  of  the 
organism  to  its  environment.  The  intellect,  ac- 
cording to  Bergson,  is  an  instrument  for  effect- 
ing this  adjustment.  It  has  to  do  with  the 
material  aspects  of  existence,  and  its  concepts 
or  thouglit-framcs,  apply  admirably  in  prac- 
tical life  and  in  physical  science.  When  we 
turn  from  physics  and  chemistry  and  astronomy 
to  tlie  study  of  life,  we  naturally  seek  to  use  the 
same  concepts.  We  treat  tlie  living  like  the 
lifeless.     We  carry  the  old  habits  into  the  new 


MODERN  SPIRIT  103 

field.  We  make,  without  realizing  it,  the  un- 
warranted assumption  that  there  is  no  differ- 
ence between  the  living  and  the  inert,  and  as- 
sume that  life  is  a  mechanism  like  the  arti- 
ficially isolated  systems  and  objects  which 
physics  studies. 

Strictly  regarded,  this  is  not  a  scientific  mode 
of  procedure.  It  is  an  a  priori  acceptance  of  a 
mechanistic  view  of  life,  an  uncritical  assump- 
tion of  the  adequacy  for  biology  and  psychology 
of  thought-frames  formed  to  deal  with  the  inor- 
ganic world.  The  method  of  true  science,  when 
it  seeks  to  understand  an  object,  is  to  study 
that  object  directly.  It  ought  to  do  the  same 
with  life.  And  if  life  is  observed  at  first  hand, 
without  a  priori  theories  brought  over  from 
physical  investigations,  it  will  be  found  to 
possess  the  qualities  which  Bergson  describes,  of 
freedom,  creativeness,  novelty,  incalculability 
and  irreversibility.  The  philosopher  in  this 
case  is  an  empirical  observer,  and  in  stating  what 
he  finds,  and  refusing  to  do  violence  to  facts  or 
to  deny  them  on  the  ground  that  they  do  not 
fit  into  a  theory,  he  is  a  truer  representative  of 
science  than  the  mechanical  biologists  who  de- 
nounce his  perceptions  of  truth  as  illusions. 
There  actually  is  a  difference  between  life  and 
the  lifeless,  and  when  we  try  to  force  the  former 
into  the  concepts  or  frames  developed  to  deal 


104  BERGSON  AND  THE 

with  the  latter,  we  "  feel  these  frames  crack- 
ing." We  are  arbitrary  in  our  procedure,  and 
are  doing  violence  to  the  truth. 

To  understand  life,  we  must  study  it  directly, 
as  biologists  and  psychologists,  and  not  as 
physicists  agreeing  to  look  only  at  its  external 
aspects  and  excluding  consciousness  by  defini- 
tion. This  truth  has  social  consequences  of  the 
first  importance.  The  human  individual  is 
something  more  than  a  machine,  and  unless  the 
individuality  of  his  life  is  regarded,  he  suffers 
injur}'.  The  progress  of  pedagogy  reveals, 
with  increasing  clearness,  the  uniqueness  of  each 
life.  The  adoption  of  a  graded  system  in  the 
schools  was  a  step  forward  in  educational  prog- 
ress. It  was  an  advance  for  the  reason  that, 
when  great  numbers  of  children  arc  to  be  dealt 
with,  some  such  plan  is  a  necessity.  Still,  it  is 
a  system,  a  mechanism,  and  it  was  soon  found 
that  it  rarely  is  perfectly  suited  to  any  child. 
j\fany  children  can  hardly  be  included  in  the 
scheme,  and  some  of  them  are  greatly  injured 
by  the  attempts  of  parents  and  teachers  to  con- 
form their  lives  to  an  alien  and  rigid  school 
mncliine.  As  systems  are  essentially  inelastic, 
efforts  are  now  being  made  to  overcome  the  dif- 
ficulty by  increasing  the  number  of  the  grades, 
so  as  to  take  account  of  differences  between  chil- 
dren that  were  formerly  ignored.  Special 
schools  are  also  being  established  in  the  larger 


MODERN  SPIRIT  105 

cities  for  special  groups,  and  other  devices  are 
being  employed,  all  of  which  tend  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  recognition  of  the  uniqueness  and  in- 
dividuality of  each  human  life. 

It  is  because  of  this  that  all  our  classifications 
of  men  are  more  or  less  unjust.  Laws  are  cruel 
in  their  operation  when  no  provision  is  made 
taking  into  account  the  special  circumstances  of 
the  individual  against  whom  they  are  enforced. 
It  is  for  this  reason,  that  the  probation  officer, 
the  suspended  sentence,  the  indeterminate  sen- 
tence, the  parole,  etc.,  are  being  adopted  by  en- 
lightened peoples  in  their  dealings  with  their  de- 
linquent members.  There  is  no  way  to  be  just 
to  anybody  except  to  treat  him  as  an  individual, 
as  a  person.  Tolstoi's  powerful  story,  "  The 
Resurrection,"  which  contains  so  much  that  is 
painful  and  revolting,  describes,  in  some  of  the 
most  vivid  pages  of  all  literature,  the  inevitable 
consequences  of  dealing  with  men  in  an  imper- 
sonal way.  He  shows  how  many  meet  their 
death  in  tragic  ways,  not  because  they  are 
treated  with  intentional  cruelty,  but  because 
they  are  regarded  abstractly,  as  so  many  units, 
and  are  dealt  with  by  the  state  without  regard 
to  individuality  and  special  needs.     He  says : 

"  If  a  psychological  problem  were  set  to  find 
means  of  making  men  of  our  time  —  Christian, 
humane,  simple,  kind  people  —  perform  the  most 
horrible  crimes  without  feeling  guilty,  only  one 


108  BERGSON 

solution  could  be  devised :  simply  to  go  on  doing 
what  is  being  done  now.  It  is  only  necessary 
that  these  people  should  be  .  .  .  convinced  that 
there  is  a  kind  of  business  .  .  .  which  allows 
men  to  treat  other  men  as  things,  without  having 
human  brotherly  relations  with  them.  ...  It 
all  lies  in  the  fact  that  men  think  there  are  cir- 
cumstances when  one  may  deal  with  human  be- 
ings without  love.  But  there  are  no  such  cir- 
cumstances. We  may  deal  with  things  with- 
out love  —  we  cut  down  trees,  make  bricks,  ham- 
mer iron  without  love  —  but  we  cannot  deal  with 
men  without  it.  .  .  .  JNIutual  love  is  the  funda- 
mental law  of  human  life." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

IJGHT  FROM  BERGSON'S  THEORY  OF 

KNOWLEDGE  UPON  BIOLOGICAL 

PROBLEMS 

The  puzzles  of  evolution,  its  apparently  In- 
soluble difficulties,  are  largely  due  to  the  fact 
that  we  are  studying  life,  not  as  biologists,  but 
as  physicists  and  chemists  and  philosophers  with 
the  mathematical  ideal  of  knowledge.  We  vol- 
untarily renounce  all  categories  except  the 
physical,  and  assume  that  the  development  of 
the  structures  of  organic  beings  must  be  ex- 
plained  on  purely  mechanical  principles.  This 
is  as  if  a  man  should  tie  up  one  hand  that  he 
might  work  better.  The  result  is  what  it  was 
bound  to  be,  if  life  not  only  has  physical  as- 
pects, but  is  something  more  besides.  For  many 
years  now  we  have  been  trying  to  regard  liv- 
ing creatures  as  machines  and  the  infinite  va- 
riety of  their  structures  as  due  to  the  accumu- 
lation of  small  differences  or  variations,  more  or 
less  accidental  in  origin,  and  preserved  by  nat- 
ural selection.  But  the  difficulties  are  too  nu- 
merous   and    too    great.      Outer   conditions    can 

eliminate  variations,  but  how  can  they  produce 
107 


108  BERGSON  AND  THE 

them?  B}'  adaptation?  But  this  is  an  ambigu- 
ous word.  Life  is  not  shaped  by  external  con- 
ditions as  water  is  by  the  vessel  that  contains  it. 
The  response  is  not  passive,  but  active ;  it  is  often 
of  the  nature  of  the  solution  of  a  problem.  The 
progressive  formation  of  the  eye,  its  develop- 
ment from  a  sensitive  pigment  spot  to  the  mar- 
velously  complex  visual  organ  of  man,  is  prac- 
tically inconceivable  without  the  intervention  of 
other  than  mechanical  causes.  For,  as  Berg- 
son  concisely  puts  the  difficulty,  "  Let  us  assume 
the  Darwinian  theory  of  insensible  variations, 
and  suppose  the  occurrence  of  small  differences 
due  to  chance,  and  continually^  accumulating. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  all  the  parts  of 
an  organism  are  necessarily  coordinated. 
Whether  the  function  be  the  effect  of  the  organ 
or  its  cause,  it  matters  little ;  one  point  is  cer- 
tain —  the  organ  will  be  of  no  use  and  will  not 
give  selection  a  liold  unk\ss  it  functions.  How- 
ever tlie  minute  structure  of  the  retina  may  de- 
velop, and  however  complicated  it  may  become, 
sucli  progress  instead  of  favoring  vision,  will 
probably  liinder  it  if  tlie  visual  centers  do  not 
develop  at  the  same  time,  as  well  as  several  parts 
of  the  visual  organ  Itself.  If  the  variations  are 
accidental,  how  can  they  agree  to  arise  in  every 
part  of  the  organ  at  the  same  time,  in  such  way 
that  the  organ  will  contlinie  to  perform  its  func- 
tion?    Darwin  quite  understood  this;  it  is  one 


MODERN  SPIRIT  109 

of  the  reasons  why  he  regarded  the  variations 
as  insensible.  For  a  difference  which  arises  ac- 
cidentally at  one  point  of  the  visual  apparatus, 
if  it  be  very  slight,  will  not  hinder  the  function- 
ing of  the  organ ;  and  hence  this  first  accidental 
variation  can,  in  a  sense,  wait  for  complementary 
variations  to  accumulate  and  raise  vision  to  a 
higher  degree  of  perfection.  Granted;  but 
while  the  insensible  variation  does  not  hinder  the 
functioning  of  the  eye,  neither  does  it  help  it, 
so  long  as  the  variations  that  are  complementary 
do  not  occur.  How,  in  that  case,  can  the  varia- 
tion be  retained  by  natural  selection?  Unwit- 
tingly one  will  reason  as  if  the  slight  variation 
were  a  toothing  stone  set  up  by  the  organism 
and  reserved  for  a  later  construction." 

But  even  if  we  could  conceive  of  a  complex  or- 
gan built  up  in  the  course  of  ages  by  the  addi- 
tion of  an  incalculable  number  of  variations,  how 
are  we  to  believe  in  the  possibility  of  two  paral- 
lel series  of  happy  accidents  infinitely  long?  If 
we  get  over  the  difficulty  of  explaining  the  varia- 
tions in  a  certain  direction  across  countless 
generations  ;  if  we  suppose  the  necessary  correla- 
tive and  complimentary  changes  to  have  taken 
place  in  the  cornea,  lens,  iris,  retina,  etc.,  how  are 
we  to  explain  the  cases  in  which  nature  has 
worked  out  similar  structures  in  divergent  lines 
of  evolution?  For  instance,  there  is  the  common 
Pecten,  a  mollusc,  which  has  an  eye  very  similar 


110  BERGSON  AND  THE 

to  that  of  man.  "  We  find  the  same  essential 
parts  in  each,  composed  of  analogous  elements. 
The  e^-e  of  the  Pecten  presents  a  retina,  a 
cornea,  a  lens  of  cellular  structure  like  our  own. 
There  is  even  that  peculiar  inversion  of  retinal 
elements  which  is  not  met  with,  in  general,  in  the 
retina  of  invertebrates.  Now,  the  origin  of 
molluscs  may  be  a  debated  question,  but,  what- 
ever opinion  we  hold,  all  are  agreed  that  the 
molluscs  and  vertebrates  separated  from  their 
common  parent-stem  long  before  the  appearance 
of  an  eye  so  complex  as  that  of  the  Pecten." 

Nor  does  the  mutation  theory  make  the  mat- 
ter more  intelligible.  It  lessens  the  number  of 
changes  to  be  made  to  be  preserved  by  selection, 
but  as  the  changes  are  also  greater,  it  is  corre- 
spondingly more  difficult  to  imagine  how  they 
could  have  taken  place  so  as  to  have  improved 
vision,  or  even  so  as  not  to  have  injured  it.  A 
considerable  change,  a  mutation,  in  one  part  of 
the  eye  would  destroy  the  vision  unless  tliore  were 
correlative  changes  equally  radical  in  all  the 
other  parts.  The  new  complications  would  have 
to  be  adjusted  to  the  old  complications,  and 
again  we  would  have  to  suppose  a  parallel  series 
of  mere  accidents  to  account  for  the  likeness  of 
the  eye  of  mollusc  and  man. 

And  this  is  by  no  means  all.  The  difficulties 
go  on  piling  up;  the  biologists  and  zoiilogists 
will  be  able  to  think  of  many  others.     The  phe- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  111 

nomcna  of  heteroblastia  are  particularly  puz- 
zling, so  long  as  we  continue  to  regard  the  body 
of  a  living  creature  simply  as  a  machine.  How 
does  it  happen,  for  instance,  that  "  if  the 
cryst-alline  lens  of  a  Triton  be  removed,  it  is  re- 
generated by  the  iris?  Now  the  original  lens 
was  built  out  of  the  ectoderm,  while  the  iris  is 
of  mesodermic  origin.  What  is  more,  in  the 
Salamandra  maculata,  if  the  lens  be  removed  and 
the  iris  left,  the  regeneration  takes  place  in  the 
inner  or  retinal  layer  of  the  remaining  region. 
Thus,  parts  differently  situated,  differently  con- 
stituted, meant  normally  for  different  functions, 
are  capable  of  performing  the  same  duties  and 
even  of  manufacturing,  when  necessary,  the  same 
pieces  of  the  machine.  Here  we  have,  indeed, 
the  same  effect  obtained  by  different  combina- 
tions of  causes." 

When  confronted  with  facts  of  this  kind,  and 
these  are  only  striking  samples  of  a  great  multi- 
tude, we  realize  once  for  all  the  hopelessness  of 
trying  to  account  for  them  on  mechanistic  prin- 
ciples. The  difficulties  are  too  great.  It  would 
be  easier  to  believe  in  miracles  outright.  On 
the  other  hand,  when  we  try  to  apply  the  only 
teleological  theories  yet  offered,  it  is  clear  that 
they  do  not  work  either.  We  therefore  seem 
to  have  come  to  a  stop.  After  wrestling  with 
such  difficulties  day  after  day,  tlie  thinker  is 
sometimes  driven  by  sheer  weariness  and  hope- 


112  BERGSON  AND  THE 

lessness  to  the  verge  of  despair.  He  is  tempted 
to  admit  that  our  intellectual  ambitions  far  ex- 
ceed our  capacities,  and  for  the  moment  to  sym- 
pathize with  the  Philistine  view  that  it  is  better 
to  eat,  drink,  and  enjoy  the  pleasures  within  our 
reach  than  to  spend  life  in  wrestling  with  prob- 
ably insoluble  problems. 

It  may  be  said  that  all  this  is  negative,  that 
others  have  shown  that  ph3^sical  and  chemical 
categories  are  not  sufficient  for  the  understand- 
ing of  life.  That  may  be  admitted.  Still,  no 
one  has  done  this  so  clearly  and  convincingly 
as  Bergson,  and  it  is  something  to  be  able  to 
write  "  No  Thoroughfare  "  over  the  path  we 
have  been  trying  to  travel,  and  to  save  thought 
from  necessarily  futile  efforts  in  the  future. 
But  he  has  done  more  than  this.  He  has  shown 
the  nature  of  the  difficulty,  and  at  least  pointed 
out  the  way  to  a  solution.  We  have,  he  says,  a 
mistaken  idea  of  what  constitutes  an  explanation 
when  we  deal  witli  tlic  problems  of  life.  We  are 
essentially  tool-makers  and  tool-users,  smiths. 
Our  mechanical  bias  is  all  the  more  potent  for 
being  unsuspected,  and  we  make  the  very  nat- 
ural but  baseless  assumption  tliat  nature  is  a 
manufacturer  like  ourselves,  and  that  she  builds 
up  organic  structures  as  we  bnild  our  macliines. 
If  this  were  really  so,  some  matlicmatician  would 
be   sure   to  anticipate   biological   discoveries   as 


MODERN  SPIRIT  113 

Clerk  Maxwell   succeeded  in  doing  in  physics. 
But  this  has  not  happened. 

Bergson  thinks  that  if  we  wish  to  know  life, 
we  should  observe  it  directly  without  preposses- 
sions, and  he  tells  us  that  when  we  do  so  it  will 
be  found  that  life  is  sui  generis,  that  it  actually 
has  qualities  or  characteristics  which  differen- 
tiate it  from  a  mechanical  system.  For  instance, 
it  is  not  a  definite  quantity ;  it  is  not  all  given ; 
it  is  creative ;  it  is  constantly  producing  the 
new ;  it  is  irreversible  and  marked  by  an  absence 
of  repetition ;  in  its  progress  it  dissociates  the 
tendencies  it  originally  contains ;  it  endures  and 
changes  with  time.  Now  our  habits  of  thought 
have  been  shaped  not  by  converse  with  life,  but 
by  a  constant  engagement  with  matter.  What 
we  have  had  to  know  of  life,  we  have  known  by 
instinct.  Our  faculty  of  conceptual  thought  has 
been  molded  on  the  material  world  with  which 
it  has  to  deal,  just  as  our  perception  informs 
us  only  of  those  aspects  of  reality  with  which 
we  have  some  practical  concern.  It  is,  there- 
fore, inevitable  that  when  we  approach  the  study 
of  life,  we  should  seek  to  use  the  tools  with  which 
we  have  achieved  so  much  and  the  limitations  of 
which  we  do  not  understand.  When  we  have  to 
deal  with  that  which  grows,  we  assume  that  it 
has  been  manufactured.  Accordingly  we  seek 
to  find  out  how  it  has  been  made,  that  is,  put  to- 


114.  BERGSON  AND  THE 

gether.  The  difficulty  is,  therefore,  in  us  rather 
than  in  nature.  We  ourselves  make  a  complex- 
it}^  of  what  is  in  itself  comparatively  simple. 
For  instance,  it  is  in  virtue  of  our  own  mental 
constitution  that  we  tend  to  regard  organic 
structure  as  arising  by  the  piling  up  of  minute 
variations.  Bergson's  illustration  is  most  felici- 
tous. "  An  artist  of  genius  has  painted  a  figure 
on  his  canvas.  We  can  imitate  his  picture  with 
many-colored  squares  of  mosaic.  And  we  shall 
reproduce  the  curves  and  shades  of  the  model 
so  much  the  better  as  our  squares  are  smaller, 
more  numerous,  and  varied  in  tone.  But  an 
infinity  of  elements  infinitely  small,  presenting 
an  infinity  of  shades,  would  be  necessary  to  ob- 
tain the  exact  equivalent  of  the  figure  that  the 
artist  has  conceived  as  a  simple  thing,  which  he 
has  wished  to  transport  as  a  whole  to  the  canvas, 
and  which  is  the  more  complete  the  more  it 
strikes  us  as  the  projection  of  an  indivisible  in- 
tuition. Now  suppose  our  eyes  so  made  that 
they  cannot  lielp  seeing  in  tlie  work  of  the  mas- 
ter a  mosaic  effect.  Or  suppose  our  intellect  so 
made  that  it  cannot  explain  the  appearance  of 
the  figure  on  tlio  canvas  except  as  a  work  of 
mosaic.  We  should  then  be  able  to  speak  simply 
of  a  collection  of  little  squares,  ;ind  we  should 
be  under  the  mechanistic  h^'potliesis.  We  might 
add  that,  beside  the  materiality  of  the  collection, 
there  must  be  a  plan  on  wliich  the  artist  worked, 


MODERN  SPIRIT  115 

and  then  we  should  be  expressing  ourselves  as 
finalists.  But  in  neither  case  should  we  have 
got  at  the  real  process,  for  there  are  no  squares 
brought  together.  It  is  the  picture, —  i.  ^.,  the 
simple  act, —  projected  on  the  canvas,  which,  by 
the  mere  fact  of  entering  into  our  perception, 
is  rff'composed  before  our  eyes  into  thousands 
and  thousands  of  little  squares  which  present,  as 
r^composed,  a  wonderful  arrangement.  So  the 
eye,  with  its  marvelous  complexity  of  structure, 
may  be  only  the  simple  act  of  vision,  divided  for 
us  into  a  mosaic  of  cells,  whose  order  seems 
marvelous  to  us  because  we  have  conceived  the 
whole  as  an  assemblage."  Bergson  then  shows 
that  we  can  make  the  same  difficulty  in  the  case 
of  a  movement  of  the  hand  that  we  find  in  the 
development  of  an  eye  in  the  evolution  of  life. 
The  movement  may  be  simple,  and  not  demand 
great  intelligence  to  make  it.  But,  if  we  have 
to  conceive  of  it  as  an  infinite  series  of  positions 
successively  occupied,  and  to  take  into  account 
their  order,  we  have  transformed  a  simple  action 
into  a  very  difficult  problem.  For  the  movement 
"  is  not  intelligent,  in  the  human  sense  of  the 
word,  and  it  is  not  an  assemblage,  for  it  is  not 
made  up  of  elements.  Just  so  with  the  relation 
of  the  e^^e  to  vision.  There  is  in  vision  more 
than  the  component  cells  of  the  eye  and  their 
mutual  co-ordination :  in  this  sense  neither  mech- 
anism nor  finalism  go  far  enough.     But  in  an- 


116  BERGSON  AND  THE 

other  sense  mechanism  and  finalism  both  go  too 
far,  for  they  attribute  to  Nature  the  most  for- 
midable of  the  labors  of  Hercules  in  holding  that 
she  has  exalted  to  the  simple  act  of  vision  an 
infinity  of  infinitely  complex  elements,  whereas 
Nature  has  had  no  more  trouble  in  making  an 
eye  than  I  have  in  lifting  ni}'  hand.  Nature's 
simple  act  has  divided  itself  automatically  into 
an  infinity  of  elements  which  are  then  found  to 
be  co-ordinated  to  one  idea,  just  as  the  move- 
ment of  my  hand  has  dropped  an  infinity  of 
points  which  are  then  found  to  satisfy  one  equa- 
tion." 

Evolution,  Bergson  thinks,  becomes  more 
comprehensible,  if  we  start  with  the  idea  of  life, 
an  original  impetus,  a  tremendous  internal  push. 
The  occurrence  of  variations  in  the  right  direc- 
tion, generation  after  generation,  may  then  be 
regarded  as  "  the  development  of  an  impulsion 
which  passes  from  germ  to  germ  across  the  in- 
dividuals." According  to  the  mutation  theor}^, 
an  entire  species  is  sometimes  beset  with  a  tend- 
ency to  change.  Tliis  is  explicable,  if  there  is 
an  orthogenesis,  if  there  is  an  impulse  in  a  defi- 
nite direction  lasting  through  many  successive 
generations.  We  may  even  conceive  of  this  im- 
pulse as  of  a  psychological  nature  and  admit 
that  there  is  something  in  tlic  neo-Lamarcklan 
view  of  effort,  but  it  is  "  an  effort  of  far  greater 
depth  than  the  individunl  effort,  far  more  inde- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  117 

pendent  of  circumstances,  an  effort  common  to 
most  representatives  of  the  same  species,  inher- 
ent in  the  germs  they  bear  rather  than  in  their 
substance  alone,  an  effort  thereby  assured  of  be- 
ing' passed  on  to  their  descendants."  On  the 
theory  of  a  common  impetus,  we  may  form  some 
notion  of  the  way  in  which  animals  so  different 
as  molluscs  and  vertebrates  have  eyes  so  much 
alike.  While  it  is  true  in  general  that  species 
that  diverge  from  a  common  stock  accentuate 
their  differences  as  evolution  proceeds,  yet,  in 
certain  points,  they  may  evolve  identically  in 
virtue  of  the  common  impetus  which  is  their 
source.  In  tlie  same  way,  other  perplexities  be- 
gin to  clear  up.  Although  the  progress  of  life 
is  marked  by  a  dissociation  of  the  tendencies  it 
originally  contains,  this  separation  is  not  abso- 
lute. There  is  something  of  all  life  in  each  of 
its  forms.  "  There  is  no  manifestation  of  life 
which  does  not  contain,  in  a  rudimentary  state 
—  either  latent  or  potential  —  the  essential 
characteristics  of  most  other  manifestations. 
The  difference  is  in  the  proportions.  But  this 
very  difference  in  the  proportions  will  serve  to 
define  the  group  if  we  can  establish  that  it  is 
not  accidental,  and  that  the  group  as  it  evolves, 
tends  more  and  more  to  emphasize  these  peculiar 
characters.  In  a  word,  the  group  must  not  be 
defined  by  the  possession  of  certain  characters, 
but  by  its  tendency  emphasize  them." 


118  BERGSON  AND  THE 

This  is  a  profound  and  fruitful  thought.  It 
may  ultimately  enable  us  to  understand  much 
that  is  now  obscure  and  seemingly  inscrutable 
in  nature.  If  it  is  merely  a  question  of  emphasis, 
if  the  whole  of  the  vital  impetus  is  in  a  sense  in 
every  species  and  every  creature,  we  can  under- 
stand that  under  exceptional  circumstances  some 
of  the  sleeping  tendencies  may  be  awakened,  as 
in  the  case  of  insectivorous  plants,  which,  in  a 
crisis  when  nutrition  threatened  to  fail,  have  de- 
veloped their  faculty  of  capturing,  absorbing 
and  digesting  insects.  Something  of  the  whole 
abides  in  all  parts.  Man  retains  some  measure 
of  instinct  which  is  seen  at  its  highest  develop- 
ment in  the  social  hjnienoptera,  while  these  are 
not  utterly  devoid  of  the  intelligence  which  is 
our  special  endowment.  As  an  example,  Berg- 
son  points  to  the  parallel  progress  which  has 
been  accomplished  by  plants  and  animals  in  the 
direction  of  sexuality.  In  this  case  the  kinship 
is  even  more  remote  than  that  between  mollusc 
and  man.  Yet  in  the  higher  plants  and  ani- 
mals, fecundation  is  the  same  in  that  it  consists 
"  in  the  vmion  of  two  nuclei  that  differ  in  their 
properties  and  structure  before  their  union  and 
immediately  after  become  equivalent  to  each 
other ;  but  the  preparation  of  sexual  elements 
goes  on  in  both  under  like  conditions:  it  consists 
in  the  reducti(m  of  the  number  of  cliromosoines 
and  the  rejection  of  a  certain  portion  of  the 


MODERN  SPIRIT  119 

chromatic  substance."  When  we  consider  the 
milhons  of  years  since  animals  and  plants  di- 
verged from  the  parent  stock,  the  difference  in 
their  circumstances  and  in  the  difficulties  they 
have  had  to  meet,  the  differentiation  in  each 
case,  into  hundreds  of  thousands  of  species,  the 
extent  to  which  the  sexual  processes  are  paral- 
lel in  so  many  and  such  diverse  forms  is  cer- 
tainly remarkable,  the  more  so  when,  in  certain 
cases  at  least,  the  sexuality  of  the  plant  appears 
to  have  no  utility,  but  to  be  a  luxury  which 
might  have  been  dispensed  with. 

Except  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  common  and 
persistent  impulse  it  is  not  only  difficult  to  un- 
derstand the  presence  of  identical  organs  in  very 
different  organisms,  but  without  some  such  in- 
ternal push  or  urge  it  is  difficult  to  see  wJiy  there 
has  been  evolution  at  all.  "  A  mere  glance  at 
fossil  species  shows  that  life  need  not  have 
evolved,  or  might  have  evolved  only  in  very  re- 
stricted limits.  Certain  Foraminifera  have  not 
varied  since  the  Silurian  epoch.  Unmoved  wit- 
nesses of  the  innumerable  revolutions  that  have 
upheaved  our  planet,  the  Lingulffi  are  to-day 
what  they  Avere  at  the  remotest  times  of  the 
palcTOzoic  era."  Adaptation  is  a  condition  of 
evolution,  but  not  a  cause.  "  The  truth  is  that 
adaptation  explains  the  sinuosities  of  the  move- 
ment of  evolution,  but  not  its  general  directions, 
still  less  the  movement  itself.     The  road  that 


120  BERGSON  AND  THE 

leads  to  the  town  is  obliged  to  follow  the  ups  and 
downs  of  the  hills ;  it  adapts  itself  to  the  acci- 
dents of  the  ground ;  but  accidents  of  the  ground 
are  not  the  cause  of  the  road,  nor  have  they 
given  it  its  direction."  Still  less,  Bergson 
might  have  said,  is  the  shape  of  the  road  the 
cause  of  the  farmer  who  must  travel  along  it  to 
get  to  town. 

Herbert  Spencer  was  really  facing  the  neces- 
sity of  some  such  hypothesis  as  that  of  the  life 
impulse  when,  in  the  revised  edition  of  his  "  Prin- 
ciples of  Biology,"  he  reconsidered  his  famous 
definition  of  life  as  "  the  adjustment  of  inter- 
nal relations  to  external  relations."  He  asked 
himself,  relations  of  what.''  and  could  give  no 
answer.  So  he  said  that  it  was  one  more  in- 
stance in  which  it  was  necessary  to  face  the  Un- 
knowable. It  was  his  method  to  pool  all  cases 
of  persistent  and  seemingly  insuperable  human 
ignorance,  to  give  the  collection  a  name  and  spell 
it  with  a  capital.  The  difference  between  him 
and  the  specialists  who  deride  his  philosophy 
seems  to  be  that  he  was  a  monistic  agnostic 
wliile  they  remain  pluralists.  To  Bergson's 
suggestion  that  life  is  a  reality,  an  activity  that 
endures  through  time,  and  that  evolution  is  its 
achievement,  many  are  likely  to  reply  with  the 
question, —  Is  not  tliis  going  backward  .^  Are 
you  not  taking  up  again  the  obsolete  concept  of 
substance  and  explaining  a  process  by  giving  it 


MODERN  SPIRIT  121 

a  name?  Is  not  life  in  the  same  category  as 
caloric  and  phlogiston?  Is  not  this  a  relapse 
into  the  exploded  theory  of  vitalism? 

Not  at  all.  We  know  very  well  what  we  mean 
by  life  in  ourselves.  We  know  that  we  are 
something  more  than  a  series  of  reflex  move- 
ments, of  mechanical  actions  performed  in  re- 
sponse to  external  stimuli.  In  our  life  there  are 
reflex  actions  and  physical  and  chemical  proc- 
esses ;  nevertheless,  there  is  a  more  or  less  con- 
scious unity  also,  a  direction  is  maintained,  there 
are  purposes  worked  out  in  the  course  of  which 
we  employ  inventive  faculties  and  in  a  measure 
control  the  forces  of  the  material  world.  What 
Bergson  means  is  that  the  power  behind  or  in 
evolution  is  something  like  the  life  in  us,  al- 
though he  denies  it  the  conscious  purpose  of 
realizing  a  plan.  But  it  is  rather  more,  not 
less,  than  we,  since  much  that  it  contains  is  la- 
tent in  our  endowment.  We  see  the  individual 
triumphing  over  difficulties  and  keeping  his  di- 
rection through  many  years.  We  are  not  mys- 
tics or  obscurantists  when  we  speak  of  a  human 
life,  for  what  is  meant  is  perfectly  understood. 
All  Bergson  means  is  that  something  like  this  is 
at  the  heart  of  things,  something  that  tries  and 
often  fails  but  sometimes  succeeds,  that  has  de- 
veloped the  human  intellect  as  one  of  its  instru- 
ments, that  lives  and  grows  through  time,  and 
has  in  the  long  process  of  evolution  moved  in 


122  BERGSON 

the  direction  of  freedom.  It  is  easy  to  carica- 
ture his  view,  but  the  truth-seeker  cannot  be 
either  a  caricaturist  or  a  captious  critic.  And 
I  am  wiDing  to  venture  the  belief  that  some  such 
theory  as  this  of  a  cosmical  life  force  has  a  fu- 
ture, and  will  more  and  more  gain  acceptance, 
for  the  double  reason  that  evolution  becomes  in- 
conceivable without  it,  and  that  it  is  practically 
identical  with  the  truth  that  religion  has  always 
carried  in  its  heart. 


CHAPTER  IX 

CONSEQUENCES    OF   BERGSON'S    THE- 
ORY OF  KNOWLEDGE  FOR  PRACTI- 
CAL LIFE  AND  THE  PHILOSOPHY 
OF  RELIGION 

Evolution  has  not  been  linear;  life  has  not 
described  a  single  course,  but  has  proceeded 
along  divergent  directions.  The  many  tenden- 
cies it  contains  are  dissociated  as  the  advance  is 
made,  and  the  species  in  which  they  find  expres- 
sion become  complementary  and  sometimes  an- 
tagonistic. The  unity  of  life  is  that  of  the  im- 
pulse that  pushes  it  along,  and  hannony  is  behind 
us,  not  before.  The  life  force  meets  -with  real 
obstacles  in  the  refractory  nature  of  the  matter 
■which  it  organizes,  and  its  failures  have  been 
many,  its  successes  few.  "  Progress  is  accom- 
plished only  on  the  two  or  three  great  lines  of 
evolution  on  which  forms  ever  more  and  more 
complex,  ever  more  and  more  high,  appear ;  be- 
tween these  lines  run  a  crowd  of  minor  paths  in 
which,  on  the  contrary,  deviations,  arrests,  and 
set-backs  arc  multiplied."     The  Great  Life  seems 

in  one  fundamental  respect  to  be  like  its  human 
123 


124  BERGSON  AND  THE 

expressions ;  it  can  not  develop  all  its  possibili- 
ties at  once.  As  Bergson  says,  "  Each  of  us, 
glancing  back  over  his  historj^  will  find  that  his 
child-personality,  though  indivisible,  united  in 
itself  divers  persons,  which  could  remain  blended 
just  because  they  were  in  their  nascent  state: 
this  indecision,  so  charged  with  promise,  is  one  of 
the  greatest  charms  of  childhood.  But  these  in- 
terwoven personalities  become  incompatible  in 
course  of  growth,  and,  as  each  of  us  can  live  but 
one  life,  a  choice  must  perforce  be  made.  We 
can  choose  in  reality  without  ceasing ;  without 
ceasing,  also  Ave  abandon  many  things.  The 
route  we  pursue  in  time  is  strewn  with  the  re- 
mains of  all  that  we  might  have  become."  The 
difference  is  that  Nature,  having  an  incalculable 
number  of  lives  at  her  command,  can  preserve 
these  different  tendencies  by  giving  them  ex- 
pression in  different  species  which  evolve  sepa- 
rately. 

The  first  great  bifurcation  resulted  in  the 
separation  of  the  organisms  that  are  able  to  fix 
the  carbon  and  nitrogen  everywhere  found  from 
the  organisms  that  are  mobile  and  conscious. 
The  plants  store  up  potential  energy  while  the 
animals  are  releasing  mechanisms.  Now,  since 
mnbilitv  and  consciousness  fro  tojietlior,  the  vco-c- 
table  world  is  sunk  in  torpor  or  prof'oinid  sleep. 
And  of  the  four  main  directions  in  wliich  ani- 
mal life  has  evolved,  two  have  led  into  blind  al- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  125 

leys.  The  molluscs  and  echinoderms,  In  order 
to  defend  themselves,  have  shut  themselves  up 
in  armor,  and  so  have  fallen  into  the  lethargy 
from  which  the  arthropods  and  vertebrates  have 
escaped.  But  even  in  the  highest  forms  reached 
along  these  two  lines,  in  the  insects  and  in  men, 
the  victory  is  not  won  for  all  time.  Eternal 
vigilance  is  the  price  of  our  liberty.  Autom- 
atism is  a  constantly  besetting  danger.  We 
cannot  attain  a  high  development  without  form- 
ing habits,  and  these  tend  to  become  numerous 
and  rigid  and  so  transform  us  into  automata. 
Thought  cannot  be  communicated  unless  it  is 
expressed,  and  the  form  it  takes  tends  to  be- 
come a  prison.  The  letter  kills  the  spirit. 
"  The  word  turns  against  the  idea."  Nietzsche, 
in  his  lively  way,  put  it  thus :  "  Wherever 
primitive  man  put  up  a  word,  he  believed  he  had 
made  a  discovery.  How  utterly  mistaken  he 
really  was !  He  had  touched  a  problem,  and 
while  supposing  he  had  solved  it,  he  had  cre- 
ated an  obstacle  to  its  solution.  Now,  with 
every  new  knowledge  we  stumble  over  flint-like 
and  petrified  words,  and,  in  so  doing,  break  a 
leg  sooner  than  a  word."  From  this  point  of 
view,  the  late  Prof.  Thomas  Davidson  was  not 
merely  paradoxical  but  had  some  reason  on  his 
side,  when  he  declared  that  it  was  a  fixed  prin- 
ciple with  him  to  form  no  habits,  and  that  when 
he  observed  them  growing  up  he  put  an  end  to 


126  BERGSON  AND  THE 

them  immediatel}'^  lest  he  should  finally  become 
fettered  by  them.  Bergson  is  constantly  telling 
us  that  life  has  no  pre-conceived  plan,  but  he 
is  also  constantly  saying  that  life  is  an  effort  to 
realize  freedom  which  has  been  to  some  extent 
attained  in  man,  though  even  in  him  it  is  in  con- 
stant danger. 

Life,  then,  in  the  Bergsonian  world-view,  is  a 
current  of  consciousness  which  has  penetrated 
matter,  and  is  cari'ying  it  along  to  organization. 
INIind,  in  its  totality,  is  composed  of  the  com- 
plementary powers  of  instinct  and  intelligence. 
This  complete  endowment  life  has  not  been  able 
to  bestow  on  any  of  its  creatures,  so  a  distribu- 
tion has  been  made.  The  mind  of  man  is  mostly 
intellect  with  some  instinct,  while  the  mind  of 
ants,  bees  and  wasps  is  mostly  instinct  with  some 
fringe  of  intelligence.  There  have  thus  been 
two  divergent  solutions  of  the  same  problem. 
For  the  vital  impetus  in  organizing  refractory 
matter  had  and  has  a  real  problem.  Mind,  in 
l)otli  its  varieties,  is  an  instrument  for  grappling 
with  difficulties.  If  all  adjustments  were  per- 
fect and  life  simple  and  easy,  it  is  probable  that 
consciousness  would  cease.  The  intellect  is  an 
instrument  wliich  we  use  when  we  get  in  trouble. 
When  we  face  a  perplexily,  we  tliink.  Conscious- 
ness seems  to  be  a  liglit  that  iHuminates  difficult 
situations  wlien  we  ai'e  called  on  to  cjioose,  and 
is    ajipaitiitly    pro])()i-t  ionate    to    the    power    of 


MODERN  SPIRIT  127 

choice.  In  deliberation,  when  we  are  trying  to 
represent  in  our  minds  all  the  factors  that  ought 
to  influence  our  actions,  to  weigh  them  and  at- 
tribute to  each  its  relative  importance,  conscious- 
ness is  intense.  A  complete  and  final  success 
in  solving  all  difficulties  might,  therefore,  much 
as  we  strive  for  it,  be  fatal  to  all  that  we  prize 
in  life,  and  force  us  willy-nilly  into  Nirvana. 

Nothing  that  Bergson  has  written  is  likely 
to  cause  more  discussion  than  his  elaborate  ef- 
fort to  show  that  instinct  and  intellect  are  not 
different  degrees  of  the  same  faculty,  but  are 
opposite  and  complementary  tendencies  which 
have  become  dissociated  in  the  process  of  growth. 
"  The  cardinal  error  which,  from  Aristotle  on- 
wards, has  vitiated  most  of  the  philosophies  of 
nature,  is  to  see  in  vegetative,  instinctive  and 
rational  life,  three  successive  degrees  of  the  de- 
velopment of  one  and  the  same  tendency, 
whereas  they  are  three  divergent  directions  of 
an  activity  that  split  up  as  it  grew."  He  thus 
insists  that  the  difference  is  one  of  kind.  If 
such  a  view  can  be  established,  it  will  obviously 
be  necessary  for  biologists  and  psychologists  to 
revise  their  ideas  on  the  subject,  and  profound 
practical  consequences  will  result  for  pedagogy, 
sociology  and  practical  life. 

Herbert  Spencer  and  others  have  tried  to 
show  that  intelligence  evolves  from  instinct, 
which  is  itself  a  compound  reflex.     The  theory 


128  BERGSON  AND  THE 

of  "  lapsed  intelligence  "  has  been  advanced  ac- 
cording to  which  instinct  is  a  habit  which  was 
formed  intelligently,  but  has  become  automatic. 
Then  there  is  the  biological  view  according  to 
which  instinct  is  the  function  of  a  structure 
which  has  been  gradually  built  up  and  represents 
a  multitude  of  minute  "  advantages  accumulated 
and  fixed  by  selection."  Our  philosopher  does 
not  quarrel  with  these  views  nor  dispute  their 
truth,  and  he  agrees  that  in  trying  to  so  con- 
ceive instinct  science  is  within  its  function.  In 
fact,  he  explicitly  admits  that  "  many  secondary 
instincts,  and  also  many  varieties  of  primary  in- 
stinct, admit  of  a  scientific  explanation."  What 
he  claims  is  that  this  is  not  the  whole  truth,  and 
that  if  instinct  be  looked  at  in  the  large  it  will 
be  found  not  to  be  a  form  of  intelligence,  but 
radically  different  in  nature.  His  discussion  is 
extraordinarily  interesting  and  illuminating, 
and  even  if  the  reader  remains  unconvinced  by 
the  arguments  advanced,  he  is  certain  to  be  in- 
structed by  the  fresh  and  original  treatment. 

The  first  impression  is  that  the  case  has  been 
overstated,  and  this  is  frankly  admitted  at  the 
outset  by  the  writer  himself.  He  says  that  the 
exigencies  of  lucid  exposition  have  forced  him  to 
draw  the  distinction  too  sharply,  but  that  he 
does  so  deliberately  because  it  is  so  important 
to  attain  to  clearness  in  this  obscure  matter,  and 
that  it  will  be  easy  enough  afterward  to  soften 


MODERN  SPIRIT  129 

tlic  outlines  and  correct  what  is  too  geometrical 
in  the  drawing.  Without  attempting  a  restate- 
ment of  his  view,  the  main  difference  between  in- 
telligence and  instinct  may  be  briefly  set  forth 
as  follows :  Intelligence  is  a  faculty  of  making 
and  using  tools  and  especially  tools  to  make 
tools,  while  instinct  is  the  faculty  of  making 
and  using  organized  instruments.  The  former 
is  susceptible  of  general  application ;  the  latter 
utilizes  a  specific  instrument  for  a  specific  ob- 
ject. Change  the  situation  and  instinct  is  help- 
less ;  intelligence  is  just  the  power  of  meeting 
new  difficulties.  If  we  distinguish  between  the 
form  of  knowledge  and  the  matter,  it  is  clear 
that  intellect  has  to  do  with  the  former,  instinct 
with  the  latter.  The  reason  the  concept  of  sub- 
stance has  proved  so  elusive  in  the  history  of 
philosophy  is  that  the  question  as  to  what  an  ob- 
ject is  is  always  asked  by  the  intellect,  and  it 
can  never  find  the  answer  since  it  has  to  do  only 
with  the  outsides  of  things.  Instinct  knows ;  in 
fact,  it  "  is  the  innate  knowledge  of  a  thing." 
The  trouble  is  that  instinct  does  not  speculate. 
It  could  answer,  but  it  won't  ask.  The  situa- 
tion then  is  that  "  There  arc  things  that  intelli- 
gence alone  is  able  to  seek,  but  which,  by  itself, 
it  will  never  find.  These  things  instinct  alone 
could  find ;  but  it  will  never  seek  them." 

This,  then,  is  the  Bergsonian  theory  of  the 
source  of  our  metaphysical  difficulties.     And  this 


130  BERGSON  AND  THE 

is  why  Mr.  Bradley  could  say  that  metaphysics 
is   a   seeking  of  bad   reasons   for  what  we  be- 
lieve on  instinct,  but  to  seek  them  is  no  less  an 
instinct.     We  have  a  one-sided  mental  develop- 
ment; the  intellect,  that  part  of  mind  which  is 
curious  and  wants  to  know  what  things  are,  is 
very   highly   evolved   in  us,   while  instinct,  the 
complementary  faculty,  that  gets  at  the  heart 
of  realit}',  is  proportionately  weak.     However, 
the  latter  capacity  is  present  in  us  and  may  be 
strengthened,   so   that   our   mental  life   may  be 
'more  nearly  complete.      The  implication  is  that 
so  far  as  zee  do  know  what  anything  is,  what  we 
are,  what  life  is  in  us  and  in  the  universe,  what 
God  is,  we  Know  it  through  insight  and  not  hy 
l-^easoning.     The  philosophic  view  of  the  world 
would  he  that  of  the  man  in  whom  both  of  these 
complementary  poxccrs  of  the  mental  life  were 
well   developed.     His    intellect    xvould   look    out 
and   ask   questions    about    the   material   world, 
questions    which    the    intellect,    using    scientific 
methods,  can  answer.      The  same  intellect  would 
also  look  in  and  ask  questions  about  the  heart  of 
life,  both  of  self  and  of  God,  and  instinct,  de- 
veloped into  intuitiun,   xcoiild  give  a   true  and 
satisfying  reply. 

The  nature  of  instinct  is  so  peculiar  that  it 
has  been  uncertain  whether  it  is  a  l)i()logical  or 
a  psychological  concept.  It  ap})cars  to  be  a 
form  of  kncnv ledge  that  is  .iclcd  a?i(l  unconscious. 


MODERN  SPIRIT  131 

but,  since  the  term  knowledge  carries  with  it  the 
implication    of   thought    and    consciousness,    in- 
stinct seems  to  be  a  contradiction  both  in  defi- 
nition and  in  reality.      The  more  perfect  it  is, 
the  more  obviously  unconscious  it  is  seen  to  be. 
Only  when  it  begins  to  fail,  when  the  adjust- 
ment  is    insufficient,   is    there   evidence   of   con- 
scious intelligence.      Bergson  makes  a  great  deal 
of  this.      Consciousness  appears,  he  says,  only 
in   difficult   situations.      It   is   inversely   propor- 
tional to  the  perfection  of  the  structures  whose 
function  we  call  instinct  and  the  adequacy  of 
their  response  to  the  needs  of  life.     The  intel- 
lect is  resorted  to  in  time  of  trouble.     When  we 
are  "  at  our  wits'  end,"   as  the  saying   is,  the 
conscious  intellect  is  stimulated  to  the  utmost, 
and  its  resources  of  ingenuity  and  invention  are 
called   into   play.      It  is  just  because   some   in- 
stincts are  cases  of  such  perfect  adjustment  that 
we  may  suppose  them  to  be  unconscious.     Rep- 
resentation   becomes    necessary    when    action    is 
stopped,  but  is  itself  obstructed  by  action.      It 
is  in  virtue  of  this  fact  that  some  consider  that 
instinct  lies  without  the  province  of  psycholog3\ 
Certainly,  experience  has  shown  the  futility  of 
trying  to  understand  the  instincts  of  animals  in 
terms  of  human  intelligence.      I  was  once  a  mem- 
ber of  a  seminar  in  animal  psychology,  the  net 
result  of  which  seemed  to  bo  that  each  one  who 
shared  in  the  discussions  had  a  deeper  sense  of 


132  BERGSON  AND  THE 

the  complexity  and  obscurity  of  the  subject. 
Bergson  would  say  that  without  the  distinction 
he  makes,  all  attempts  to  understand  the  psychic 
life  of  animals  must  end  in  a  similar  way.  For 
him,  the  primal  reality  is  life,  which  has  two 
ways  of  knowing,  and  nothing  but  confusion 
can  result  from  attempts  to  state  either  one  of 
these  in  terms  of  the  other. 

A  little  boy,  being  asked  for  his  idea  of  the 
difference  between  instinct  and  intelligence,  said, 
"  The  animals  have  instincts,  and  know  every- 
thing they  need  to  know  without  going  to 
school.  Man  is  blessed  with  the  gift  of  reason, 
and  so  has  to  study  himself  almost  blind  or  be  a 
fool,"  This,  which  is  a  schoolboy's  expression 
of  the  popular  view,  does  not  do  justice  to  the 
fact  that  intelligence,  as  well  as  instinct,  is  to  a 
certain  extent  innate  knowledge,  since  the  young 
child  understands  immcdiatel^'^  things  that  an 
animal  will  never  understand,  and  that  without 
learning  them.  But  this  knowledge  is  of  the 
outsidcs,  the  forms,  the  relations  of  things. 
Hume  was  therefore  entirely  right,  even  though 
his  use  of  terms  was  peculiar,  when,  to  the 
question,  What  is  intelligence?  he  replied, —  It 
is  an  irrational  instinct.  It  is  the  fashion  of 
some  to  contrast  the  intellect  with  life,  whereas 
it  is,  even  in  its  most  critical  forms,  itself  an 
expression  of  life.  The  only  justification  for 
the   theory   which   opposes    intelligence   to   life. 


MODERN  SPIRIT  133 

according  to  Bergson,  is  the  fact  that  instinct 
knows  life  from  the  inside,  while  intellect  gives 
the  outside  view.  The  former  possesses  knowl- 
edge of  the  intimate  secrets  of  the  life-force,  for 
the  reason  that  "  it  only  carries  out  further  the 
work  by  which  life  organizes  matter  —  so  that 
we  cannot  say,  as  has  often  been  shown,  where 
organization  ends  and  where  instinct  begins. 
When  the  little  chick  is  breaking  its  shell  with 
a  peck  of  its  beak,  it  is  acting  by  instinct,  and 
yet  it  does  but  carry  on  the  movement  which 
has  borne  it  through  embryonic  life.  In- 
versely, in  the  course  of  embryonic  life  itself 
(especially  when  the  embryo  lives  freely  in  the 
form  of  a  larva),  many  of  the  acts  accomplished 
must  be  referred  to  instinct.  The  most  essen- 
tial of  the  primary  instincts  are  really,  there- 
fore, vital  processes." 

One  may  well  pause  at  this  point  for  reflec- 
tion, for  he  who  realizes  the  full  significance 
of  the  undoubted  fact  that  instinctive  processes 
are  but  a  continuation  of  organic  processes, 
will  find  himself  face  to  face  with  the  greatest 
of  all  problems,  and  may  even  see  a  light  shin- 
ing on  his  path.  For,  let  us  grant  that  instinct 
is  a  prolongation  of  life,  is,  in  fact,  life  itself. 
Then  if  it  could  be  shown  that  any  moral  re- 
action or  conviction,  or  any  purified  religious 
belief,  was  a  genuine  primary  instinct,  the  va- 
lidity   of    such    conviction    or   belief   would   be 


134  BERGSON  AND  THE 

established  in  the  most  complete  manner  imag- 
inable.    Such    an    instinctive    belief    xcould    he 
life's   declaration   of  its   oxen   nature.     If  man 
really  is  endowed  with  moral  and  religious  in- 
stincts,   the    philosophers    and    ministers    and 
teachers    of    religion    and    the    promoters     of 
ethical  culture  have  their  task  clearly  outlined. 
It  is  to  appeal  to  these  latent  forces  in  human 
nature     and     develop     them     till     they     become 
clearly     self-conscious,    until    they    pass     from 
the  stage  of  dumb  feeling  to  intuition.      Those 
who   are   devoted   to   pure   and   applied   science 
must  continue  to  rely  upon  the  intellect ;  Berg- 
son's   intuitive  method  will  be  of  most   use   to 
philosophers,     preachers,     artists     and     moral, 
social    and    political   leaders.     On    this    theory, 
even   practical  men,  who   owe   a  large  part  of 
their  success  to  their  intuitive  perception  of  the 
sentiments    and    feelings    of    their    fellow    men, 
might  be  still  more  practical  and  successful  if 
they   understood   the   method   they   instinctively 
use.      For  it  is  upon  this  that  tlie  management 
of  men   depends.      In   some   few    individuals,   it 
is   a  gift   and  amounts   to   genius.     They  may 
start  as   section  men   or  brakemen  on  the  rail- 
road,  and   have   but    little   education,   but   they 
understand  so  well  the  human  factors  of  a  great 
enterprise  that  they  sometimes  rise  to  the  high- 
est positions,  and  become  managers  and  prcsi- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  135 

dents,  directing  the  activities  of  engineers  and 
other  speciahsts  whose  intellects  are  efficient  in- 
struments for  building  bridges  and  digging 
canals.  To  control  men,  it  is  necessary  to  have 
sympathetic  insight  into  their  inner  life;  to 
control  nature,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  be  able  to  think  scientifically  and  then, 
having  discovered  how  natural  processes  go  on, 
to  have  the  power  to  contrive,  build  and  use  ma- 
chines for  turning  these  processes  to  human  ad- 
vantage. If  men  were  machines,  we  might  have 
schools  of  social  engineering,  and  be  able  to  sup- 
ply the  demand  for  leadership.  As  it  is,  how- 
ever, we  have  no  methods  of  manufacturing  so- 
cial perception  and  producing  insight  into  other 
lives.  Psychology,  e.  g.,  can  furnish  much  use- 
ful information,  but  it  cannot  make  any  one  a 
good  teacher.  It  may  show  the  young  peda- 
gogue what  he  must  avoid,  and  make  clear  cer- 
tain principles  to'  which  all  good  teaching  must 
conform.  But  all  these  are  general  considera- 
tions  and  outside  views.  And  the  spectacle  of 
a  teacher  in  the  presence  of  a  young  life,  indi- 
vidual and  unique,  seeking  to  give  instruction 
by  applying  remembered  formula^  would  be 
amusing  if  it  were  not  so  pitiful.  Failure  is  C 
the  certain  and  necessary  result  of  all  attempts 
to  treat  the  living  like  the  lifeless.  The  history 
of  pedagogy    confirms    what   Bergson   tries    to 


136  BERGSON  AND  THE 

explain,  namely,  the  view  "  that  the  intellect  is 
characterized  by  a  natural  inability  to  compre- 
hend life." 

The  question  naturally  arises,  how  is  insight 
into  other  lives  possible?  Take  a  concrete  case, 
that  of  the  Sitaris  beetle,  which  Bergson  cites. 
"  This  insect  lays  its  eggs  at  the  entrance  of  the 
underground  passages  dug  by  a  kind  of  bee, 
the  Anthophora.  Its  larva,  after  long  waiting, 
springs  upon  the  male  Anthophora  as  it  goes 
out  of  the  passage,  clings  to  it,  and  remains  at- 
tached until  tlie  nuptial  flight,  when  it  seizes 
the  opportunity  to  pass  from  the  male  to  the 
female,  and  quietly  waits  until  it  la^'s  its  eggs. 
It  then  leaps  on  the  egg,  wliich  serves  as  a  sup- 
port for  it  in  the  honey,  devours  the  egg  in  a 
few  days,  and,  resting  on  the  shell,  undergoes 
its  first  metamorphosis.  Organized  now  to  float 
on  tlie  honey,  it  consumes  this  provision  of 
nourishment,  and  becomes  a  nymph,  then  a  per- 
fect insect."  Everytliing  happens  as  if  the 
larva,  from  the  moment  it  was  hatclied,  knew 
tlie  things  it  would  have  to  do,  and  as  if  the 
Sitaris  knew  that  its  larva  would  know  them. 
Another  striking  instance  is  that  of  the  wasp 
that  stings  its  victim  so  as  to  paralyze  but  not 
kill  it.  This  looks  like  knowledge,  but  we  can 
be  certain  that  it  is  not  knowledge  of  the  kind 
the  intellect  possesses.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
more  marvelous  than  the  insi";ht  that  men  have 


MODERN  SPIRIT  137 

into  one  another's  lives,  for  this  is  instinctive 
knowledge  of  one  species  by  a  very  different  spe- 
cies. Bergson  makes  the  suggestion  that  such 
instincts  have  their  "  root  in  the  very  unity  of 
life,"  which  is,  in  spite  of  all  the  differentiation 
that  has  taken  place,  a  "  whole  sympathetic  to 
itself."  Is  it  in  virtue  of  the  unity  of  life  that 
the  great  dramatist  or  novelist  portrays  with 
such  surprising  success  the  characters  and  mo- 
tives of  "  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men,"  of 
women,  of  old  and  young,  criminals  and  saints.'' 
The  superficial  reader  of  this  theory  of 
knowledge  may  get  the  impression  that  Berg- 
son is  to  be  classed  with  the  anti-intellec- 
tualists,  but  this  would  be  incon-ect.  He  has 
no  sympathy  with  mystics  in  their  reaction 
against  positive  science.  "  The  doctrine  which/- 
I  hold,"  he  says,  "  is  throughout  a  protest 
against  mysticism  since  it  proposes  to  recon- 
struct the  bridge  (broken  since  Kant)  between 
metaphysics  and  science."  He  seeks  to  show 
that  our  knowledge  is  not  relative,  but,  so  far 
as  it  goes,  real  and  valid ;  that  it  touches  the 
absolute ;  that  the  intellect  knows  the  world  of 
matter  in  part,  but  to  this  extent  knows  it  as  it 
is.  He  is  peculiar  in  this,  that  whereas  Kant  <;' 
regarded  all  our  intuitions  as  sensuous  and  in- 
fra-intellectual, he  tries  to  show  that  there  is 
an  intuition  of  the  psychical  and  vital,  an  in- 
tuition  that   is    supra-intellectual.     If   he   lays 


138  BERGSON 

emphasis  upon  this  part  of  our  mental  endow- 
ment, it  is  because  it  is  as  important  as  it  is 
neglected  and  undeveloped.  It  throws  a  light, 
feeble  indeed,  but  the  only  light  we  have,  upon 
subjects  of  the  greatest  interest  to  us  and  about 
which  the  intellect  can  not  tell  us  all  that  we 
need  to  know, —  upon  "  our  personality,  our 
freedom,  the  place  which  we  occupy  in  the  whole 
of  nature,  our  origin  and  perhaps  also  our  des- 
tiny." His  tliought  has  been  expressed  by 
Wordsworth  in  the  famous  "  Ode  on  Intimations 
of  Immortality  from  Recollections  of  Early 
Childhood  "  : 

"  Hence,  in  a  season  of  calm  weather, 
Though  inland  far  we  be, 
Our  souls  have  sight  of  that  immortal  sea 
Which  brought  us  hither. 
Can  in  a  moment  travel  thither. 
And  see  the  children  sport  upon  the  shore, 
And  hear  the  mighty  waters  rolling  evermore." 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    PRAGMATIC   VIEW    OF    SCIENCE 
AND  COMMON  SENSE  AND  THE 
SYNOPTIC  VIEW  OF  PHI- 
LOSOPHY 

The  main  difficulty  in  understanding  "  Cre- 
ative Evolution  "  lies  not  merely  in  the  novelty 
and  originality  of  its  ideas,  but  in  the  poverty 
of  our  categories  and  the  fixity  of  our  mental 
habits.  We  find  it  hard  to  grasp  the  writer's 
meaning,  and,  having  grasped  it,  to  hold  it, 
because  we  are  too  intellectual.  Life  is  a  much 
larger  thing  than  intellect  in  the  narrow  sense, 
the  latter  being  merely  an  implement  which  life 
has  formed  to  enable  it  to  deal  successfully 
with  what  is  not  living.  That  is,  we  tend  to 
conceive  of  reality  in  practically  useful  ways 
and  to  neglect  every  aspect  of  it  which  docs  not 
seem  to  concern  our  welfare.  As  soon,  how- 
ever, as  men  attain  a  certain  measure  of  success 
in  dealing  with  the  practical  problem  of  exist- 
ence, when  security  and  social  order  are  estab- 
lished, the  philosophic  interest  awakens,  and  the 

desire  to  know  the  truth  of  things  becomes  ur- 
139 


140  BERGSON  AND  THE 

gent.  When  this  reflective  period  arrives,  it 
becomes  necessary  to  criticise  views  of  the  world 
previously  held,  to  examine  their  foundations 
and  their  adequac}',  and  to  seek  for  rationality, 
consistency  and  completeness  of  thought. 
Now,  according  to  Bergson,  the  intellect,  the 
concept-making  and  using  part  of  the  mind,  is 
an  admirable  instrument  for  practical  purposes, 
but  it  is  incompetent  in  speculation.  At  least, 
the  views  it  takes  of  reality  must  be  deepened 
and  supplemented  by  insight  into  life.  He  re-  \ 
gards  life  as  a  current  which  flows  through  time, 
and  which  has  developed  the  mathematical,  me- 
chanical, tool-making,  and  tool-using  under- 
standing as  an  implement  in  dealing  with  that 
inverse  current  which  we  call  matter.  When 
applied  to  the  material  world,  the  intellect  is 
marvelously  successful,  but  it  is  constitutionally 
incapable  of  understanding  life.  We  have  many 
experiences  that  the  geometrical,  artisan  mind 
can  not  understand.  But,  since  philosophy  has 
so  largely  to  do  witli  life,  it  is  a  hopeless  under- 
taking unless  there  is  more  in  mind  than  the 
intellect,  unless  wc  have  other  powers  comple- 
mentary to  that  of  logical  and  conceptual 
thought.  We  cannot  understand  life  with  an 
instrument  all  of  wliose  categories  are  material, 
whose  thought-frames  have  been  constructed 
to  enclose  the  facts  of  that  flux  which  is  matter, 
and  are  therefore  inapplicable  to  the  events  and 


MODERN  SPIRIT  141 

i  experiences  of  that  inverse  flux  which  is  life ; 
but  we  have,  most  fortunately,  a  power  which 
may  be  so  developed  as  to  give  us  a  vision  into 

\   the  very  heart  of  life  itself.     This  is  instinct, 

I  which,  when  it  has  evolved  and  become  self-con- 

I       .  .     . 

j    scious,  IS  mtuition. 

This  view  of  the  nature  of  the  mind  as  com- 
posed of  an  intellect  that  is  a  useful  instru- 
ment for  dealing  with  the  physical  world,  and 
that  even  knows  the  very  truth  of  matter,  and 
of  an  instinct  that  knows  life  and  the  things  of 
life,  and  of  philosophy  as  the  combination  of 
the  contributions  of  both  into  a  synoptic  view, 
is  very  interesting  and  plausible,  and  if  it  is 
true,  enables  us  to  understand  much  that  is 
otherwise  obscure.  We  see  at  once,  for  in- 
stance, why  the  majority  of  men  are  such  poor 
philosophers.  They  have  to  make  their  way 
in  a  material  world,  their  very  existence  depend- 
ing upon  their  ability  to  understand  and  control 
the  forces  of  nature.  In  the  performance  of 
their  necessary  task,  they  become  one-sided, 
that  is,  too  intellectual  to  philosophize  well. 
Their  intuitive  faculty  is  weak,  although  it  is 
strong  enough  to  enable  them  to  realize  that 
through  it  they  know  some  things  not  to  be 
known  in  any  other  way.  Furthermore,  since 
the  human  environment  is  a  very  important  part 
of  every  man's  environment,  since  his  success  or 
failure  depends  largely  upon  the  attitude  of  his 


142  BERGSON  AND  THE 

fellow  men,  instinctive  understanding  of  the  feel- 
ings, intentions  and  reactions  of  others  has  al- 
ways had  a  certain  practical  value.  It  is  a 
matter  of  common  knowledge  that  teachers  who 
have  no  organic  sympathy  with  young  life,  no 
intuitive  understanding,  cannot  be  made  good 
teachers  by  courses  in  pedagogy.  Success  in 
the  ministr}',  in  business,  political  and  social 
life,  depends  largely  on  the  same  factor. 

Still,  it  remains  true  that  our  intellectual  bias 
is  so  great  that  we  tend  to  regard  everything 
we  try  to  understand  as  a  mechanism,  and  this 
almost  incapacitates  us  for  philosophizing  about 
life. 

Our  fixed  habits  of  thought  interfere  even 
with  our  perceptions.  Thus,  in  talking  with  a 
painter  and  watching  him  at  his  work,  I  was 
much  surprised  to  find  that  in  his  nature 
sketches  he  sometimes  used  purples  and  browns 
in  representing  the  meadows  and  fields.  I  had 
supposed  that  all  grass  was  green,  and,  even 
when  he  pointed  to  a  portion  of  the  lawn  out- 
side in  deep  shadow,  it  was  difficult  to  see  what 
he  saw.  The  idea  that  grass  must  be  green 
was  so  fixed  that  simple  perceptions  were  diffi- 
cult. Most  of  us  have  lost  that  innocence  of 
the  eye  which  is  a  condition  of  success  for  the 
artist.  And,  when  we  try  to  draw  or  paint, 
we  seek  to  express  what  we  suppose  that  we 
know    instead    of    wliat    we    actually    see.     A 


MODERN  SPIRIT  143 

teacher  of  art  tells  me  that  children  before  the 
age  of  six  are  unsophisticated,  and  by  the  way 
they  choose  their  colors  show  that  their  percep- 
tions are  still  undisturbed  by  their  concepts. 
For  this  reason,  she  considers  it  very  important 
that  their  artistic  training  should  begin  at  a 
very  early  age.  Art  as  well  as  philosophy  must 
see  the  world  with  fresh  eyes,  and  the  confirmed 
utilitarianism  of  our  mental  habits  incapacitates 
most  of  us  for  both. 

It  is  a  difficulty  of  this  kind  that  confronts 
the  reader  of  Bergson.  He  is  told  that  matter 
is  a  current  and  life  is  a  current,  and  the  state- 
ment strikes  him  as  paradoxical.  To  him  the 
world  is  a  collection  of  objects,  such  as  trees, 
hills,  mountains,  plains  and  seas. 

"  The  world  is  so  full  of  a  number  of  things, 
I  am  sure  we  should  all  be  as  happy  as  kings." 

For  practical  purposes,  the  world  may  be  so 
regarded.  But  for  the  purpose  of  deeper  think- 
ing, this  view  must  be  dropped.  In  fact,  the 
world  is  not  composed  of  things.  It  is  a  con- 
tinuum, a  flux.  The  reality  is  a  universal  in- 
teraction. The  mountain  seems  to  be  one  thing, 
and  the  plain  another ;  but  the  line  of  separation 
is  arbitrary,  and  both  are  continuous  with  a 
larger  whole.  The  way  we  divide  the  world 
up  into  objects,  things,  is  determined  by  the  ac- 
tions   we    have    to    perform.      "  It    is    doubtful 


144  BERGSON  AND  THE 

whether  animals  built  upon  a  different  plan, — 
a  mollusc  or  an  insect,  for  instance, —  cut  mat- 
ter up  along  the  same  articulations." 

It  is  hard,  therefore,  to  remember  that  mat- 
ter is  not  a  collection  of  things,  but  a  flux,  a 
stream,  a  current  that  flows ;  but  it  is  necessary 
if  our  pui-pose  is  to  understand,  rather  than  act 
upon,  the  world.  In  this  connection  it  is  very 
interesting  to  read  an  account  of  the  most  recent 
researches  in  radioactivity.  If  any  readers  of 
Bergson  have  been  tempted  to  regard  his  view  of 
matter  as  purely  speculative  and  fantastic,  they 
are  recommended  to  compare  it  with  the  latest 
conceptions  of  science  as  set  forth  in  such  a 
book  as  "  The  Electrical  Nature  of  Matter  and 
Radioactivity,"  by  Harry  C.  Jones,  Professor 
of  Physical  Chemistry  in  Johns  Hopkins  Uni- 
versity (Second  edition,  1910).  They  will 
there  learn  that  recent  discoA^erics  force  us  to 
regard  the  chemical  atom  as  unstable.  The 
clearest  case  is  that  of  radium,  which  in  its  pro- 
gressive disintegration  undergoes  a  complete 
series  of  transfonnations,  starting  with  uranium 
and  ending  witli  lead.  Some  of  the  changes 
require  a  few  minutes,  otliers  many  years.  But 
what  is  true  of  radium  may  be  to  some  extent 
true  of  all  matter.  Says  Prof.  Jones,  "  If  it 
should  be  shown  that  all  matter  is  slightly  radio- 
active, then  we  should  be  forced  to  tlie  conclusion 
of  the  general  instability  of  the  chemical  cle- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  145 

merits.  .  .  .  There  is  some  evidence  that  many 
of  the  elements  are  radioactive  to  a  very  slight 
extent.  If  this  should  be  proved  to  be  due  to  the 
elements  themselves,  to  be  a  property  inherent  in 
all  matter,  and  not  caused  by  the  deposition  of 
some  form  of  radioactive  matter,  then  we  must 
regard  matter  in  general  as  undergoing  change. 
This  change  is  slow,  very  slow,  but  is  progress- 
ing continuously ;  the  more  complex,  unstable 
forms,  breaking  down  into  simpler  aggregates 
of  electrons."  The  changes  go  on  spontane- 
ously, and  are  "  largely  unaffected  even  by  the 
most  extreme  artificial  conditions,"  so  that  we 
are  by  no  means  able  to  effect  the  transforma- 
tion of  one  element  into  another  by  artificial 
means. 

But  what  are  these  electrons.''  They  are  the 
elements  which  enter  into  the  formation  of  the 
chemical  atom,  which  is  now  regarded  as  very 
complex,  the  atom  of  mercury,  for  instance,  con- 
taining more  than  150,000  of  them.  "  The 
electron  is  a  disembodied  electrical  charge,  con- 
taining no  matter,  and  is  the  term  which  we  shall 
hereafter  use  for  this  ultimate  unit,  of  which  we 
shall  learn  that  all  so-called  matter  is  probably 
composed."  ..."  Is  not  all  matter  of  an  elec- 
trical nature?  There  is  a  large  amount  of 
evidence  which  answers  this  question  in  the 
affirmative.  Indeed,  this  conclusion  is  accepted, 
at  least  tentatively,  by  a  large  number  of  the 


146  BERGSON  AND  THE 

leading    physicists    and    ph^'sical    chemists    the 
world  over." 

In  1895  a  famous  paper  was  published  by 
Ostwald  on  "  The  Overthrow  of  Scientific  Ma- 
terialism." Apropos  of  tliis,  Prof.  Jones  re- 
marks :  "  Whatever  our  opinion  of  the  paper <(. 
as  a  whole,  there  is  one  point  at  least  brought 
out  so  clcarl}^  that  there  can  scarcely  be  any 
question  about  it,  and  that  is,  that  matter  is 
a  pure  h^potliesis.  What  we  know  in  the  uni- 
verse, and  all  that  we  know,  is  changes  in  energy. 
In  order  to  liave  something  to  which  we  can 
mentally  attach  the  energy,  we  have  created,  in 
our  imagination,  matter.  Matter,  then,  is  a 
pure  hypotliesis,  and  energy  is  the  only  reality. 
We  are  accustomed  to  take  exactly  the  opposite 
view,  and  regard  matter  as  the  reality  and  en- 
ergy as  hypothetical.  If  Ostwald  accomplished 
nothing  else  by  the  paper  in  question  than  the 
mere  calling  attention  to  the  hypothetical  nature 
of  matter,  he  made  an  important  contribution 
to  science.  It  should  be  noted  that  for  a  long 
time  Ostwald  has  insisted  not  only  that  matter 
is  a  pure  liyjiothcsis,  but  that  tliere  is  not  the 
least  evidence  for  its  existence,  as  we  ordinarily 
understand  the  tci-m.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  Thomson  has  reached  the  same  conclusion 
as  the  result  of  one  of  the  most  brilliant  series 
of  experiments  that  has  ever  been  carried  out 
in    any    l)ranch    of    experimental    science.     We 


MODERN  SPIRIT  147 

have  thus  direct  experimental  verification  of  a 
conclusion,  the  importance  of  which  it  is  dif- 
ficult to  overestimate."     Pp.  22-24. 

Bergson's  writings  do  not  give  the  impression 
of  familiarity  with  physical  chemistry,  and  the 
fact  that  substantially  the  same  dynamic  con- 
ception of  matter  has  been  reached  by  two 
independeiit  methods  of  approach  is  certainly 
significant.  There  must  be  something  in  a  phil- 
osophic method  when  its  results  are  confirmed  by 
experimental  science.  It  is  tempting  to'  con- 
sider what  is  involved  in  this  agreement,  but  an 
adequate  discussion  would  take  us  too  far  afield, 
and  I  can  only  say  here  that  those  who  have 
interest  enough  to  go  into  the  matter  will  prob- 
ably meet  with  some  of  the  most  exciting  ex- 
periences  in  their  intellectual   career. 

Holding  fast,  then,  to  the  truth  that  matter 
is  a  process,  let  us  consider  that  we  must  take  a 
similar  view  of  life.  Here,  too,  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  think  of  living  beings  as  individuals, 
as  isolated  and  distinct.  And  in  this  we  have 
partial  justification,  for  a  highly  organized 
living  being  is  the  nearest  approach  to  individu- 
ality, to  a  closed  circle,  that  we  find  in  nature. 
Still,  the  truth  is  that  life  also  is  a  flux,  a  vast 
current  moving  through  time,  a  great  wave  of 
which  each  of  us  is,  so  to  speak,  but  a  rill. 
"  Creative  Evolution "  puts  the  matter  con- 
cisely :  — 


148  BERGSON  AND  THE 

..  "  An  organism  such  as  a  higher  vertebrate 
is  the  most  individuated  of  all  organisms;  yet, 
if  we  take  into  account  that  it  is  only  the  devel- 
opment of  an  ovum  forming  part  of  the  body 
of  its  mother  and  of  a  spermatozoon  forming 
part  of  the  body  of  its  father,  that  the  egg  {i.  e., 
the  fertilized  ovum)  is  a  connecting  link  between 
the  two  progenitors,  since  it  is  common  to  their 
two  substances,  we  shall  realize  that  every  in- 
dividual organism,  even  that  of  a  man,  is  merely 
a  bud  that  has  sprouted  on  the  combined  body 
of  its  parents.  Where,  then,  does  the  vital  prin- 
ciple of  the  individual  begin?  Gradually,  we 
shall  be  carried  further  and  further  back,  up 
to  the  individual's  remotest  ancestors ;  we  shall 
find  him  solidary  with  each  of  them,  solidary 
with  that  little  mass  of  protoplasmic  jelly 
which  is  probably  at  the  root  of  the  genealog- 
ical tree  of  life.  Being,  to  a  certain  extent,  one 
with  this  primitive  ancestor,  he  is  also  solidary 
with  all  that  descends  from  the  ancestor  in  di- 
vergent directions.  In  this  sense  each  individ- 
ual may  be  said  to  remain  united  with  the 
totality  of  living  beings  by  invisible  bonds." 

In  practical  life  we  must  consider  the  world 
as  a  collection  of  objects  and  peopled  by  in- 
dividuals ;  but  in  philosophy,  which  seeks  to 
know  reality,  we  must  view  "  life  as  a  whole, 
from  the  initial  impulsion  which  thrust  it  into 
the  world,  as  a  wave  wiiicli  rises,  as  a  current 


MODERN  SPIRIT  149 

flowing  through  the  generations,  which  is  op- 
posed by  the  descending  movement  of  matter." 
Now,  according  to  the  theory  under  examina- 
tion, the  great  difference  between  instinct  and 
intellect  is  that  through  the  latter  we  are  able 
to  deal  successfully  with  the  material  flux,  while 
only  the  former  enables  us  to  comprehend  life 
itself.  In  virtue  of  this  fundamental  difference, 
it  is  vain  to  seek  to  know  the  laws  of  physical 
processes  by  intuition,  and  equally  vain  to  try 
to  understand  life  and  spiritual  experience 
through  concepts  molded  upon  and  applicable 
only  to  the  material  world.  A  vast  amount  of 
mental  confusion  and  conflict  between  men  has, 
indeed,  come  from  attempting  to  apply  to  life 
the  categories  that  are  applicable  only  to 
things.  In  chapter  I.  of  his  "  Individualism," 
Warner  Fite  shows  the  consequences  of  the  shal- 
low philosophy  which  regards  men  as  things. 
If  two  billiard  balls  approach  each  other  on 
the  same  path,  a  collision  is  inevitable ;  but  two 
men  may  so  approach  and  yet  make  way  for  each 
other.  The  more  conscious  Ave  are,  the  more 
truly  men,  the  more  it  is  possible  to  adjust  all 
our  interests,  and  our  wars  and  conflicts  are 
evidence  of  the  degree  to  which  we  are  still 
things  rather  than  men. 

The  ravages  of  such  a  misapplication  of  con- 
cepts in  history  have  been  incalculable.  And 
there  still  linger  among  us  thinkers  who  liken 


150  BERGSON  AND  THE 

the  sreat  nations  to  the  grass  blades  on  a  lawn 
or  the  seedlings  in  a  forest.  As  they  grow, 
they  begin  to  press  upon  one  another,  then  there 
comes  strain,  then  war,  then  a  new  equilibrium 
which  in  time  is  upset  by  further  growth. 
There  is  truth  in  the  doctrine,  for  the  reason 
that  we  are  incomplete  personalities,  are  not 
yet  fully  developed  men.  But  such  a  view  is 
also  false  because  it  leaves  out  of  account  the 
capacity  of  rational  men  for  adjustment;  it 
misapplies  concepts,  and  asserts  of  men  and 
women  wliat  is  true  only  of  plants  and  animals. 
If  primitive  animism  was  due  to  a  misleading 
analogy  in  consequence  of  which  the  savage  sup- 
posed inanimate  objects  that  moved  to  be  ani- 
mated by  a  soul  similar  to  his  oAvn,  the  ma- 
terialism and  determinism  of  modern  times  is 
due  to  tlic  converse  mistake  of  trying  to  appl}'^ 
to  life  and  mind  categories  that  are  applicable 
only  to  the  niatii-i;il  woi'ld.  The  lesson  in  this 
for  us  is  tliat  we  nnist  not  mix  our  concepts. 

If  human  life  is  to  be  set  in  order,  we  must 
Icai-n  to  think  clearly,  and  understand  the  na- 
ture, limitations,  and  liability  to  illusions,  of 
conceptual  thought.  A  bright  woman  recently 
remarked,  "  I  hate  psychology,"  Small  won- 
der, considering  the  fre(]uency  with  which  the 
name  of  science  is  taken  in  vain  !  Yet,  just  as 
is  her  irritation.  It  remains  true  that  to  use  an 
instrument    properly    it    is    necessary    to    know 


MODERN  SPIRIT  151 

something  about  it,  and  the  mental  instrument 
is  no  exception.  Bergson  believes  that  we  are 
constantly  trying  to  do  the  impossible  with  the 
intellect,  i.  e.,  the  power  of  conceptual  thought. 
It  can  do  certain  things  and  do  them  well.  Its 
business  is  to  preside  over  actions.  In  this 
capacity,  it  is  a  very  efficient  instrument,  and 
we  have  good  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  it.  It 
has  acquired  certain  very  useful  habits  which 
the  practical  man  need  never  question.  But  it 
so  happens  that  besides  the  practical  interests 
in  life  there  are  also  others,  such  as  the  philo- 
sophic, poetic,  artistic.  Men  and  women  actu- 
ally do  care  not  only  for  "  results,"  but  also 
for  truth  and  beauty.  It  is  legitimate  to  in- 
dulge the  poetic  imagination,  but  we  must  re- 
alize that  such  activity  is  not  scientific  think- 
ing. Similarly,  when  dealing  with  reality  in 
a  practical  way,  we  must  not  be  under  the  illu- 
sion that  we  are  philosophizing,  we  must  not 
make  a  metaphysics  of  a  scientific  hypothesis. 

Bergson's  analysis  of  our  mental  instrument 
is  peculiarly  instructive  for  the  reason  that  it 
affords  an  explanation  of  certain  very  old  and 
troublesome  metaphysical  puzzles  with  which 
most  thoughtful  men  sooner  or  later  try  a  fall. 
Although  realit}^  in  both  its  aspects,  as  matter 
and  life,  is  a  perpetual  flowing,  a  ceaseless  be- 
coming, the  average  practical  intellect  regards 
the  material  world  as  a  collection  of  thinirs  and 


152  BERGSON  AND  THE 

life  as  a  series  of  states.  And  for  ordinary  pur- 
poses, such  views  are  justified  because  they  are 
successful.  But  they  are  not  the  truth,  and 
it  is  also  useful  for  men  to  have  quiet,  reflective, 
philosophic  hours  when  they  perceive  the  truth. 
In  order  to  attain  to  a  vision  of  reality  it  is  nec- 
essary to  call  up  our  reserves,  our  unused  men- 
tal resources,  and,  even  at  great  effort,  to  free 
ourselves  temporarily  from  the  habits  which  the 
exigencies  of  action  have  produced.  We  then 
realize  that  the  intellect  is  unable  to  think  the 
continuous,  whether  of  time,  motion  or  life,  for 
the  reason  that  its  habits  are  static  and  its  con- 
cepts have  been  molded,  not  on  that  which  is 
mobile,  but  on  the  unorganized  solid.  The  re- 
sult is  that  when  science  deals  with  movement, 
it  substitutes  for  the  concrete  movement  the  tra- 
jectory of  the  mo\nng  object  and  seeks  to  con- 
ceive of  it  as  a  scries  of  positions,  of  immobil- 
ities  put  together.  This  is  legitimate  for  the 
astronomer,  for  instance,  who  is  interested  in 
knowing  where  a  particular  planet  will  be  at  a 
certain  time.  Yet  it  must  not  be  forgotten  such 
calculations  do  not  deal  with  a  real  movement, 
but  with  a  substitution  which  is  regarded  as  its 
practical  equivalent.  Of  course,  no  movement 
is  made  up  of  inimobilitics.  Attempts  at  such 
a  conception  of  motion  lead  at  once  to  the 
famous  puzzles  which  have  troubled  the  woi'ld 
from  Zeno  down. 


MODERN  SPIRIT  153 

The  problem  of  the  flying  arrow  and  Its  so- 
lution is  put  by  Bergson  thus :  "  At  every  mo- 
ment," says  Zeno',  "  it  is  motionless,  for  it  can- 
not have  time  to  move,  that  is,  to  occupy  at  least 
two  successive  positions,  unless  at  least  two  mo- 
ments are  allowed  it.  At  a  given  moment,  there- 
fore, it  is  at  rest  at  a  given  point.  Motionless 
in  each  point  of  its  course,  it  is  motionless  dur- 
ing all  the  time  that  it  is  moving.  Yes,  if  we 
suppose  that  the  arrow  can  ever  be  in  any  point 
of  its  course.  Yes  again,  if  the  arrow  which  is 
moving  ever  coincides  with  a  position,  which  is 
motionless.  But  the  arrow  never  is  in  any  point 
of  its  course.  The  most  we  can  say  is  that  it 
might  be  there,  in  this  sense,  that  it  passes  there 
and  might  stop  there.  It  is  true  that  if  it  did 
stop  there,  it  would  be  at  rest  there,  and  at  this 
point  it  is  no  longer  movement  that  we  should 
have  to  deal  with.  The  truth  is  that  if  the 
arrow  leaves  the  point  A  to  fall  down  at  the 
point  B,  its  movement  AB  is  as  simple,  an  inde- 
composable, as  the  tension  of  the  bow  that 
shoots  it.  .  .  .  You  fix  a  point  C  in  the  intem'al 
passed,  and  say  that  at  a  certain  moment  the 
arrow  was  in  C.  If  it  had  been  there  it  would 
have  stopped  there,  and  you  would  no  longer 
have  had  a  flight  from  A  to  B,  but  tzao  flights, 
one  from  A  to  C,  and  the  other  from  C  to  B, 
with  an  interval  of  rest.  A  single  movement  is 
entirel}^  by  the  hypothesis,  a  movement  between 


154  BERGSON  AND  THE 

two  stops  ;  if  there  are  intermediate  stops,  it  is 
no  longer  a  single  movement.  At  bottom,  the 
illusion  arises  from  this,  that  movement,  once 
effected,  has  laid  along  its  course  a  motionless 
trajectory  on  which  we  can  count  as  many  im- 
mobilities  as  we  will.  From  this  we  conclude 
that  the  movement,  while  being  effected,  lays  at 
each  instant  beneath  it  a  position  with  which  it 
coincides.  We  do  not  see  that  the  trajectory 
is  created  at  one  stroke,  although  a  certain  time 
is  required  for  it ;  and  that  though  we  can  divide 
at  will  the  trajectory  once  created,  we  cannot 
divide  its  creation,  which  is  an  act  in  progress 
and  not  a  thing.  To  suppose  that  the  moving 
bod}^  is  at  a  point  of  its  course  is  to  cut  the 
course  in  two  by  a  snip  of  the  scissors  at  this 
point,  and  to  substitute  two  trajectories  for 
the  single  trajectory  which  we  were  first  con- 
sidering. It  is  to  distinguish  two  successive 
acts  where,  by  the  hypothesis,  there  is  only  one. 
In  short,  it  is  to  attribute  to  the  course  of  the 
arrow  itself  everything  that  can  be  said  of  the 
interval  that  the  arrow  has  traversed ;  that  is  to 
say,  to  admit  a  priori  the  absurdity  that  the 
movement  coincides  with  the  immobility."  So 
with  the  other  paradoxes  of  Zeuo,  "  Thcv  all 
consist  in  applying  the  movement  to  the  line 
traversed,  and  supposing  that  what  is  true  of 
the  line  is  true  of  the  movement." 

Ill   other  words,  it   is  legitimate  to  substitute 


MODERN  SPIRIT  155 

the  concept  of  an  immobile  line  for  a  movement 
when  we  desire  to  calculate  the  position  of  the 
moving  object  at  a  certain  time,  but  to  forget 
what  we  are  doing  and  to  suppose  that  the 
movement  is,  like  a  line,  composed  of  a  series  of 
immobilities  is  to  carry  a  practical  device  of 
the  intellect  up  into  the  region  of  metaphysics 
where  it  becomes  an  absurdity.  If  we  did  not 
know  that  the  arrow  does  move  and  that  Achilles 
does  catch  the  tortoise,  conceptual  thought, 
which  has  only  static  forms,  would  deny  the  pos- 
sibility. It  necessarily  misconceives  the  real 
nature  of  movement. 

This  is  the  reason  why  the  philosophers  have 
been  mistaken  about  duration,  or  real  time.  It 
is  a  flow,  a  flux ;  it  is  continuous ;  we  know  what 
it  is  by  living  through  it,  but,  when  we  try  to 
think  it,  we  substitute  for  it  a  succession  of 
simultaneities.  For  practical  purposes,  such 
as  the  calculations  of  the  astronomer,  this  is 
sufficient.  But  the  calculations  take  no  account 
of  the  flow.  It  is  enough  to  know  orbits,  suc- 
cessive positions,  etc.  When  we  try  to  think  of 
time,  we  find  that  we  are  thinking  of  it  as  a 
line ;  i.  e.,  in  terms  of  space.  But  real  time  is 
not  a  line.  There  is  more  iii  motion,  in  time, 
and  in  life  than  there  can  be  in  our  concepts  of 
these  realities.  "  The  intellect,''  says  Bergson, 
—  and  he  means,  of  course,  the  faculty  of  con- 
ceptual thinking, — "  is  characterized  hij  a  nat- 


156  BERGSON  AND  THE 

ural  inability  to  comprehend  life.''''  "  Of  be- 
coming we  perceive  only  states,  of  duration  only 
instants ;  and,  even  when  we  speak  of  duration 
and  of  becoming,  it  is  of  another  thing  that  we 
are  thinking."  "  Just  as  we  separate  in  space, 
we  fix  in  time.  The  intellect  is  not  made  to 
think  Evolution,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the 
word ;  that  is  to  say,  the  continuity  of  a  change 
that  is  pure  mobility." 

Our  intellectual  life  is  likened  by  Bergson  to 
our  experience  at  a  moving-picture  show.  Re- 
ality is  a  flux,  matter  is  a  flux,  life  is  a  flux ;  but 
what  our  intellect  perceives  is  a  collection  of 
forms.  The  truth  is  that  all  forms  are  chang- 
ing. "  There  is  no  form,  since  form  is  immobile, 
and  the  reality  is  movement.  What  is  real  is 
the  continual  change  of  form :  form  is  only  a 
snapshot  of  a  transition."  The  intellect  is, 
therefore,  a  sort  of  cinematograph,  which  takes 
snapshots  of  the  passing  reality,  and  by  string- 
ing tlicsc  together  imitates  what  is  characteris- 
tic of  becoming,  movement,  life. 

This  is  not  anti-intcllcctualism.  It  is  a  frank 
acknowledgment  of  the  value  of  conceptual 
thinking  for  practical  purposes.  But,  inas- 
much as  there  is  more  in  life  tli;in  in  our  con- 
cepts, we  arc  but  foolish  philosophers  when  we 
deny  the  most  certuin  experiences  that  life 
brings  because  we  cannot  find  tlieni  in  its  con- 
cept.     We  ought    not    to  give  uj)  our  belief  in 


MODERN  SPIRIT  157 

the  reality  of  our  experience  of  duration  be- 
cause it  is  not  contained  in  the  bare,  abstract 
concept  of  time  used  in  mathematical  calcula- 
tions. So  Avith  our  experience  of  the  novelties 
that  life  is  always  producing.  The  practical 
intellect  naturally  seeks  for  repetition.  If  there 
were  no  repetition,  we  would  not  know  what  to 
depend  upon,  and  life  would  be  incalculable. 
But  with  this  kind  of  an  intellect  it  is  not  easy 
to  believe  in  novelty.  It  is  usually  easier  to  do 
something  new  than  to  prove  that  it  can  be 
done.  A  certain  college  boy,  interested  in  ath-  , 
letics,  returned  to  his  village  and  told  the  neigh- 
bors that  he  had  seen  pitchers  throw  curved 
balls.  They  laughed  him  to  scorn,  saying  that 
he  did  not  know  as  much  as  before  he  went  away 
from  home.  To  them  it  seemed  evident  that  the 
ball  must  go  in  a  straight  line  after  it  leaves  the 
pitcher's  hand.  It  is,  in  fact,  easier  to  throw  a 
ball  in  a  curve  than  it  is  to  explain  why  the  ball 
follows  the  curve.  But  the  point  is  that  in  such 
cases  the  explanation  follows,  if  it  comes  at  all. 
We  are  continually  living  forward  and  under- 
standing backward.  As  Hegel  said,  the  owl  of 
Athene,  the  goddess  of  wisdom,  flew  only  in  the 
evening. 

The  French  philosopher  is  eminently  sane 
and  wise,  it  seems  to  me,  in  insisting  that,  if  we 
wish  to  know  life,  we  must  study  it  directly. 
We  must   deepen   insight   and  develop   our   in- 


158  BERGSON  AND  THE 

stinct  into  intuition,  and  not  try  to  apply  to  it 
concepts  applicable  only  to  the  material  world. 
We  are  to  use  all  our  powers,  supplementing 
scientific  thinking  about  the  material  reality 
with  intuitive  knowledge  of  life.  As  Prof. 
James  has  said,  we  are  to  use  concepts  when  they 
help  and  drop  them  when  they  hinder  under- 
standing, and  to  remember  always  that  they 
are  only  thin  extracts  from  perception  and  in- 
sufficient representatives  thereof,  and  that  they 
must  never  be  treated  as  if  they  gave  a  deeper 
quality  of  truth.  In  other  words,  in  our  per-  r 
ceptual  experience  we  have  direct  and  immediate 
knowledge  of  continuity,  motion,  time,  change, 
cause,  Jiovclty,  and  freedom,  and  it  is  ridiculous 
to  doubt  or  deny  the  validity  or  worth  of  these 
experiences  because  conceptual  thought,  which 
deals  with  the  out  sides  of  things,  falls  into  con- 
tradictions when  it  tries  to  represent,  with  the 
means  at  its  disposal,  life's  rich  and  varied  con- 
tent. 

This  truth  is  of  groat  practical  significance 
for  religious  thinkers  and  teachers.  The 
j)reaclicr  has  use  for  knowledge  of  all  kinds  ;  he 
ought  to  be  acfjuainted  with  the  leading  con- 
ceptions of  science  and  to  have  a  first  hand  ac- 
quaintance with  scientific  methods  of  investi- 
gation; and  he  ought  lo  be  philosopher  enough 
to  .-ittaiii  to  a  niutu.il  interpi-ctation  of  the  truths 
reached  by  objective  studies  and  through  sj)ii-it- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  159 

ual  insight.  But  his  main  business  is  with  life 
and  its  interpretation,  and  for  success  here  he 
must  rely  chiefly  upon  intuition. 

A  certain  young  minister  read  Spencer's  "  So- 
ciology," and  under  the  influence  of  this  and  sim- 
ilar works  came  to  feel  that  the  important  things 
in  the  world  are  the  great  impersonal  laws  in 
accordance  with  which  nations  and  civilizations 
arise  and  decline,  and  that  in  comparison  with 
truth  of  this  order  interest  in  personalities  is 
trivial.  He  tried  to  set  forth  important  scien- 
tific generalizations  in  his  sermons,  but  without 
much  success,  and  he  was  surprised  and  disap- 
pointed at  the  interest  aroused  by  lecturers  who 
dealt  with  the  problems  of  the  personal  life. 
Yet  the  men  and  women  around  him  were  wiser 
than  he.  They  were  chiefly  interested  in  life, 
and  life  is  individual  and  personal  while  science 
deals  with  classes.  They  were  content  to  leave 
the  discovery  of  the  laws  of  nature  to  the  men 
of  science  and  the  application  of  new  truths  to 
engineers.  They  were  rightly  concerned  with 
the  problems  of  the  moral  and  religious  life,  and 
truth  comes  in  this  region  by  insight  rather 
than  by  the  methods  successful  in  the  physical 
laborator3\ 

Indeed,  it  is  doubtful  if  one  can  be  expert  in 
both  methods  at  once.  Emerson,  for  instance, 
bewails  his  shortcomings  as  a  conceptual  thinker. 
In  his  journal,  under  date  Jan.   15,   1833,  he 


160  BERGSON 

says :  "  Seldom,  I  suppose,  was  a  more  inapt 
learner  of  arithmetic,  astronomy,  geography, 
political  economy,  than  I  am,  as  I  daily  find  to 
my  cost.  My  comprehension  of  a  question  in 
technical  metaphysics  very  slow,  and  in  all  arts 
practick.  ...  I  have  no  skill."  Yet  Emerson 
is  the  greatest  seer  in  the  modern  world.  His 
vision  of  life,  of  its  spiritual  processes  and  laws, 
is  one  of  the  deepest  and  clearest  yet  enjoyed  by 
man.  In  his  essay  on  "  Self-reliance,"  he  says, 
"  A  man  should  leani  to  detect  and  watch  that 
gleam  of  light  which  flashes  across  his  mind 
from  within,  more  than  the  luster  of  the  firma- 
ment of  bards  and  sages."  This  was  his  own 
method  which  he  employed  with  marvelous  suc- 
cess, and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  he  is  one  of 
the  inspirers  and  helpers  of  American  life. 
Conceptual  thinking  discovers  Roentgen  rays: 
intuition  gives  us  Emerson's  essays. 


CHAPTER  XI 

BERGSON  AND  ETHICS 

Modem  readers  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  are 
often  astonished  at  the  elevation  and  complete- 
ness of  their  ethical  thought.  How  is  it  that 
we  have  so  little  to  add  either  to  their  principles 
or  ideals,  we  who  have  steam  and  electric  en- 
gines, telephones,  telescopes,  microscopes,  and 
all  the  wealth  and  comfort  of  a  civilization  rest- 
ing upon  applied  science?  To  this  question, 
men  like  Lester  F.  Ward  reply  that  ethics  is 
not  a  dynamic  factor  of  civilization,  but  is  es- 
sentially static  and  unprogressive.  This  is  a 
superficial  and  unsatisfactory  answer.  Moral- 
ity is  one  of  the  great  interests  of  life,  and,  like 
the  life  of  which  it  is  a  part,  it  is  a  process,  an 
evolution.  The  reason  for  the  apparent  fail- 
ure of  ethical  thinking  to  make  progress  in 
recent  times  is  the  very  great  advance  that  was 
made  in  the  classic  age.  Physical  science  de- 
pends for  its  development  upon  apparatus, 
often    elaborate    and    expensive.     Without   the 

microscope  or  telescope,  without  our  laboratories 
161 


162  BERGSON  AND  THE 

and  the  marvelous  instruments  of  precise  meas- 
urement the}^  contain,  the  ancient  investigators 
could  not  possibly  attain  the  results  which  are 
the  glory  of  modern  times. 

Ethical  philosophers,  however,  require  no 
laboratory.  They  do  need  a  knowledge  of  his- 
tory and  biology,  and  of  the  laws  of  personal 
and  social  development,  which  the  Greeks  did 
not  have,  and  for  Avhich  we  are  now  striving. 
Nevertheless,  ethical  principles  are  in  large 
measure  the  products  of  insight  and  expressions 
of  the  wisdom  of  experience.  And  in  these  re- 
spects we  have  little  if  any  advantage  over  the 
gifted  citizens  of  the  Athens  of  the  fourth  cen- 
tury before  Christ.  Aristotle  remarks  that  a 
man  to  be  competent  as  an  ethical  thinker  must 
have  received  a  good  moral  education.  This  is 
profoundly  true,  and  was  illustrated  in  his  own 
case  and  in  that  of  his  great  teacher.  Men  of 
such  native  gifts,  who  enjoyed  the  education  of 
a  Greek  gentleman  in  one  of  the  bloom  periods 
of  the  race,  were  exceptionally  well  fitted  for 
their  work  as  moral  philosopliers.  And  their 
actual  success  is  the  chief  reason  for  the  appar- 
ently unpi'ogressivc  character  of  ethical  think- 
ing ever  since.  They  carried  ethical  philoso- 
phy as  high  as  it  could  go  until  the  evolutionary 
age.  Now  tliat  we  have  learned  to  think  in 
terms  of  growth,  we  are  keenly  alive  to  the 
chief  defect  of  Greek  ethics,  namely,  its  statical 


MODERN  SPIRIT  163 

character.  Ph3^sical  science,  dependent  as  it  is 
upon  apparatus,  necessarily  advanced  more 
slowl}^  and  was  outstripped  at  the  very  start 
bj'^  investigations  which  could  be  carried  on  with- 
out complicated  devices  which  have  recently  been 
made  possible  by  a  mechanical  knowledge  and 
skill  then  non-existent  in  the  world. 

Taken  in  the  large,  Plato's  conception  of  the 
ideal  moral  life  has  never  been  improved  upon. 
For  him  the  good  life  was  the  life  set  in  order, 
no  power  lacking,  but  every  part  of  our  human 
endowment  present  and  functioning  in  its 
proper  place.  He  conceived  of  educated  human 
nature  as  a  hierarchy  of  impulses,  reason,  as- 
sisted by  the  higher  feelings,  being  in  complete 
control  of  the  more  fundamental  and  animal 
tendencies.  The  ideal  is  that  of  an  organized 
and  graded  life.  The  perfect  product  he  lik- 
ened to  a  musical  scale.  Sometimes  it  is  called 
"  the  city  within."  Tliis  is  the  fundamental 
ethical  idea  in  the  Republic,  the  earlier  parts 
of  which  describe  the  best  means  he  could  think 
of  for  effecting  that  organization  of  life  which 
was  synonymous  with  the  supreme  good,  and 
the  eighth  and  ninth  books  sketching  in  outline 
the  progressive  disorganization,  or  break-up, 
of  life  which  is  moral  ruin.  There  is  one  pas- 
sage in  the  fourth  book  in  which  tin's  great  con- 
ception is  concisely  stated :  "  But  in  reality 
justice  was  such  as  we  were  describing,  being 


164  BERGSON  AND  THE 

concerned,  however,  not  with  the  outward  man, 
but  with  the  inward,  which  is  the  true  self  and 
concernment  of  man:  for  the  just  man  does  not 
permit  the  several  elements  within  him  to  inter- 
fere with  one  another,  or  any  of  them  to  do  the 
work  of  others, —  he  sets  in  order  his  own  inner 
life,  and  is  his  own  master  and  his  own  law,  and 
at  peace  with  himself;  and  when  he  has  bound 
together  the  three  principles  within  him,  which 
may  be  compared  to  tlie  higher,  lower  and  mid- 
dle notes  of  the  scale,  and  the  intermediate  in- 
tervals —  when  he  has  bound  all  these  together, 
and  is  no  longer  many,  but  has  become  one  en- 
tirely temperate  and  perfectly  adjusted  nature, 
then  he  proceeds  to  act,  if  he  has  to  act,  whether 
in  a  matter  of  propcrt}^  or  in  the  treatment  of 
the  bod}^,  or  in  some  affair  of  politics  or  private 
business;  uhcays  thinliing  and  calling  that  which 
preserves  and  co-operates  with  this  harmonious 
condition,  just  and  good  action,  and  the  knowl- 
edge which  presides   over  it,  wisdom,  and  that 
which   at   any   time   impairs    this    condition,   he 
will   call   unjust  action,   and    the   opinion  which 
presides  over  it   ignorance."      443  E. 

Notice  the  parenthetic  and  apparently  un- 
important words,  "  the  intermediate  intervals." 
Plato  knows  that  he  Is  not  giving  a  comj)lete  ac- 
count of  human  nature,  l)iit  a  broadly  schematic 
statement.  He  makes  ji  division  of  the  parts 
of  our  natural  endowment   which,  in  a  general 


MODERN  SPIRIT  165 

way,  conforms  to  the  facts.  The  highest  in 
man  he  calls  the  rational  part  of  the  soul,  by 
which  he  means  not  only  the  intelligence  that  un- 
derstands, but  also  that  which  makes  him  desire 
to  understand,  that  love  of  the  true  and  the 
beautiful,  that  divine  eros  which  is  capable  of 
the  development  described  in  the  "  Symposium." 
The  nobler  emotions  he  groups  together  and 
calls  "  spirit."  It  is  that  manly  part  which 
resists  aggression,  which  is  righteously  indig- 
nant at  injustice,  which  makes  a  man  a  brave 
soldier  for  the  ideal,  and  which  is  closely  related 
to  our  divinest  powers.  The  third  part  of  the 
soul  is  the  appetitive  group  of  impulses,  the 
bodily  appetites  and  the  desire  for  wealth. 
These  are  bad  only  when  they  are  insubordinate 
and  throw  the  whole  nature  into  disorder.  Just 
as  the  bad  citizen  is,  in  Platonic  phrase,  the 
"  inorganic  "  man,  the  man  who  is  not  perform- 
ing his  proper  function  in  the  social  organiza- 
tion, but  is  like  a  foreign  particle  lodged  in  it, 
so  impulses  are  bad  only  when  they  have  not 
their  peculiar  and  appropriate  place  in  the  or- 
ganic life.  Plato  does  not  give  a  list  of  all 
the  powers  or  parts  of  human  nature,  but  he 
has  stated  with  perfect  clearness  what  we  are  to 
do  with  them.  The  moral  'problem  of  the  ages 
is  set  forth  in  that  passage  in  the  fourth  book 
of  the  Republic  witli  entire  adequacy  and  pre- 
cision.    Life  is  to  be  orgayiized  to  the  end  that 


166  BERGSON  AND  THE 

it  may  he  enjoyed  abundantly.  The  many  vari- 
ous interests  forming  part  of  our  complex  hered- 
itary endoAvment  arc  to  be  conciHated,  not  from 
enmity^  to  any,  but  from  regard  to  all.  A  life 
that  is  in  disorder  is  necessarily  meager  and 
poor.  In  the  organized  and  well-disciplined 
nature,  every  function  is  exercised  so  far  as  is 
consistent  with  the  welfare  of  the  whole. 

We  are  to-day  in  urgent  need  of  a  revised 
conception  of  goodness.  The  ideal  that  is  pre- 
sented in  many  pulpits  and  ethical  Avorks  is  too 
ascetic,  too  suggestive  of  repression  rather  than 
of  fullness  of  life.  This  is  one  result  of  the 
too  exclusive  pre-occupation  of  moral  teachers 
M'ith  the  New  Testament.  In  some  respects,  the 
teaching  of  Jesus  and  Paul  gives  a  needed  sup- 
plement to  Greek  ethics.  The  doctrine  that  evil 
is  to  be  overcome  by  good,  tliat  we  are  to  live 
ceaselessly  in  the  spirit  of  goodwill,  that  he  who 
loves  enters  into  the  divine  order,  the  spirit  of 
Jesus  in  his  treatment  of  social  outcasts,  of  the 
despised  and  rejected  of  men, —  this  is  the  pur- 
est gold.  Higher  teacliing  is  not  conceivable. 
But  there  is  another  side  to  New  Testament 
ethics  which  is  less  admirable.  In  the  letter  to 
the  Romans,  it  is  emphasized  and  repeated, — 
"  Mortify  the  deeds  of  the  flesh,  make  war 
against  the  bodily  desires  and  impulses,  since 
they  are  the  enemy  of  the  spiritual  or  re;il  na- 
ture.     Crucify   the   natural    man,   kill    one   side 


MODERN  SPIRIT  167 

of  your  nature,  and  let  the  other  Hve  in  mystic 
union  with  the  divine  spirit."  Such  is  the  spirit 
of  this  teaching,  and  it  does  not  and  ought  not 
to  appeal  to  our  young  people  whose  ideal  is 
of  a  full  rather  than  of  a  mutilated  life.  The 
message  of  the  moral  teacher  should  be  — "  Dis- 
cipline  your  life  and  organize  it  in  order  that  it 
may  be  as  rich  and  abundant  as  possible. 
Moral  principles  are  essentially  the  principles 
of  complete  living."  He  should  say  to  the 
young  and  ardent  souls  who  crave  expression, 
who  long  to  find  an  outlet  for  the  powers  they 
feel  pressing  within,  "  You  want  to  live  to  the 
utmost,  very  well ;  that  is  what  you  ought  to 
desire.  What  I  am  seeking  to  show  you  is  that 
the  condition  of  success  in  your  undertaking  is 
organization,  not  anarchy.  An  insubordinate 
impulse  may  deprive  3'^ou  of  many  of  the  richest 
and  sweetest  experiences  to  which  you  rightly 
look  forward." 

Of  course,  there  are  cases  in  which  the  Pauline 
admonition  to  destroy  impulses  is  wiser  than  the 
Platonic  advice  to  organize  them.  If  one  is  so 
badly  born  that  certain  animal  impulses  are  un- 
duly strong,  if  morbid  desires  threaten  destruc- 
tion, then  one  must  fight  for  one's  life.  If  thy 
right  eye  offend  thee,  pluck  it  out  and  cast  it 
from  thee,  for  it  is  profitable  for  thee  that  one 
of  thy  members  should  perish,  and  not  that  thy 
whole   body    should   be   cast    into   hell.     Better 


168  BERGSON  AND  THE 

mutilated  than  having  eyes  to  fall  into  the  hell 
of  disorganization  and  moral  ruin.  But  such 
advice  is  needed  only  in  exceptional  cases.  The 
unhappy  creatures  whose  whole  career  must  be 
a  struggle  with  devils  are  fortunately  few.  Of 
course,  they  need  to  be  born  again  who  are  too 
badly  born  the  first  time,  but  the  majority  are 
wholesome  people  whose  life-long  task  is  simply 
that  of  setting  in  order  their  inner  and  outer 
lives.  This  conception  of  the  good  life  as  a 
construction,  as  a  product  of  organization,  is  in 
entire  harmony  with  the  present  view  that 
civilization  is  a  constructive  activity  in  which 
all  men  should  have  a  conscious  part.  If  it 
could  be  put  in  the  forefront  of  the  ethical 
teaching  of  the  present,  and  concretely  pre- 
sented ;  if  goodness  could  be  shown  to  be  the 
amplest  expression  of  human  nature,  and  moral- 
ity the  essential  condition  of  the  complete  reali- 
zation of  self;  if  Christian  ethics  were  supple- 
mented by  Platonic  ctliics,  our  whole  people 
would  in  time  come  to  cherish  a  nobler  ideal, 
one  more  natural,  social  and  human,  and  an 
immeasurable  gain  in  real  happiness  would  re- 
sult. 

Tlu'  great  and,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  the  only 
defect  in  this  conception  is  that  it  is  too  static. 
It  needs  to  be  revised  in  the  light  of  the  doctrine 
of  evolution.  We  now  realize,  what  tlie  ancient 
Greeks  and  early  Christians  did  not  know,  that 


MODERN  SPIRIT  169 

tlie  moral  life  Is  not  like  a  house  that  is  builded 
once  for  all  and  that  henceforth  remains  un- 
changed. Life  is  a  process  and  must  be  con- 
ceived in  terms  of  growth.  Although  moral 
progress  can  be  effected  only  by  increasing 
organization,  the  ideal  is  not  that  of  a  mechan- 
ism, of  a  rigid  and  crystal-like  stinicture,  but 
a  plastic  type  that  can  keep  up  its  adjustment 
to  a  changing  environment.  In  other  words, 
the  good  is  that  which  conduces  to  development, 
which  furthers  personal  and  social  evolution. 
The  bad  is  that  which  arrests  or  hinders  the 
onward  movement. 

These  two  great  fundamental  ideas  of  organi- 
zation and  evolution  round  out  ethical  philoso- 
phy, and  form  a  basis  on  which  individuals  and 
nations  can  safely  build  their  lives.  Without 
the  organization  which  habits,  customs  and  tra- 
ditions afford,  evolution  is  not  possible.  It  is 
necessary  early  in  life  to  make  elementary  moral 
principles  automatic  and  a  matter  of  course. 
They  must  be  built  into  the  structure  of  the 
nervous  system,  so  that  we  shall  speak  truth  and 
be  honest  as  the  bees  make  honey.  When  good 
morals,  gentle  manners  and  correct  speech  have 
become  habitual  and  natural,  conscious  thought 
is  set  free  for  new  and  higher  acquisitions. 
Only  when  the  musician  is  master  of  technique 
can  he  be  concerned  solely  with  his  mood  and 
its  expression.      The  part  of  life  that  through 


170  BERGSON  AND  THE 

habit  has  become  organically  moral  is  like  the 
heart  of  a  tree,  where  the  living  protoplasm 
used  to  be ;  it  is  the  strength  and  support  of  the 
life  that  is  building  new  structures.  So  our 
stability  depends  on  the  organization  of  inner 
life  through  habit  and  loj^alty  to  venerable  tra- 
dition, to  principles  which  the  experience  of  the 
ages  has  shown  to  be  livable. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  remain  plastic, 
able  to  reshape  our  traditions,  to  alter  our  cus- 
toms, and  to  revise  our  ideas,  for  if  anarchy  lies 
in  one  direction,  we  must  also  avoid  the  opposite 
danger  of  the  fixity,  the  rigidity  which  means 
death.  "  New  times  demand  new  measures  and 
new  men,"  said  Lowell.  To  be  exact,  we  may 
say  that  new  times  demand  new  measures,  new 
thoughts,  and  new  deeds,  and  if  men  have  lost 
their  plasticity  and  cannot  be  "  renewed  in  the 
spirit  of  their  minds,"  they  are  cast  aside  and 
their  places  are  taken  by  new  men. 

Bergson  has  not  written  upon  ethics,  but  it  is 
easy  to  see  the  significance  of  liis  philosophy 
for  ethical  thou gl it  and  the  moral  life.  He  is 
a  thorough-going  evolutionist,  but  evolution 
means  for  him  something  more  than  a  redis- 
tribution of  matter  and  motion,  than  a  rear- 
rangement of  a  fixed  number  of  atoms  and  a 
transformation  of  a  definite  amount  of  energy. 
It  involves  the  production  of  novelties  and  is  of 
the  nature  of  an  adventure.      Since  the  past  is 


MODERN  SPIRIT  171 

ever  swelling  with  the  addition  of  the  present, 
it  follows  that  history  does  not  repeat  itself  and 
that  life  is  constantly  confronted  by  new  situa- 
tions. The  adjustments  it  has  to  make  in  con- 
sequence are  not  passive,  but  are  of  the  nature 
of  solutions  of  a  problem.  Evolution  is  there- 
fore creative,  which  in  a  block-universe,  a  cos- 
mic mechanism,  it  could  not  possibly  be. 

The  reader  of  Bergson  cannot  fail  to  see  that, 
for  his  author,  automatism  is  the  enemy  that 
ever  threatens  the  life  force.  This  point  is 
urged  in  many  vivid  pages.  "  Consciousness," 
he  says,  "  is  synonymous  with  invention  and 
with  freedom.  Now,  in  the  animal,  invention 
is  never  anything  but  a  variation  on  the  theme 
of  routine.  Shut  up  in  the  habits  of  the  spe- 
cies, it  succeeds,  no  doubt,  in  enlarging  them  by 
its  individual  initiative ;  but  it  escapes  automa- 
tism only  for  an  instant,  for  just  the  time  to 
create  a  new  automatism.  The  gates  of  its 
prison  close  as  soon  as  they  are  opened ;  by  pull- 
ing at  its  chain  it  succeeds  only  in  stretching  it. 
With  man  consciousness  breaks  the  chain.  In 
man,  and  in  man  alone,  it  sets  itself  free.  The 
whole  history  of  life  until  man  has  been  that  of 
the  effort  of  consciousness  to  raise  matter,  and 
of  the  more  or  less  complete  overAvhelming  of 
consciousness  by  the  matter  which  has  fallen  back 
on  it.  The  enterprise  was  paradoxical,  if,  in- 
deed,   we    may    speak    here    otherwise    than   by 


172  BERGSON  AND  THE 

metaphor  of  enterprise  and  effort.  It  was  to 
create  with  matter,  which  is  necessity  itself,  an 
instrument  of  freedom,  to  make  a  machine  which 
should  triumph  over  mechanism,  and  to  use  the 
mechanism  of  nature  to  pass  through  the  meshes 
of  the  net  which  this  ver}'^  determinism  had 
spread.  But  everywhere  except  in  man,  con- 
sciousness has  let  itself  be  caught  in  the  net 
whose  meshes  it  tried  to  pass  through:  it  has 
remained  the  captive  of  the  mechanisms  it  has 
set  up.  Automatism,  which  it  tries  to  draw  in 
the  direction  of  freedom,  winds  about  it  and 
drags  it  down."  (Italics  mine.)  Life  has, 
therefore,  to  its  credit,  some  great  successes  and 
many  failures.  A'^egetable  and  animal  life  is 
for  the  part  sunk  in  automatism.  The  various 
species  wliich  have  been  successively  built  are 
achievements,  but  M'hen  they  become  fixed  they 
appear  in  a  certain  sense  as  failures,  "  what  was 
to  have  been  a  thoroughfare  liaving  become  a 
terminus." 

I'von  man  must  continually  guard  against  the 
danger  tliat  has  overtaken  all  else  that  lives. 
"  It  is  wliat  each  of  us  may  experience  in  him- 
self. Our  freedom,  in  tlie  very  movements  by 
whic])  it  is  affirmed,  creates  the  growing  habits 
that  will  stifle  it  if  it  fails  to  renew  itself  by  a 
constant  effort:  it  is  dogged  by  automatism. 
Tlic  most  living  thought  becomes  frigid  in  the 
formula    that    expresses    it.      The    word    turns 


MODERN  SPIRIT  173 

against  the  idea.  The  letter  kills  the  spirit. 
And  our  most  ardent  enthusiasm,  as  soon  as  it  is 
externalized  in  action,  is  so  naturally  congealed 
into  the  cold  calculation  of  interest  or  vanity, 
the  one  takes  so  easily  the  shape  of  the  other, 
that  we  might  confuse  them  together,  doubt  our 
own  sincerity,  deny  goodness  and  love,  if  we  did 
not  know  that  the  dead  retain  for  a  time  the 
features  of  the  living." 

In  "  Laughter :  An  Essay  on  the  Meaning  of 
the  Comic,"  a  translation  of  "  Le  Rire," 
Bergson  himself  gives  some  intimation  of  the 
bearing  of  his  world-view  upon  ethical  thought. 
Laughter  he  regards  as  a  means  society  uses  to 
correct  the  dangerous  unsocial  tendency  to 
mechanical  inelasticity  which  constantly  threat- 
ens its  members.  "  What  life  and  society  re- 
quire of  each  of  us  is  a  constantly  alert  atten- 
tion that  discerns  the  outlines  of  the  present 
situation,  together  with  a  certain  elasticity  of 
mind  and  body  to  enable  us  to  adapt  ourselves 
in  consequence.  Tension  and  elasticity  are  two 
forces,  mutually  complementary,  which  life 
brings  into  play.  If  these  two  forces  are  lack- 
ing in  the  body  to  any  considerable  extent,  we 
have  sickness  and  infirmity  and  accidents  of 
every  kind.  If  they  are  lacking  in  the  mind,  we 
find  every  degree  of  mental  deficiency,  evei-y  va- 
riety of  insanity.  Finally,  if  they  are  lacking 
in  the  character,  we  have  cases  of  the  gravest  in- 


174  BERGSON  AND  THE 

adaptability  to  social  life,  which  are  the  sources 
of  misery  and  at  times  the  causes  of  crime. 
Once  these  elements  of  inferiority  are  removed 
—  and  they  tend  to  ehminate  themselves  in  what 
has  been  called  the  struggle  for  life  —  the  per- 
son can  live,  and  that  in  common  with  other  per- 
sons. But  society  asks  for  something  more ;  it 
is  not  satisfied  with  simply  living,  it  insists  on 
livins:  well.  What  it  now  has  to  dread  is  that 
each  one  of  us,  content  with  paying  attention  to 
what  affects  the  essentials  of  life,  will,  so  far  as 
the  rest  is  concerned,  give  way  to  the  easy  au- 
tomatism of  acquired  habits.  Another  thing  it 
must  fear  is  that  the  members  of  whom  it  is 
made  up,  instead  of  aiming  after  an  increasingly 
delicate  adjustment  of  wills  which  will  fit  more 
and  more  perfectly  into  one  another,  will  con- 
fine themselves  to  respecting  simply  the  funda- 
mental conditions  of  this  adjustment:  a  cut-and- 
dried  agreement  among  the  persons  will  not  sat- 
isfy it,  it  insists  on  a  constant  striving  after  re- 
ciprocal adaptation.  Society  will  therefore  be 
suspicious  of  all  inelasticity  of  character,  of 
mind  and  even  of  body,  because  it  is  the  possible 
sign  of  a  slumbering  activity  as  well  as  of  an 
activity  with  separatist  tendencies,  that  inclines 
to  swerve  from  the  common  center  round  which 
society  gravitates  ;  in  sliort,  because  it  is  the  sign 
of  an  eccentricity.  And  yet,  society  cannot  in- 
tervene  at   this   stage   by   material  repression, 


MODERN  SPIRIT  175 

since  it  is  not  affected  in  a  material  fashion. 
It  is  confronted  with  something  that  makes  it 
uneasy,  but  only  as  a  symptom  —  scarcely  a 
threat,  at  the  very  most  a  gesture.  Laughter 
must  be  something  of  this  kind,  a  sort  of  social 
gesture.  By  the  fear  which  it  inspires,  it  re- 
strains eccentricity,  keeps  constantly  awake  and 
in  mutual  contact  certain  activities  of  a  second- 
ary order  which  might  retire  into  their  shell 
and  go  to  sleep,  and  in  short,  softens  down  what- 
ever the  surface  of  the  social  body  may  retain 
of  mechanical  inelasticity."      (Italics  mine.) 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  author  is  here 
speaking  of  the  laughter  directed  at  the  comic, 
not  of  all  laughter,  such  as  that  which  is  the  ex- 
pression of  childish  exuberance  and  pure  joy. 
And  since,  as  he  says,  "  there  is  no  essential  dif- 
ference between  the  social  ideal  and  the  moral," 
laughter  has  both  a  social  and  moral  meaning 
and  import.  It  is  not  moral  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  kind,  for  when  we  laugh  at  the  absurdities 
of  others,  there  is  "  always  an  unavowed  inten- 
tion to  humiliate,  and  consequently  to  correct." 
When  one  becomes  a  man  of  one  idea,  when  his 
habits  become  so  fixed  that  he  is  more  and  more 
like  a  mechanism,  a  mechanical  puppet,  when  he 
loses  his  pliability  and  consequently  his  social 
adaptability,  he  is  laughed  at.  This  may  be 
and  often  is  good  for  him,  but  not  very  lovely 
in  those  who  thus  subject  him  to  hmniliation  and 


176  BERGSON  AND  THE 

intimidation.  Laughter  at  the  comic  is  not 
kind-hearted.  Bergson  remarks  that  "  nature 
has  implanted  in  the  best  of  men,  a  spark  of 
spitcfuhiess,  or,  at  all  events,  of  mischief.  Per- 
haps we  had  better  not  investigate  this  point 
too  closely,  for  we  should  not  find  anything  very 
flattering  to  ourselves."  Nevertheless,  "  here, 
as  elsewhere,  nature  has  utilized  evil  with  a  view 
to  good." 

Bergson's  meaning  is  very  clear.  It  is  that, 
ideally,  a  man  is  alert,  always  meeting  new  sit- 
uations with  appropriate  adjustments  of  mind, 
heart  and  action.  This  is  to  be  intensely,  com- 
pletely alive.  It  is  to  be  present-minded  men, 
rather  than  absent-minded,  for  the  latter  adapt 
themselves  to  "  a  past  and  therefore  imaginary 
situation,  when  they  ought  to  be  shaping  their 
conduct  in  accordance  with  the  reality  which  is 
present."  Moreover,  such  inattention  to  self 
involves  inattention  to  others  and  this  means  un- 
sociability and  moral  failure.  The  more  a  man 
tends  to  become  a  set  of  fixed  reactions,  a  series 
of  repetitions,  tlic  more  lie  resembles  a  mecha- 
nism, a  thing,  and  the  less  alive  he  is. 

The  ideal  moral  life  has,  as  we  have  shown, 
two  aspects.  It  is  an  organization  of  the  multi- 
tude of  impulses,  tondoncios,  needs,  desires  and 
capacities  which  each  human  being  receives  as  a 
legacy  from  those  througli  whom  his  life  has 
come.     Out  of  this  chaos,  he  nnist  create  order, 


MODERN  SPIRIT  177 

and  the  individual  must  so  build  that  his  struc- 
ture will  fit  into  the  social  order.  There  must 
be  a  scale  of  values  and  a  corresponding 
hierarchical  organization  of  instinctive  tenden- 
cies, so  that  the  highest  is  in  control  and  each 
down  to  the  lowest  fills  its  proper  place.  This 
is  the  elementary  lesson  which  a  great  part  of 
the  world  has  still  to  learn.  But  it  is  only  the 
beginning.  First  order,  then  progress.  With- 
out order,  all  is  anarchy :  without  progress,  the 
rigid  structures  fall  out  of  relation  with  the 
changing  of  environment,  and  death  results  from 
lack  of  plasticity.  All  the  thoughts,  the  habits 
and  social  institutions  which  life  creates  to  meet 
certain  situations  must  remain  capable  of  the 
revision  demanded  by  new  situations.  Since 
the  moral  life  is  a  life,  it  is  a  process,  an  evolu- 
tion, and  our  conceptions  of  goodness,  to  be  ade- 
quate, must  be  dynamic.  It  is  therefore  in- 
evitable that  the  ethical  philosophy  of  the 
Greeks,  so  noble  and  satisfying  in  part,  should 
be  remolded  in  the  light  of  the  philosophy  of 
evolution.  All  modern  thinkers  are  evolution- 
ists, but  Bergson  is  peculiar  in  the  stress  he  lays 
upon  the  creative  aspects  of  the  life  process. 
For  him  the  moral  ideal  is  to  keep  life  alert, 
free,  creative,  that  is  to  say,  living.  The  pil- 
grim in  his  progress  must  guard  against  the 
monster  Automatism,  whose  prisons  are  full  and 
who   seeks   to    catch   him   unawares.     He   must 


178  BERGSON 

"  put  on  the  new  man,"  not  merely  once,  as  the 
Apostle  Paul  demands,  but  unceasingly.  He 
must  not  dream  of  finalities  to  be  attained,  for 
"  spirituality  is  a  progress  to  ever  new  crea- 
tions," and  the  spiritual  life  an  unending  adven- 
ture. 


CHAPTER  XII 

BERGSON  AND  PRAGMATISM 

What  is  the  relation  of  Bergson  to  his  great 
predecessors,  to  Plato  and  Aristotle,  to  Des- 
cartes, Spinoza  and  Liebnitz,  to  Kant  and  Spen- 
cer, and  to  the  most  eminent  representatives  of 
modern  science?  To  this  question,  he  has  him- 
self given  an  answer,  marvelous  for  the  lucidity 
and  the  precision  with  which  the  greater  issues 
in  the  history  of  thought  are  set  forth.  He  has, 
however,  explained  merely  the  logical,  not  the 
historical  and  genetic,  relation  of  his  general 
view  to  previous  philosophical  constructions. 
How  much  does  he  owe  to  the  suggestions  of 
others,  and  what  precisely  has  he  contributed 
that  is  absolutely  new.?  This  is  an  interesting 
question,  the  discussion  of  which  must  be  de- 
ferred as  it  would  take  us  too  far  afield.  Those 
who  care  to  pursue  the  subject  for  themselves 
will  find  some  interesting  suggestions  in  an  ar- 
ticle by  Prof.  A.  O.  Lovejoy,  on  "  Schopenhauer 
as  an  Evolutionist,"  and  in  an  essay  by  Rene 
Berthclot  in  his  "  Evolutionnisme  et  Platonisme," 

entitled  "  Apropos  de  I'idee  do  vie  chez  Guyau, 
179 


180  BERGSON  AND  THE 

chez  Nietzsche,  et  chez  Bergson."  According 
to  the  former,  some  of  the  main  features  of  Berg- 
son's  "  romantic  evolutionism  "  or  "  generahzed 
vitalism  "  was  anticipated  by  Schopenhauer. 
He  states  his  conclusion  as  follows :  "  Like 
Schopenhauer,  M.  Bergson  adopts,  as  the  bio- 
logical theory  most  congenial  to  his  metaphysics 
of  the  poussee  vitale,  a  combination  of  the  doc- 
trines of  orthogenesis  and  mutation.  The  later 
writer  may  or  may  not  have  been  influenced  by 
the  earlier  one,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  in 
Schopenhauer  we  find  the  first  emphatic  affirma- 
tion of  the  three  conceptions  most  characteristic 
of  the  biological  philosophy  of  L'Evolution 
Creatrice." 

Berthelot,  seeking  the  origin  of  Bergsonism, 
finds  that  it  is  in  part  due  to  the  influence  of 
Ravaisson,  who  had  got  his  metaphysics  from 
Schelling.  It  seems  that  Ravaisson  knew  the 
German  philosopher  at  Munich  and  had  accepted 
from  him  "  the  doctrine  according  to  which  the 
principle  of  all  things  is  a  free,  spiritual  activ- 
ity wliich  is  both  love  and  aesthetic  activity, 
while  matter  and  logical  and  mathematical  ideas 
iiave  only  an  imperfect  reality." 

Whatever  may  be  tlie  truth  about  this,  no  one 
will  deny  that  Bergson  is  one  of  the  most  origi- 
nal of  thinkers.  All  of  us,  perhaps,  have  intel- 
lectual debts  of  which  we  are  unaware.  No  one 
can  make  a  list  of  all  the  fruitful  suggestions 


MODERN  SPIRIT  181 

and  inspiring  stimuli  his  mind  has  received. 
The  jealousy  about  priority  of  statement  is  one 
of  the  most  amusing  and  at  the  same  time  one  of 
the  most  pitiful  features  of  the  academic  and 
scholarly  life  of  our  time.  It  is  discreditable  to 
be  so  concerned  about  receiving  credit  for  contri- 
butions to  knowledge.  Such  foibles  are  of  no 
interest  to  laymen,  who  look  on  these  disputes  of 
the  learned  with  wonder.  The  main  question 
the  world  asks  about  Bergson's  philosophy  is, 
Is  it  true,  and  if  true,  what  does  it  signify  for 
our  life.^ 

There  is  a  special  reason  for  a  consideration 
of  Bergson's  relation  to  pragmatism.  This  so- 
called  philosophy  is  attracting  the  attention  of 
many  people,  some  of  whom  are  taking  stock  in 
it  without  any  very  careful  examination  of  its 
claims.  For  it  is  with  philosophies  and  re- 
ligions and  theories  of  health  and  disease  as  it 
is  with  less  important  and  more  material  mat- 
ters, such  as  mining  ventures,  industrial  stocks, 
state  and  municipal  bonds.  There  is  an  as- 
tounding readiness  on  the  part  of  the  public  to 
invest  in  what  they  have  not  investigated.  A 
Scotchman  met  his  parson,  who  said,  "  Sanday,  I 
have  not  seen  you  at  the  kirk  lately."  "  No," 
he  replied,  "  I  have  been  tinkering  with  my  soul 
myself."  Something  is  to  be  said  for  this  self- 
reliant  and  adventurous  spirit.  Still,  systems 
of  thought,  like  financial  enterprises,  often  go 


182  BERGSON  AND  THE 

into  bankruptcy,  and  the  prudent  will  not  dis- 
pense with  expert  advice.  And  it  is  always  well 
to  consider  the  question  of  solvency  beforehand. 
The  logicians,  who  criticise  for  us  the  philoso- 
phies upon  which  we  think  of  building  our  hopes, 
perform  a  service  similar  to  that  of  the  bank 
examiners.  At  the  beginning  of  his  discussion 
of  the  relation  of  absolute  idealism  and  religion, 
Prof.  R.  B.  Perry  remarks  that  "  Idealism  un- 
dertakes to  substantiate  the  extreme  claims  of 
faitli, —  the  creation  of  matter  by  spirit,  the  in- 
destructible significance  of  every  human  person, 
and  the  unlimited  supremacy  of  goodness.  The 
terms  of  a  devotional  mysticism  —  Spirit,  Per- 
fection, Eternity,  Infinity  —  appear  in  the  very 
letter  of  its  discourse.  Nor  has  this  promise  of 
good  tidings  been  unheeded.  Idealism  has  ac- 
quired prestige  and  a  position  of  authority. 
While  it  has  little  if  any  direct  access  to  the  pop- 
ular mind,  it  is  resorted  to  habitually  by  the 
middle  men  of  enlightenment,  by  clergymen,  lit- 
terateurs, lecturers,  and  teachers.  Hence  it 
comes  about  that  many  an  honest  man  has  in- 
vested all  his  hopes  of  salvation  in  the  adven- 
ture. And  this  is  my  apology  for  undertaking 
to  audit  its  accounts  ;  the  qiu>stion  of  its  solvency 
being  of  no  small  human  im{)()rtaiice."  ("  Pres- 
ent Philosopliical  '^rcndcncics,  p.  Kvk) 

"^I'lie  present  situation  cannot  be  better  stated 
than  in  the  words  of  Prof.  J.  B.  Pratt :     "  Some- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  183 

how  or  other  pragmatism  has  got  itself  pretty 
generally  associated  in  the  public  mind  with  re- 
ligion. It  seems  to  be  the  common  impression 
that  at  this  critical  moment  in  the  warfare  of  re- 
ligion with  agnosticism  the  pragmatists  have 
come  to  the  help  of  the  Lord  against  the  mighty, 
and  that,  thanks  to  their  new-forged  and  new- 
fashioned  Aveapons,  victory  is  secure.  It  is  this 
belief,  I  suppose,  which  more  than  anything  else 
explains  the  wide  and  growing  popularity  of 
the  new  philosophy.  For,  after  all,  no  other 
philosophical  problems  have  so  great  and  so 
permanent  a  hold  upon  the  interests  of  the 
people  at  large  as  have  those  that  deal  with  re- 
ligion. For  this  very  reason,  moreover,  no 
philosophical  ideas  deserve  and  require  more 
careful  scrutiny  than  those  which  affect  the  re- 
ligious views  of  the  community.  Since,  there- 
fore, there  is  so  considerable  a  tendency  to-day 
to  throw  one's  cap  in  air  and  shout,  '  The  sword 
of  the  Lord  and  of  Pragmatism  ! '  it  behooves  all 
those  who  have  the  interests  of  religion  at  heart 
to  look  carefully  into  the  question  whence  prag- 
matism has  gained  its  religious  reputation  and 
how  well  it  deserves  it.  What  is  the  nature  and 
the  temper  of  this  newly  patented  pragmatic 
sword,  and  is  it  so  sure  a  defense  that  we  may 
with  safety  throw  aside  for  it  our  older  weapons.'' 
Just  what  is  it  that  pragmatism  proves  and  how 
does  it  prove  it.^     If  we  trust  our  religious  be- 


184  BERGSON  AND  THE 

liefs  to  its  defense,  just  what  surety  have  we 
that  they  will  be  defended  and  that  when  we  get 
them  back  again  they  will  still  be  recognizable? 
When  the  question  is  put  in  this  way,  the  contro- 
versy over  the  meaning  and  validity  of  pragma- 
tism ceases  to  be  a  merely  academic  matter,  and 
is  seen  to  be  fraught  with  truly  human  and  liv- 
ing interest."  ("What  is  Pragmatism?"  pp., 
175,  176.) 

The  amateur  in  philosophy,  hearing  of  prag- 
matism, might  suppose  it  to  be  something  defi- 
nite, something  which,  after  reading  a  book  or 
two  about  it,  he  could  easily  understand.  Such 
a  supposition  is  most  natural  when  we  consider 
that  the  whole  movement  was  started  by  an  arti- 
cle entitled,  "  How  to  IMake  Our  Ideas  Clear," 
which  appeared  in  the  Popular  Science  Monthly 
for  January,  1878.  The  article  attracted  no 
attention  until,  in  an  address  at  the  University 
of  California  in  1898,  Prof.  Wm.  James 
"  brought  it  forward  and  made  a  special  appli- 
cation of  it  to  religion."  Since  then,  it  has 
been  one  of  the  chief  subjects  of  controversy  in 
the  philosophical  world.  Books  have  been  writ- 
ten and  the  technical  journals  have  abounded  in 
articles  by  the  exponents  and  defenders  of  the 
new  doctrine.  This  controversy  may  easily  be 
misinterpreted,  and  accepted  as  confirmation  of 
llu'  iiiiy)rossion  that  philosophy  is  after  all  noth- 
\•^^(|■  l)ut  a  war  of  words.      The  fact  is  that  dis- 


MODERN  SriRIT  185 

cussion  is  the  philosopher's  laboratory,  and  all 
this  argumentation  is  a  form  of  co-operation. 
If  the  contents  of  our  minds  are  not  to  be  tangled 
masses  of  inconsistencies,  there  must  be  acute 
criticism,  and  the  implications  and  logical  out- 
come of  every  system  proposed  for  our  accept- 
ance must  be  made  clear.  In  this  work,  it  is 
the  consistent  and  thorough-going  thinkers  who 
are  the  most  helpful.  Practical  life  is  possible 
only  through  the  conciliation  of  many  interests 
and  through  numerous  compromises,  but  when 
it  is  a  question  of  understanding  the  meaning 
of  ideas,  clearness  and  logical  thoroughness  are 
essential. 

We  speak  of  the  irony  of  history.  It  was 
never  better  illustrated  than  in  the  case  of 
pragmatism.  Announced  as  a  method  of  mak- 
ing our  ideas  clear,  it  has  made  nothing  clear, 
least  of  all  its  own  nature.  The  one  constant 
note  in  nearly  all  the  expositions  of  pragmatism 
is  the  note  of  complaint  of  being  misunderstood. 
The  trained  philosophers  of  Europe  and  Amer- 
ica, men  whose  business  in  life  is  to  understand 
such  things,  are  accused  of  incapacity  and  will- 
ful blindness.  One  of  the  leading  American 
philosophers  finally  closed  a  discussion  with  an 
English  pragmatist,  saying  that  the  pragmatists 
have  so  changed  the  meaning  of  words  that  a 
mutual  understanding  is  hopeless.  Worse  still, 
the  defenders  of  the  new  method  do  not  always 


186  BERGSON  AND  THE 

understand  one  another.  The  founder  of 
pragmatism,  Mr.  Charles  Peirce,  gave  a  course 
of  lectures  on  the  subject  at  Harvard  Univer- 
sity, which  his  auditors  evidently  failed  in  large 
part  to  comprehend.  He  also  gave  a  course  of 
lectures  on  the  same  theme  at  the  Lowell  Insti- 
tute, which  Prof.  James  himself  confesses  that 
he  did  not  understand,  saying  that  in  them  were 
"  flashes  of  brilliant  light  relieved  against  Cim- 
merian darkness.  None  of  us,  I  fancy,  under- 
stood all  that  he  said."  In  this  connection,  it 
is  also  interesting  to  note  that  Mr.  Peirce  was 
so  dissatisfied  with  what  Prof.  James  and  others 
made  of  lu's  principle  that  he  finally  decided  to 
give  up  the  use  of  the  word  pragmatism  to 
them,  while  he  calls  his  own  view  pragmaticism. 
The  original  idea  seemed  simple  enough.  To 
have  a  clear  thought  of  an  object,  said  INIr. 
Peirce,  it  is  necessary  and  only  necessary,  to 
know  what  to  do  with  or  about  it,  what  to  ex- 
pect from  it  and  what  response  to  make  to  it. 
If  it  is  a  stick  of  dynamite  that  is  in  question, 
or  a  tiger,  or  a  persuasive  agent  of  an  invest- 
ment company,  your  knowledge  is  adequate  if 
you  know  wliat  effects  tlie  ol)ject  is  likely  to 
produce  and  how  to  act  so  as  to  guard  your 
own  interests.  Our  ideas  are  tlnis  rules  of 
action,  and  tlieir  test  is  our  success.  There  is 
some  truth  in  this  view,  })ut  it  is  fragmentary 
and  partial.  We  owe  a  great  deal  to  Prof. 
Dewey,  who  has  shown  what  it  leads  to  if  con- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  187 

sistently  and  exclusively  held.  He  says  that 
ideas  are  plans  of  action.  Now  of  such  plans, 
we  may  say  that  they  are  good  or  bad  accord- 
ing as  they  do  or  do  not  work.  It  is  irrelevant 
to  speak  of  them  as  true  or  false.  Prof.  Dewey 
and  those  who  are  equally  clear  and  logical  con- 
tinue to  use  the  word  truth,  but  they  refuse  to 
admit  that  it  has  any  other  meaning  than  that 
of  effective  working.  The  vast  majority  of 
thinking  men  know  perfectly  well  that  they  have 
some  significant  ideas  which  are  not  plans  of 
actions,  but  are  judgments  of  fact  and  exist- 
ence. Thus  if  I  think  that  J  is  in  Berlin  and 
he  is  really  there,  my  judgment  is  true.  I  may 
not  intend  to  do  anything  about  it,  yet  the  fact 
may  be  interesting  just  as  I  am  interested  in 
knowing  that  almost  half  of  the  moon's  surface 
is  invisible  from  the  eartli.  One  of  the  great 
goods  of  life  is  in  learning  truths,  not  merely 
that  we  may  act  more  wisely,  but  for  the  pure 
pleasure  of  learning  and  knowing.  To  the  rad- 
ical pragmatists,  this  is  most  perverse.  Says 
Prof.  Dewey:  "  The  appropriate  subject  mat- 
ter of  awareness  is  not  reality  at  large.  .  .  . 
Its  proper  and  legitimate  object  is  that  rela- 
tionship of  organism  and  environment  in  which 
functioning  is  most  amply  and  effectively  at- 
tained ;  or  by  which,  in  case  of  obstruction  and 
consequent  needed  experimentation,  its  later 
eventual  free  course  is  most  facilitated.  As  for 
the  other  reality,  metaphysical  reality  at  large, 


188  BERGSON  AND  THE 

it  may,  so  far  as  awareness  is  concerned,  go  to 
its  own  place." 

That  is,  the  great  interest  of  men  in  all  his- 
tory in  such  questions  as  the  philosophers  and 
religious  people  have  asked  and  sought  to  an- 
swer is  utterly  vain.  The  existence  of  God,  the 
nature  of  the  world  and  of  human  nature, —  it 
is  idle  to  discuss  such  themes  except  so  far  as 
they  conduce  to  a  better  functioning  of  the  hu- 
man organism.  This  condemnation  of  the  hu- 
man race  for  its  intellectual  and  religious  pro- 
clivities is  not  merely  general,  but  falls  hardest 
on  its  finest  representatives.  For  the  finest  men 
and  women  who  have  lived  on  the  planet  have 
shared  the  spirit  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and 
have  believed  with  them  that  the  highest  of  hu- 
man joys  is  to  ascend  to  the  summits  of  thought 
and  approximate  the  ideal  of  "  the  spectator  of 
all  time  and  existence."  Their  attitude  is  that 
expressed  in  Francis  Bacon's  famous  words, 
"  Howsoever  these  things  are  in  men's  depraved 
judgments  and  affections,  yet  truth,  which  only 
doth  judge  itself,  teacheth  that  the  inquiry  of 
truth,  which  is  the  love-making  or  wooing  of  it; 
the  knowledge  of  truth,  which  is  the  presence  of 
it;  and  the  belief  of  truth,  which  is  the  enjoying 
of  it,  is  the  sovereign  good  of  human  nature." 

One  of  the  terms  by  which  tlie  Germans  desig- 
nate philosopliy  is  Lchcn.f'ccishcit.  The  con- 
troversy over  pragmatism  illustrates  the  differ- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  189 

ence  in  value  for  life  of  the  philosophy  which 
takes  a  single  point  of  view  and  keeps  to  it,  and 
the  other  type  of  philosophy  which  surveys  hu- 
man experience  and  the  world  from  all  avail- 
able positions.  Dewey  shows  what  we  come  to 
when  we  take  the  biological  point  of  view  and 
resolutely  refuse  to  consider  any  aspects  of  real- 
ity which  cannot  be  seen  from  that  position.  It 
is  very  useful,  e.  g.,  to  consider  man  in  his  place 
in  nature,  affected,  like  his  lowly  kindred,  by  the 
conditions  which  we  know  to  have  so  great  an 
influence  on  their  life.  For  instance,  we  are  be- 
ginning to  realize  the  importance  of  selection  to 
the  human  race.  Is  war  under  modern  condi- 
tions a  process  of  destroying  the  biologically 
best,  leaving  the  inferior  to  breed?  Are  our 
charities  and  philanthropies,  our  economic  and 
social  conditions,  producing  a  differential  fer- 
tility in  favor  of  the  weaklings  and  incompetents .? 
As  society  is  so  extensively  interfering  with  the 
processes  of  natural  selection,  must  it  not,  to 
prevent  organic  deterioration,  interfere  still 
more?  We  cannot,  to  be  sure,  answer  these 
questions  at  present,  but  it  means  much  that  we 
know  enough  to  ask  them.  It  is,  therefore,  not 
only  important  but  absolutely  necessary  that 
we  survey  the  world  from  the  biological  point  of 
view.  But,  for  other  purposes,  it  is  equally 
necessary  that  we  occupy  different  standpoints. 
For  instance,  the  orthopedic  surgeon  is  a  very 


190  BERGSON  AND  THE 

useful  member  of  society,  and  he  must  consider 
the  human  body  as  a  machine.  It  is,  of  course, 
much  more ;  still,  it  is  that.  To  understand  it 
as  a  mechanism,  is  to  be  a  man  of  science ;  to 
insist  that,  because  tlie  bones  are  levers  moved 
by  muscles  stimulated  to  action  by  nerve  cur- 
rents which  are  the  result  of  chemical  reactions, 
we  are  only  conscious  automata,  is  to  be  an  a 
priori  philosopher  and  a  very  crude  one  at  that. 
It  is  to  do  what  Prof.  Dewey  and  the  radical 
pragmatists  do,  namely,  deny  all  values  which 
they  cannot  see  from  the  place  where  they 
stand.  If  we  want  to  understand  a  doctrine 
perfectly,  we  shall  follow  men  like  this  who  hold 
it  with  an  absolute,  if  narrow,  consistency.  But 
if  we  wish  Lehensiceisheit,  the  philosophy  Avhich 
is  the  wisdom  of  life,  we  shall  survey  all  objects 
of  all  thought  from  all  possible  positions.  We 
shall  sec  how  life  looks  from  the  materialistic, 
biological,  psychological,  moral  and  religious 
point  of  view,  and  do  our  best  to  make  a  com- 
posite picture  of  the  whole.  We  sliall  fail  of  per- 
fect success,  but  our  effort  at  least  is  in  the  right 
direction  and  makes  for  sanity  and  against  the 
fanaticism  of  devotion  to  partial  views.  There 
will  bo  inconsistencies  in  our  mental  construc- 
tions, but  this  is  because  we  have  not  yet  learned 
to  liarmonize  in  thouglit  the  many  tendencies 
which  exist  in  the  concrete  world.  And  the  be- 
ginner ill  pliilosnphv  would  do  well  to  j)ass  the 


MODERN  SPIRIT  191 

following  resolution : — "  I  will  never  deny  facts 
on  the  ground  of  a  theory."  Having  done  so, 
he  will  find  a  delight  in  reading  the  books  of 
William  James ;  for  that  great  man,  with  a 
beautiful  candor,  as  absolute  as  that  of  John 
Stuart  Mill,  frankly  admitted  the  valid  criti- 
cisms offered  against  his  original  theory  of 
pragmatism,  and  made  so  many  concessions  that 
practically  nothing  was  left  of  it  at  last  except 
the  part  of  it  that  argument  can  never  reach, 
namely,  a  certain  temper  of  mind,  which  he  de- 
scribes as  "  The  attitude  of  looking  away  from 
first  things,  principles,  categories,  supposed 
necessities  ;  and  of  looking  forward  towards  last 
things,  fruits,  consequences,  facts." 

This,  which  has  been  called  "  the  laboratory 
habit  of  mind,"  is,  of  course,  old.  "  By  their 
fruits  ye  shall  know  them,"  is  a  maxim  that 
comes  to  us  from  old  time.  And  Plato  has  ex- 
plained at  great  length  that  the  man  who  really 
knows  an  implement  is,  not  the  painter  who  re- 
produces its  likeness  in  his  picture,  nor  even  the 
artisan  who  made  it,  but  the  man  who  knows 
how  to  use  it.  But,  besides  being  a  method, 
pragmatism  is  for  Professor  James  also  (2)  a 
theory  of  truth  and  (3)  a  theory  concerning 
the  structure  of  the  universe,  the  theory  that 
reality  is  still  in  the  making,  that  the  universe, 
instead  of  being  complete,  is  unfinished  and 
growing  in  all  sorts  of  places,  the  processes  of 


192  BERGSON  AND  THE 

our  human  consciousness  having  a  creative  part. 

Pragmatism  is  first  of  all  a  method  of  dis- 
tinguishing really  significant  propositions  from 
those  without  meaning.  Of  the  value  of  this 
method  Professor  James  has  the  highest  opin- 
ion. "  It  is  astonishing,"  he  says,  "  to  see  how 
many  philosophical  disputes  collapse  into  in- 
significance the  moment  you  subject  them  to  this 
simple  test  of  tracing  a  concrete  consequence." 
This  is  a  pleasing  prospect.  If,  by  a  simple 
and  easy  method,  it  can  be  shown  that  many 
ancient  and  difficult  questions  are  unmeaning  for 
the  reason  that  it  makes  no  difference  to  us 
whether  they  are  true  or  not,  we  are  obviously 
dispensed  from  the  labor  of  inquiring  into  their 
truth.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  proposed 
method  is  not  only  no  royal  road  to  a  solution  or 
disposal  of  pliilosophic  problems,  but  it  is  no 
road  at  all,  for  tlie  reason  that  the  method  is 
not  one  but  two,  and  when  these  two  have  been 
disentangled,  it  is  clear  that  tlicrc  is  no  help  in 
either. 

Peirce's  use  of  the  pragmatic  principle  was 
clear  and  unanihiguous.  The  meaning  of  an 
object,  he  says,  consists  in  the  effects  we  may  ex- 
pect from  it,  in  the  practical  reactions  it  de- 
mands, in  the  responses  that  arc  appropriate 
wlicn  we  come  into  its  presence  or  have  to  do 
with  it.  When,  however,  this  test  is  used  to  de- 
termine the  meaning  of  judgments,  the  case  is 


MODERN  SPIRIT  193 

less  simple.  It  is  not  enough  to  state  that  the 
meaning  of  a  judgment  consists  in  its  conse- 
quences, for,  as  the  logicians  have  been  quick 
to  point  out,  the  cases  in  which  the  consequences 
come  whether  the  judgment  be  believed  or  not 
must  be  distinguished  from  those  in  which  the 
consequences  come  only  when  the  judgment  is 
believed  to  be  true.  Thus,  the  statement  that 
cyanide  of  potassium  is  a  poison  that  causes  in- 
stant death  is  one  that  holds  good  regardless 
of  the  opinions  of  the  person  who  puts  it  to  the 
proof.  Not  even  a  Christian  Scientist  could 
avoid  the  consequences.  On  the  other  hand, 
optimistic  and  pessimistic  views  of  life  are  prac- 
tically resultless  when  they  are  regarded  in  an 
idle,  speculative  way.  But  when  they  are  se- 
riously believed  in  they  produce  the  most  mo- 
mentous consequences,  profoundly  affecting  the 
emotional  and  practical  life.  Regard  men  as 
merely  half-tamed  gorillas,  moved  principally 
by  greed  and  fear,  and  you  get  results,  some  of 
which  will  appear  to  justify  your  theory.  Be- 
lieve, on  the  other  hand,  that  men  are  the  sons 
of  God,  that  they  will  respond  to  the  appeal  of 
reason  and  love,  think  of  the  universe  as  a  di- 
vine order  in  which  the  only  appropriate  life  is 
one  that  is  controlled  by  the  highest  human 
ideals  —  live  by  this  as  a  working  theory,  and 
you  will  find  it  full  of  significance.  It  will  have 
a  meaning  for  you  which  it  would  not  have  if 


194  BERGSON  AND  THE 

you  did  not  believe  it.  The  consequences  of  a 
proposition  and  the  consequences  of  belief  in  a 
proposition  are,  therefore,  wholly  different 
things,  but  Professor  James,  in  his  application 
of  the  pragmatic  test,  has  not  kept  them  apart. 
So  long  as  the  ambiguity  is  not  noted,  the  method 
seems  very  effective.  It  is  easy  for  a  lively 
pragmatist  writer  to  ignore  the  consequences  of 
belief  and  show  that  the  philosophic  and  re- 
ligious theories  which  he  does  not  like  are  truly 
ridiculous.  Looked  at  in  an  unsj^mpathetic 
way,  the  most  venerable  ideas  do  indeed  appear 
insignificant.  To  those  who  have  no  affection 
for  them  and  who  do  not  accept  them  as  true, 
they  seem  irrelevant,  they  make  no  difference. 
Since  the  facts  are  what  they  are  and  these  the- 
ories alter  reality  not  one  whit,  they  arc  prag- 
matically condemned.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
belief  is  taken  into  consideration,  it  is  obvious 
that  no  idea  that  men  have  ever  cherished  or 
taken  seriously  to  heart  is  without  significance, 
and  the  method  cannot  be  used  to  distinguish 
propositions  tiiat  have  meaning  from  those  that 
have  not.  We  shall  not  know  what  pragma- 
tism as  a  method  is  until  its  representatives  tell 
us  which  of  these  two  theories  of  meaning  they 
adopt.  We  may  join  with  Professor  Lovejoy 
in  calling  for  an  election  between  them,  and 
agree  with  him  that  probably  neither  choice  will 
be  foimd  welcome.      "  For  all  the  charm  and  im- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  195 

pressiveness  of  the  theory  arises  out  of  the  con- 
fusion of  its  alternative  interpretations.  It 
gets  its  appearance  of  novelty  and  of  practical 
serviceableness  in  the  settlement  of  controver- 
sies from  its  one  meaning ;  and  it  gets  its  plausi- 
bility entirely  from  the  other.  But  (when  the 
distinction  is  made)  in  the  sense  in  which  the 
theory  might  be  logically  functional,  it  seems 
hardly  likely  to  be  plausible ;  and  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  is  plausible,  it  appears  destitute  of  any 
applicability  or  function  in  the  distinguishing 
of  real  from  meaningless  issues."  That  is,  if 
pragmatism  chooses  the  first  theory  of  meaning 
and  ascribes  importance  and  significance  only 
to  those  propositions  which  enable  us  to  pre- 
dict events  that  will  come  even  if  these  proposi- 
tions are  not  believed,  the  theory  will  not  be  of 
much  use,  since  nothing  can  pass  this  test  ex- 
cept such  scientific  laws  as  those  through  which 
we  can  foretell  eclipses,  practically  all  the  work- 
ing hypotheses  men  live  by,  fight  over  and  die 
for  being  reduced  to  nonsense,  for  the  reason 
that  they  have  no  results  at  all  unless  they  are 
believed  in.  And  if  the  other  choice  is  made, 
again  we  are  not  helped,  since  all  views  of  life 
are  full  of  meaning  to  those  who  take  them  se- 
riously and  believe  them  true. 

So  much,  then  for  the  first  pragmatism,  the 
method.  It  may  be  noted  in  passing  that  the 
way  in  which  it  has  been  disposed  of  illustrates 


196  BERGSON  AND  THE 

the  value  of  that  criticism  which  consists  in  the 
making  of  distinctions.  Our  thought  is  often  (^ 
a  blur  because  we  are  trying  to  think  together 
things  which  do  not  belong  together,  and  the 
greatest  service  that  can  be  rendered  in  such 
cases  is  to  have  these  confused  components  of 
our  ideas  distinguished  and  set  apart.  The 
task  that  next  confronts  us  in  the  consideration 
of  the  pragmatic  notion  of  truth  is  the  same 
in  kind,  though  far  more  difficult.  In  Bacon's 
famous  essay  we  read, — "What  is  tnith.'^  cried 
jesting  Pilate,  and  waited  not  for  an  answer." 
One  bright  woman,  who  has  listened  to  some  of 
the  recent  discussions  which  pragmatism  has 
started  about  the  nature  of  truth,  says  she 
now  knows  why  Pilate  did  not  wait.  It  should 
be  remembered,  however,  that  it  is  not  the  phi- 
losopher's fault  that  the  problems  he  deals  with 
are  hard  to  answer.  He  can  be  held  responsible 
only  for  doing  his  best.  Now  it  is  over  this 
question  of  the  nature  of  truth  that  the  battle 
rages,  for  here  is  the  storm  center  of  interest, 
and  it  is  chiefly  in  tlie  discussion  of  this  sub- 
ject that  tlie  pragmatlsts  complain  of  being  mis- 
understood. And,  while  all  men  are  concerned, 
the  outcome  of  the  debate  is  of  vital  importance 
for  those  who  as  students  of  science  and  phi- 
losophy and  as  ministers  of  religion  conceive 
that  a  large  part  of  their  business  is  the  learn- 
iniT  and  tcachinn;  of  truth.      Such  Icarnino-  and 


MODERN  SPIRIT  197 

teaching  is  not  merely  our  privilege ;  it  is  our 
life.  It  may  be  frankly  admitted  that  Truth, 
Truth  with  a  capital  T,  is  an  idol  of  our  tribe. 
The  conviction  that  truth  is,  that  it  is  discover- 
able, that  to  learn,  teach  and  apply  it  is  one  of 
the  noblest  and  most  salutary  things  a  human 
being  can  do,  is  one  of  the  assumptions  on  which 
our  lives  rest.  This  idea  fills  us  with  enthusi- 
asm, inspires  our  studies  and  professional  work, 
and  whatever  threatens  it  threatens  the  heart 
of  our  higher  life.  If,  as  the  pragmatists  say, 
truth  is  no  longer  a  distinct  category,  but  merely 
a  form  of  the  good,  if  ideas  are  merely  useful  or 
expedient  rather  than  true,  it  is  obvious  that 
much  of  our  enthusiasm  has  been  foolish  and 
we  must  change  our  tone. 

Of  course,  when  the  pragmatists  attempt  to 
establish  a  new  view  of  the  nature  of  truth,  it 
does  not  occur  to  us  that  they  mean  to  deny  its 
existence.  Nevertheless,  they  have  a  way  of 
speaking  about  it  that  alarms  our  instincts. 

The  situation  is  as  follows :  The  ordinary, 
intellectualist  view  is  that  truth  is  a  matter  of 
agreement  of  our  ideas  with  an  objective  order, 
that  this  order  is  something  to  which  our 
tlioughts  must  conform,  if  they  are  to  be  true. 
That  is,  certain  things  have  happened,  and  cer- 
tain processes  go  on,  events  have  a  certain  se- 
quence ;  thus,  we  say,  Ca'sar  lived,  the  angle  of 
incidence    is    equal   to   the    angle    of   reflection, 


198  BERGSON  AND  THE 

Henry  is  In  Berlin,  the  date  of  Deuteronomy  is 
about  620  B.  C  These  things  being  so,  if  I 
think  they  are  so  my  thought  is  true.  It  is  hard 
to  see  how  anything  could  be  simpler.  But  the 
pragmatists  make  difficulties  and  offer  a  view 
they  consider  to  be  more  concrete,  in  the  exposi- 
tion of  M-hich  thej'  fill  us  with  uneasiness  by  seem- 
ing to  give  aid  and  comfort  to  those  who  have  no 
intellectual  conscience  and  who  play  fast  and 
loose  with  truth.  We  have  observed  the  prog- 
ress that  has  been  made  by  men  like  Faraday 
and  Darwin,  constructing  theory  after  theory, 
and  then  ruthlessly  crushing  in  their  beautiful 
promise  all  these  intellectual  constructions  that 
do  not  agree  with  or  reflect  the  processes  they 
are  meant  to  explain.  And  we  see  that  the  lack 
of  this  intellectual  piety  in  many  people,  their 
preference  for  ideas  that  are  merely  pleasing  or 
that  legitimate  their  prejudices,  and  their  fail- 
ure to  acknowledge  their  obligation  to  find  out 
what  has  been  and  is  and  to  accept  what  is 
proved  to  be  true  regardless  of  its  disturbing  ef- 
fect on  tlieir  traditional  beliefs,  has  filled  the 
world  with  war  and  is  still  the  cause  of  endless 
strife  and  mental  confusion. 

It    is,    therefore,    naturally    disconcerting   to 

read    in    the   lectures    of  Professor   James   that 

J     "  Truth  happens  to  an  idea.      It  hccovica  true, 

is    vkkIc   true    by    events.      It    verily    ts    in    fact 

an  event,  a  process:  the  jjrocess  namely  of  veri- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  199 

fying  itself,  its  ycv'i-fication.^^  .  .  .  Truth  is 
made,  just  as  health,  wealth  and  strength  are 
made,  in  the  course  of  experience.  .  .  .  This 
function  of  agreeable  leading  is  what  we  mean 
by  an  idea's  verification.  The  truth  of  a  state 
of  mind  means  this  function  of  a  leading  that  is 
zvorth  while.  And  when  much  is  said  about 
truth  being  what  gives  "  the  maximum  possible 
sum  of  satisfactions,"  about  the  true  being 
"  only  the  expedient  in  our  way  of  thinking,"  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  the  pragmatist  acknowl- 
edges the  coercions  of  the  world  of  sense  and  of 
abstract  relations  and  feels  as  much  as  anyone 
"  the  immense  pressure  of  objective  control  un- 
der which  our  minds  perform  their  operations," 
we  are  not  satisfied,  since  we  cannot  help  feeling 
not  only  that  it  is  the  incidental  features  of 
truth  which  have  been  emphasized,  but  also  that 
all  this  will  tend  to  strengthen  that  mere  willful- 
ness in  thinking  of  which  there  is  already  too 
much  in  the  world,  and  that  it  will  benefit  none 
but  those  who  are  ever  looking  for  some  justifi- 
cation of  their  determination  to  hold  to  cher- 
ished beliefs  in  the  absence  of  evidence  and  even 
in  the  face  of  contrary  evidence. 

When,  impelled  by  such  interests,  we  subject 
the  pragmatist  theory  of  truth  to  close  scrutiny 
in  order  to  determine  its  meaning  and  probabil- 
ity, we  find,  as  in  the  case  of  pragmatism  re- 
garded   as    a    method,    a    radical    ambiguity. 


200  BERGSON  AND  THE 

There  are  many  passages  in  Professor  James' 
book  that,  taken  by  themselves,  would  indicate 
that  he  maintains  the  view  that  truth  is  wholly 
within  human  experience,  a  view  which  he  dis- 
claims as  absurd.  Yet  these  misleading  pas- 
sages are  there,  and  the  fact  that  they  stand 
side  by  side  with  other  statements  which  teach  a 
different  doctrine  has  confused  the  readers  of 
this  brilliant  and  fascinating  book.  This  has 
come  out  clearly  in  recent  discussions,  and  since 
my  purpose  is  to  make  plain  how  pragmatism 
has  gradually  been  forced  practically  to  give  up 
its  case,  I  propose  to  give  a  resume  of  the  course 
of  these  discussions  touching  this  main  point. 
Herbert  Spencer  somewhere  complains  that  he 
found  Plato  uninteresting  reading,  and  objects 
particularly  to  the  dialogue  form  in  which  his 
philosophy  is  cast.  But,  as  I  have  said,  phi- 
losophy is  essentially  a  dialogue.  It  is  only 
through  discussion  that  we  become  clear  as  to  our 
own  intent  or  can  know  the  mind  of  others.  The 
old  Greek  philosophers  wished  to  clear  up  the 
subject  as  they  went  along,  and  not  pass  over 
any  points  that  were  obscure  or  that  failed  to  se- 
cure the  assent  of  botli  parties.  The  method 
to-day  is  to  write  a  book  and  then  reply  to  the 
critics  in  the  technical  journals.  And  even  in 
the  book  the  views  of  opponents  are  discussed, 
so  that  the  dialogue  is  preserved  in  the  sub- 
stance, if  not  in  form. 


MODERN  SPIRIT  201 

It  was  a  great  day  in  Athens  when  Socrates 
could  be  pitted  against  some  famous  philosopher, 
and  it  is  a  great  thing  for  us  that  this  question 
has  been  discussed  by  able  men  on  both  sides. 
I  am  sure  there  is  no  better  way  to  clarify  the 
situation  than  to  extract  from  the  Journal  of 
PhilosopJiT/,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods 
the  following  passages  from  a  controversy  be- 
tween Professor  James  and  the  clearest  and 
most  brilliant  of  his  opponents,  Prof.  J.  B.  Pratt, 
of  Williams  College. 

To  this  conversation  of  Socrates  and  Protag- 
oras let  us  now  attend.  Professor  Pratt  first 
calls  attention  to  the  fact  that,  while  pragma- 
tism identifies  the  truth  of  an  idea  with  the 
process  of  its  verification,  it  is  also  spoken  of  as 
being  verifiability,  which  is  a  very  different 
thing ;  and  he  properly  insists  that  the  issue  be- 
tween pragmatism  and  intellectualism  cannot  be 
perfectly  clear-cut  if  these  two  views  are  con- 
fused. The  latter  conception  of  truth  as  veri- 
fiability is  not  pragmatic,  for  pragmatism  says 
truth  is  a  process,  an  event,  and  "  verifiability 
is  not  a  process,  is  not  included  within  anyone's 
experience,  but  is  a  general  condition  or  set  of 
conditions  which  transcends  every  single  finite 
experience.  It  is  not  a  '  felt  leading,'  it  is  not 
a  '  form  of  the  good,'  nor  a  '  satisfactory  work- 
ing,' nor  any  other  kind  of  experience  or  experi- 
ence-process.    It  is  a  totality  of  relations  which 


202  BERGSON  AND  THE 

are  not  within  any  finite  experience.  It  is  a 
present  condition  of  the  idea,  not  something  that 
happens  to  it.  It  is  not  '  made  ' ;  it  is  already 
there.  Verification  is  one  thing ;  verifiability  is 
another."  The  pragmatist  must  choose,  for  it 
is  as  impossible  to  identify  truth  with  both  "  as 
it  is  to  be  both  a  pragmatist  and  an  intellectual- 
ist  at  the  same  time.  The  pragmatist  cannot 
hold  them  both  ;  he  cannot  say  truth  is  altogether 
within  experience  and  truth  transcends  experi- 
ence." ..."  That  being  the  case,  there  can  be 
no  doubt,  after  all,  as  to  the  fundamental  prag- 
matic view  of  truth.  Truth  for  the  pragmatist 
does  not  mean  verifiability,  it  means  the  process 
of  verification.  It  is  wholly  within  experience." 
This,  of  course,  turns  out  to  be  as  foolish  as 
it  at  first  appears.  For  it  is  clear  that  a  theory 
which  reduces  everything  to  psychology,  though 
it  may  properly  speak  of  satisfactory  and  suc- 
cessful experiences,  cannot  consistently  use  the 
word  verification  at  all.  A  simple  case  is  used 
to  illustrate  the  difference  between  the  pragma- 
tist and  the  ordinary  view.  "  John  thinks  Peter 
has  a  toothache;  the  object  of  John's  tliought  is 
Peter's  present  experience ;  and,  as  a  fact,  Peter 
has  a  tootliache.  Now  the  intellectualist's  no- 
tion of  truth  is  this :  that  Jolm's  thought  is  true 
because  its  object  is  as  he  tliinks  it.  Now  let  us 
apply  the  pragmatic  meaning  of  truth  to  the 
same  situation  —  remembering  that  truth  here 


MODERN  SPIRIT  203 

means  a  '  form  of  the  good,'  the  '  useful,'  '  effi- 
cient,' '  workable,'  '  satisfactory,'  the  process  of 
verification.  The  truth  of  John's  idea  about 
Peter's  experience,  therefore,  according  to  the 
pragmatist,  consists  in  its  satisfactoriness  to 
John,  in  its  successful  leading,  in  its  verifying 
itself.  If  it  works,  if  it  harmonizes  with  John's 
later  experience  of  Peter's  action,  if  it  leads  in 
a  direction  that  is  worth  while,  it  is  true  (a  state- 
ment to  which,  indeed,  all  might  assent),  and  its 
truth  consists  in  this  working,  this  harmony, 
this  verification  process.  John's  thought,  the 
pragmatist  insists,  becomes  true  only  when  it 
has  worked  out  successfully,  only  when  his  later 
experience  confirms  it  by  being  consistent  with  it 
—  for  remember,  truth  is  not  verifiability,  but 
the  process  of  verification.  Truth  happens  to 
an  idea.  It  becomes  true,  is  made  true  by  events. 
At  the  time  when  John  had  the  thought  about 
Peter,  the  thought  was  neither  true  nor  false, 
for  the  process  of  verification  had  not  yet  be- 
gun, nothing  had  as  yet  happened  to  the  idea. 
To  be  sure,  Peter  had  a  toothache,  just  as  John 
tliought,  but,  all  the  same,  John's  thought  was 
not  true.  It  did  not  become  true  till  several 
hours  afterward  —  in  fact,  we  may  suppose,  not 
until  Peter,  having  cured  his  toothache,  told 
John  about  it.  The  thought,  '  Peter  has  a 
toothache,'  thus,  as  it  happens,  turns  out  not  to 
have   been   true   while   Peter   actually   had   the 


204  BERGSON  AND  THE 

toothache,  and  to  have  become  true  only  after 
he  had  ceased  to  have  a  toothache.  It  became 
true  onl}'  by  being  proved  true,  and  its  truth 
consisted  in  the  process  of  its  proof.  One 
might  perhaps  be  tempted  to  ask  what  it  was 
that  was  proved,  and  to  say  to  the  pragmatist, 
either  this  satisfactoriness,  this  successful  lead- 
ing, is  a  proof  of  something  outside  John's  im- 
mediate experience,  something  by  which  his  idea 
is  to  be  judged  and  justified  (in  which  case 
truth  ceases  to  be  mere  verification  process  and 
becomes  at  least  vcrifiabilit}^)  ;  or  else  it  is  merely 
John's  subjective  feeling  of  satisfaction  and  of 
successful  leading  and  consistence,  with  no  refer- 
ence to  anything  else  to  justify  it  —  in  which 
case  it  may  indeed  be  pleasant  and  good,  but  ii; 
is  hard  to  sec  why  it  should  be  called  true. 
For,  suppose  tliat  at  the  same  time  with  John's 
thought,  Tom  thinks  Peter  has  not  a  toothache. 
Suppose  tliat,  being  a  little  stupid  and  perhaps 
a  little  hard  of  hearing,  he  misinterprets  John's 
actions  and  expressions,  and  that  later  on  he  is 
assured  by  someone  equally  misinfonned,  that 
Peter  certainly  had  no  toothache.  His  thought 
thus  works  out,  is  successful,  harmonizes  with 
his  later  experience,  is  to  him  genuinely  verified. 
Tlie  whole  matter  ends  here  and  he  drops  the 
question  completely,  never  investigating  farther. 
AVere  tlie  thoughts  of  both  John  and  Tom 
true.^" 


MODERN  SPIRIT  205 

So  our  Protagoras,  and  he  imagines  his  op- 
ponent replying,  "  No,  Tom's  thought  was  not 
genuinely  verified.  Only  that  thought  was 
really  verified  and  therefore  true  which  would 
have  worked  out  had  both  been  verified  suf- 
■ficiently"  But  this  reply  is  unsatisfactory. 
"  For  what  do  you  mean  by  sufficiently?  Suf- 
ficiently, for  what.^*  To  argue  thus  would  be  to 
presuppose  a  criterion  (apart  from  the  leading 
of  the  thought)  to  which  the  thought  must  cor- 
respond if  it  is  to  be  true.  If  you  distinguish 
between  a  genuine  verification  and  one  that  is 
only  subjectively  satisfactory,  you  appeal  to 
some  other  criterion  than  the  process  of  verifi- 
cation —  in  other  words  you  go  over  to  the  in- 
tellectualist's  point  of  view.  If  on  the  other 
hand,  you  stick  to  your  pragmatic  criterion  and 
say  that  the  truth  of  the  thought  consists  in 
actual  satisfactoriness,  then  the  question  be- 
comes pertinent :  Were  the  thoughts  of  both 
boys  true?  Obviously  they  were,  for  both 
worked,  both  were  satisfactory,  both  were  verified. 
Hence  it  was  true  at  the  same  time  and  in  the 
same  sense  that  Peter  had  a  toothache  and  that 
Peter  had  not  a  toothache.  Nor  is  there  any- 
thing surprising  in  this,  if  truth  is  nothing  hut 
a  particular  hind  of  satisfactory  experience. 
The  principle  of  contradiction  has  no  meaning 
and  can  no  longer  hold  if  truth  be  altogether 
within  one's  experience." 


206  BERGSON  AND  THE 

When  I  read  these  words,  which  so  perfectly 
expressed  my  difficulty,  I  wondered  what  the  an- 
swer would  be.  We  did  not  have  to  wait  long. 
Professor  James  promptly  replied  that  he  was 
misunderstood,  saying,  "  Whether  such  a  prag- 
matist  as  this  exists  I  know  not,  never  having 
myself  met  with  the  beast."  He  rejects  most 
emphatically  what  we  thought  was  the  prag- 
matic theory  of  truth,  and  makes  this  state- 
ment :  "  Truth  is  essentially  a  relation  between 
two  things,  an  idea,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a 
reality  outside  the  idea  on  the  other.  This  rela- 
tion, like  all  relations,  has  its  f undamentum ; 
namely,  the  matrix  of  experiential  circumstance, 
psychological  as  well  as  physical,  in  which  the 
correlated  terms  are  found  imbedded.  .  .  . 
What  constitutes  the  relation  known  as  truth, 
I  now  say,  is  just  the  existence  in  the  empirical 
world  of  this  fundamentum  of  circumstance  sur- 
rounding object  and  idea  and  ready  to  be  short- 
circuited  or  traversed  at  full  length.  So  long 
as  it  exists  and  a  satisfactory  passage  through 
it  between  the  object  and  tlie  idea  is  possible, 
that  idea  will  both  he  true,  and  will  have  been 
true  of  that  object,  whether  fully  developed 
verification  has  taken  place  or  not." 

This  statement  is  certainly  explicit  and  clear. 
It  fully  recogniy.cs  tliat  truth  is  a  relation  be- 
tween the  idea  and  the  objective  order.  And 
in   an   article    in    the   Philosophical  Review   for 


MODERN  SPIRIT  207 

January,  1908,  on  "  The  Pragmatist  Account  of 
Truth  and  Its  Misunderstanders,"  Professor 
James  is  even  more  emphatic.  He  says  the 
pragmatist  is  necessarily  a  realist  in  his  theory 
of  knowledge ;  he  "  calls  satisfactions  indispensa- 
ble for  truth  building,  but  expressly  calls  them 
insufficient  unless  reality  be  also  incidentally  led 
to.  If  the  reality  he  assumed  were  canceled 
from  his  universe  of  discourse,  he  would  straight- 
way give  the  name  of  falsehoods  to  the  beliefs 
remaining,  in  spite  of  all  their  satisfactoriness. 
For  him,  as  for  his  critic,  there  can  be  no  truth  if 
there  is  nothing  to  be  true  about."  This  seems 
to  state  with  perfect  clearness  that  truth  is  not 
found  within  any  human  experience,  but  trans- 
cends, or  may  transcend,  every  such  experience. 
What  now  does  the  critic  say  to  this  complaint 
of  being  misunderstood  and  to  the  new  position? 
He  does  not  find  it  difficult  to  show  that  his  idea 
of  the  pragmatist  view  of  truth  is  not  a  carica- 
ture. Not  only  has  Professor  James  said  the 
things  attributed  to  him,  but  other  representa- 
tives of  the  same  school  have  made  similar  state- 
ments. Thus,  Professor  Dewey  has  said: 
"  Truth  is  an  experienced  relation  of  character- 
istic quality  of  things  and  it  has  no  meaning 
outside  of  such  a  relation."  So  Professor 
Moore :  "  That  which  is  accepted  as  real,  i.  e., 
as  logically  real,  is  one  factor  xcitliin  the  judg- 
ing process,  not  something  outside  to  which  the 


208  BERGSON  AND  THE 

whole  judgment  conforms."  Mr.  Schiller  says 
truth  is  "  a  function  of  our  intellectual  activity, 
or  a  manipulation  of  our  objects  which  turns  out 
to  be  useful."  But,  allowing  Professor  James 
to  repudiate  this  view,  which  he  says  he  never 
held,  the  critic  asks  what  is  the  difference  be- 
tween this  latest  pragmatist  theory  that  truth  is 
a  relation  between  an  idea  and  a  reality  outside 
of  the  idea,  and  the  view  he  opposes?  He  asks 
also  if,  as  the  pragmatist  now  admits,  ideas  may 
"  be  true  in  advance  of  and  apart  from  their  util- 
ity," provided  their  objects  are  "  really  there," 
how  can  their  truth  depend  upon  satisfactions? 
For  if  satisfactions  are  indispensable  to  the  truth 
of  an  idea,  it  would  seem  that  the  idea  cannot  be 
true  till  they  are  experienced,  "  and  the  fact  that 
the  object  of  the  idea  is  really  there  does  not 
make  the  idea  true."  "  Thus,  John's  idea  that 
Peter  has  a  toothache  would  not  be  true  till  John 
is  satisfied,  even,  if  as  a  fact,  Peter  actually  has 
a  toothache,  and  although  it  is  true  at  the  same 
time  to  Paul  who  is  satisfied."  ..."  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  satisfactions  are  not  indispensable, 
if  truth  is  merely  the  condition  that  makes  verifi- 
cation possible,  and  if  a  belief  may  be  genuinely 
true  before  it  is  verified  and  without  anyone's 
feeling  satisfaction,  then  it  is  hard  to  see  that 
pragmatism  has  contributed  anything  in  the 
least  original  or  new  to  the  conception  of  the 
truth    relation.     Will    the   pragmatists    tell    us 


MODERN  SPIRIT  209 

pLainly  which  of  these  two  contradictory  views  is 
orthodox  pragmatism?  " 

These  long  quotations  will,  I  hope,  be  excused, 
because  they  take  us  to  the  heart  of  the  subject. 
The  lover  of  that  philosophic  diamond,  clearness 
of  thought  and  statement,  will  find  beautiful 
specimens  in  Professor  Pratt's  essays.  To  ar- 
guments so  cogent  what  answer  is  possible?  In 
the  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Sci- 
entific Methods  for  March  26,  1908,  Professor 
James  asks,  "  Would  it  satisfy  the  repudiators 
of  the  fuller  definition  if  we  agreed  to  let  them 
keep  the  word  '  true  '  for  what  they  stickle  for 
so  exclusively,  namely,  the  more  preliminary  and 
objective  conditions  of  the  cognitive  relation. 
.  .  .  while  the  word  '  truthful '  should  be  re- 
served, as  having  the  more  concrete  sound,  for 
the  entire  unmutilated  notion  for  which  Mr. 
Schiller  and  I  contend?  Mr.  Schiller  and  I 
would  then  appear  as  fighting  the  battles  of 
truthfulness  against  truth.  The  question  would 
be  almost  purely  academic,  for  in  actual  life  the 
true  and  the  truthful  would  usually  denote  the 
same  body  of  actual  human  statements  or  beliefs. 
Even  now  none  of  the  facts  which  either  party 
emphasizes  has  even  been  denied  by  the  other 
party,  and  the  quarrel  might  have  the  bottom 
knocked  out  of  it  altogether,  so  far  as  related  to 
truth's  definition  only,  by  the  invention  of  this 
or  some  other  pair  of  technical  terms." 


210  BERGSON  AND  THE 

Such,  then,  is  what  it  all  comes  to,  so  far  as 
the  pla}'  of  brilliant  minds  about  the  subject  has 
been  able  to  show  what  is  really  there.  About 
the  value  of  the  outcome  you  can  form  your  own 
conclusion,  after  applying  either  or  both  of  the 
pragmatic  tests,  what  difference  does  it  make  if 
3'ou  believe  it,  or  what  difference  does  it  make 
anyway  ? 

The  critic  of  pragmatism  so  extensively 
quoted  in  this  paper  points  out,  as  I  think 
rightly,  that  "  an  ambiguity  in  the  word  idea 
...  is  responsible  for  a  great  deal  of  the  mis- 
understanding between  pragmatists  and  anti- 
pragmatists.  The  former  accept  Professor 
Dewey's  definition  of  an  idea  as  a  '  plan  of  ac- 
tion,' and  look  upon  it  as  '  an  instrument  for  en- 
abling us  the  better  to  have  to  do  with  the  ob- 
ject and  to  act  about  it.'  " 

Of  course,  if  ideas  are  to  be  defined  in  this 
way,  they  can  be  spoken  of  as  useful  and  suc- 
cessful, but  it  seems  irrelevant  to  call  them  true. 
A  good  tool  is  merely  good,  not  truthful  or 
true.  And  the  usefulness  of  ideas  tliat  are 
merely  plans  of  action  has  no  meaning  apart 
from  their  use. 

But,  ordinarily,  when  we  say  that  an  idea  is 
truo,  we  are  tliinking  not  of  plans  or  purposes, 
but  of  a  judgment  that  a  thing  is  so.  And  while 
we  may  l)e  fully  justified  in  speaking  of 
plans  and  purposes  as  wise,  successful  or  good, 


MODERN  SPIRIT  211 

only  judgments  can  properly  be  said  to  be  true. 

The  net  result,  then,  is  that  of  the  two  views 
which  have  been  confused  in  the  pragmatist 
theory  of  truth,  one  is  admitted  to  be  ridiculous 
even  by  Professor  James  himself,  while  the  other 
is  not  different  from  the  view  he  opposes.  And 
the  confusion,  it  is  now  clear,  is  largely  due  to 
the  fact  that  when  the  pragmatists  are  talking 
about  ideas  they  are  thinking  about  plans  of  ac- 
tion, while  the  rest  of  us  are  thinking  of  state- 
ments about  the  sequence  of  events  and  matters 
of  fact.  It  amounts  to  this,  practically,  that  if 
the  pragmatists  are  to  be  allowed  to  appropriate 
the  word  Truth  and  give  it  the  new  meaning 
upon  which  they  insist,  we  shall  simply  have  to 
find  another  name  for  that  much  more  important 
tiling  which  we  have  always  meant  when  we  used 
the  term.  For  when  we  listen  to  others  we  are 
not  concerned  to  hear  what  they  think  is  expedi- 
ent or  what  feels  satisfactory  to  them,  but  what 
they  consider  to  be  true.  It  will  be  long  before 
the  pragmatist  form  of  oath,  proposed  by  Pro- 
fessor Royce,  will  be  accepted  in  any  court  of 
justice :  "  I  promise  to  tell  whatever  is  expedi- 
ent and  nothing  but  what  is  expedient,  so  help 
me  future  experience." 

A  peculiarly  instructive  feature  of  this  whole 
episode  in  philosophy  is  the  way  in  which  the 
pragmatic  theory  of  knowledge,  like  every  theory 
rigidly  held,  demands  of  its  devotees   constant 


212  BERGSON  AND  THE 

sacrifices  of  fact.  One  of  the  most  obvious,  con- 
crete and  seemingly  indisputable  characteristics 
of  cognition  is  its  external  reference.  We  actu- 
ally do,  in  our  thought,  refer  to  what  is  beyond 
our  experience.  On  their  theory,  the  pragma- 
tists  find  such  transcendence  a  puzzle,  and  so 
deny  the  fact,  that  is,  the  more  radical  among 
them  do.  Professor  James,  it  is  true,  was  a 
realist,  and  may  at  first  be  considered  an  excep- 
tion. Still,  though  his  theory  of  ideas  as  hav- 
ing the  function  of  leading,  as  enabling  us  to 
'  ambulate  '  from  one  part  of  experience  to  an- 
other, served  him  very  well  when  only  phases  of 
experience  were  in  question,  it  broke  down  when 
it  was  used  to  explain  the  relation  of  these  ideas 
to  what  is  wholly  outside  us.  The  '  saltatory  ' 
nature  of  this  relation  is  obvious,  and  when 
James  admitted  it,  he  practically  gave  up  his 
case.  In  fact,  the  pragmatic  theory  of  truth 
and  knowledge  has  been  logically  dead  for  sev- 
eral years.  Here  again,  Dewey  is  the  true  ex- 
ponent of  the  ultimate  nature  of  pragmatism. 
The  many-sided  James  admitted  tluit,  if  we  are 
to  know  the  true  from  the  false,  there  must  be 
some  reference  to  a  reality  outside  our  experi- 
ence, while  Dewey,  with  his  theory  that  knowl- 
edge is  a  doubt-inquiry-answer  experience, 
rejects  all  considerations  of  external  reality. 
For  the  latter,  the  only  question  is  as  to  the 
satisfactory  or  unsatisfactory  character  of  the 


MODERN  SPIRIT  213 

experiences.  Our  plans  work  and  it  is  well  with 
us,  or  the  reverse.  If  one  still  wants  to  know 
about  objective  truth  and  existence,  that  is  a 
mere  pre-pragmatic  temper  that  lingers  on  from 
the  days  of  our  ignorance.  It  is  to  ask  about 
metaphysical  reality,  which  is  no  proper  concern 
of  ours  and  "  may  go  to  its  own  place." 

The  denial  of  objective  reference  in  knowl- 
edge, and  of  a  relation  to  that  which  is  beyond 
experience,  as  necessary  if  knowledge  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  error,  is  thus  entirely  com- 
parable to  the  denial  of  the  existence  of  the 
moons  of  Jupiter.  And  it  affords  us  one  more 
illustration  of  the  fact  that  neither  the  biolog- 
ical point  of  view,  nor  any  other,  is  absolute. 
It  is  unquestionably  useful  to  consider  those  as- 
pects of  knowledge  which  for  the  logical  prag- 
matists  are  fundamental  and  all-sufficient.  But 
if  we  refuse  to  consider  other  equally  important 
and  indeed  aboriginal  characteristics,  such  as 
external  reference,  we  are  landed  in  solipsism 
and  agnosticism. 

It  is  now  clear  that  James'  famous  doctrine 
of  the  "  Will  to  Believe  "  is  strictly  incompati- 
ble with  a  thorough-going  pragmatism,  that  is, 
with  a  theory  that  knowing  involves  no  reference 
to  anything  beyond  the  experience  of  the  knower. 
For,  apart  from  caricatures,  James  really  means 
that  when  we  have  done  our  best  to  decide  about 
the  truth  of  such  a  doctrine  as  that  of  the  ex- 


214  BERGSON  AND  THE 

istence  of  God,  and  have  not  been  able  for  lact 
of  data ;  wlien,  furthermore,  we  are  compelled  to 
act,  and  our  action  must  take  for  granted  that 
the  doctrine  either  is  or  is  not  true ;  then,  and 
not  till  then,  we  have  the  right  to  take  the 
course  which  seems  on  the  whole  wisest.  In 
these  cases  of  compulsory  action  with  insufficient 
knowledge,  we  have  the  right  to  believe.  This 
is  a  ver}^  different  thing  from  what  is  implied 
in  the  term,  "  The  Will  to  Believe,"  which  James 
laments  that  he  ever  used. 

But  it  is  of  value  only  to  men  who  b}'^  truth 
mean  something  more  than  effective  working. 
Wlien  religious  men  hear  tliat  the  truth  of  a 
theory  is  its  satisfactory  working,  they  are  apt 
to  be  comforted  by  the  statement  tliat  the  doc- 
trine of  the  existence  of  a  God  is  true  because 
it  works.  But  they  will  not  be  so  happy  when 
they  realize  the  illusory  nature  of  this  assist- 
ance. For  this  does  not,  and  on  strictly  prag- 
matic principles  can  not,  mean  that  we  may  be- 
lieve in  the  objective  existence  of  God  because 
the  belief  lielps  us  to  live.  The  belief  is  not  true 
in  this  sense.  All  that  the  right  to  believe  can 
signify,  on  Dewey's  pragmatism,  is  that  the  be- 
lief in  God  works  because  it  works.  To  ask 
about  God's  real  existence  is  to  enquire  about 
metaphysical  reality,  and  that  is  not  a  legiti- 
mate question. 

Indeed,     pragmatism     refuses     to      consider 


MODERN  SPIRIT  215 

whether  anything  is  true,  in  the  old,  familiar, 
objective  sense.  Even  of  itself,  all  that  it  can 
properly  do  is  to  insist  that  it  is  a  good  method, 
not  that  it  is  objectively  true. 

This,  then,  seems  to  be  the  outcome  of  the 
whole  matter.  As  a  mere  attitude  of  protest, 
pragmatism  is  intelligible,  but  not  constructive. 
It  is  not  to  be  refuted  by  argument,  since  it  is 
partly  a  matter  of  temperament  and  partly  a 
reaction  in  a  particular  thought-situation.  As 
a  theory  of  meaning,  and  a  method  of  determin- 
ing the  significance  of  propositions,  of  "  making 
our  ideas  clear,"  it  has  proved  to  be  the  reverse 
of  useful.  As  a  theory  of  truth  and  a  theory 
of  knowledge,  it  is  obviously  an  overstatement 
of  partial  truths  and  is  logically  dead.  For 
religion,  this  outcome  is  fortunate.  Solipsism 
probably,  scepticism  certainly,  is  the  necessary 
result  of  a  philosophy  that  refuses  to  even 
consider  questions  of  ontology,  of  metaphysical 
reality. 

If  this  is  pragmatism,  and  I  think  it  deserves 
the  right  to  the  name,  it  is  entirely  incompatible 
v\'ith  that  venture  of  faith  which  all  of  us  make, 
and  which  Prof.  James  was  trying  to  describe 
in  his  famous  and  misnamed  essay,  "  The  Will 
to  Believe."  We  cannot,  if  we  are  clear  and 
consistent,  call  these  two  radically  different 
things  by  the  same  name. 

If,   ignoring   these   technical   discussions,   we 


216  BERGSON  AND  THE 

think  only  of  the  etymological  implications  of 
the  term  pragmatism,  and  decide  to  define  it  for 
ourselves,  we  may  do  so  provided  we  clearly  re- 
alize the  perfectly  definite  meaning  we  are  giv- 
ing to  it,  and  do  not  by  its  use  commit  ourselves 
to  precarious  and  one-sided  ideas  of  life.  Be- 
cause we  are,  and  must  continue  to  be,  pragma- 
tists  in  one  sense,  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that 
the  James-Dewey  theory  of  truth  and  knowledge 
is  correct.  The  gist  of  it  all,  the  element  of 
value  in  pragmatism,  as  thus  redefined,  ma}'  be 
stated  as  follows :  In  the  general  situation 
which  confronts  us  all,  we  are  constantly  com- 
pelled to  decide  the  most  important  matters  in 
the  absence  of  adequate  data.  Life  is  like  rid- 
ing a  bicycle ;  we  have  to  go  ahead  before  we 
know  we  are  right.  Our  knowledge  is  very  lim- 
ited, and  we  walk  mostly  by  faith.  Only  com- 
paratively simple  facts  can  be  calculated,  and 
our  most  developed  sciences  deal  with  restricted 
fields.  Our  specialists  know  many  things  about 
chemical  reactions,  ph3'sical  processes,  geolog- 
ical changes  and  micro-organisms.  Upon  ap- 
plied science  our  civilization  largely  rests,  and 
in  the  growth  of  science  is  a  great  part  of  our 
hope  for  the  future.  But  the  larger  the  scope 
of  a  science  the  more  inadequate  and  undevel- 
oped it  is.  The  sciences  that  deal  with  life,  such 
as  psychology,  ethics,  sociology,  arc  not  much 
more  than  programmes,  which  it  is  hoped  future 


MODERN  SPIRIT  217 

investigations  may  fill  up.  Meanwhile,  we  have 
to  live  now,  and  it  is  well  to  realize  that  neither 
science,  which  is  so  useful  in  its  way,  nor  phi- 
losophy, which  synthesizes  the  results  of  scien- 
tific investigations,  is  a  complete  guide  to  life. 
They  cannot  yet  demonstrate  to  us  the  nature 
of  reality  and  the  appropriate  human  reaction. 
Is  the  evolving  cosmos,  this  mighty  engine  of 
mud  and  fire,  all  ?  Or  is  there  in  and  through  it 
a  God,  a  life,  a  spirit,  that  is  at  least  as  great 
as  our  ideals  of  the  noble,  the  good,  the  divine.? 
Is  the  universe  congenial  to  our  ideals?  Is  the 
heart  of  reality  akin  to  what  we  instinctively  love 
and  reverence.''  Arc  courage  and  faith  and 
hope  appropriate,  or  is  the  pessimist  right.'' 
Are  we  the  sole  inhabitants  of  an  otherwise  life- 
less universe.''  Are  we  orphans,  marooned  on 
this  planet.''  Or  is  our  life  in  touch  with  a  great 
life  with  whom  we  may  have  fellowship.''  Are 
we  mistaken  in  the  sense  we  have  that  when  we 
think  truly,  when  we  love,  when  we  are  lo3-al  to 
the  highest  we  know,  we  are  living  on  lines  that 
do  not  end  where  our  lives  end  but  that  in  some 
sense  they  are  the  lines  of  God's  life.'' 
^  Whichever  view  we  take  must  be  taken  at  our 
risk.  In  these  matters  life  is  necessarily  a  ven- 
ture. It  is,  as  someone  has  said,  a  speculation 
on  a  grand  scale.  And  it  is  worth  while  to  re- 
alize that  certain,  absolute  knowledge  is  not  to 
be  had ;  that  neither  philosophers  nor  men   of 


218  BERGSON  AND  THE 

science  can  tell  us ;  that  even  the  founders  of  the 
world's  great  rcHffions  themselves  knew  no  more 
than  we,  but  that  the}^  too,  had  to  make  the 
great  venture. 

There  are  many  people  who  do  not  under- 
stand this.  They  run  here  and  there,  go  to  this 
church  and  that,  read  the  new  books  and  investi- 
gate the  new  religions  and  philosophic  fads,  in 
the  hope  of  getting  definite  knowledge  concern- 
ing the  great  themes.  But  a  little  reflection 
ought  to  show  that  this  is  vain.  There  is  ab- 
solutely nothing  for  us  but  to  select  a  working 
theory  of  life,  live  by  it,  and  take  the  risk.  The 
Socrates  of  the  "  Phaedo  "  long  ago  told  us  this. 
"  I  know,"  he  said,  "  how  hard  or  rather  impos- 
sible is  the  attainment  of  certainty  about  ques- 
tions such  as  these  in  our  present  life.  And  yet 
I  should  deem  him  a  coward  who  did  not  prove 
what  is  said  about  them  to  the  iittennost,  or 
whose  heart  failed  him  before  he  had  examined 
them  on  every  side.  For  he  should  persevere 
until  he  has  achieved  one  of  two  things :  either 
he  should  discover  or  be  taught  the  truth  about 
them  ;  or,  if  this  be  impossible,  I  would  have  him 
take  the  best  and  most  irrefragable  of  human 
theories,  and  let  this  be  the  raft  on  which  he  sails 
through  life  —  not  without  risk,  as  I  admit,  if 
he  cannot  find  some  word  of  God  which  will 
more  surely  and  safely  carry  liim."  (Phaedo 
85.) 


MODERN  SPIRIT  219 

To  be  sure,  in  choosing  a  working  theory  of 
life,  we  use  the  pragmatic  method  and  take  the 
one  which  promises  best  results.  Experience 
affords  some  help.  In  the  long  past  some  the- 
ories have  been  found  to  be  livable,  to  be,  when 
believed  and  acted  upon,  biologically  serviceable. 
INIore  important  yet,  for  we  are  interested  not 
merely  in  existence  but  in  noble  living,  certain 
ways  of  reacting  toward  the  world  have  been 
found  to  produce  grand  and  beautiful  lives. 
The  results  we  care  most  for  have  been  achieved 
when  men  and  women  have  assumed  that  this 
world  is  a  place  for  a  manly  and  womanly  life, 
when  they  have  taken  and  kept  the  way  of  cour- 
age, hope  and  love,  when  they  have  lived  in  the 
conviction  that  loyalty  to  the  highest,  even  on 
the  part  of  the  humblest,  is  the  supreme  good 
and  has  more  than  temporal  significance.  Our 
theodicies,  we  may  as  well  frankly  admit  it,  are 
all  failures.  We  cannot  explain  away  all  the 
cruelties  and  brutalities  in  the  universe.  Yet  in 
spite  of  the  facts  that  depress  us  and  the  argu- 
ments that  threaten  to  reduce  us  to  despair,  it  is 
significant  that  those  men  have  lived  most  nobly 
and  beautifully,  most  satisfactorily  to  them- 
selves and  helpfully  to  others,  who  have  lived 
as  if  they  were  citizens  of  a  moral  universe,  of 
God's  world.  In  this  spiritual  situation  we  are 
necessarily  pragmatists.  Not  only  is  it  legiti- 
mate to  decide  which  way  we  shall  adventure  our 


220  BERGSON  AND  THE 

lives,  but  we  must  do  so.  And  if  we  are  religious 
men,  it  is  because  we  have  resolved  to  trust  our 
moral  sentiments,  because  we  are  following,  far- 
off  it  may  be,  but  still  following,  and  counseling 
others  to  follow  those  heroic  souls  who,  in  the 
darkest  hours  and  most  desperate  situations, 
have  said  of  the  God  who  is  a  name  for  our  moral 
ideals,  "  Though  he  slay  me,  yet  will  I  trust  in 
Him." 
[  "  But  what  has  Bergson's  philosophy  to  do 
with  all  this?  "  The  question  is  natural  and 
the  answer  easy.  It  would  be  very  nearly  cor- 
rect to  reply,  "  Nothing  at  all."  The  meta- 
physician of  the  life  force,  the  strenuous  up- 
holder of  the  view  that  the  primal  reality  is 

"  The  Life  that  maketh  all  things  new, 
The  blooming  earth,  tlic  thoughts  of  men," 

is  not  a  man  of  the  pragmatist  temper,  nor  does 
he  hold  the  theory  of  truth  or  the  theory  of 
knowledge  announced  and  defended  by  James, 
Schiller  and  Dewey.  He  has  a  very  definite 
theory  of  knowledge,  according  to  which  the 
mind  is  composed  of  two  complementary  powers. 
The  intellectual  element  knows  the  outside  of 
things.  It  gives  us  the  truth  of  the  material 
world  and  ultimately  helps  us  to  an  intuition  of 
the  very  nature  of  matter.  It  is  true  that  it  is 
constitutionally  incapal)le  of  knowing  life,  but 
we  are  able  to  get  at  the  I  ruth  of  this  through 


MODERN  SPIRIT  221 

intuition,  sympathy,  insight.  We  thus  have 
ideas  that  are  more  than  plans  of  action.  By 
combining  into  a  synoptic  view  what  sight  and 
insight  reveal,  we  arrive  at  the  very  truth  of 
metaphysical  reality.  Bergson  is  therefore  no 
pragmatist,  agnostic  or  sceptic.  Faith  in  hu- 
man knowledge  never  went  further,  and  has 
never  been  better  defended. 

Why,  then,  has  he  ever  been  classed  with  the 
pragmatists .''  Chiefly,  it  seems,  because  it  is 
so  common  to  reason  after  this  fashion :  I  am 
a  pragmatist  and  I  hold  a  particular  view.  B 
defends  the  same  or  a  similar  view.  Therefore 
B  is  a  pragmatist.  As  we  have  seen,  it  is  very 
difficult  to  know  which  of  the  many  things  that 
have  been  called  pragmatism  deserves  the  name. 
I  think  that  what  is  characteristic  in  it  is  its 
theory  of  knowledge  and  its  theory  of  truth, 
and  that  these  theories,  at  least  as  the  prag- 
matists  hold  them,  are  false.  But  there  are 
other  definitions.  We  are  told  that,  in  its  broad- 
est sense,  pragmatism  means  "  the  acceptance  of 
the  categories  of  life  as  fundamental.  It  is  the 
bio-centric  philosophy."  This  is  peculiar,  vague 
and,  on  the  whole,  most  unsatisfactor}'.  For 
there  are  many  of  us  who  have  come  up  to  phi- 
losophy and  to  the  problems  of  the  moral  and 
social  life,  and  even  of  history,  by  Ava^'  of  biology 
and  psychology,  who  are  yet  unable  to  accept 
pragmatism  as  a  spirit,  a  method,  or  a  theory 


222  BERGSON  AND  THE 

of  truth.  The  fact  is  that  exponents  of  con- 
tested views  are  always  looking  for  support, 
especially  when  hard  pressed,  and  in  this  case 
Bergson  has  been  claimed  as  an  ally  because 
of  his  theory  of  the  instrumental  nature  of 
the  intellect  and  of  the  concepts  it  uses.  It  ^ 
is  perfectly  true  that  he  does  regard  the  intel- 
lect as  an  instrument  developed  by  the  mind 
to  enable  it  to  deal  with  matter,  but  the  prag- 
matists  who  emphasize  this  usually  neglect  to 
state  the  further  fact  that  this  instrument  has 
been  molded  on  the  material  environment  and 
reveals  to  us  something  of  its  truth,  of  its  na- 
ture, that  is,  of  that  part  of  reality.  It  is 
metaphysically  incompetent  only  when  it  deals 
with  life,  the  truth  of  which  we  may  also  know, 
although  in  another  way. 

But  different  as  James  and  Bergson  are,  they 
agree  in  two  fundamental  points.  The  Amer- 
ican philosopher  follows  tlie  Frenchman  in  his 
theory,  we  may  even  say  his  demonstration,  of 
tlie  impossibility  of  knowing  the  fullness  and 
richness  of  life  through  conceptual  tliought,  of 
expressing  wliat  is  essentially  movement  in  static 
terms. 

Both  contend  against  the  rationalistic  notion 
that  all  is  given,  and  tliink  of  tlie  universe  not 
as  a  median  ism,  but  in  terms  of  growth.  Says 
James:  " 'i'ho  essential  contrast  is  that  for 
rationalism  reality  is  ready-made  and  complete 


MODERN  SPIRIT  223 

from  all  eternity,  while  for  pragmatism  it  is 
still  in  the  making,  and  awaits  part  of  its  com- 
plexion from  the  future.  On  the  one  side  the 
universe  is  secure,  on  the  other  it  is  still  pursu- 
ing its  adventures."  (Pragmatism,  p.  257.) 
Their  common  a^cw  is  perhaps  best  expressed  in 
James'  essay  on  "  Bergson  and  His  Critique  of 
Intellectualism,"  which  the  author  of  "  Crea- 
tive Evolution "  says  faithfully  expresses  his 
thought.  As  a  preparation  for  philosophic 
study,  it  would  be  hard  to  find  anything  better 
than  this  wonderful  chapter,  for  it  contains  a 
sun-clear  statement  of  the  nature  of  concepts 
and  their  relations  to  perceptual  experience, 
without  which  no  one  can  get  far.  It  is  not  a 
denial,  but  an  explicit  admission  of  the  value  of 
a  stable  scheme  of  concepts  as  a  means  of  order- 
ing life  and  of  enabling  us  to  find  our  way  about 
in  the  world.  What  it  does  deny  is  the  notion 
that  "  logic  is  an  adequate  measure  of  what  can 
or  cannot  be."  Giving,  as  it  does,  "  primarily 
the  relations  between  concepts  as  such,  and  the 
relations  between  natural  facts  only  secondarily 
or  so  far  as  the  facts  have  already  been  identified 
with  concepts  and  defined  by  them,  logic  must 
of  course  stand  or  fall  with  the  conceptual 
method."  In  conceptual  thought,  we  substitute 
"  tracings  for  realities,"  "  brain  diagrams  or 
physical  metaphors  for  moral  facts,"  and  treat 
human    interests    as   mechanical   forces.     These 


224  BERGSON 

theoretic  constructions  are  extremely  useful, 
since  they  are  "  maps  of  the  distribution  of 
other  percepts  in  space  and  time."  Still,  they 
are  only  schematic  arrangements,  while  "  the 
inner  movements  of  our  spirit  are  known  only 
perceptually." 

I  submit,  then,  neither  James  nor  Bergson  is 
an  anti-intellectualist  except  in  a  limited  and 
perfectl}^  definite  sense.  The  latter  has  taken 
great  pains  to  explain  that  "  concepts  are  indis- 
pensable to  intuition,"  and  is  declared  by  James 
to  be  "  accurately  right  wlicn  he  limits  concep- 
tual thought  to  arrangement,  and  when  he  in- 
sists that  arrangement  is  the  mere  skirt  and  skin 
of  the  whole  of  wliat  we  ought  to  know."  Of 
course,  it  is  possible  to  go  through  the  books  of 
these  writers  "  like  a  myopic  ant  over  a  build- 
ing," and  after  the  manner  of  a  partisan  de- 
bater judge  them  b}^  statements  taken  apart 
from  tlieir  context.  But  whoever  interprets 
them  sympathetically  and  in  thcMr  total  inten- 
tion, will  not  make  the  mistake  of  supposing  that 
they  can  be  quoted  in  favor  of  the  view  that 
"  knowledge  is  merely  experienced  transition, 
that  truth  is  merely  satisfactory  consequences 
and  transcendence  nothing  but  nonsense,"  and 
he  will  not  identify  their  philosophy  with  any 
of  those  marvelous  caricatures,  the  pragmatisms 
of  popular  imagination. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

RELIGIOUS     SIGNIFICANCE     OF     THE 

BERGSONIAN    CONCEPTION    OF 

EVOLUTION 

Although  the  content  of  human  life  has  been 
growing  richer  at  a  rapid  rate  during  the  last 
few  centuries,  religious  and  moral  interests  are 
still  supreme.  So  far  from  dying  out,  they  are 
to  most  people  the  very  heart  of  life.  What 
threatens,  even  remotely,  these  precious  inter- 
ests, instantly  arouses  alarm.  Religious  feeling 
is  so  strong  that  discussion  of  religious  subjects, 
except  among  the  like-minded,  is  instinctively 
avoided.  A  man  who  introduces  such  themes  in 
th.e  conversation  of  mixed  companies  is  regarded 
as  more  or  less  of  a  fool,  who  does  not  hesitate  to 
play  with  dynamite  in  a  crowd.  Arguments  on 
religious  subjects  are  usually  more  heated  than 
judicial,  and  tend  to  degenerate  into  social  com- 
bats. Men  and  women  who  converse  rationally 
and  agreeably  on  all  other  subjects,  very  often 
appear  at  their  worst  when  their  faith  is  in  ques- 
tion. This  is  perfectly  intelligible,  when  full  ac- 
count is  taken  of  what  their  faith  means  to  them. 


226  BERGSON  AND  THE 

Their  religion  is  their  working  theory  of  life  on 
which  they  are  staking  their  happiness  and  their 
destiny,  and  it  includes  the  ideals  which  they 
worship  and  strive  to  follow.  To  strike  at  this 
is  to  threaten  their  lives,  and  the^'  can  no  more 
be  unconcerned  and  judicial  than  can  a  mother 
when  her  children  are  in  danger. 

Substantially  the  same  thing  is  time  of  the 
moral  interest.  This  also  is  instinctively  felt 
to  be  what  it  really  is,  not  merely  one  interest 
among  many  of  about  equal  importance,  but  a 
supreme  concern  of  life.  The  question  whether 
we  shall  be  good  or  bad  takes,  as  Plato  said, 
precedence  of  all  else.  Moral  ruin  means  total 
ruin,  the  disorganization  of  life.  This  instinc- 
tive moral  feeling  manifests  itself  sometimes  in 
unlovely  and  absurd  ways,  as  when  fanatics 
drape  the  most  beautiful  of  statues  and  suppress 
innocent  and  wholesome  anmsements ;  but  it  is 
nevertheless  on  the  whole  justified.  There  are 
people  who  cannot  enjoy  Goethe's  poetry  be- 
cause they  object  to  his  private  life,  and  Wag- 
ner's music  is  spoiled  for  them  because  they  be- 
lieve that  the  famous  composer  was  disloyal  to 
his  friends.  It  is,  of  course,  regrettable  when 
ethics  thus  obtinjdes  itself  unnecessarily  in  aes- 
thetics, but  such  facts  serve  to  keep  us  vividly 
aware  that  the  religious  and  moral  interests  are 
still  supreme.  When,  therefore,  we  read  that 
religion  is  dying,  and  tliat  it  is  to  be  replaced 


MODERN  SPIRIT  227 

by  science,  or  social  service,  or  socialism,  we 
know  at  once  that  we  have  the  opinion  of  a  super- 
ficial observer  of  human  life,  of  one  who  confuses 
the  decline  of  certain  dogmas  and  institutions 
with  that  of  the  religious  life  of  which  they  are 
historic  expressions,  or  it  is  perhaps  the  theory 
of  someone  who  is  generalizing  from  his  own 
experience  or  that  of  certain  sections  of  society 
which  are  now  in  an  attitude  of  revolt  but  which 
will  inevitably  come  in  time  to  a  more  positive 
and  constructive  spirit.  The  question  of  ques- 
tions, then,  for  wholesome,  normal  people,  is  and 
doubtless  will  continue  to  be  that  of  morality 
and  religion.  What  they  want  to  know  about 
Bergson,  as  about  every  other  great  thinker,  is, 
first  of  all,  the  bearing  of  his  thought  on  their 
working  theory  of  life,  upon  their  ideals,  upon 
the  courage,  faith  and  hope  which  enable  them 
to  live  and  feel  that  life  is  worth  while. 

It  is  only  putting  the  same  question  in  a  dif- 
ferent form  to  ask, —  What  does  Bergson  think 
about  teleology.?  For  religion  seems  bound  up 
with  a  teleological  view  of  the  world.  If  the 
whole  is  a  machine,  a  mechanical  scheme,  if  there 
is  no  meaning  or  purpose  in  it,  our  lives  seem  to 
lose  their  significance,  and  we  are  like  children 
realizing  for  the  first  time  that  they  are  or- 
phans. The  very  essence  of  religious  faith  has 
perhaps  received  its  concise  and  classic  expres- 
sion in  Browning's  lines, — 


22£  BERGSON  AND  THE 

"  This  world's  no  blot  for  us 
Nor  blank;  it  means  intensely,  and  means  good: 
To  find  its  meaning  is  my  meat  and  drink." 

All  great  religions,  therefore,  whatever  their 
differences,  are  found  to  involve  or  imply,  even 
when  they  do  not  consciously  uphold,  a  philoso- 
phy of  history.  And  Tolstoy  was  substantially 
right  when,  in  his  work  on  the  nature  of  art,  he 
said  that  to  be  unreligious  is  to  have  lost  the 
clew  to  history,  to  be  without  any  noble  concep- 
tion of  its  meaning.  Moreover,  all  the  philoso- 
phies of  history  which  are  inspiring  rather  than 
depressing  agree  in  assigning  to  man  a  signifi- 
cant place  in  the  cosmos,  and  so  give  to  him  a 
sense  of  dignity  and  worth. 

The  philosophy  of  evolution,  in  particular, 
gives  a  new  and  immense  sweep  to  human 
thought.  It  literally  puts  a  meaning  into  his- 
tory, into  time,  past,  present  and  future.  What 
intelligible  conception  of  the  past  could  our  an- 
cestors form  in  the  old,  pre-evolutionary  days.'' 
We  are  so  accustomed  to  the  idea  that  something 
has  really  been  accomplished,  achieved,  in  the 
long  ages  of  which  we  arc  the  heirs,  that  we 
cannot  understand  how  the  world  must  have 
looked  to  those  who  thought  of  it  as  simply  ex- 
isting. Evolution  has  widened  our  hori/on  and<, 
given  us  an  organic  conception  of  the  world- 
process   in   time,  so  that   it  is  now  not  merely  a 


MODERN  SPIRIT  229 

question  of  the  place  of  our  people  in  history, 
but  of  humanity  in  the  biological  realm,  and  of 
life  in  the  cosmos.  We  dare  to  think  that  the 
whole  past  had  a  meaning,  that  we  are  the  heirs 
of  the  ages  to  whom  the  ends  of  the  world  have 
come,  that  in  our  part  of  the  universe  we  are 
the  highest  product  of  the  creative  power  at 
work  through  all  past  time.  As  the  whole  proc- 
ess flowers  in  humanity,  so  humanity  flowers  in 
lives  of  goodness,  intelligence  and  love,  in  the 
saints,  the  saviors,  the  inspirers  and  helpers  of 
our  race.  And  since  we  can  form  no  rational 
notion  of  how  a  process  is  to  be  interpreted  ex- 
cept by  its  outcome,  we  seem  logically  compelled 
to  regard  the  meaning  of  the  universe  as  indi- 
cated in  its  finest  and  noblest  lives,  and  in  the 
qualities  to  which  those  lives  aspire.  When  we 
consider  what  the  best  men  and  women  are,  and 
what  they  are  striving  to  be,  we  may  legitimately 
though  modestly  claim  that  we  have  some  true, 
even  if  inadequate  notion,  of  what  the  universe 
is  doing,  of  the  inci'easing  purpose  of  the  ages. 
For,  as  Schopenhauer  truly  saw,  we  are  of  the 
stuff  of  which  the  world  is  made,  the  ultimate 
reality  is  what  we  are,  and  there  is  nothing  in 
us,  even  our  highest  aspiration,  whicli  is  not  an 
expression  of  that  life  of  our  life. 

There  is  more  than  one  form  of  the  philosophy 
of  evolution.  The  Spencerian  conception,  which 
is  the  most  familiar,  has  the  defect  of  not  being 


230  BERGSON  AND  THE 

thorough-going.  In  this  view  there  is  no  real 
evolution  of  the  power  behind  evolution,  of  that 
reality  which  he  sometimes  spoke  of  as  the  Un- 
knowable, sometimes  as  the  All-Being,  and  some- 
times as  the  Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy  from 
which  all  things  proceed.  Evolution,  as  he  un- 
derstood it,  is  not  of  this  reality,  but  takes  place 
in  the  realm  of  the  phenomenal,  and  consists  in 
a  redistribution  of  matter  and  motion  according 
to  certain  laws.  Of  this  process,  there  is  no 
permanent  result.  The  complex  system  of  atoms 
changes  its  configuration,  and  energy  is  cease- 
lessly transfonned, —  that  is  all.  After  the  in- 
tegration of  matter  comes  its  disintegration,  and 
evolutions  and  dissolutions  succeed  each  other 
without  end.  Nothing  is  being  built  up  that  is 
to  last,  nothing  is  really  achieved  in  time. 

Bcrgson,  on  the  other  hand,  belongs  among 
the  romantic  evolutionists  in  the  sense  that  for 
him  it  is  real  being,  or,  if  you  will,  the  absolute, 
that  evolves.  Time  is,  therefore,  not  rcsultless. 
The  ultimate  reality  is  a  creative,  evolving  life. 
Now,  since  life  as  we  know  it  in  ourselves  is  a 
thing  of  purpose,  Bcrgson  seems  to  be  moving 
straight  toward  a  telcological  philosophy,  es- 
pecially since  he  says  explicitly  that  "  life  is  of 
the  psychological  order,"  and  that  consciousness 
in  general  nmst  be  "  co-extensive  with  universal 
life."  When,  in  addition,  he  has  shown  the  utter 
inadequacy  of  the  mechanistic  world-view,  there 


1 


MODERN  SPIRIT  231 

seems  to  be  no  alternative  remaining  but  a  tele- 
ological,  i.  e.,  religious  philosophy.  This  ap- 
parently logical  consequence  of  his  premises, 
hoAvever,  he  refuses  to  accept.  He  rejects  tele- 
ology and  is  at  great  pains  to  explain  why,  al- 
though his  rejection  of  this  way  of  regarding 
life  is  qualified,  and  not  so  absolute  as  some  of 
his  interpreters  claim.  Some  time  ago  I  had  a 
conversation  on  this  point  with  a  cultivated  gen- 
tleman who  had  himself  given  a  series  of  lec- 
tures on  Bergson's  philosophy,  and  who  would 
not  listen  to  the  suggestion  that  teleology  had 
not  been  completely  and  finally  banished  from 
the  theory  of  Creative  Evolution.  Having  re- 
jected all  such  elements  from  his  own  thought- 
scheme,  he  was  a  trifle  impatient  on  being  told 
that  he  could  not  claim  the  French  thinker  as  a 
defender  of  his  extreme  position.  As  this  is  a 
matter  of  the  greatest  importance,  it  deserves  to 
be  examined  with  some  care.  No  good  can 
come  of  arbitrary  interpretations  of  this  or  any 
other  philosopher,  or  of  attempts  to  force  an 
unintended  meaning  into  his  utterances,  in  the 
interests  of  any  views,  whether  religious  or  un- 
religious,  which  we  ourselves  hold.  It  is  neces- 
sary, first  of  all,  to  be  perfectly  clear  as  to  what 
Bergson  thinks  about  the  subject,  and  why  he 
takes  precisely  that  position  and  no  other.  It 
will  then  be  in  order  to  criticise  the  view  and  to 
show,  if,  as  I  think,  it  can  be  shown,  that  Berg- 


232  BERGSON  AND  THE 

son's  premises  will  take  the  consistent  thinker 
much  further  than  the  philosopher  himself  has 
gone. 
-V  .  Recall,  in  the  first  place,  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge upon  which  this  whole  construction  rests. 
Life  is  the  primary  reality.  As  it  has  organ- 
ized plants  and  animals,  as  it  has  produced  sense- 
organs,  hands  and  feet,  wings  and  fins,  so  it  has 
developed  that  other  instrument  of  adaptation 
which  we  call  the  intellect.  This  implement, 
wliich  life  uses  for  perfecting  adjustments  to  the 
material  world,  itself  makes  use  of  certain  in- 
struments which  we  call  ideas  or  concepts,  chief 
of  which  are  two,  those  of  mechanism  and  tele- 
ology, or,  to  use  Bcrgson's  terms,  mechanism 
and  finalisni.  In  dealing  with  unorganized  mat- 
ter, with  the  world  of  objects  and  things,  these 
thought-frames  are  quite  adequate  and  satisfac- 
tory. But  when  we  seek  to  apply  them  to  life, 
for  wliicli  tlicy  were  not  made,  we  find  that  both 
are  inapplical)le,  though  not  in  the  sani?  degree. 
Bergson's  words  are, — "  we  try  on  the  evolu- 
tionary progress  the  ready-made  garments  that 
our  understanding  puts  at  our  disposal,  mecha- 
nism and  finality  ;  we  show  that  they  do  not  fit, 
neither  the  one  nor  the  other,  l)ut  that  one  of 
them  might  he  recut  and  resercn,  and  in  this  new 
form  fit  less  badly  than  the  other.'"  (Italics 
mine.) 

We    have    here    an    intimation    that    though 


MODERN  SPIRIT  233 

neither  the  machine  view  nor  the  purposive  view 
of  the  world  is  true,  the  latter  is  at  least  nearer 
the  truth  than  the  former,  and,  moreover,  is 
susceptible  of  being  put  in  a  less  objectionable 
than  its  oi'dinary  form.  In  fact,  the  reader 
must  be  careful  not  to  overlook  the  qualifying 
statements  which  this  thinker,  who  is  careful  as 
well  as  bold,  is  constantly  making.  For  in- 
stance, he  rejects  the  theory  of  mechanism  be- 
cause it  is  a  rigid  scheme  which  forces  those 
who  hold  it  to  deny  or  ignore  the  obvious  facts 
of  life.  There  is  no  place  in  it  for  the  constant 
upspringing  of  the  new,  for  the  maturing  and 
ripening  characteristic  of  what  really  lives,  for 
the  effect  of  time,  for  individuality  and  freedom. 
There  is  a  difference  between  the  living  and  the 
lifeless,  and  mechanism  ignores  this  difference. 
For  this  theory,  all  is  given,  and  the  new  is  in- 
conceivable and  therefore  inadmissible.  Reality 
actually  is  creative,  but  in  a  universe  which  is  a 
mechanism,  nothing  more  is  possible  than  rear- 
rangements of  the  parts.  Life  is  a  larger  thing 
than  either  mechanism  or  finalism,  which  are,  at 
bottom,  "  only  standpoints  to  which  the  human 
mind  has  been  led  by  considering  the  work  of 
man."  The  intellect  is  an  instrument  created 
by  life,  and  concepts,  such  as  those  of  mechanism 
and  finality,  are  instruments  of  the  intellect ; 
consequently  to  try  to  conceive  of  life  in  such 
terms  is  to  try  to  put  the  whole  into  a  part  of 


< 


234  BERGSON  AND  THE 

a  part.  Now  the  physicists  and  chemists  who 
are  investigating  organic  structures  would  be 
wrong;  to  take  such  statements  as  an  indication 
that  Bergson  regards  their  researches  as  ille- 
gitimate or  futile.  If  they  read  further,  they 
will  come  upon  such  qualifications  as  this :  "  I 
recognize  that  positive  science  can  and  should 
proceed  as  if  organization  was  like  making  a 
machine.  Only  so  will  it  have  any  hold  on  or- 
ganized bodies.  For  its  object  is  not  to  show  ' 
us  the  essence  of  things,  but  to  furnish  us  with  ; 
the  best  means  of  acting  on  them.  Physics  and  ' 
chemistry  are  well  advanced  sciences,  and  living 
matter  lends  itself  to  our  action  only  so  far  as 
we  can  treat  it  by  the  processes  of  our  physics 
and  chemistry.  Organization  can  therefore 
only  be  studied  scientifically  if  the  organized 
body  has  first  been  likened  to  a  machine.  The 
cells  will  be  the  pieces  of  the  machine,  the  organ- 
ism their  assemblage,  and  the  elementary  labors 
which  have  organized  the  parts  will  be  regarded 
as  the  real  elements  of  the  labor  which  has  or- 
ganized the  whole.  That  is  the  standpoint  of 
science.  Quite  different,  in  our  opinion,  is  the 
stand])oint  of  philosophy."      C  K.,  93. 

This  means  that  for  the  practical  purposes  of 
life,  e.g.,  for  medicine  and  for  the  industries 
and  manufactures  winch  use  organic  products, 
the  methods  used  in  the  physical  and  chemical 
laboratories  are  the  best.     It  is  only  necessary 


MODERN  SPIRIT  235 

to  remember  that  in  such  cases  life  is  viewed  in  a 
special  and  partial  way,  and  that  we  must  not 
make  a  metaphysics  of  our  practically  useful 
concepts.  "  If  science  is  to  extend  our  action 
on  things,  and  if  we  can  act  only  with  inert  mat- 
ter for  instrument,  science  can  and  must  continue 
to  treat  the  living;  as  it  has  treated  the  inert. 
But,  in  doing  so,  it  must  be  understood  that  the 
further  it  penetrates  the  depths  of  life,  the  more 
sjaiibolic,  the  more  relative  to  the  contingencies 
of  action,  the  knowledge  it  supplies  us  be- 
comes." ^     C.  E.,  198. 

1  The  reader  who  desires  to  know  something  of  the 
astonishing  number  of  processes  which  biochemistry  has 
already  discovered  in  protoplasm  may  study  the  lucid 
little  summary,  entitled  "  Chemical  Phenomena  in  Life " 
by  Ferdinand  Czapek,  published  by  Harper  and  Broth- 
ers, New  York,  1911.  He  will  there  learn  that  protoplasm 
has  a  peculiar  chemical  constitution  and  a  mechanical 
structure,  and  upon  these,  according  as  one  or  the  other 
seems  the  more  important,  are  based  the  Stuff  Theories 
and  the  Engine  Theories  of  life.  Protoplasm  is  a  col- 
loid, an  albumin  sol,  or  rather  a  group  of  colloids,  which 
has  many  of  the  physical  and  chemical  characteristics  of 
true  solutions  but  also  properties  which  are  found  only 
in  suspensions.  Besides  the  nucleus  of  the  cell,  there  is 
the  protoplasmatic  membrane  which  has  peculiar  func- 
tions more  or  less  well  understood,  and  in  the  narrow 
space  it  encloses  go  on  a  great  number  of  chemical 
processes.  Some  of  these  are  due  to  soluble  ferments 
called  enzymes,  such  as  diastase,  which  are  divided 
into  groups,  the  hydrolases,  esterases,  carbohydrases,  lip- 
ases, amidases,  proteases,  coagulases,  oxidases,  reductases, 
carboxylases,  etc.  We  read  also  of  pro-enzymes  or 
zymogens,  of  a  group  of  peculiar  compounds  called  hor- 


2SG  BERGSON  AND  THE 

^^  There  are  some  minds  which  seem  determined 
by  their  constitution  to  exaggerate  all  differ- 
ences. They  habitually  use  superlatives,  never 
having  realized  the  value  of  the  positive  degree. 
What  seems  good  to  them,  they  call  di^^ne,  the 
inferior  being  condemned  as  diabolical.  He  who 
criticises  them,  they  regard  as  an  enem3\  Es- 
sentially partisans,  they  denounce  the  saner  men 
who  see  the  various  sides  of  vexed  questions  and 
the  complexity  of  nearly  all  concrete  situations. 
There  is  no  gradation  of  light  and  shadow  in 
their  mental  pictures.  "  Let  darkness  keep  her 
raven  gloss  " ;  "  he  wlio  offends  in  but  one  point 
is  guilty  of  the  whole  law," —  such  are  their  fa- 
vorite maxims.  Natures  of  this  character  arc 
incompetent  in  philosophy,  although  they  are 
precisely  the  ones  that  need  it  most.  When 
they  meet  with  an  original  construction  such  as 
that  of  Bergson,  they  seem  unable  to  take  notice 

mones,  which  exert  stimulating  or  regulating  effects  on 
the  organism.  Then  tliere  are  numerous  toxins  and  anti- 
toxins with  which  Iinmunocheniistrj^  deals.  There  are 
substances  such  as  ojisonines,  bactcrolysins  which  sen'e 
for  the  jirotcction  of  the  organism,  and  others  such  as 
aggressines  wliich  "  assist  parasites  against  their  hosts." 
One  does  not  need  to  be  a  chemist  and  know  a  great  deal 
about  these  matters  at  first  hand  to  miderstand  that  the 
chemical  investigation  of  living  matter  promises  results 
of  great  practical  value,  even  if  one  sides  with  Bergson 
rather  than  with  this  ])rofessor  of  plant  physiology,  who 
regards  life  as  "on  the  wliole  nothing  else  but  a  com- 
plex of  innumerable  chemical  reactions  in  tiie  living  sub- 
stance which  wc  call  protoplasm." 


JNIODERN  SPIRIT  237 

of  the  qualifications  which  the  philosopher  makes 
of  his  own  doctrines.  We  have  just  seen  that  he 
justifies  and  makes  place  for  mechanistic  con- 
ceptions in  science,  and  in  the  case  of  finalism 
he  goes  even  further,  saying  that  "  one  accepts 
something  of  it  as  soon  as  one  rejects  pure 
mechanism.  The  theory  we  shall  put  forward 
in  this  book  will  therefore  necessarily  partake  of 
finalism  to  a  certain  extent."  P.  40.  "  The 
philosophy  of  life  to  which  we  are  leading  up 
claims  to  transcend  both  mechanism  and  final- 
ism ;  but  it  is  nearer  the  second  doctrine  than  the 
first."     P.  50, 

It  is  easy  to  see  why  Bergson  rejects  final- 
istic  conceptions.  To  him  they  imply  a  rigid 
scheme,  "  a  programme  previously  arranged." 
The  universe,  on  that  theory,  would  be  like  a 
phonograph,  and  our  lives  like  the  "  records." 
When  the  machine  works,  the  songs  or  speeches 
represented  on  gutta  percha  disks  would  come 
out.  But  this  is  mechanism  again,  only  it  is 
an  inverted  mechanism,  in  which  "  the  attrac- 
tion of  the  future  is  substituted  for  the  impul- 
sion of  the  past."  All  is  given,  all  is  rigid  and 
mechanical,  and  there  is  no  room  for  the  inven- 
tion, the  creation,  the  incalculable,  which  are 
characteristics  of  our  human  experience.  In 
short,  it  is  not  life.  We  cannot  therefore  re- 
gard life  as  the  realization  of  a  plan,  for  a  plan 
is  an  idea,  and  life  creates  ideas  as  it  moves  on- 


238  BERGSON  AND  THE 

ward.  "  Evolution  does  not  mark  out  a  solitary 
route ;  it  takes  directions  without  aiming  at  ends, 
and  it  remains  inventive  even  in  its  adapta- 
tions." If  life  were  nothing  more  than  the  re- 
alization of  a  plan,  what  would  the  final  comple- 
tion of  its  activity  mean.^  Suppose  there  is  a 
goal  and  that  it  is  finally  reached:  what  then.'' 
For  Bcrgson  the  question  is  its  own  answer :  there 
is  no  finality.  "  Nature  is  more  and  better  than 
a  plan  in  course  of  realization.  A  plan  is  a 
term  assigned  to  labor :  it  closes  the  future  whose 
form  it  indicates.  Before  the  evolution  of  life,  ^ 
on  the  contrary,  the  portals  of  the  future  re- 
main wide  open.  It  is  a  creation  that  goes  on 
forever  in  virtue  of  an  initial  movement.  This 
movement  constitutes  the  unity  of  the  organized 
world  —  a  prolific  unity,  of  an  infinite  richness, 
superior  to  any  that  the  intellect  could  dream 
of,  for  the  intellect  is  only  one  of  its  aspects  or 
products."     C.  E.  105. 

This  sense  of  the  inadequacy  of  conceptual 
thought  to  express  life's  fullness  is  what  was  in 
Tennyson's  mind  wlien  he  wrote  the  lines : 

"  Our  little  systems  h,ave  their  day; 

They  have  their  day  and  cease  to  be; 

They  arc  but  broken  lights  of  Thee, 

And  Thou^  ()  Lord,  art  more  than  they." 

Anotlier  reason  for  rejecting  the  tcleological 
view  of  reality  Bergson  finds  in  the  fact  that  evo- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  239 

lution  is  not  along  one  line  only.  Finalistic 
thinkers  usually  slip  over  this  difficulty  too 
easily ;  they  tend  to  forget  that  there  are  many 
^  divergent  tendencies  in  the  living  world;  that 
nature  is  like  a  tree  whose  branches  grow  more 
numerous  and  separate  more  and  more  widely 
from  each  other  and  from  the  common  trunk. 
Such  unity  as  there  is  in  life  Bergson  thinks  is 
due  rather  to  an  original  impetus,  a  vis  a  tergo, 
than  to  an  ideal  harmony,  "  a  far  off,  divine 
event  toward  which  the  whole  creation  moves." 
"  So  the  discord  between  species  will  go  on  in- 
creasing. Indeed,  we  have  as  yet  only  indicated 
the  essential  cause  of  it.  We  have  supposed, 
for  the  sake  of  simplicity,  that  each  species  re- 
ceived the  impulsion  in  order  to  pass  it  on  to 
others,  and  that,  in  every  direction  in  which  life 
evolves,  the  propagation  is  in  a  straight  line. 
But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  there  are  species  which 
are  arrested;  there  are  some  that  retrogress. 
Evolution  is  not  only  a  movement  forward ;  in 
many  cases  we  observe  a  marking-time,  and  still 
more  often  a  deviation  or  turning  back.  It 
must  be  so,  as  we  shall  show  further  on,  and  the 
same  causes  that  divide  the  evolution  movement 
often  cause  life  to  be  diverted  from  itself,  hypno- 
tized by  the  form  it  has  just  brought  forth. 
Thence  results  an  increasing  disorder.  No 
doubt  there  is  progress,  if  progress  means  a  con- 
tinual advance  in  the   general  direction  deter- 


MO  BERGSON  AND  THE 

mined  by  a  first  impulsion ;  but  this  progress  is 
accomplished  only  on  the  two  or  three  great 
lines  of  evolution  on  which  forms  ever  more  and 
more  complex,  ever  more  and  more  high,  appear ; 
between  these  lines  run  a  crowd  of  minor  paths 
in  which,  on  the  contrary,  deviations,  arrests, 
and  set-backs,  are  multiplied." 

Apropos  of  this  passage,  and  there  are  many 
others  of  the  same  character  in  the  pages  of 
"  Creative  Evolution,"  it  may  be  remarked  that 
men  of  science,  especially  zoologists  and  biolo- 
gists, ought  to  find  a  delight  in  reading  Bcrgson, 
that  is,  if  they  care  for  philosophy  at  all.  For 
he  is  the  most  empirical  of  the  world's  great 
thinkers.  The  difficulties  he  cites  in  the  way  of 
teleological  views  are  not  those  which  would  be 
fully  appreciated  or  deeply  felt  by  mathemati- 
cians, physicists  or  literary  men.  He  has  con- 
templated long  and  earnestly  the  panorama  of 
the  living  world,  the  complex  relations  of  the  in- 
numerable species  of  plants  and  animals.  That 
is,  he  has  gazed  at  the  spectacle  of  life  and  not 
merely  read  about  it  in  a  book.  I  do  not  know 
of  any  other  pliilosopher  of  his  class  who  has 
faced  these  difficulties  with  such  knowledge  and 
sucli  frankness.  Tlie  theodicies  of  most  of  them 
arc  too  easy,  and  those  wlio,  as  a  result  of  long 
study  of  nature,  liave  an  adequate  sense  of  her 
disharmonies  and  incoherences,  have  been  wait- 
ing for  a  thinker  who  could  give  us  a  comprelien- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  241 

sivc  intci-pretation  of  nature  with  a  place  in  it 
for  the  concrete  facts  of  life. 
^  Bergson  offers  as  a  help  in  understanding 
the  great  process  the  conception  of  an  elan  vital, 
a  poussee  interieure,  an  enduring  impulse  or  life 
force,  an  original  impetus,  which  is  at  first  undif- 
y  ferentiated  but  which  splits  up  as  it  grows.  As 
an  hypothesis,  it  fits  a  multitude  of  the  facts  of 
life  of  evolutionary  history  fairly  well.  But  I 
venture  to  suggest  that  there  is  a  certain  ambig- 
uity about  the  term,  a  vagueness  that  becomes 
troublesome  when  the  discussion  turns  upon  the 
purposive  aspects  of  life.  Although  Bergson 
warns  us  against  the  physical  connotations  of 
the  term,  and  says  explicitly  that  this  life  force 
is  psychological  in  its  nature,  is  consciousness  or 
superconsciousness,  the  reader  gets  the  impres- 
sion that  in  his  biological  discussions  Bergson 
himself  does  not  always  sufficiently  remember 
this.  For  instance,  he  has  a  chapter  on  "  the 
meaning  of  life."  But  how  can  there  be  mean- 
ing without  purpose?  He  says  that  evolution 
"  takes  directions  without  aiming  at  ends."  A 
physical  force  might  do  that,  but  not  a  conscious 
life.  If  the  cosmical  elan  keeps  a  direction 
through  whole  geological  ages,  and  is  "  inventive 
in  its  adaptations,"  if  through  millions  of  years 
and  in  spite  of  countless  defeats  and  failures,  it 
"  strives  "  in  the  direction  of  the  freedom  it  at- 
tains in  man,  it  is  impossible  not  to  attribute 


242  BERGSON  AND  THE 

to  it  some  knowledge  of  its  end.  We  can  not  use 
such  language  and  deny  the  purposive  character 
of  the  movement. 

Indeed,  purpose  is  implied  in  the  very  term 
"  creative  evolution."  Bergson,  rightly,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  insists  that  the  facts  of  orthogene- 
sis are  unintelligible  except  on  the  assumption 
of  some  impulse  "  which  passes  from  germ  to 
germ  across  the  individuals,"  so  that  the  con- 
stant variation  in  a  certain  direction  which  builds 
up  a  new  species  is  not  an  accident.  He  even 
admits  that  in  the  orthogcnetic  development  of 
the  eye,  "  a  psychological  cause  intervenes." 
"  A  hereditary  change  in  a  definite  direction, 
which  continues  to  accumulate  and  add  to  itself 
so  as  to  build  up  a  more  and  more  complex  ma- 
chine, must  certainl}^  be  related  to  some  sort 
of  effort,  but  an  effort  of  far  greater  depth  than 
the  individual  effort,  far  more  independent  of 
circumstances,  an  effort  connnon  to  most  repre- 
sentatives of  the  same  species,  inherent  in  the 
germs  they  bear  rather  tlian  in  their  substance 
alone,  an  effort  thereby  assured  of  being  passed 
on  to  their  descendants."  If,  however,  this  ef- 
fort which  bridges  tlie  interval  between  the  gen- 
erations and  unites  tliem  in  a  process  of  develop- 
ment is  not  a  physical  force,  but  is  psychological 
in  its  nature,  how  can  it  fail  to  be  aware  of  what 
it   is   doing.?     How  can   tJwre   be  effort  main- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  243 

tained  for  ages  hy  a  psychological  cause  without 
purpose? 

Of  course,  this  has  not  escaped  Bergson.  He 
realizes  that  teleology  is  implicit  in  all  such 
terms  as  development  and  progi-ess.  "  In  speak- 
ing of  a  progress  toward  vision,^''  he  asks,  "  are 
we  not  coming  back  to  the  old  notion  of  final- 
ity  ?  It  would  be  so,  undoubtedly,  if  this  prog- 
ress required  the  conscious  or  unconscious  idea 
of  an  end  to  be  attained.  But  it  is  really  ef- 
fected in  virtue  of  the  original  impetus  of  life," 
etc.  To  me,  progress  does  require  such  an  idea 
of  an  end,  for  without  it  the  process  would  seem 
of  necessity  to  be  purely  physical.  Bergson's 
reserve  is  the  more  puzzling  in  that  he  expressly 
says  that  the  life  tendency  in  its  action  on  mat- 
ter "  implies  at  least  a  rudiment  of  choice,  and 
a  choice  involves  the  anticipatory  idea  of  several 
possible  actions.  Possibilities  of  action  must 
therefore  be  marked  out  for  the  living  being 
before  the  action  itself.  Visual  perception  is 
nothing  else."     C.E.P.  96.      (Italics  mine.) 

The  dramatic  story  of  the  age-long  effort  of 
the  cosmical  life  force  to  insert  some  indeter- 
mination  into  matter,  to  build  up  organisms 
whose  action  should  be  really  free,  cannot  be  told 
except  in  language  which  implies  the  teleology 
which  Bergson  rejects.  If  this  primitive  im- 
petus were  purely  physical,  this  would  not  be 


244  BERGSON  AND  THE 

true.  But  it  is  not  pressing  a  metaphor  too 
far  to  say  that  we  have  a  real  drama  in  the 
story  of  the  successes  and  failures  of  the  life 
that  is  in  the  universe  "  to  create  with  matter, 
which  is  necessity  itself,  an  instrument  of  free- 
dom, to  make  a  machine  which  should  triumph 
over  mechanism,  and  to  use  the  determinism  of 
nature  to  pass  through  the  meshes  of  the  net 
which  this  very  determinism  has  spread."  In 
the  human  brain  and  nervous  system,  which  is  a 
complicated  switchboard  that  makes  possible  a 
variety  of  responses  to  stimuli  and  so  affords  a 
way  of  escape  from  the  determinism  of  simple 
reflex  action,  Bergson  sees  the  chief  triumph  of 
organic  evolution.  "  That  the  main  energy  of 
the  vital  impulse  has  been  spent  in  creating  ap- 
paratus of  this  kind  is,  we  believe,  what  a  glance 
over  the  organized  world  as  a  whole  easily 
shows."  The  life  of  the  human  body  is  there- 
fore "  on  the  road  that  leads  to  the  life  of  the 
spirit."  The  history  of  life  "  manifests  a  search  < 
for  individuality."  It  is  tlie  story  of  a  con- 
scious or  supcrconscious  reality,  "which  is  essen- 
tially invention  and  freedom,  pursuing  its  course 
through  all  tlic  ages  of  evolution,  ovcrwlielmed 
by  automatism  in  the  vegetable,  sunk  in  torpor 
in  the  echinodcniis  jiiid  mollusca,  and  finally  at- 
taining to  an  expression  of  its  instinctive  na- 
ture in  the  higliest  of  the  artliropods  and  of  its 
i-;il  ional   powers  ;iin()i)g  the  vertebrates,  i.  c.,  in 


MODERN  SPIRIT  245 

man.  Wliat  is  this  which  keeps  its  course,  which 
faces  obstacles  with  inventiveness,  which  is 
thwarted  often  but  after  millions  of  years  at- 
tains a  partial  success?  Can  we  say  all  this  of 
it  and  deny  it  purpose?  It  is  true,  as  Bergson 
says,  that  the  more  we  fix  our  attention  on  the 
continuity  of  life,  and  we  may  say  on  its  achieve- 
ments, "  the  more  we  see  that  organic  evolution 
resembles  the  evolution  of  a  consciousness." 

The  effort  to  avoid  finalism  therefore  proves 
futile  after  all.  If  the  clan  vital  is  lifeless,  if 
it  is  a  physical  force,  we  can  think  of  it  in  terms 
of  mechanism ;  but  if  it  is  a  life,  then  we  have 
no  other  alternative  than  that  of  attempting  to 
recut  and  resew  that  other  ready-made  and 
badly  fitting  garment  which  the  understanding 
has  put  at  our  disposal,  namely,  finalism  or  tele- 
ology.    Let  us  see  what  we  can  do  in  this  line. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

RELIGIOUS     SIGNIFICANCE     OF     THE 

BERGSONTAN     CONCEPTION     OF 

EVOLUTION  (Continued) 

In  the  Platonic  dialogues  and  in  the  Homeric 
poetry,  the  characters  who  are  starting  on  an 
adventure  or  beginning  a  difficult  argument 
often  preface  their  undertakings  with  an  invoca- 
tion to  the  gods.  It  will  be  enough  for  us  sim- 
ply to  remark  that  consti-uctive  thinking,  to  be 
helpful,  must  be  thorough-going.  Whoso  lacks  ^ 
logical  courage  or,  having  put  his  hand  to  the 
plow,  looks  back,  is  not  fit  for  the  kingdom  of 
thouglit.  Nulla  vestigia  retrorsum!  The  half- 
way modes  of  thought,  the  evolutionary  theories 
with  reservations,  with  large  areas  of  reality 
marked  off  and  posted  with  signs  of  "  No  Tres- 
pass," are  but  the  pitiful  makeshifts  of  timid 
thinkers,  and  the  only  service  they  can  render 
is  to  case  for  those  who  make  them  the  path  to 
a  logically  untenable  position.  Bergson  is  pe- 
culiarly satisfying  as  a  constructive  thinker  be- 
cause of  the  clear  and  consistent  way  in  which 

his    thinking    is    carried    out^,    and    because    of 
240 


MODERN  SPIRIT  247 

the  frankness  with  which  he  faces  the  real 
difficulties.  Moreover,  the  evolution  he  de- 
scribes is  a  real  process,  not  an  illusion,  a 
mere  appearance  in  the  phenomenal.  Time  is 
real,  and  there  is  "  a  progressive  growth  of 
the  absolute."  The  universe,  regarded  as  a 
whole,  evolves.  All  that  we  know  anything 
about  is  part  of  the  great  process,  the  latest, 
finest,  highest  intellectual,  moral  and  spiritual 
aspects  of  life  as  well  as  those  which  are  more 
material,  crude,  sensual  and  gross.  What  is 
necessary,  first  of  all,  is  to  fully  realize  that 
as  "  there  is  unbroken  continuity  between  the 
evolution  of  the  embryo  and  that  of  the  complete 
organism,"  as  "  life  docs  but  prolong  this  prena- 
tal evolution,"  so  there  is  the  same  organic  con- 
nection between  the  lowest  forms  of  aboriginal 
life  and  the  highest  reaches  of  spiritual  activity 
of  the  finest  specimens  of  the  human  race.  To 
comprehend  the  significance  of  the  truth  that 
the  highest  and  the  lowest,  the  earliest  and  the 
latest,  the  natural  and  the  spiritual,  are  bound 
together  in  the  unity  of  a  process  of  develop- 
ment, is  to  attain  to  conceptions  of  the  greatest 
value.  For,  rightly  viewed,  the  relation  be- 
tween the  humble  beginnings  of  life  on  the  earth 
and  the  spiritual  elevation  of  its  manifestations 
in  the  most  highly  evolved  men,  takes  nothing 
from  the  latter  but  rather  transforms  our  con- 
ception of  the  former.      Man,  even  as  he  is,  be- 


248  BERGSON  AND  THE 

ing  the  outcome  of  the  world-process,  gives  to 
that  process  its,  meaning, —  a  meaning  that  will 
itself  appear  more  profound  as  human  life  ad- 
vances toward  the  ideal  and  achieves  what  trans- 
cends the  present  powers  of  the  constructive 
imagination. 
.^  It  is  now  clear  why  religious  thinkers  make  a 
mistake  when  they  are  half-hearted  in  their  ac- 
ceptance of  the  philosophy  of  evolution,  and 
when  they  try  to  prove  that  the  spiritual  life  of 
humanity  is  an  exception,  a  miraculous  addition 
to  the  world-process  rather  than  its  outgrowth. 
Such  a  disjointed  theory  is  unsatisfactory  from 
every  point  of  view,  tlie  religious  and  moral  as 
well  as  the  purely  intellectual.  Vain  is  the  ef- 
fort to  find  some  nook  or  cranny  in  the  cosmic 
process  for  the  supernatural.  Precarious  is  the 
faith  of  those  who  are  looking  for  some  place 
outside  tlie  realm  of  tlic  natural  for  God  and  the 
higher  naturi'  of  man.  Tluis,  Alfred  Russel 
Wallace  agrees  witli  Darwin  that  man's  body 
was  developed  h}'  natural  process,  hut  he  makes 
an  exception  of  the  intelligence  of  tlio  liiglu-r 
moral  qualities.  ]\Ian's  spiritual  nature,  he 
tliinks,  is  superadded,  not  evolved.  "  The  love 
of  trutli,  the  delight  in  beauty,  the  passion  for 
justice,  and  tlie  thrill  of  exaltation  when  we  hear 
of  any  act  of  courageous  self-sacrifice,  are  the 
workings  in  us  of  a  higher  nature  which  has  not 


MODERN  SPIRIT  249 

been  developed  by  means  of  the  struggle  for 
material  existence." 
"V  That  Wallace  has  failed  to  make  out  his  case, 
that  the  consensus  of  opinion  is  against  him, 
will  cause  no  regret  to  those  who  understand 
the  real  situation.  Indeed,  I  can  hardly  imag- 
ine anything  more  disastrous  to  philosophy  and 
religious  faith  than  for  Wallace's  idea  to  have 
proved  true.  For,  as  I  have  elsewhere  tried  to 
show,  all  our  hope  lies,  not  in  disproving  nat- 
uralism, but  in  making  it  thorough-going.  It 
is  precisely  because  man  is  inside  the  natural 
realm,  Avholly  inside  and  all  of  him  inside,  body, 
soul,  and  spirit,  that  we  are  not  only  justified 
in  liolding,  but  logically  driven  toward,  a  spir- 
itual interpretation  of  the  universe.  For  see, 
what  is  it  that  depressed  us  but  our  conception 
of  nature  as  merely  physical,  as  a  material, 
mechanical  process?  But  a  process  that  in- 
cludes man  cannot  be  so  conceived.  That  which 
is  dead  could  not  originate  life,  that  which  is 
material  could  not  produce  and  sustain  civiliza- 
tion. When  we  arc  forming  our  conception  of 
nature,  we  cannot  leave  man  out.  A  nature  that 
produces  life,  that  blossoms  out  into  conscious- 
ness, tlie  love  of  truth,  the  passion  for  justice, 
tlie  thirst  for  righteousness,  and  the  longing  for 
ideal  perfection,  is  the  only  nature  we  know  any- 
thing about.     The  trouble  with  our  agnostics 


250  BERGSON  AND  THE 

is  that  their  thought  halts  when  it  ought  to  be 
thorough-going.  It  is  clearly  unjustifiable  to 
foiTn  a  conception  of  nature  from  a  study  of 
her  lower,  more  inorganic  processes,  leaving  out 
her  higher  product,  man,  and  then  to  suppose 
that  nature  so  conceived  explains  man.  The 
fact  is  that  human  nature  in  its  very  highest 
development,  in  the  visions  of  its  poets  and 
prophets,  of  its  philosophers  and  men  of  science, 
is  simply  nature  in  its  upper  ranges.  For  man 
is  no  alien.  He  has  not  been  injected  into  the 
realm  of  the  natural  from  the  outside.  He  is 
an  outcome  of  the  world-process,  and  no  beauti- 
ful qualities  that  he  has  manifested  have  ever 
been  drawn  from  an  extraneous  source. 

All  is  natural,  then?  Yes.  Including  Jesus? 
Yes,  including  his  life,  his  love,  and  his  influ- 
ence in  the  world.  No  rose  on  its  stalk,  no  bird 
building  its  nest,  no  creature  fulfilling  the  law 
of  its  being,  is  more  natural  than  was  Socrates 
drinking  the  hemlock  or  Jesus  on  the  rood. 
From  this  conclusion  there  is  absolutely  no  es- 
cape. It  is  only  necessary  to  be  clear-headed 
and  see  the  significance  of  the  truths  and  princi- 
ples that  we  accept  without  hesitation,  in  order 
to  have  a  religion  once  more.  And  what  a  mag- 
nificent view  it  is  that  now  opens  before  us,  and 
rewards  us  for  refusing  timidly  to  halt  or  com- 
promise or  attempt  to  go  back  !  The  vision  is 
thaf    of   a    great    process,    seemingly    material, 


MODERN  SPIRIT  251 

physical,  and  mechanical  in  its  lower  ranges,  but 
evolving  at  last  into  a  world  of  conscious,  as- 
piring beings,  into  faith,  hope,  and  love,  into 
philosophy,  science,  and  art,  into  a  vast  society 
of  social  beings,  v,ith  imperfections  no  doubt, 
yet  with  dreams  of  perfection  and  earnest  ef- 
forts to  find  out  and  fulfill  the  law  of  their  be- 
ing. If,  as  is  but  fair,  this  great  process  be 
interpreted  by  its  achievements  and  aspirations, 
rather  than  by  its  obscure  beginnings,  what 
must  we  say  of  it  when  we  see  that  it  has  pro- 
duced saints,  sages,  and  saviors,  and  the  still 
higher  ideals  which  they  worshiped,  but  did  not 
attain?  Yet  the  implication  of  ordinary  nat- 
uralism is  that  in  the  laws  and  forces  of  the 
physical  part  of  the  universe  we  have  the  real, 
essential  nature.  A  more  enlightened  natural- 
ism will  say  that  the  great  process  is  to  be 
judged  by  its  outcome  rather  than  by  its  earlier 
phases,  and  that  the  noblest  fruits  of  its  long 
development  are  the  best  expressions  of  its  real 
nature. 

Below  the  living  realm  natural  processes  may 
be  unconscious.  The  mote  in  the  air  current 
and  the  sun  in  its  course  may  be  moved  by  forces 
as  purely  physical  as  they  seem.  And,  though 
animals  exhibit  evidences  of  consciousness,  there 
is  nothing  that  leads  us  to  suppose  that  any 
one  of  them  has  an  ideal  to  which  it  strives  to 
conform   its  life.     In  man,  however,  the  great 


^ 


252  BERGSON  AND  THE 

process  becomes  self-conscious.  He  strives  to 
find  and  fulfill  the  law  of  his  being:  he  co-oper- 
ates in  his  own  evolution.  His  worship  is  as 
natural  a  function  as  digestion,  and  for  his 
further  progress  as  necessary.  When  he  ceases 
to  adore  and  strive  to  realize  ideals,  he  ceases 
to  grow.  His  prayer,  his  longing  for  an  unat- 
tained  perfection,  is  the  impulse  of  growth  be- 
come conscious.  To  dispense  with  religion, 
then,  is  to  forego  all  further  development,  for 
the  moral  aspirations  are  merely  anticipations 
of  coming  reality,  the  promise  and  potency  of  a 
nobler  future. 

To  some  this  view  will  at  first  appear  too  re- 
ligious, too  inspiring,  too  beautiful  to  be  true. 
Yet  it  is  one  wliicli  it  is  not  merely  permissible 
to  hold.  Rather  is  it  a  view  to  which  we  are 
driven  wlicn  we  acknowledge  that  man  is  no  for- 
eigner wlio  has  effected  an  entrance  into  tlie  uni- 
verse, but  an  outcome  of  its  life.  When  we  are 
consistent  in  our  naturalism  and  draw  the  ulti- 
mate consequences  of  our  scientific  principles, 
the  position  I  have  been  trying  to  state  seems 
uncscapablc.  A  realization  of  the  profound 
significance  of  this  truth  will  bring  again  joy- 
ous faith  and  buoyant  hope.  Estimating  na- 
ture by  the  spiritual  values  she  has  produced, 
we  see  that  she  must  be  as  divine  as  our  divinest 
dreams. 

Furtlurninre,  this  interpretation  is  no  private 


MODERN  SPIRIT  253 

fancy.  Toward  it  the  clearest  and  best  thought 
of  our  time  is  converging.  Thus,  Prof.  F.  J. 
E.  Woodbridge  of  Columbia  University,  New 
York,  declares  that  we  must  draw  the  necessary 
conclusions  from  the  accepted  view  of  the  natural 
origin  of  our  race.  He  says  that  "  Narrow 
and  straightened  naturalism  has  erred  in  its 
estimate  of  Nature.  .  .  .  Having  learned  that 
Nature  works  by  machinery,  it  neglected  the 
obvious  fact  that  the  machinery  exists  to  sup- 
port and  maintain  its  product.  The  future  his- 
torian will  note  the  neglect  and  characterize  our 
age  as  one  strikingly  lacking  in  intelligence. 
He  will  note  our  vast  industry,  and  comment  on 
the  fact  that,  while  we  made  great  machines 
to  support  and  sustain  the  products  of  that  in- 
dustry, we  could  none  the  less  regard  Nature  as 
purely  mechanical,  with  no  product  to  exalt  and 
sustain.  We  have  been  so  afraid  of  the  doc- 
trine of  final  causes  and  of  assigning  deliberate 
intentions  to  Nature,  that  we  have  forgotten 
that  she  has  produced,  supported,  and  sustained 
human  civilization.  For  man  is  a  part  of  Na- 
ture, carried  on  by  her  forces  to  work  the  works 
of  intelligence.  In  him  she  bursts  forth  into 
sustained  consciousness  of  her  own  evolution, 
producing  in  him  knowledge  of  her  processes, 
estimation  of  her  goods,  and  suspicions  of  her 
ultimate  significance." 

Well  may  the  professor  continue,  "  This  is  a 


254  BERGSON  AND  THE 

truth  of  Nature  and  not  a  product  of  human 
fanc}' ;  and  it  is  a  truth  fraught  with  the  pro- 
foundest  emotional  import."  He  who  perceives 
this  import  has  found  the  way  out  of  "  darkest  " 
into  an  enhghtened  naturalism ;  for  it  is  ever- 
more indisputable  that  man,  not  in  his  body  only, 
but  in  his  higher  nature,  in  his  religion  and 
spiritual  life,  is  an  outgrowth  of  Nature  her- 
self. It  is  simply  a  fact,  as  this  thinker  says, 
that  man  "  has  grown  out  of  Nature's  own  stuff 
and  been  wrought  in  her  workshop.  He  is, 
then,  no  mere  commentator  on  the  world  or  spec- 
tator of  it :  he  is  one  of  its  integrations,  so  to 
speak,  a  supreme  instance  Avherc  Nature  has 
measurably  evaluated  herself.  His  comments 
are  Nature's  self-estimate." 

An  admirably  clear  statement  of  this  inter- 
pretation is  given  by  Sir  Henry  Jones  in  liis 
series  of  lectures  entitled  "  Idealism  as  a  Prac- 
tical Creed."     It  is  as  follows : 

"  A  little  while  ago  the  realm  of  nature  was 
hardly  recognized  as  a  coherent  whole.  The 
physical  sciences  were  feeble,  they  worked  apart, 
their  provinces  did  not  intersect.  Physical  life 
stood,  apparently,  unrelated  to  its  material  sub- 
strate: it  was  taken  as  a  clear  addition  to  it. 
Within  the  domain  of  pliysical  life  itself  there 
were  fixed  species,  each  of  them  describable  by 
itself:  the  problem  of  their  connection  was  not 
raised.     Man  as  a  rational  and  responsible  be- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  255 

ing  stood  aloof  from  all  —  an  exception  and 
addendum  to  the  natural  scheme.  Even  his  own 
nature  was  riven  in  two :  his  body  Avas  merely 
the  temporary  tenement  of  his  soul.  On  all 
sides  there  were  interstices,  and  rifts,  oppor- 
tunities for  miraculous  interventions  —  which 
came.  For,  beyond  the  natural  world  and 
around  it,  ready  to  flow  in  upon  it  at  any 
moment,  there  was  another.  It  was  the  object 
of  faith  rather  than  of  knowledge,  of  spiritual 
rather  than  natural  vision.  .  .  .  God  dwelt  in 
that  remote  region  of  moveless  mystery,  in  sov- 
ereign majesty  inscrutable.  .  .  .  But  of  intrin- 
sic or  rational  continuity  between  that  world 
and  this  there  was  none.  .  .  .  Now  all  is 
changed.  .  .  .  Belief  in  the  unity  of  the  nat- 
ural universe,  including  man,  is  now  practically 
universal  in  civilized  communities.  There  are 
neither  interstices  nor  rifts ;  there  are  no  causes 
without  natural  consequences,  and  no  effects 
without  natural  and  necessary  antecedents  — 
no  mere  accidents  anywhere.  The  whole  scheme 
is  compact,  and  man  is  a  part  of  it.  His  phys- 
ical nature  is  inextricably  intertwined  with  his 
bodily  frame ;  he  is  not  spirit  plu^s  soul,  plus 
body;  but  spirit,  soul  and  body  interfused;  a 
sensuous-rational  being,  continuous  with  the 
world  in  which  he  lives.  All  being  is  of  one  tis- 
sue." 

What    is    the    consequence.?     What,    indeed. 


256  BERGSON  AND  THE 

can  it  possibly  be  but  that,  seen  in  this  light, 
"  Nature  ceases  to  be  merely  natural,"  and  nat- 
uralism is  transformed  into  a  religious  idealism? 
In  tliis  magnificent  conception,  we  are  finding 
"  deliverance  from  the  cramping  dualisms  of  the 
previous  age."  We  now  see  that  "  Natural 
science  corroborates  the  truth  which  the  poets 
and  philosophers  divine.  Man,  it  tells  us.  Is 
not  an  exception  to  the  scheme  of  things,  or  a 
divine  after-thought  and  addendum  to  a  dead 
world.  He  is  part  of  nature's  tissue.  He  is 
brother  and  blood-relation  to  the  brute ;  nay, 
he  was  present  in  promise  at  the  dawn  of  being, 
waiting  to  be  evolved.  The  potencies  of  his 
spirit  slumbered  among  the  molten  masses  and 
the  fiery  vapors.  For  all  is  one  scheme.  Evo- 
lution tolerates  no  break,  brings  forth  nothing 
altogether  new,  permits  nothing  to  become  alto- 
gether old.  It  builds  the  living  present  from 
the  dying  past,  forgetting  nothing,  abandoning 
nothing  in  its  course,  least  of  all  the  dormant 
promise  of  the  emerging  ideal.  That  is  immor- 
tal, present  from  first  to  last  and  maintaining 
itself  in  every  change.  Every  step  in  the  cos- 
mic process  is  its  self-emancipation,  until  at 
length  it  stands  declared  in  a  form  worthy  of 
itself;  and  it  shows  itself  as  spirit." 

"  In  the  light  of  this,  the  last  achievement, 
the  meaning  of  the  whole  process  becomes  visi- 
ble, and  Nature,  bereft  of  life  by  the  abstract 


MODERN  SPIRIT  257 

dualisms  of  the  previous  age,  comes  to  her  own 
again.  Presenting  her  as  instinct  with  purpose 
and  order  and  beauty,  the  poetry  and  philoso- 
phy of  the  present  day,  present  her  in  truth. 
For  she  is  their  treasury.  She  possesses  what 
they  find,  reveals  what  they  discover,  bounte- 
ously yields  all  that  they  gain.  Their  thoughts 
are  her  communications :  she  fills  their  mind." 

"  Enlightened  by  his  world,  guided  and  re- 
strained by  its  mute  laws,  man  achieves  some 
knowledge,  and  acquires  some  wisdom  and 
strength.  Left  to  himself  he  were  utterly 
without  resource,  a  blind  soul  groping  in 
an  empty  void.  Man  becomes  strong  only  in 
the  strength  of  nature ;  for  he  is  sustained 
by  her  verities.  She  is  his  coadjutor  and  part- 
ner in  the  enterprise  of  life.  On  the  other  hand, 
nature  has  meaning  and  highest  worth  only  in 
relation  to  the  man  she  evolves.  She  blooms 
into  full  significance  only  in  his  spirit.  For 
spirit  holds  together  what  else  were  scattered, 
overcoming  the  discreteness  of  time  and  space 
and  circumstance.  Only  where  there  is  mind  is 
there  order,  or  beauty,  or  purpose,  or  signifi- 
cance."    Pp.  236f.,  145  f.      (Italics  mine.) 

One  of  the  most  brilliant  and  compelling  state- 
ments of  this  truth  has  been  made  by  Prof.  L. 
P.  Jacks.  He  points  out  the  significance  of  the 
fact  that  a  pliilosophy  of  tlie  universe  must  in- 
clude itself  as  one  of  the  things  to  be  explained. 


S58  BERGSON  AND  THE 

"  The  t3'pe  of  thinker  too  commonly  met  with 
to-da}"  is  one  who  violently  seizes  a  point  of 
view  outside  the  problem  he  is  seeking  to  an- 
swer, and  builds  for  himself  a  crow's  nest  of  ob- 
servation on  territory  and  out  of  material  se- 
cretly filched  from  the  object  of  liis  inquiry." 
This  omission  of  the  philosopher  himself,  this 
suppression  of  an  important  factor  in  the  situa- 
tion, is  not  simply  pardonable  modesty ;  it 
"  turns  out  on  nearer  view  to  be  mere  defective 
logic."  "  We  ask  the  philosopher,  who  explains 
how  all  things  come  in,  not  to  forget  to  explain 
how  he  happens  to  come  in  himself,  and  what 
in  the  total  production  is  the  significance  of  his 
part.  The  secret  of  the  Universe  being,  for  in- 
stance, matter  and  force,  is  it  a  fact  of  no  sig- 
nificance that  the  Universe  has  somehow  man- 
aged to  find  out  and  publish  its  own  secret,  and 
to  grow  hilarious,  contented,  pessimistic,  or  he- 
roically defiant,  as  the  case  may  be,  over  the  dis- 
covery.'' .  .  .  What  kind  of  a  Universe  is  that 
which  contains,  as  this  Universe  undoubtedly 
docs  contain,  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  '  Synthetic 
Philosophy'?  How  is  our  conception  of  Na- 
ture affected  if  we  are  to  admit  tiiat  Hacckcl, 
T.  H.  Green,  James  Martincau,  witli  all  their 
speculations,  are  natural  products?  Or  when 
Huxley  discovers  that  Nature  is  indifferent  to 
the  moral  needs  of  man,  what  is  that  in  Huxley 
which  makes  the  discovery,  and  what  is  the  dis- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  259 

covery  itself?  Do  these  fall  outside  of  Nature 
or  inside?  If  inside,  what  shall  we  think  of  a 
Nature  which  in  the  fullness  of  time  is  able  to 
produce  a  brilliant  essay  on  her  own  shortcom- 
ings, and  advise  men  how  best  to  bear  themselves 
in  consequence?  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Huxley 
and  his  works  fall  outside  of  Nature  and  have 
nothing  to  do  with  her,  then  to  what  or  to  whom 
do  they  belong?  Were  Huxley  to  admit,  as 
probably  he  would  have  done,  that,  after  all,  the 
'  Romanes  Lecture '  is  Nature's  doing,  then, 
we  must  ask,  is  she  also  responsible  for  the  very 
different  view  of  herself  put  forward  in  Mar- 
tineau's  '  Study  of  Religion,'  and,  in  addition 
to  that,  for  the  attempt  to  reconcile  these  con- 
tradictions which  we  call  Hegelian?  "  ^  Either 
these  men  view  the  world  ab  extra,  like  the  God 
of  Deism,  and  are  mere  spectators  of  a  cosmos 
in  which  they  have  no  lot  or  part,  or  they  are 
themselves  organic  elements  in  the  whole.  In 
the  latter  case,  our  conception  of  Nature  is 
necessarily  transformed.  A  logical  Monism 
can  escape  facing  the  fact  that  Nature  actually 
does  "  confess  her  moral  indifference  by  Huxley, 
proclaim  her  moral  concern  by  Martineau,  and 
strive  to  reconcile  the  discord  by  Hegel."  If 
Haeckcl  explains  the  Universe  and  leaves  out 
himself  and  his  philosophy,  he  is  only  a  dualist 
after  all.  But  if  we  see  clearly  that  such  a  pro- 
1  The  Alchemy  of  Thought.     P.  83  f . 


260  BERGSON  AND  THE 

cedure  is  logically  impossible,  then  "  there  is  no 
escaping  the  conclusion  that  it  is  the  Universe 
itself  by  means  of  Haeckel,  and  not  Haeckel 
apart  from  the  Universe,  which  answers  its  own 
riddles  in  the  systematic  and  intelligent  manner 
of  the  German  biologist.  And  that  discovery 
will  send  you  further  than  Haeckel  in  search  of 
light."  That  is,  if  the  Universe  is  really  one, 
it  thinks  through  the  philosophers  and  through 
them  produces  a  variety  of  self-expressions,  and 
it  follows  absolutely  that  "  every  form  of  jNIon- 
ism  implies  that  the  Universe  is  self-conscious." 
Thought  is  thus  rewarded  when  it  is  comprehen- 
sive and  thorough-going.  The  conclusions  it 
reaches  prove  to  be  in  accord  with  what  the  best 
of  our  race  have  felt  to  be  true.  In  the  admira- 
ble words  of  Prof.  Jacks,  this  "  doctrine,  far 
from  being  novel,  can  claim  a  witness  wherever 
Religion  and  reflective  Conscience  have  found  a 
voice.  '  Thus  saitli  the  Lord  '  is  ever  the  word 
of  the  Prophet :  '  Thus  thinks  the  Wliole  '  is 
but  the  deeper  implication  of  the  Prophet's  cry. 
'  Our  wills  are  ours  to  make  them  Thine  ' ;  and 
Thought  is  ours  for  no  other  end.  Were  the 
second  false,  the  first  could  not  be  true. 
Thouglit,  like  morality,  must  lose  in  order  to 
find;  and  in  surrendering  her  Insight  to  the 
All-of-Things,  she  achieves  on  lighter  terms  a 
victory  won  in  other  s|)ht'res  at  the  cost  of 
agony    and    })loody    sweat.      We    are    not    here 


MODERN  SPIRIT  261 

stralnino:  after  far-fetched  and  unheard-of 
things  ;  we  are  repeating  our  daily  confessions 
and  moving  among  our  most  familiar  thoughts. 
With  impeded  utterance  and  a  slightly  foreign 
accent,  philosophy  is  here  speaking  the  lan- 
guage which  ever  flows  from  the  lips  of  Re- 
ligion with  the  easy  music  of  a  mother-tongue." 
To  some  such  view,  a  consistent  and  thorough- 
going philosophy  of  evolution  must  eventually 
come.  It  seems  to  me  that  logic  not  only  per- 
mits it,  but  compels  it.  If  we  have  no  life  that 
is  not  natural,  then  the  divinest  prayer  of  the 
divinest  man  in  history  is  but  the  world-life  be- 
come conscious  and  articulate.  Naturalism, 
when  consistently  carried  out,  is  transfigured 
and  becomes  a  religious  philosophy.  For  we 
now  see  that  it  does  not  mean  that  man  is  swal- 
lowed up  in  a  process  that  goes  mechanically 
on,  but  rather  that  he  must  change  his  concep- 
tion of  that  process,  since  he  is  its  outcome. 
Put  together  the  two  things  that  belong  to- 
gether, man  and  the  universe,  and  then  con- 
sider what  kind  of  a  universe  it  is  that  is  flow^- 
ering  out  into  a  human  world  of  thought  and 
love  and  righteousness,  of  peace,  hope  and  joy. 
IMatcrialism  is  forever  dead,  for  all  that  ever 
made  it  possible  was  the  fact  that  in  construct- 
ing it  only  that  part  of  nature  which  lies  be- 
low the  realm  of  life  and  conscious  purpose,  of 
aspiration  and  creative  genius,  was  taken  into 


2C2  BERGSON  AND  THE 

account.  But  a  philosophy  that  does  not  take 
human  life  among  its  data,  that  in  its  formation 
ignores  all  but  the  physical  aspects  of  existence 
and  when  formed  is  applied  to  the  explanation 
of  the  higher  values,  is  b}'  that  very  fact  con- 
demned and  henceforth  ridiculous. 

Nevertheless,  there  is  a  very  serious  difficulty 
in  the  way  of  this  view,  one  which  I  have  not 
believed  insuperable,  but  is  very  difficult  to  re- 
solve. It  is  this :  Evolution  is  not  along  a 
single  line.  We  may  be  the  terminal  twigs  on 
a  certain  branch  of  the  great  tree  of  life,  but 
there  are  other  branches.  Nature  has  pro- 
duced not  onl}^  the  splendid  men  and  women  wo 
know,  but  she  has  made  the  tiger  and  the 
microbes  of  diphtheria  and  tuberculosis.  Fur- 
thermore, we  cannot  explain  other  species  as 
imperfect  stages  of  development.  Microbes  and 
tigers  are  not  on  the  way  to  become  men.  As 
Bergson  remarks,  "  it  is  abundantly  evident 
that  the  rest  of  nature  is  not  for  the  sake  of 
man :  we  struggle  like  the  other  species,  we  have 
struggled  against  the  other  species.  Moreover, 
if  the  evolution  of  life  had  encountered  other 
accidents  in  its  course,  if,  thereby,  the  current 
of  life  had  been  otherwise  divided,  we  should 
have  been,  physically  and  morally,  far  different 
from  what  we  are.  For  these  reasons  it  would 
be  wrong  to  regard  humanity,  such  as  we  have 
it  before  our  eyes,  as  prefigured  in  the  cvolu- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  263 

tionary  movement.  It  cannot  even  be  said  to 
be  the  outcome  of  the  whole  of  evolution,  for 
evolution  has  been  accomplished  on  several  di- 
vergent lines,  and  while  the  human  species  is 
at  the  end  of  one  of  them,  other  lines  have  been 
followed  with  other  species  at  their  end."  C. 
E.  265. 

Now  it  is  extremely  curious  that  Bergson 
should  in  this  paragraph  so  clearly  state  the 
difficulty  with  which  many  of  us  have  long 
wrestled  in  vain  and  so  decisively  reject  our 
interpretation  of  evolution,  and  yet  on  the  very 
same  page  show  how  that  difficulty  is  to  be  re- 
solved and  give,  in  a  more  adequate  form,  a  re- 
statement of  that  interpretation.  To  my  mind, 
this  page  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  and 
valuable  in  the  whole  history  of  philosophy,  as 
it  indicates  a  way  of  escape  from  one  of  the 
most  disquieting  of  antinomies.  It  is  as  fol- 
lows: 

"  It  is  in  a  quite  different  sense  that  we  hold 
humanity  to  be  the  ground  of  evolution.  From 
our  point  of  view,  life  appears  in  its  entirety  as 
an  immense  wave  which,  starting  from  a  cen- 
ter, spreads  outwards,  and  which  on  almost  the 
whole  of  its  circumference  is  stopped  and  con- 
verted into  oscillation :  at  one  single  point  the 
obstacle  has  been  forced,  the  impulsion  has 
passed  freely.  It  is  this  freedom  that  the  hu- 
man form  registers.     Everywhere  but  in  man, 


264.  BERGSON  AND  THE 

consciousness  has  had  to  come  to  a  stand ;  In 
man  alone  it  has  kept  on  its  way.  ]\Ian,  then, 
continues  the  vital  movement  indefinitely,  al- 
though he  does  not  draw  along  with  him  all  that 
life  carries  in  itself.  On  other  lines  of  evolu- 
tion there  have  traveled  other  tendencies  which 
life  implied,  and  of  which,  since  everything  in- 
terpenetrates, man  has,  doubtless,  kept  some- 
thing, but  of  which  he  has  kept  only  very  lit- 
tle. It  is  as  if  a  vague  and  formless  being, 
K'hom  we  may  call,  as  we  rcill,  man  or  supennan, 
had  sought  to  realize  himself,  and  had  succeeded 
only  by  abandoning  a  part  of  himself  on  the 
way.  The  losses  are  represented  by  the  rest 
of  the  animal  world,  and  even  by  the  vegetable 
world,  at  least  in  what  these  have  that  is  posi- 
tive and  above  the  accidents  of  evolution. 

"  From  this  point  of  view,  the  discordances  of 
which  nature  offers  us  the  spectacle  are  singu- 
larly weakened.  The  organized  world  as  a 
whole  becomes  as  the  soil  on  which  was  to  grow 
either  man  himself  or  a  being  who  morally  must 
resemble  him.  The  animals,  however  distant 
they  may  be  from  our  species,  however  hostile  to 
it,  have  none  the  less  been  useful  traveling  com- 
panions, on  whom  consciousness  has  unloaded 
whatever  cncvnnbrances  it  was  dragging  along, 
and  who  have  enabled  it  to  rise,  in  man,  to 
heights  from  which  it  sees  an  unlimited  horizon 
open  again  before  it.      It  is  true  that  it  has  not 


MODERN  SPIRIT  265 

only  abandoned  cumbersome  baggage  on  the 
way ;  it  has  also  had  to  give  up  valuable  goods. 
Consciousness,  in  man,  is  pre-eminently  intel- 
lect. It  might  have  been,  it  ought,  so  it  seems, 
to  have  been  also  intuition.  Intuition  and  in- 
tellect represent  two  opposite  directions  in  the 
work  of  consciousness :  intuition  goes  in  the  very 
direction  of  life,  intellect  goes  in  the  inverse  di- 
rection, and  thus  finds  itself  naturally  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  movement  of  matter.  A  com- 
plete and  perfect  humanity  would  be  that  in 
which  these  two  forms  of  conscious  activity 
should  attain  their  full  development."  C.  E. 
266-7. 

The  italics  in  this  passage  are  Bergson's  own, 
but  most  of  the  other  sentences  are  deserving  of 
equal  emphasis.  For  we  are  here  told  that  hu- 
manity  is  after  all  "  the  ground  of  evolution," 
that  it  is  as  if  the  great  life  had  sought  to 
realize  itself,  but  its  content  was  so  rich  that  it 
was  found  impracticable  to  express  the  whole  in 
our  species.  Just  as  no  one  of  us  can  develop 
all  of  the  latent  potentialities  of  our  child- 
hood, as  no  man  can  hope  to  be  a  successful 
prize  fighter  and  a  great  scholar,  an  Arctic  or 
African  explorer,  a  statesman,  poet,  financier, 
social  leader,  expert  in  scientific  research  and 
administrator  of  great  estates  all  together,  as 
personal  development  cannot  proceed  in  all  di- 
rections   at   once,   so   is   it   with  the   great  life 


^66  BERGSON  AND  THE 

of  which  we  are  partial  manifestations.  As 
chlorophyl-bearing  organisms  could  not  be  de- 
veloped into  good  animals,  a  division  of  labor 
was  necessarj^  which  resulted  in  the  vegetable 
and  animal  worlds.  The  two  tendencies  not  be- 
ing able  to  evolve  together,  each  has  gone  its 
way.  Evolution  is  thenceforth  in  two  directions. 
Still  Bergson  himself  admits  that  one  of  these  is 
fundamental.  He  says :  "  But  if,  from  the 
very  first,  in  making  the  explosive,  nature  had 
for  object  the  explosion,  it  is  the  evolution  of 
the  animal,  rather  than  that  of  the  vegetable, 
that  indicates,  on  the  whole,  the  fundamental 
direction  of  life."  (Italics  mine).  C.  E.,  116, 
As  the  storing  of  solar  energy  by  separating 
atoms  of  carbon  and  oxygen  was  a  function 
which  could  not  well  be  performed  by  animals 
wliich  were  to  keep  "  the  fundamental  direction 
of  life,"  the  plants  were  specialized  for  that 
work,  and  the  animals  continued  in  the  upward 
path.  But  tlic  remaining  possil)ilities  were  still 
so  numerous,  that  it  was  impracticable  to  realize 
them  in  one  species.  One  can  no  more  be  all 
kinds  of  an  animal  at  once  tlian  one  can  at  tlie 
same  time  be  a  highly  developed  animal  and 
plant.  The  case  is  not  different  with  the  mind. 
Our  intellectual  development  has  l)cen  possible 
only  at  the  partial  sacrifice  of  our  instinctive 
and  intuitional  possibilities.  Still,  humanity  is 
actually  the  highest  product  that  in  the  nature 


MODERN  SPIRIT  267 

of  the  case  was  possible.  Although  we  are  far 
from  the  ideal  of  "  a  complete  and  perfect  hu- 
manity in  which  the  two  forms  of  conscious  ac- 
tivity should  attain  their  full  development,"  the 
situation  is  not  hopeless.  For,  says  Bergson, 
man  has  kept  something  of  everything  he  has 
lost,  even  if  he  has  in  some  cases  kept  only  very 
little.  And  there  are  in  us  still  the  rudiments 
of  the  intuitional  powers  which  are  what  we  need 
to  round  out  and  complete  our  mental  life.  In- 
deed, to  show  us  what  we  have  lost  and  how  we 
may  recover  it,  is  precisely  the  Bergsonian  con- 
ception  of  the   function   of  philosophy. 

What  is  now  the  result?  We  have  scrupu- 
lously avoided  forcing  upon  Bergson  an  arbi- 
trary interpretation,  and  have  aimed  simply  at 
getting  at  his  meaning  and  the  necessary  im- 
plications of  his  doctrine,  only  to  find  that  he 
merely  qualifies,  but  does  not  really  reject,  what 
we  have  shown  to  be  the  meaning  of  evolution. 
He  himself  says  that  "  the  organized  world  as 
a  whole  becomes  as  the  soil  upon  which  was  to 
grow  either  man  himself  or  a  being  who  morally 
must  resemble  him."  In  spite  of  our  necessary 
losses  by  the  way,  and  our  incomplete  and  frag- 
mentary nature  now,  we  }iax>e  yet  kept  "  the 
fundamental  direction  of  life,"  and  in  us  this 
great  life  has  risen  "  to  heights  from  which  it 
sees  an  unlimited  horizon  open  again  before  it." 
We  have  escaped  the  dangers  that  have  over- 


268  BERGSON 

whelmed  all  our  companions  on  the  great 
march ;  we  have  attained  to  the  freedom  toward 
which  life  has  moved  from  the  beginning ;  and 
we  are  still  the  thoroughfare  through  which  life 
advances  to  unknown  and  unknowable  possibil- 
ities. The  great  adventure  is  not  over,  there 
is  hope  of  beating  down  all  remaining  resist- 
ances and  clearing  the  most  formidable  obsta- 
cles, "  perhaps  even  death."  As  we  look  off 
into  the  blue,  we  may  face  the  future  with  cour- 
age and  hope.  "  Now  are  we  the  children  of 
God,  and  it  doth  not  ^^et  appear  what  we  shall 
be."  And  when  we  survey  the  past,  the  long 
ages  when  lower  types  contended  with  each 
other  for  the  master}-,  when  we  try  to  picture 
to  ourselves  the  struggle  and  tlie  suffering,  we 
get  some  feeble  sense  of  tlic  "  cost  of  the  hu- 
man." Biological  reflection  thus  fills  with  new 
meaning  the  words  of  Paul, — "  The  earnest 
expectation  of  the  creation  waiteth  for  the  re- 
vealinir  of  the  sons  of  God." 


CHAPTER  XV 

RELIGIOUS     SIGNIFICANCE     OF     THE 

BERGSONIAN     CONCEPTION     OF 

EVOLUTION  (Concluded) 

If  this  teleologlcal  interpretation  of  evolution 
proves  to  be  the  most  natural  and  rational  we 
can  think  of,  it  is  a  very  great  matter.  For 
there  can  hardly  be  any  question  that  the  think- 
ing of  educated  people  is  to  be  more  and  more 
along  evolutionary  lines,  and  this  for  the 
simple  reason  that  such  thinking  is  the  most 
effective.  All  fruitful  work  in  science,  in  so- 
ciology, history  and  philosophy,  is  performed 
by  those  who  view  the  subjects  studied  as 
phases  of  development.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
religious  needs  of  most  people  are  deep  and  in 
many  cases  imperious,  and  a  religious  view  of 
the  world  seems  to  involve  teleology.  That  is, 
the  aspiring  life  of  men  flourishes  most  when  they 
are  able  to  believe  that,  in  some  sense,  the  good 
is  the  cause  of  things,  that  reality  is  not  a 
rigid  mechanism  but  a  life,  the  nature  of  which 

is  akin  to  what  we  reverence  and  love.     When 
269 


270  BERGSON  AND  THE 

science,  which  is  to-day  regarded  as  an  au- 
thority, is  supposed  to  negative  such  a  view, 
there  is  a  painful  schism  in  our  lives.  In  such 
a  case,  men  feel  that  they  must  give  up  either 
science  or  religion  or  keep  them  far  apart  in 
their  minds.  The  first  of  these  alternatives  is 
often  impossible,  while  the  latter  is  always  dif- 
ficult and  dangerous.  A  life  so  divided  is  de- 
prived of  its  peace,  its  natural  joyousness  and 
its  normal  strength.  The  ideal  unification  of 
life  takes  place  when  the  thoughts  that  seem 
to  us  the  most  true  are  seen  to  have  religious 
significance.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  a  final- 
istic  or  teleological  interpretation  of  evolution 
is  so  important.  This  is  the  dominant  thought 
scheme,  and  it  is  therefore  a  great  event  in  the 
history  of  thought  when  a  thinker,  a  seer  who 
looks  at  the  vast  process  with  fresh  eyes,  tells 
us  that  there  is  a  meaning  in  evolution,  that 
our  lives  are  not  mere  cpiphcnomena,  mean  and 
transitory  by-products,  but  that  they  give  the 
whole  process   its   significance. 

It  is  perfectly  true,  however,  tliat  some  of 
the  clearest  minds  find  Bcrgson's  statement  un- 
satisfactory. He  is  so  reserved,  so  untheologi- 
cal  in  his  mode  of  expression,  and  some  of  his 
statements  denying  ordinary  teleology  are  so 
sweeping,  that  religious  minds  feel  uncertain 
whether  he  is  an  enemy  or  a  friend.  Their  at- 
titude is  well  expressed  by  tlie  English  states- 


MODERN  SPIRIT  271 

man  Balfour:  "This  free  consciousness  pur- 
sues no  final  end,  it  follows  no  predetermined 
design.  ...  It  is  ignorant  not  only  of  its 
course,  but  of  its  goal;  and  for  the  sufficient 
reason  that,  in  M.  Bergson's  view,  these  things 
are  not  only  unknown  but  unknowable.  .  .  . 
Creation,  freedom,  will, — these  doubtless  are 
great  things ;  but  we  can  not  lastingly  admire 
them  unless  we  know  their  drift."  Mr.  Balfour 
is  also  like  many  other  readers  of  the  French 
philosopher  in  the  obvious  reluctance  with 
which  he  makes  the  criticism,  while  confessing 
his  gratitude  to  the  eminent  thinker,  and 
frankly  acknowledging  his  admiration  for 
"  this  brilliant  experiment  in  philosophic  con- 
struction." The  Rev.  Charles  F.  Dole  doubt- 
less expresses  the  very  natural  perplexity  of 
many,  and  their  dissatisfaction  with  the  the- 
ological vagueness  of  Bergson's  thought,  when 
he  wi'ites, — 

"  Bergson  does  not  even  try  to  tell  us  who 
God  is,  nor  does  he  appear  to  have  any  use  for 
the  word.  But  he  affirms  his  conviction  of  a 
mystery,  more  or  less  purposeful,  but  indescrib- 
able, and  somewhat  blind,  which  lies  behind,  and 
acts  through,  all  the  tortuous  processes  of  evolv- 
ing life.  Has  this  mystery  (or  God)  any  moral 
character,  that  we  may  reverence  it,  or  love  it, 
or  trust  in  its  wisdom  or  goodness.'*  Can  it  be 
truly  said  to  love  man,  or  care  for  man.''     Be- 


S72  BERGSON  AND  THE 

fore  such  questions  we  stand  as  agnostics,  so 
far  as  Bergson  throws  any  hght." 

To  this  one  might  reply  that  the  objection  as 
to  the  absence  of  purpose  in  the  life  impulse  is 
put  too  strongly.  The  critics  might  be  re- 
minded that  Bergson,  in  one  of  his  frequent 
summaries,  says,  "  I  see  in  the  whole  evolution 
of  life  on  our  planet  an  effort  of  this  essentially 
creative  force  to  arrive,  by  traversing  matter, 
at  something  which  is  only  realized  in  man,  and 
which,  moreover,  even  in  man,  is  realized  only 
imperfectly."  If  the  full  meaning  of  this  state- 
ment, which  is  by  no  means  an  isolated  one,  but 
is  truly  representative  of  his  thought,  is  com- 
prehended, it  is  clear  that  Bergson  has  himself 
answered  these  critics.  If  the  great  life  is 
striving  towards  something  which  is  but  imper- 
fectly realized  in  humanity's  highest  types,  it 
cannot  be  purposeless  after  all.  Still,  this  an- 
swer does  not  satisfy,  for  the  philosopher  has 
been  so  emphatic  in  rejecting  finalism  as  ordi- 
narily understood  tliat,  despite  his  qualifications, 
he  is  naturally  regarded  as  tlie  opponent  of  all 
finalism. 

It  would,  I  think,  be  more  to  the  point  to  say 
that  what  he  rejects  is  the  idea  that  life  is  the 
realization  of  a  pxcd  plan,  the  mechanical  ad- 
herence to  a  fixed  order.  The  motto  of  those 
who  would  live  in  his  spirit  might  be  "  Room  for 
life!"     He     will     not     admit     the     mechanistic 


MODERN  SPIRIT  £73 

theory  with  its  assumption  that  "  all  is  given," 
for  he  sees  that  spirit  and  life  are  not  limited 
to  what  has  been.  For  a  similar  reason,  the 
thought  is  intolerable  to  him  that  in  its  onward 
march  life  must  arrive  at  a  predetermined  goal, 
there  being  no  chance  of  failure  and  nothing  un- 
certain along  the  route.  But,  may  we  not  say 
to  him,  this  is  not  what  we  mean  by  having  a 
purpose  and  striving  toward  a  goal.  No  real 
purpose  is  so  mechanical  as  that.  At  the  age 
of  sixteen,  for  example,  we  have  certain  ideals 
that  serve  as  guides  of  our  personal  develop- 
ment ;  but  at  twenty-six  we  find  that  these  ideals 
have  changed,  they  have  expanded  and  grown 
with  our  growth.  Life  in  its  progress  not  only 
realizes  ideals,  but  it  also  produces  and  changes 
them.  We  know  our  direction,  but  our  life  pur- 
pose grows  clearer  to  us  as  we  advance.  We 
are  always  finding  out  what  we  mean.  This  is 
the  nature  of  life  as  we  know  it,  of  the  only  life 
we  know  anything  about.  Now  I  understand 
Bergson  to  say  that  something  like  this  is  true 
of  the  Great  Life  that  lives  in  us,  that  it  is  not 
condemned  to  repeat  forever  what  it  knows,  that 
it  really  evolves,  creates,  achieves,  that  is  to 
say,  that  it  really  lives.  Thus,  when  we  con- 
sider the  matter  well,  we  have  to  admit  that  we 
have  no  experience  of  a  purposive  life  which  is 
nothing  more  than  that  realization  of  a  fixed 
and  detailed  plan,  that  necessary  following  out 


274  BERGSON  AND  THE 

of  a  cut-and-dried  programme,  which  is  the  ob- 
ject of  Bergson's  strictures.  We  have  ends  at 
which  we  hope  to  arrive,  and  general  plans  of 
action  which  are  always  modified  in  the  course 
of  their  working  out.  I  once  undertook  a  piece 
of  research  work,  in  which  it  was  necessary  to 
invent  apparatus  and  devise  methods  as  I  went 
along.  The  investigation  corrected  itself  as  it 
proceeded.  Artists,  painters  and  writers  have 
similar  experiences.  In  fact  neai'ly  all  our  pur- 
posive undertakings  are  more  or  less  like  that. 
We  never  foresee  all  the  situations  we  actually 
have  to  meet  in  pursuing  our  goals.  There  is 
usually  abundant  need  for  all  the  ingenuity  and 
inventiveness  we  can  command.  In  short,  our 
human  lives  can  be  controlled  hy  purpose,  and 
still  retain  the  adventurous  nature  by  which 
Bergson  sets  such  store.  Why  may  not  the  life 
of  all  our  lives  have  a  purpose  in  this  sense,  an 
"increasing  purpose,"  as  Tennyson  says.'' 
And  if  it  has,  is  it  necessary  for  us  to  be- 
lieve that  it  foresees  every  event  along  its 
future  course?  The  Fourth  Gospel  represents 
Christ  as  saying  to  his  disciples  on  the  eve  of 
his  final  departure,  "  And  wliither  I  go,  ye  know 
the  way."  That  is  all  any  of  us  knows, —  the 
xvay.  T  understand  Bergson  to  suggest  that  a 
similar  thing  may  be  true  of  the  life  from  which 
we  derive  our  own,  and  which  we  may  naturally 


MODERN  SPIRIT  275 

and  legitimately  regard  as  not  wholly  different 
from  our  own,  "  since  we  are  its  offspring." 

But  even  with  these  explanations  and  after 
generously  giving  Bergsonism  credit  for  all  that 
seems  to  be  involved  in  it  and  that  might  be 
made  out  of  it,  the  religious  heart  will  still  be 
troubled  at  the  thought  of  so  much  change,  even 
though  that  change  be  a  process  of  creative 
evolution  ;  for  it  worships  "  the  Father  of  lights, 
with  whom  is  no  variableness,  neither  shadow 
of  turning,"  and  its  constant  prayer  is,  "  O 
Thou  who  changest  not,  abide  with  me,"  This 
is  a  disquieting  antinomy,  with  which  we  would 
have  to  deal,  even  if  Bergson  had  written  noth- 
ing. I  offer  no  subtle  explanation.  Ingenious 
subtleties  are  usually  evasions  of  gi'eat  prob- 
lems, not  solutions.  Nevertheless,  there  is  one 
consideration  that  throws  some  light  on  our  per- 
plexity. We  may  fearlessly  admit  that  the  uni- 
verse is  unfinished,  provided  we  remember  that 
it  cannot  be  finished  in  just  any  way.  There 
is  no  caprice  about  the  creative  process,  and  the 
incomplete  must  be  completed  along  the  lines 
of  growth. 

Life  as  we  know  it,  our  individual  and  social 
life,  is  in  the  making,  and  our  ideals  light  the 
way.  But  the  relation  of  the  ideal  to  the  im- 
perfect actual  is  not  that  of  the  unreal  to  the 
real.      Our  ideals  are  not  alien,  impertinent  and 


216  BERGSON  AND  THE 

irrelevant,  but  spring  out  of  our  constitution. 
They  are  simply  present  tendencies  carried 
further  in  the  imagination ;  they  are  advanced, 
foreseen,  desired,  but  yet  unrealized  stages  of 
the  present  good.  The  actual  world  thus  i-eveals 
its  idealit}^  in  the  aspirations  of  man.  A  human 
life  retains  its  identity  through  all  stages  of 
its  development.  There  is  nothing  capricious 
about  nonnal  gro\\'th  or  time  freedom ;  but,  ac- 
cording to  Bergson,  creative  evolution  means 
just  the  achievement  of  freedom,  and  is  there- 
fore a  realization  of  ideals  which  are  themselves 
the  projection  of  actual  tendencies  and  thus 
manifest  the  very  nature  of  the  real. 

Finally,  all  those  whose  criticism  practically 
amounts  to  a  disappointment  that  Bergson  has 
not  told  us  more,  and  that  he  has  left  some  of 
the  great  problems  unsolved,  ought  to  be  re- 
minded that  he  has  himself  pointed  out  that  an 
adequate  philosophy  will  be  itself  an  evolution. 
All  flunking  men  must  work  at  it.  No  phi- 
losopher can  perform  the  service  for  the  race 
once  for  all.  "  A  })liilosophy  of  this  kind  will 
not  be  made  in  a  day.  Unlike  the  ]:)hih)s()])hicnl 
systems  properly  so  called,  each  of  which  was 
the  work  of  a  man  of  genius  and  sprang  up  as 
a  whole,  to  be  taken  or  left,  it  will  only  be  built 
up  by  the  collective  and  progressive  effort  of 
many  thinkers,  of  many  observers  also,  com- 
pleting, correcting  and  improving  one  another. 


MODERN  SPIRIT  277 

So  the  present  essay  docs  not  aim  at  resolving 
at  once  the  greatest  problems.  It  simply  de- 
sires to  define  the  method  and  to  permit  a 
glimpse,  on  some  essential  points,  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  its  application."  C.E.  XIV.  More 
important,  then,  than  the  question,  what  results 
has  Bergson  reached  through  his  method,  is  the 
question,  what  can  we  do  with  it.^*  And  in  seek- 
ing an  answer,  it  is  natural  to  enquire  into  its 
history.  Has  it  ever  been  used  to  good  pur- 
pose? Bergson  himself  replies  that  it  is 
through  intuition  that  the  great  advances  in 
philosophy  have  been  made  and  the  great  works 
of  art  produced.  "  Philosophizing,"  he  tells  us, 
"  just  consists  in  placing  one's  self,  by  an  effort 
of  intuition,  in  the  interior  of  concrete  reality." 
Here  and  there  in  history  have  been  men  who 
have  been  splendidly  endowed  not  only  with  that 
fragment  of  mind  which  we  call  intellect,  in  the 
narrow  sense,  but  who  have  also  had  the  power 
of  vision,  who  have  been  able  to  install  themselves 
within  the  great  current  of  cosmic  life  and,  so 
to  speak,  coincide  with  it  for  a  few  moments  and 
get  a  glimpse  of  its  flow.  For  an  instant,  the 
rhythm  of  their  lives  has  been  one  with  that  of 
the  cosmic  spirit,  of  the  creative  activity,  and 
they  have  felt  the  life  of  the  whole,  and  known 
the  heart  of  reality.  In  such  rare  experiences, 
the  artist  sees  his  ideal,  and  the  philosopher 
gets  that  vision  of  the  truth  which  is  his  con- 


P.78  BERGSON  AND  THE 

tribution  to  the  world.  There  is  no  durable  •'- 
s^'Stem  that  is  not,  at  least  in  some  of  its  parts, 
vivified  by  intuition.  To  be  sure,  what  comes 
in  this  way  must  be  put  to  the  proof,  it  must  be 
criticised,  tested  by  logic,  made  intelligible  to 
others,  and  finally  incorporated  into  the  great 
body  of  constructive  thought. 

The  intuitive  method  is  not  easy  to  use.  It 
is  difficult  to  "  put  our  being  back  into  our  will, 
and  our  will  itself  into  the  impulsion  it  pro- 
longs, to  feel  that  reality  is  a  perpetual  growth, 
a  creation  pursued  without  end."  The  experi- 
ence never  lasts  long,  but  its  value  has  no  rela- 
tion to  its  duration. 

"  We  cannot  kindle  wlien  we  will 

The  fire  tliat  in  tlie  heart  resides, 
The  spirit  blowetli  and  is  still, 
In  mystery  our  soul  abides: 
But  tasks  in  liours  of  insiglit  will'd 
Can  be  through  hours  of  gloom  fulfill'd." 

"  Intuition,  if  it  could  be  prolonged  beyond  a 
few  instants,  would  not  only  make  the  philos- 
oj)her  agree  with  his  own  thought,  but  also  all 
philosophers  with  each  other.  Such  as  it  is, 
fugitive  and  incomplete,  it  is,  in  each  system, 
what  is  wortli  more  than  the  system  and  sur- 
vives it." 

The  same  thing  is  true  of  art,  which  Bcrgson 
says  "  is  certainly  only  a  more  direct  vision  of 


MODERN  SPIRIT  279 

reality."  What  the  philosopher  has  said  on 
this  subject,  in  the  third  chapter  of  his  book  on 
"  Laughter,"  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  and 
suggestive  things  he  has  written.  He  there 
shows  that  we  might  all  be  transcendent  artists, 
were  it  not  for  our  utilitarian  bias  and  practical 
habit  of  mind.  Indeed,  if  we  could  enter  into 
intimate  communion  with  things  and  with  our- 
selves, art  would  be  useless,  for  then  "  our  soul 
would  continually  vibrate  in  perfect  accord  with 
nature.  Our  eyes,  aided  by  memory,  would 
carve  out  in  space  and  fix  in  time  the  most  in- 
imitable of  pictures.  Hewn  in  the  living  mar- 
ble of  the  human  form,  fragments  of  statues, 
beautiful  as  the  relics  of  antique  statuary,  would 
strike  the  passing  glance.  Deep  in  our  souls 
we  should  hear  the  strains  of  our  inner  life's  un- 
broken melody, —  a  music  that  is  ofttimes  gay, 
but  more  frequently  plaintive  and  always  origi- 
nal. All  this  is  around  and  within  us,  and  yet 
no  whit  of  it  do  we  distinctly  perceive.  Be- 
tween nature  and  ourselves,  nay,  between  our- 
selves and  our  own  consciousness  a  veil  is 
interposed :  a  veil  that  is  dense  and  opaque  for 
the  common  herd, —  thin,  almost  transparent, 
for  the  artist  and  the  poet." 

The  trouble  with  the  most  of  us  is  not  that 
we  are  not  practical  enough,  but  that  we  are 
such  pragmatists,  such  hardened  utilitarians, 
and  are  so  completely  conventionalized,  that  in- 


280  BERGSOX  AND  THE 

stead  of  seeing  actual  things  we  usually  "  con- 
fine ourselves  to  reading  the  labels  affixed  to 
them."  We  have  our  system  of  classification 
into  which  everything  must  go,  the  individuality 
of  things  escapes  us,  and  we  are  offended  at  new 
thoughts  and  original  people.  We  even  try  to 
be  conventional  and  socially  proper  even  in  our 
griefs.  The  spontaneous  life  is  not  allowed  to 
well  up  within,  but  we  are  always  asking  our- 
selves what  Avc  think  that  other  people  think  that 
we  ought  to  think.  The  artist  obeys  his  inner 
prompting.  He  dares  to  live,  to  see  things  as 
they  arc  and  not  as  they  must  be  to  conform 
to  the  traditional  notion  of  the  socially  useful. 
"  Poetic  imagination  is  but  a  fuller  view  of  real- 
it}'."  "  Art  is  a  breaking  from  society  and  a 
return  to  a  pure  nature," 

Shakespeare,  e.  g.,  was  a  master  in  tlic  use  of 
the  intuitive  method.  He  succeeded  in  placing 
himself  b}^  sympathy  back  in  the  great  tide  that 
bears  us  on,  he  felt  and  lived  in  imagination  the 
many  tendencies  implicit  witliin  it.  The  same 
man  could  not  be  Macbeth,  Hamlet,  Othello, 
King  Lear  and  the  rest,  but  tlie  great  dramatist 
was  able  to  identify  himself  with  the  life  that 
might  have  been  any  of  these  characters.  The 
true  artist  thus  retraces  the  stream  of  hfc  till 
he  reaches  and  "  lays  hold  of  the  potential  in  the 
real,  and  takes  up  what  nature  has  left  as  a 


MODERN  SriRIT  281 

mere  outline  or  sketch  in  his  soul,  in  order  to 
make  of  it  a  finished  work  of  art." 

The  great  moral  leaders  of  the  race,  I  do 
not  mean  the  ethical  theorists,  have  also  been 
men  of  vision.  And  so  sure  have  they  been  that 
they  saw  truly  that,  in  describing  what  they 
have  seen,  they  have  assumed  to  be  spokesmen 
of  reality  itself.  "  Thus  sayeth  the  Lord,"  the 
way  the  prophets  begin  their  messages,  is  a  per- 
fectly natural  mode  of  expression  for  men  who 
feel  that  their  life  in  its  depths  is  one  with  the 
cosmic  spirit,  who  understand  that  to  speak  the 
truth  is  not  merely  to  utter  a  private  opinion 
but  to  say  what  the  universe  is  saying.  This 
does  not  mean  that  they  are  not  often  mistaken. 
In  fact,  the  greatest  prophets  of  Israel  were 
sometimes  mistaken,  but  usually  when  they  as- 
sumed to  speak  of  world  politics  and  other  mat- 
ters beyond  the  scope  of  their  moral  vision. 
The  ideal  prophet,  the  great  spokesman  of  the 
moral  consciousness  and  rcvealer  of  the  truths 
that  come  through  insight,  is  Emerson.  The 
young  people  who  come  under  his  influence  do 
not  ask  him  for  his  credentials  when  he  speaks 
to  them  of  truth,  sincerity,  self-reliance,  com- 
pensation, character  and  spiritual  laws.  For 
when  he  has  pointed  out  great  principles,  others 
see  them  for  themselves.  His  incomparable 
service  is  that  he  deepens  and  develops  moral 


282  BERGSON  AND  THE 

insight ;  he  helps  us  to  see.  As  we  read  him, 
we  are  conscious  of  learaing  much,  and  yet  we 
realize  that  we  have  learned  nothing  absolutely 
new.  For  all  that  he  enables  us  to  see  with 
such  beautiful  clearness,  we  are  conscious  of  hav- 
ing known  in  some  dumb  or  inarticulate  way 
before.  The  life  was  there,  but  it  had  not 
reached  the  stage  of  self-consciousness.  But 
when  Emerson  holds  up  the  moral  ideal,  we  in- 
stantly know  that  that  is  what  we  have  implicitly 
loved.  Of  every  great  seer  we  may  truly  and 
reverently  say  what  is  said  of  the  master  of  the 
spiritual  life, — "  In  him  was  life,  and  the  life 
was  the  light  of  men."  As  Martineau  says, 
"  Am  I  admitted  to  the  company  of  greater  and 
purer  men,  who  move  among  the  upper  springs 
of  life ;  who  aim  at  what  has  scarcely  visited  my 
dreams  ;  wlio  hold  themselves,  with  freest  sacri- 
fice, at  the  disposal  of  affections  known  to  me 
only  by  momentary  flash ;  who  rise  above  the 
fears  that  darken  me,  and  do  the  duties  that 
shame  me,  and  bear  the  sorrows  that  break  mc 
down.?  The  whole  secret  and  sanctity  of  life 
seem  to  burst  upon  me  at  once ;  and  I  find  how 
near  the  ground  is  the  highest  I  have  touched, 
and  how  the  steps  of  possibility  ascend,  and 
pass  away,  and  lose  themselves  in  heaven.  This 
is  the  discipline,  the  divine  school,  for  the  un- 
folding of  our  moral  nature, —  the  appeal  of 
character    without    to    character    within.     The 


MODERN  SPIRIT  283 

sacred  poem  of  our  own  hearts,  with  its  passion- 
ate hymns,  its  quiet  prayers,  is  writ  in  invis- 
ible ink ;  and  only  when  the  lamp  of  other  lives 
brings  its  warm  light  near  do  the  lines  steal  out, 
and  give  their  music  to  the  voice,  their  solemn 
meaning  to  the  soul."  From  all  this,  it  is  clear 
that  the  higher  life  of  humanity,  all  that  in  us 
which  makes  us  admirable  and  dear  to  one 
another,  is  awakened,  stimulated,  inspired  and 
sustained  by  those  masters  of  the  intuitive  meth- 
ods, the  prophets  of  the  race. 

Wliat  Bergson  himself  would  say  to  this,  I 
do  not  know.  But  it  seems  to  me  a  legitimate 
application  of  his  philosophy.  If  his  ideas  are 
true,  men  will  not  only  read  his  books  but,  in 
the  light  of  them,  they  will  also  re-read  human 
history.  This  is  true  of  all  the  books  of  the 
first  order.  But  we  have  his  explicit  statement 
that  the  poets  are  among  those  who  penetrate 
most  deeply  into  the  nature  of  reality.  If,  then, 
we  turn  to  the  great  poets,  we  ought  to  be  able 
to  learn  from  them  what  we  would  see  if,  like 
them,  we  were  more  able  to  use  the  intuitive 
method  which  Bergson  recommends.  In  other 
words,  in  their  musical  speech  we  ought  to  find 
a  confirmation  of  the  vision  of  life  which  the 
philosopher  has  strained  the  resources  of  the 
most  wonderful  prose  speech  to  express.  And 
in  them,  we  shall  see  most  clearly  the  religious 
significance     of    his     philosophy.     Opening     a 


284  BERGSON  AND  THE 

volume  of  Wordsworth  and  turning  to  "  Lines 
on  Tintem  Abbe}^"  we  seem  to  be  reading  Berg- 
son  translated  in  English  poetry: 

"  Nor  less,  I  trust, 
To  them  I  may  have  owed  another  gift, 
Of  aspect  more  sublime;  that  blessed  mood. 
In  which  the  burden  of  the  mystery. 
In  which  the  heavy  and  weary  weight 
Of  all  this  unintelligible  world, 
Is  lightened :  —  that  serene  and  blessed  mood. 
In  which  the  affections  gently  lead  us  on, — 
Until  the  breath  of  this  corporeal  frame 
And  even  the  motion  of  our  human  blood 
Almost  suspended,  we  are  laid  asleep 
In  body,  and  become  a  living  soul: 
While  with  an  eye  made  quiet  by  the  power 
Of  harmony,  and  the  deep  power  of  joy, 
We  see  into  the  life  of  things." 

The  last  three  lines  almost  startle  one  who 
is  familiar  with  Bcrgson's  pages ;  with  his  in- 
sistence that  instinct,  which  becomes  intuition 
when  it  is  developed,  is  sympathy ;  and  with 
his  admonition  to  place  ourselves  back  in  the 
primitive  impulsion  so  that  we  can  feel  our- 
selves one  with  it  and  see  its  nature. 

What  is  it,  then,  tliat  Wordsworth  sees  in 
such  inspired  moments?  In  the  same  poem,  he 
tells  us  that  the  j)assionate  joy  in  the  colors 
and  forms  of  beautiful  natural  scenes  which 
he  had  felt  as  a  boy  had  subsided.     The  time 


MODERN  SPIRIT  285 

had  passed  for  his  youthful  feehng  and  love  of 
nature. 

"  That  had  no  need  of  a  remoter  charm, 
By  thought  supplied,  nor  any  interest 
Unborrowed  from  the  eye." 

Still  he  does  not  mourn  the  loss  for  which 
there  was  abundant  recompense. 

"  For  I  have  learned 
To  look  on  Nature,  not  as  in  the  hour 
Of  thoughtless  youth;  but  hearing  oftentimes 
The  still,  sad  music  of  humanity, 
Nor  harsh,  nor  grating,  though  of  ample  power 
To  chasten  and  subdue.     And  I  have  felt 
A  presence  that  disturbs  me  with  the  joy 
Of  elevated  thoughts ;  a  sense  sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused. 
Whose  dwelling  is  the  light  of  setting  suns. 
And  the  round  ocean  and  the  living  air, 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man. 
A  motion  and  a  spirit  that  impels 
All  thinking  things,  all  objects  of  all  thought, 
And  rolls  through  all  things." 

What  is  this  but  the  intuition  of  the  cosmic 
spirit  or  life.''  What  is  this  experience  but 
the  perennial  source  of  religion.''  If  Bergson 
ever  seriously  takes  up  the  study  of  religion, 
I  venture  to  believe  that  he  will  be  surprised 
and  delighted  at  the  many  noble  passages 
such   as    this   which  may  be   found  in  English 


286  BERGSON  AND  THE 

poetry.  If  Samuel  Johnson,  for  instance,  had 
been  the  philosopher's  disciple,  how  could  he 
have  better  expressed  both  his  spirit  and  his 
general  world-view  than  in  the  noble  lines : 

"  Life  of  ages,  richly  poured, 

Love  of  God,  unspent  and  free. 
Flowing  in  the  prophet's  word 
And  the  people's  liberty ! 

Never  was  to  chosen  race 

That  unstinted  tide  confined ; 
Thine  is  every  time  and  place. 

Fountain  sweet  of  heart  and  mind. 

Breathing  in  the  thinker's  creed, 

Pulsing  in  the  hero's  blood, 
Nerving  simplest  thought  and  deed. 

Freshening  t'me  with  truth  and  good. 

Consecrating  art  and  song. 

Holy  book  and  pilgrim  track. 
Hurling  floods  of  tyrant  wrong 

From  the  sacred  limits  back, — 

Life  of  Ages,  richly  poured, 

Love  of  God,  unsjKnt  and  free. 

Flow  still  in  tlie  prophet's  word 
And  the  people's  liberty !  " 

Wordsworth    makes    repeated    efforts    to    de- 
scribe his   experiences   in   the   moments,   which 


MODERN  SPIRIT  287 

were  rare  even  for  hiin,  when  he  partially  suc- 
ceeded in  using  that  part  of  the  mind  which  is 
not  intellect,  but  its  complement.  Thus,  in 
"  The  Prelude  "  he  writes : 

"  Gently  did  my  soul 
Put  off  her  veil,  and  self-transmuted,  stood 
Naked,  as  in  the  presence  of  her  God. 
While  on  .1  walked,  a  comfort  seemed  to  touch 
A  heart  that  had  not  been  disconsolate: 
Strength  came  where  weakness  was  not  known  to  be, 
At  least  not  felt ;  and  restoration  came 
Like  an  intruder  knocking  at  the  door 
Of  unacknowledged  weariness." 

Now  this  was  not  simply  the  enjoyment  of  a 
quiet  evening,  for  he  continues : 

"  Of  that  external  scene  that  round  me  lay. 

Little,  in  this  abstraction,  did  I  see. 

Remembered  less ;  but  I  had  inward  hopes 

And  swellings  of  the  spirit,  was  rapt  and  soothed. 

Conversed  with  promises,  had  glimmering  views 

How  life  pervades  the  undecaying  mind; 

How  the  immortal  soul  with  Godlike  power 

Informs,  creates,  thaws  the  deepest  sleep 

That  time  can  lay  upon  her;  how  on  earth, 

Man,  if  he  do  but  live  the  light 

Of  high  endeavors,  daily  spreads  abroad 

His  being  armed  with  strength  that  cannot  fail." 

The  reader  of  Bergson's  first  work,  "  Time 
and  Free  Will,"  a  master-work  in  psycholog- 
ical analysis,  will  remember  descriptions  of  in- 


288  BERGSON  AND  THE 

trospective  experiences  which  differ  from  this 
chiefly  in  that  they  are  expressed  in  the  tech- 
nical language  of  science.  Take  these  words 
from  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  199,  "  Let  us 
then  concentrate  attention  on  that  which  we 
have  that  is  at  the  same  time  the  most  removed 
from  externality  and  the  least  penetrated  with 
intellectuality.  Let  us  seek,  in  the  depths  of 
our  experience,  the  point  where  we  feel  ourselves 
most  intimately  within  our  own  life.  It  is  into 
pure  duration  that  we  then  plunge  back,  a 
duration  in  which  the  past,  always  moving  on, 
is  swelling  unceasingly  with  a  present  that  is 
absolutely  new."  Read  further  what  he  has  to 
say  about  the  interpcnetration  of  our  experi- 
ences, the  undifferentiated  nature  of  our  life 
as  we  draw  nearer  the  source  whence  it  un- 
ceasingly shoots  forth,  the  vagueness  of  the 
tendencies  that  will  become  clear  in  the  life  of 
action.  Now  turn  to  the  "  Ode  on  Intimations 
of  Immortality "  and  read  the  same  thing. 
Wordswortli   there  speaks   of 

..."  those  obstinate  questionings 

Of  sense  and  outward  things, 

I-'alliugs    from   us,  vanishings; 

lilnnk  misgivings  of  a  creature 
Moving  about  in  worlds  not  realized, 
High  instincts  beforo  wliich  our  mortal  nature 
Did  trcnibl*'  like  a  guilty  thing  surprised; 

But   (or  those  first  affections. 


MODERN  SPIRIT  289 

Those  shadowy  recollections, 

Which,  be  they  what  they  may, 
Are  yet  the  fountain  light  of  all  our  day, 
Are  yet  a  master  light  of  all  our  seeing." 

There  are  probably  few  with  the  power  of 
appreciation  of  what  is  great  in  literature  who 
would  say  that  there  is  any  prose  in  any 
language  more  excellent  than  Bergson's ;  but, 
though  poetry  and  prose  are  incommensurable, 
those  who  care  both  for  philosophy  and  noble 
speech  must  admit  that  the  poet  has  equaled 
the  philosopher  in  the  beauty  of  the  expression 
which  he  has  given  of  their  common  vision. 

In  a  former  chapter,  I  was  speaking  of  the 
way  our  conceptual  thought  interferes  with 
our  perceptions,  so  that  we  call  the  grass  green 
because  we  think  it  is  and  must  always  be  so. 
Bergson  and  Wordsworth  both  make  a  great 
deal  of  the  kindred  fact  that  custom  and  habit 
and  intellectual  bias  hinder  our  native  power 
of  insight.     The  poet  thus  addresses  the  child, 

"  Thou  best  philosopher,  who  yet  dost  keep 
Thy  heritage;  thou  eye  among  the  blind. 

On  whom  those  truths  do  rest 

Which  we  are  toiling  all  our  lives  to  find." 

This  beautiful  phase  of  life  will  swiftly  pass, 
and  the  child  become  conventionalized  and  in- 
tellectualizcd  like  the  rest  of  us. 


290  BERGSON  AND  THE 

"  Full  soon  thy  soul  shall  have  her  earthly  freight, 
And  custom  lie  upon  thee  with  a  weight, 
Heavy  as  frost,  and  deep  almost  as  life !  " 

It  thus  appears  that  into  art  and  philosophy, 
as  into  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven,  we  can  enter 
only  by  becoming  as  little  children. 

Robert  Browning,  because  of  his  anti-In- 
tellectualism,  was  heavily  handicapped  in  his 
work  as  a  poet.  His  was  the  idealism,  not  of 
thought,  but  of  love.  Still,  like  everybody  else, 
he  happily  failed  of  perfect  consistency,  and 
so  occasionally  reached  the  heights  where 
poetry  and  philosophy  are  seen  to  be  but  prose 
and  poetic  versions  of  the  same  world.  He 
tells   us   that  God 

"  Dwells  in  all 
From  life's  minute  beginnings,  up  at  last 
To  man  —  the  consummation  of  this  sclieme 
Of  being,  the  completion  of  this  sphere  of  life." 

He  has  used  his  intuitive  powers,  and  thus 
reports   the   experience: 

"  I  knew.     I  felt  .   .  . 

What  God  is,  what  we  are, 
What  life  is  —  how  God  tastes  an  infinite  joy 
In  infinite  ways  —  one  everlasting  bliss. 
From  whom  all  being  emanates,  all  power 
Proceeds;  in  whom  is  life  for  evermore, 
Yet  whom  existence  in  its  lowest  form 
Includes." 


MODERN  SPIRIT  291 

When  he  looks  within,  he  finds  what  the 
author  of  "  Time  and  Free  Will  "  declares  that 
he  has  found.  The  nearer  we  get  to  the  springs 
of  life,  the  deeper  our  sense  of  vague,  undif- 
ferentiated and  undeveloped  tendencies  or  po- 
tentialities, 

"  instincts  immature,  all  purposes  unsure," 
together   with 

"  August  anticipations,  symbols,  types. 
Of  a  dim  splendor  ever  on  before 
In  that  eternal  circle  life  pursues." 

But  there  is  one  more  respect  in  which  the  spirit 
of  Browning  is  like  that  of  Bergson.  For  both 
life  is  first  of  all  an  adventure.  The  philoso- 
pher has  a  deep  sense  of  the  "  infinite  richness  " 
of  life.  He  cannot  bear  the  suggestion  of  a 
mechanical  scheme.  He  rejects  the  suggestion 
of  finality,  even  that  of  a  plan,  saying  that 
"  the  portals  of  the  future  remain  wide  open." 
Life    is    movement,   creation,   adventure. 

"  Onward,  onward,   follow  the  gleam." 

For  the  poet,  life  has  been  an  enterprise,  a 
series  of  conflicts  and  triumphs.  Even  his  faith 
has  been  won,  achieved.  And  when  he  leaves 
us,  it  is  as  a  happy  warrior  setting  forth  in 
search  of  new  adventures  : 

"  Life's  struggle  having  so  far  reached  its  term. 
Thence  shall  I  pass,  approved 


292  BERGSON  AND  THE 

A  man,  for  aye  removed 
From  the  developed  brute :  a  god  though  in  the  germ. 

And  I  shall  thereupon 

Take  rest,  ere  I  be  gone 
Once  more  on  my  adventure,  brave  and  new: 

Fearless  and  unperplexed 

When  I  wage  battle  next, 
What  weapons  to  select,  what  armor  to  endue." 

David  A.  Wasson's  magnificent  poems,  "  All's 
Well,"  and  "  Seen  and  Unseen,"  voice  the  exul- 
tation of  a  life  that  feels  itself  one  with  an  all- 
conquering  life.  The  following  lines  are  from 
the  latter  poem.  The  poet  is  on  a  sailing  ves- 
sel, facing  head  winds,  and  though  the  voyage 
lengthens  out  from  days  to  weeks,  he  feels  that 
his  life  is  not  like  the  baffled  ship,  but  keeps  its 
course  as  it  sails  another  sea. 

"  Tlie  winds  that  o'er  my  ocean  run 
Reacli  tlirough  all  worlds  beyond  the  sun; 
Througli  life  and  death,  tlirough  fate,  through  time. 
Grand  breaths  of  God  tliey  sweep  sublime. 

Eternal  trades,  they  cannot  veer, 
And,  blowing,  teach  us  how  to  steer; 
And  well  for  him  whose  joy,  whose  care, 
Is  but  to  keep  before  them  fair. 

O  thou  God's  mariner,  heart  of  mine ! 
Spread  canvas  to  tlie  airs  divine! 
Spread  sail !  and  let  thy  Fortune  be 
Forgotten  in  thy  Destiny. 


MODERN  SPIRIT  293 

Life  loveth  life  and  good ;  then  trust 
What  most  the  spirit  would,  it  must; 
Deep  wishes,  in  the  heart  that  be. 
Are  blossoms  of  Necessity. 

A  thread  of  Law  runs  through  thy  prayer 
Stronger  than  iron  cables  are; 
And  Love  and  Longing  toward  her  goal 
Are  pilots  sweet  to  guide  the  soul. 

So  life  must  live,  and  Soul  must  sail. 
And  Unseen  over  Seen  prevail ; 
And  all  God's  argosies  come  to  shore. 
Let  ocean  smile,  or  rage  or  roar. 

And  so,  'mid  storm  or  calm,  my  bark 
With  snowy  wake  still  nears  her  mark; 
Cheerily  the  trades  of  being  blow. 
And  sweeping  down  the  wind  I  go." 

In  making  these  quotations  from  this  beauti- 
ful poem,  I  do  not,  of  course,  mean  to  suggest 
that  anything  so  triumphant  in  tone  can  be 
found  in  Bergson's  Avriting.  The  point  is  that 
this  is  the  tone  of  those  masters  of  the  intuitive 
method,  the  nobler  poets.  It  is  significant  that 
they  and  the  prophets  and  religious  leaders  of 
the  race  have  had  the  intuition  of  a  great  life 
with  which  they  have  felt  their  essential  oneness, 
and  through  this  conscious  unity  have  attained 
to  a  victorious,  even  exultant  spirit,  to  strength 
and    courage,    gladness    and    peace.     This    is 


29i  BERGSON  AND  THE 

generally  the  tone  of  healthy  life,  even  when  it 
is  not  thoughtful.  The  pessimists  among 
philosophers  and  religious  teachers  have  nearly 
all  been  either  sick,  or  embittered  by  unhappy 
personal  experiences,  or  they  have  been  sur- 
rounded by  wretched  social  conditions.  They 
have  generalized  too  widely  from  the  exceptional 
and  abnormal.  The  fact  is  that  even  con- 
ceptual thought,  when  it  reaches  a  certain 
elevation,  like  healthy  life  begins  to  sing.  \ 
Aristotle,  usually  so  sober  and  judicious,  the 
very  type  of  the  thinker,  becomes  dithyrambic 
when,  in  a  famous  passage  in  his  "  Metaphysics," 
and  also  in  his  "  Ethics,"  he  considers  the  blessed 
life  of  God,  which  is  altogether  such  as  the 
thinker's  life  is  in  his  moments  of  rapt  vision. 
So  Kant,  the  critical  philosopher  par  excellence, 
the  unemotional  analyzer  of  the  mental  'ap- 
paratus, utters  exclamations  of  enthusiasm 
when  he  considers  the  starry  heavens  and  the 
moral  law. 

The  greatest  height  human  life  can  reach 
lies  at  the  point  where  the  intuitions  of  the 
cosmic  life  are  blended  with  the  conceptual  view 
of  the  universe  worked  out  by  science,  when  each 
is  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  other  and  both 
arc  united  in  that  philosophic  view  of  reality 
xchich  is  the  very  truth,  and  which,  because  the 
truth  Is  a  vision  of  the  good,  naturally  and  in- 
evitably expresses   itself  in  noble  and  musical 


MODERN  SPIRIT  S95 

speech,  and  in  strong,  beautiful  and  courageous 
lives.  The  songs  which  will  be  sung  by  those 
who  are  at  once  the  poets  of  spiritual  insight 
and  of  evolution  are  just  beginning  to  be 
written.  I  select  one  which  may  serve  as  an 
example  and  a  type.  The  results  of  science,  of 
conceptual  thought,  the  world-process  as  it 
appears  to  the  intellect,  are  here  set  forth  to- 
gether with  the  meaning  of  it  all  as  perceived 
by  religious  intuition,  as  known  to  the  under- 
standing heart.  The  philosophy  of  Bergson 
has  not  reached  this  point,  but  it  is  in  this 
direction  that  it  and  all  the  clearest  and  best 
in  modern  thinking*  moves. 

"  He  hides  within  the  lily 

A  strong  and  tender  care. 
That  wins  the  earth-born  atoms 

To  glory  of  the  air; 
He  weaves  the  shining  garments 

Unceasingly  and  still, 
Along  the  quiet  waters, 

In  niches  of  the  hill. 

We  linger  at  the  vigil 

With  him  who  bent  the  knee 
To  watch  the  old-time  lilies 

In  distant  Galilee ; 
And  still  the  worship  deepens, 

And  quickens  into  new, 
As  brightening  down  the  ages 

God's  secret  thrilleth  through. 


296  BERGSON 

O  Toiler  of  the  lily, 

Thy  touch  is  in  the  man ! 
No  leaf  that  dawns  to  petal 

But  hints  the  angel  plan. 
The  flower  horizons  open ! 

The  blossom  vaster  shows ! 
We  hear  thy  wide  worlds  echo, — 

See  how  the  lily  grows ! 

Shy  yearnings  of  the  savage, 

Unfolding  thought  by  thought, 
To  holy  lives  are  lifted, 

To  visions  fair  are  wrought; 
The  races  rise  and  cluster, 

And  evils  fade  and  fall. 
Till  chaos  blooms  to  beautj', 

Thy  purpose  crowning  all !  " 

William  C.  Gannett. 


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